Best British Strategy in the Far East

As it says on the tin, really.

What could the British Commonwealth and Empire have done differently in the Pacific War to minimise defeats and maximise victories (i.e. preventing the loss of Singapore, etc.) against the Japanese?
 
Go to war with Japan over the Tientsin Incident in 1939.
After being snubbed by the US (When GB sought US support, the US was meh, we wont back European Imperialists in Asia against Japan.), cut a deal with the Russians for them to support Poland against Germany in return for a free hand in Manchuria and GB to provide the Naval Power in a combined Anglo-Russian effort against Japan. No war in Europe as Hitler wont attack Poland with the Russians supporting the Poles and Japan is out of the Asian mainland by 1943.
 
Depends, are they prepared mor for it? Do they know some stuff?

Perhaps if they'd implemented operation Matador.

I they'd increased defenses for Malaya then the Japanese are going to have to increase their number in order to take it. More planes on the side ofthe British for example. Any kind of extra losses the Uk can inflict on Japan is a win. Especially airpower or if they can sink a ship or 2.
 
Whatever is done, if you want to keep Malaya, the allies also need to hold Sumatra.

Other then training troops, are more units from the Indian Army available?

And half a dozen spitfire squadrons would be nice. Give Admiral Phillips the air cover he asked for and He might accomplish his mission.
 
Firstly I would plan to not even attempt to hold HK beyond obliging the Japanese to use force to take the colony

It is little more than a trading post and serves no purpose strategically - If Britain loses the war it wont make any difference - if it wins it simply takes it back (as per OTL)

Therefore I would reduce its garrison and certainly would not reinforce it.

Then for Malaya I would do the following

A Littoral light naval force comprising a dedicated submarine force of 6 T Class operating with the Dutch boats with a dedicated base in Singapore and several flotillas of MTBs based out of the East coast ports

At the very least I would withdraw the MTBs and Insect gun boats from HK and use them as the core of this force

For Malaya I would ask that in time of war that the 2nd Australian Imperial Force take ownership with at least 2 front line Divisions in the Malayan Peninsula - with British Divisions in the UK replacing those 2AIC units in the Middle east (start this process when Japan occupies all of French Indochina in July 1941) - there will be a great burden on Australia in this post - but I believe that ultimately they will be better served by it.

I would also ensure that the '1st Armoured Division' be equipped with enough A13 Covenanters (about 300 odd) to equip an armoured Brigade (3 'Regiments') along with anything else Britain can spare that is not useful in NA to allow for proper training with the expectation that they would be replaced later - however while the overheating problem was deemed to prevent them from working in warmer climates some later models did work alongside Kingsforce in the desert - so I guess it was resolved.

Naturally following the Japanese occupation in July 1941 the 1st Armoured division is moved to Malaya and starts training there in Sept 1941 with an effective strength of 4 Tank regiments (mostly A13s) and 3 armoured car regiments and 2 of the middle east based infantry divisions arriving at around the same time.

At the same time the Australian Tank design committee who had gone to the US to investigate the M3 tank with view to building a similar vehicle in Australia (ultimately the failed sentinel) also visit the Canadian Pacific Railway companies railway production facility in Angus, Montreal and are immediately impressed by the speed at which the facility had been converted to start producing the Vickers Valentine tank design.

Armed with this knowledge they get the plans for the tank and adopt it for construction at the New South Wales Railroad company's construction facilities - although serial production would not effectively start until Jan 1942 with full production not up to speed until March 1942 it did allow Australia to maintain the fighting strength of the 1st Armoured Division during the fighting in Malaya during 1942.

The Valentine while increasingly obsolete in the ETO was more than a match for Japanese AFVs in the Far East throughout the war

The production of the Owens should also be brought forward - OTL there were delays in its adoption and then delays in getting ammo production sorted out. Handwave those issues away and production of these weapons

This allows for a Sept TOE of the following

2nd Australian Imperial Force in the region at of Dec 1941

2AIF Corps HQ + Corps troops
6th Infantry Division (Aus)
7th Infantry Division (Aus)
8th Infantry Division (Aus) note: effectively a 2 Brigade formation as it is minus units used to reinforce Rabaul, Ambon, and Timor - in November C force (not sent to HK) arrives from Canada to reinforce the garrison on Ambon effectively folding in with Gull Force creating a fully equipped Commonwealth Brigade on the Island under command of Brigadier John Lawson
1st Armoured Division (Aus) note: effectively one Armoured Brigade and one Armoured Cavalry Brigade with ACs

III Indian Army Corps
Reinforced with a reinforced Brigade of troops and support units withdrawn from the HK Garrison
9th Indian Division is reorganised into a 3 Brigade structure with increased Divisional troops as a result of the HK reinforcements

11th Division - much as it was OTL

As for fighters - hmmmmm

Far too many RAF squadrons were retained in the UK during this period IMO

Freeing up 10 or so Spitfire Squadrons for overseas duties and/or being less aggressive regarding ineffective fighter sweeps across France etc - would allow Spitfire units to reinforce the Garrison in Malta and the Desert Airforce in North Africa which should have a knock on effect of allowing Hurricane and P40 Squadrons / Aircraft to become available for the Malayan Garrison through a combination of direct replacements and the DAF suffering fewer losses in aircraft and pilots than OTL.

