"Best Case" German WWI victory?

BooNZ

Banned
Once Germany has broken the Entente, whether by way of military victory or a British betrayal of their allies, then the British no longer have access to any continental allies. Their last alliance will be with Japan, but Japan would no longer have any benefiet to the arrangement if Britain were facing a continental coalition.
No. In 1914 Britain had no allies in Europe. Both Grey and Cambon were acutely aware Britain was not bound by Grey's representations - Grey whispering sweet nothings in the shadows meant exactly that - nothing.
Pretty high, it's mainly human factors such as Moltke not keeping in close touch with the advance or appointing a HeeresGruppe commander on the right wing that it didn't happen, rather than physical limits like troops not being able to march that fast or whatever.
You have previously cited Martin van Creveld as influencing your views on the German execution of the Schlieffen Plan. Has that changed?

You don't need to trap the BEF and/or 5th army to win the Race to the Sea, Moltke could have not allowed Rupprecht to go on the offensive on the left wing and instead in accordance with the plan began transferring left wing troops to the right wing. This would have provided the troops to win the Race to the Sea.
Agreed, there are probably a number of PODs that have the Germans winning the race to the sea, but at best that might have the Germans win a late war on a points decision - scarcely a "best case" for Germany. Further, as far as I understand it, "the race" was more a series of failed flanking manuvers rather than a concerted effort to secure strategic coastal views - therefore any race victory would be as much happenstance as anything else.

In a similar vein, the one redeeming outcome of the Schlieffen Plan, being the German occupation of productive parts of northern France, does not appear to have been a consideraton on pre-war German planning. The purported purpose of the Schlieffen Plan was to engage and destory French armies, not to occupy valuable French and Belgium real estate. The Schlieffen Plan was clearly not fit for purpose.

8 December 1912, in what has been called the German Imperial War Council the Kaiser specifically told Moltke that Britain was to be considered as a belligerent in the next war. So when campaign planning cycle started in April 1913 Moltke developed a plan that aimed to engage British forces, that by then were planned to be deployed to France on the left flank of French forces.
No. It was the German navy that was told to scrap plans for a naval war with Russia only and prepare for a naval war with Britain from day one. This begs the question, how was the Royal navy not already at the forfront of German naval preparations, given a decade long rivalry? It also appears dismissive of French naval capabilities. Moltke is on record in May 1914 telling Conrad "Our people unfortunately still expect a declaration from Britain that it will not join in", a view some have attributed to Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg at the time.

I would respectfully suggest Moltke's opinion and plans remained substantially unchanged from the meeting of 8 December 1912. It is tempting for me to suggest Moltke's plans remained substantially unchanged from 1906 to 1914, but the reality is Moltke went to considerable effort to convert one of Schlieffen's selection of detailed etchings into something resembling a single inflexible war plan. However, like Leonardo Da Vinci's premature plans for the helicopter, that f**ker* was never going to fly - and no, I don't mean Forker*.

To assume Britain will be neutral will require Britain to do things differently up to 1912 so not to be seen by the German Government as a certain belligerent, it has nothing to do with the use of Belgium as a marching route in August 1914.
No. Haldane spelt out quite clearly in 1912 “England could therefore under no circumstances tolerate the crushing of the French…". For the benefit of the British, the French went to great efforts to paint the Germans as the aggressors, a role Moltke emblaced like the muppet he was...
 
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No. In 1914 Britain had no allies in Europe. Both Grey and Cambon were acutely aware Britain was not bound by Grey's representations - Grey whispering sweet nothings in the shadows meant exactly that - nothing.

If the British had backstabbed their allies in 1914 they'd have been held to account by the French and Russians themselves. Grey could talk in Paris until he was blue in the face - a stab in the back is a stab in the back. Unless German policy towards France proved unwisely punitive, the natural result is a Franco-German alliance.

No. It was the German navy that was told to scrap plans for a naval war with Russia only and prepare for a naval war with Britain from day one. This begs the question, how was the Royal navy not already at the forfront of German naval preparations, given a decade long rivalry? It also appears dismissive of French naval capabilities. Moltke is on record in May 1914 telling Conrad "Our people unfortunately still expect a declaration from Britain that it will not join in", a view some have attributed to Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg at the time.

