Best Byzantine Emperor?

Best Byzantine Emperor

  • Justinian I

    Votes: 19 29.2%
  • Basil II the Bulgar-Slayer

    Votes: 20 30.8%
  • Heraklios

    Votes: 9 13.8%
  • Alexios I Kommenos

    Votes: 6 9.2%
  • Michael VIII Palaiologos

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Manuel I Kommenos

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • John II Kommenos

    Votes: 3 4.6%
  • Basil I

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • John I Tzimiskes

    Votes: 4 6.2%
  • Leo VI the Wise

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Other? Specify.

    Votes: 2 3.1%
  • John III Vatatzes

    Votes: 1 1.5%
  • Nikephoros II Phokas

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Anastasius I Dicorus

    Votes: 1 1.5%
  • Leo III

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    65
  • Poll closed .
Some of the people on the list are excellent commanders, even military geniuses. Basil II was not a military genius; he was defeated a number of times early on, and humiliated at the Gates of Trajan. But he learned and improved, and most importantly he was not just a soldier-emperor; he administered the empire well and not only avoided bankrupting it with military expenditures but vastly increased its resources. He wisely looked after conquered territories, allowing the Bulgarians to pay their taxes in kind, a policy which was foolishly reversed by his later successors to disastrous results. If you want the best tactician to wear the purple, it's not Basil - try John Tzimiskes, perhaps - but military acumen isn't the whole ballgame.

There are two claimed faults with Basil II:
1. He left no heirs; and
2. He arguably shifted the empire's policy of defense towards the central field army at the expense of the thematic armies

The first issue, while glaring, would have been totally moot if his brother had produced sons - as I mentioned in another thread, had Theodora Porphyrogenita been born a man the empire would have been in an excellent position going forward. The second is, to me, not all that relevant: the Byzantine collapse in the late 11th century was IMO less because of any specific military organizational principle than the collapse of legitimacy following the demise of the Macedonians which allowed the throne to bounce from one family to another and led to interminable civil war. Basil's emphasis on the central army was a predictable result of the revolts against him early in his life (both of which were led by Anatolian generals leading provincial forces) and would not have been a serious deficiency had the empire not already been in crisis before Manzikert.
 
Ah, you are right-sorry got my dates mixed up. OK, I can't blame Peter for this one thing, but I will still stick by the claim that the Spanish attempt was a disaster.

A waste of resources, certainly, but Justinian did actually manage to conquer and hold on to the southern portion of Spain. Even when the Byzantines were kicked out, the province was marginal enough to them that I think "disaster" is probably putting it too strongly.

He also didn't spend the 9 years waiting, Heraclius did make some attempts to stop the Persians from invading Syria and failed.

I factored those into my chronology: the nine years is from Heraclius' defeat at Antioch in 613 (AFAIK the last battle he fought in person before the final counter-attack, unless I'm forgetting one) and the beginning of his counter-attack in 622.

The second is, to me, not all that relevant: the Byzantine collapse in the late 11th century was IMO less because of any specific military organizational principle than the collapse of legitimacy following the demise of the Macedonians which allowed the throne to bounce from one family to another and led to interminable civil war. Basil's emphasis on the central army was a predictable result of the revolts against him early in his life (both of which were led by Anatolian generals leading provincial forces) and would not have been a serious deficiency had the empire not already been in crisis before Manzikert.

Whilst the post-Manzikert civil wars would no doubt have happened even with a thematic army, the consequences for the Empire's position would have been less devastating, because the themes would have been better-able to defend themselves so the Turks could have been kept out, even whilst the centre was paralysed. The loss of Anatolia wasn't due to a concerted invasion, after all, but to Turkish raiders coming in, finding there were no troops to stop them, and deciding to settle down. The centralisation of the army under Basil wasn't a sufficient condition for the post-Manzikert collapse, but it was a necessary one.
 
John III Vatazes managed to make Nicaea into a regional power with only Western Anatolia and parts of the Balkans. Sheer ability-wise, he is best.
 
The loss of Anatolia wasn't due to a concerted invasion, after all, but to Turkish raiders coming in, finding there were no troops to stop them, and deciding to settle down.

Remember, however, that much of Anatolia was lost because it was given away. Rebel generals like Nikephoros Botaneiates (who became emperor) and Nikephoros Melissenos (who didn't) relied on Turkish support and installed Turks as garrisons in Byzantine cities and fortresses throughout Anatolia, which they then kept. Some were never reclaimed.

The reason I'm skeptical of the importance of Basil's "centralized" army in the loss of Anatolia is the experience of the Pechenegs. They were, in many ways, just like the Turkmen of the east: a nomadic, Turkic people whose invasions were frequently propelled by poor weather and bad forage back home. Their invasions are not exactly a Byzantine success story: although often overlooked because of the Seljuks, Pecheneg raiding seriously damaged the empire. Yet the Byzantine army was capable, given competent leadership, of defeating them, and despite raiding all the way to the walls of Thessalonica and Constantinople at times, Pecheneg settlement within the borders of the empire was not so drastic in its consequences as Turkish settlement in Anatolia. Pechenegs were settled in Paristrion, sometimes had significant autonomy there, and occasionally rose in rebellion, but their incursions did not result in the wholesale loss of Paristrion/Bulgaria to the empire and the creation of Pecheneg beyliks as happened with the Turks in the east. The difference, IMO, was collaboration. No major claimant in the west raised an army of Pechenegs and installed them in all the major fortresses in the Balkans. The Turks were there because they were placed there, and once there they proved to be difficult to dislodge. The fact that they had even been installed in Bithynia, right across the Sea of Marmara, and could thus stand between the capital and the rest of Anatolia also played a role in the overall Byzantine loss of the east.

It is possible that the post-Basil army was less suited to deal with nomadic incursions than the pre-Basil army, but the post-Basil army was obviously capable of muddling through a nomadic threat without ceding half the empire, because they did exactly that with the Pechenegs. The dagger in the heart of the empire was regime instability. Basil deserves blame for his role in that (in the sense of not having children and not having his nieces married), but his failure to prolong the dynasty was a much more important factor in the late 11th century collapse than systemic changes made to the military, which had in any case already begun before Basil II rose to power.
 
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PhilippeO

Banned
one overlooked part is Emperor inheritance. Justinian inherited strong Empire with full treasury. Basil inherited strong Empire and Army from previous Macedonian Emperor.

i prefer Emperor who start small and later brought Empire to greatness

Alexios I Kommenos start from local nobility and weakened Empire and ended with multiple victory and strong Empire.
 

Deleted member 97083

Justinian had the best overall policy, military, religious, economic. There was no way he could have predicted the plague.

Basil II had the best economic policies of any Emperor, but took decades to figure out a successful military.
 

Red Orm

Banned
Justinian had the best overall policy, military, religious, economic. There was no way he could have predicted the plague.

Basil II had the best economic policies of any Emperor, but took decades to figure out a successful military.

Justinian was hated though, he was honestly a pretty bad emperor. The fact that the Nika revolt could even happen, his handling of the Goths and his best and most loyal general, and his complete deflation of the treasure despite its being full due to Anastasius show just how bad he really was.
 
Justinian was hated though, he was honestly a pretty bad emperor. The fact that the Nika revolt could even happen, his handling of the Goths and his best and most loyal general, and his complete deflation of the treasure despite its being full due to Anastasius show just how bad he really was.
Not to mention his crippling taxes and his ingenious idea of getting rid of the Avars by paying them off (which would come back to bite the Empire shortly after his death).
 

Red Orm

Banned
Not to mention his crippling taxes and his ingenious idea of getting rid of the Avars by paying them off (which would come back to bite the Empire shortly after his death).

Honestly that was his policy for everything east of the Adriatic: fight a bit, then pay them off. He never reached a more decisive settlement with Persia because he had five guys busy dicking around in Italy when Belisarius could have put it in good order quickly. Another stupid move, choosing a literally who wife who only poisoned his mind against his best general. Of course she got him to stay during the Nika riots, but they would never have happened if it weren't for his dumbass tax policies.
 
Honestly that was his policy for everything east of the Adriatic: fight a bit, then pay them off. He never reached a more decisive settlement with Persia because he had five guys busy dicking around in Italy when Belisarius could have put it in good order quickly. Another stupid move, choosing a literally who wife who only poisoned his mind against his best general. Of course she got him to stay during the Nika riots, but they would never have happened if it weren't for his dumbass tax policies.
Yeah...Justinian was fantastic in terms of law, administration and the arts but his tax policies were just awful (arguably his militaristic policies were bad aswell, he was simply lucky he had good generals to redeem his poor planning). Did the Hagia Sophia really need to be completed so quickly? Did he really need to rebuild old cities and found new ones while in the middle of a war? Was paying off his eastern enemies a good idea in hindsight, probably not.

Not to mention all these dreams of his broke the backs of taxpayers, as his solution for getting most of his dreams done was raising taxes.
 
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