German naval planning in a nutshell was that if Britain was in the war the HSF was confined to an area nearby to its ports, but if the British remained neutral longer ranged missions, even trans-Atlantic, would be possible. Given that it would be the British that would decide the matter of British neutrality, there was not too much usefulness in pursuing British neutrality scenarios (that might leak and cause scandals) until such an event had actually come about.

Haldane spelt out quite clearly in 1912 “England could therefore under no circumstances tolerate the crushing of the French…". For the benefit of the British, the French went to great efforts to paint the Germans as the aggressors, a role Moltke emblaced like the muppet he was...

Haldane was being disingenuous; while the British might be able to tolerate something less than the 'crushing' of the French, the French themselves would see anything less from Britain than a French victory as a useless policy to France.
 
Isn't the best case scenario for Germany the Schlieffen Plan working with France knocked out by late September? Why is this not discussed more? Do people consider it ASB?
 
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Isn't the best case scenario for Germany the Schlieffen Plan working with France knocked out in by late September? Why is this not discussed more? Do people consider it ASB?

Not ASB per se, but a complete knock-out in September is pretty darned hard to pull off, even if Moltke is magically replaced by a chief of staff who won't make his operational mistakes. (It is not even clear that it was really intended by Moltke to achieve a sudden and complete knockout anyway.)

Merely winning the race for the Channel ports (which means a probable Central Powers land victory in the West in 1915-16) is easier to achieve, but far from a sure thing. (It will take more than just the two extra corps and the restraint of Rupprecht to achieve.)

The difficulty is that even a knockout still leaves Britain in the war, blockading Germany. And the British won't be so quick to reach terms (any more than they did every time Napoleon knocked out their continental allies). This could mean a long lingering war and all the economic damage that entails, German colonies all picked off, and Germany's Ottoman ally picked apart by British offensives and the Arab Revolt.

And again, the question must be asked: "At what cost?" What is it worth in terms of blood, treasure, and social upheaval to Germany to achieve the decisive defeat of a given great power?
 
Isn't the best case scenario for Germany the Schlieffen Plan working with France knocked out in by late September? Why is this not discussed more? Do people consider it ASB?

What does France "knocked out" really mean? There is no reason to not fight on, Powerful allies are still fighting Germany?

I am assuming in means that 50% of the German army in the west can be transferred east, the rest presumably is encircling Paris, watching the channel coast, facing the remaining French along the Loire river. It seems it would take a pretty incredible victory with 2 or 3 French armies encircled to achieve that it seems.
 
Not ASB per se, but a complete knock-out in September is pretty darned hard to pull off, even if Moltke is magically replaced by a chief of staff who won't make his operational mistakes. (It is not even clear that it was really intended by Moltke to achieve a sudden and complete knockout anyway.)

Merely winning the race for the Channel ports (which means a probable Central Powers land victory in the West in 1915-16) is easier to achieve, but far from a sure thing. (It will take more than just the two extra corps and the restraint of Rupprecht to achieve.)

The difficulty is that even a knockout still leaves Britain in the war, blockading Germany. And the British won't be so quick to reach terms (any more than they did every time Napoleon knocked out their continental allies). This could mean a long lingering war and all the economic damage that entails, German colonies all picked off, and Germany's Ottoman ally picked apart by British offensives and the Arab Revolt.

And again, the question must be asked: "At what cost?" What is it worth in terms of blood, treasure, and social upheaval to Germany to achieve the decisive defeat of a given great power?

The same question could be asked of Britain. With France gone, the blockade will be much less effective, significantly reducing the strain of war that the German people feel. Additionally, Britain pursuing the war after it has already been lost puts the onus on her for Europe being closed off to American trade. We essentially have a repeat of 1940, except we know that it is all but certain that Russia will lose too.

What's to keep Germany from reinforcing the Ottomans? With France knocked out so early, what allies does Britain have in Europe other than a collapsing Russia? Britain can pick off all the irrelevant pacific islands and resource-draining German colonies (what's to keep Lettow-Vorbeck from still causing the British headaches?) that she wants, but at the end of the day, continental Europe is still infinitely more valuable.

At the end of the day, the question would be asked in Britain "At what cost?" With the war lost, what point would there be to continue on?
 
What does France "knocked out" really mean? There is no reason to not fight on, Powerful allies are still fighting Germany?

I am assuming in means that 50% of the German army in the west can be transferred east, the rest presumably is encircling Paris, watching the channel coast, facing the remaining French along the Loire river. It seems it would take a pretty incredible victory with 2 or 3 French armies encircled to achieve that it seems.

Knocked out means knocked out. Done. Over. Armistice signed.
 
It'd probably be easier to change the circumstances of the whole war itself, so that it leads into something within Germany's favor.
 
It'd probably be easier to change the circumstances of the whole war itself, so that it leads into something within Germany's favor.
War with the West trashes the economy, kills trade and blocks access to world markets. In the east, A-H, Germany and Russia need to collaborate to partition Poland and keep it that way. War with the east just creates an independent Poland, which Germany would probably lose land to. Germany wouldn't even want Austria as it was full of Catholics.
General European War wasn't worth either of these western or Eastern outcomes. Pre-war the press was saying that such a war was not worth deciding if Valona should be Rome's or Vienna's.
The best outcome for Germany would be a break up of the Entente, drop A-H and sign up with Russia. All without a single boot crossing a border.
Prior to the Dec 1913 Sanders affair, Russia and Germany had no real reason to fight. Sure there was an arms race but arms races don't cause wars no more than insurance causes accidents. Economic recovery causes war.
 
Knocked out means knocked out. Done. Over. Armistice signed.

Its hard to see France signing an armistice, until Russia is done, and likely Russia has rolled over Austrian Galacia by the time the Germans are transferring divisions back. No reason anybody as to stop fighting right away.

Best case,
Germany is able to transfer a number of divisions east, after occupying the principal French industrial centers and rail junctions in France in August-October 1914.
Italy seeing the inevitable German victory doesn't come in the war.
Germany and Austria are able to put together, larger offensives with more reserve into the east from November 1914 on. By the end of 1915, the Germans take Riga, Minsk and Zhiyomyr in Russia.
Serbia is occupied like in OTL, but no evacuation is possible.

early 1916, a central powers favorable peace is reached.

Like mentioned above, the peace is hardly worth the treasure and lives expended, and markets lost, and permanent hostility of USA, Russia and Britain.
 

BooNZ

Banned
If the British had backstabbed their allies in 1914 they'd have been held to account by the French and Russians themselves. Grey could talk in Paris until he was blue in the face - a stab in the back is a stab in the back. Unless German policy towards France proved unwisely punitive, the natural result is a Franco-German alliance.
No, as previously stated, the British had no european allies in 1914 and there is nothing natural about a Franco-German alliance.

German naval planning in a nutshell was that if Britain was in the war the HSF was confined to an area nearby to its ports, but if the British remained neutral longer ranged missions, even trans-Atlantic, would be possible. Given that it would be the British that would decide the matter of British neutrality, there was not too much usefulness in pursuing British neutrality scenarios (that might leak and cause scandals) until such an event had actually come about.
No, Riain referenced the German Imperial War Council on 8 December 1912. Records of that meeting suggest the German navy was to no longer assume a war against Russia only, prima facie suggesting Russia was the focus of German naval planning prior to that instruction. I don't disagree with your logic in this instance, but it does not reconcile with the facts being addressed.

Haldane was being disingenuous; while the British might be able to tolerate something less than the 'crushing' of the French, the French themselves would see anything less from Britain than a French victory as a useless policy to France.
No. The OTL deliberations in the British cabinet in July 1914 confirm aside from Grey (and maybe [purportedly] Churchill), no one much cared about the French. Most of the British Cabinet would have probably preferred France remained a 'great power', but very few in the British Cabinet were prepared to go to war to defend French honour. It was the German invasion of Belgium and the potential control of channel ports that resulted in British belligerence. If the Germans remain on the defensive in the west, there is no imminent threat to either the Channel ports or French status as a great power.

Haldane was being exceedingly conservative to manage German expectations of potential British neutrality.
 
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