Oh and I believe that Hugh Dowding was effectively unemployed during this period and while he was a rubbish diplomat (he upset the Americans with his outspoken manner when he was sent by the Ministry of Aircraft Production after being relieved in Nov 1940 and ultimately was withdrawn to the UK) he was very good at creating an Air Defence System - send him to Malaya in early 41 and report back directly to Churchill regarding the situation and then have more suitable airfields created with a modern air defence network - and possibly even radar stood up in time but at minimum an organization of ground observers linked to a Malayan fighter command HQ that can coordinate the air defence of the Peninsular.

So while there will still be a superior number of Japanese Aircraft the more than OTL Allied Squadrons will be better used.

General Ironsides is also a good choice to do the same thing regarding the Army and getting it sorted out but if the 2AIF is present then many of those issues will not exist with 2 or 3 top quality Commonwealth divisions in place!

Then Operation Matador

With better quality, experienced and equipped veteren Australian forces present a much more ambitious Matador could be conducted with a full bloodied tank supported Divisional thrust into Thailand to immediately attack the Japanese landings at Pattinia as well as and form a blocking force across the narrower Kra Isthmus.

As for Force Z with an increased Garrison in the Peninsular and improved littoral forces any large RN force could be held back as far as India as OTL the force was sent because of the weakness of the Garrison.

Sumatra is important but faced with far superior forces in Malaya the Japanese would have to reinforce that campaign to have any chance of success and have little left over for Sumatra, Burma and even might have to drawdown forces from the Philippines possibly impacting that campaign as well?
 
Have commanders on the ground with the authorization (and willingness) to impose harsh martial law in the event of hostilities that way you avoid soldiers being forbidden dig trenches on golf courses.

Deploy some decent light attack squadrons trained in anti-shipping operations. The RN took delivery of 50 Vindicators from the US in early to mid 1941 but relegated them to training duties because they were not suitable to operate off of escort carriers. Send those to Malaya where they operate from land bases. Scrape up enough surviving Skuas to field a squadron of those as well. Neither of these planes are anything special but they are light years better than the Vickers Vildebeests that were deployed to Malaya OTL.
 
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Not far east related really but save one of glorious ark royal or courageous, double down on taranto free up the mediteranean fleet and send an actual fleet to the far east.
 
As it says on the tin, really.

What could the British Commonwealth and Empire have done differently in the Pacific War to minimise defeats and maximise victories (i.e. preventing the loss of Singapore, etc.) against the Japanese?
What's the POD for this?
 
Not far east related really but save one of glorious ark royal or courageous, double down on taranto free up the mediteranean fleet and send an actual fleet to the far east.

One of my favoured PODs - I would triple down on it plus Eagle

Illustrious, Furious and Ark Royal (Already part of Operation MB8 - the covering operation) plus Eagle could deploy 60+ Torpedo carrying bombers between them if not more - using the Skuas from Ark and Furious as flare dropping planes freeing up the Swordfish as torpedo carrying planes - the best way to sink a ship remaining to let the water in!

Dedicate the best 2 squadrons to attack Littorio and Vittorio Veneto (the main prizes) and then sufficient numbers to attack the other Battleships and some to attack the 3 Heavy Crusiers

There is a Canadian Colonel who wrote an excellent piece on the OTL attack claiming it was a Tactical Victory but ultimately a strategic failure as Britain did not take advantage of their victory and also believes that a larger attack should have been made
 
Allies take the Japanese seriously as opponents?
The Royal Navy took the Japanese seriously as opponents from the day the Washington Treaty was signed.

Edit

From 6th February 1922 to 30th January 1933 Japan was the only nation in the world that the British Government and defence establishment took seriously as opponents.
 
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One of my favoured PODs - I would triple down on it plus Eagle

Illustrious, Furious and Ark Royal (Already part of Operation MB8 - the covering operation) plus Eagle could deploy 60+ Torpedo carrying bombers between them if not more - using the Skuas from Ark and Furious as flare dropping planes freeing up the Swordfish as torpedo carrying planes - the best way to sink a ship remaining to let the water in!

Dedicate the best 2 squadrons to attack Littorio and Vittorio Veneto (the main prizes) and then sufficient numbers to attack the other Battleships and some to attack the 3 Heavy Crusiers

There is a Canadian Colonel who wrote an excellent piece on the OTL attack claiming it was a Tactical Victory but ultimately a strategic failure as Britain did not take advantage of their victory and also believes that a larger attack should have been made
I think I've read that paper. IIRC he also wrote that Eagle should have taken part in the attack. However, I've read elsewhere that Eagle didn't take part because of a hangar fire and 6 of her 18 Swordfish were transferred to Illustrious.

Is Eagle not having the hangar fire a permissible POD?
 
The Royal Navy took the Japanese seriously as opponents from the day the Washington Treaty was signed.

There was still plenty of racism among the Allies WRT the fighting capabilities of the Japanese including beliefs that they were poor pilots because of a weak middle ear.
 
I think I've read that paper. IIRC he also wrote that Eagle should have taken part in the attack. However, I've read elsewhere that Eagle didn't take part because of a hangar fire and 6 of her 18 Swordfish were transferred to Illustrious.

Is Eagle not having the hangar fire a permissible POD?

EAGLE not having that fire is a great POD although I thought the problem was issues with her aircraft refueling system that required repairs. Either, having EAGLE and ILLUSTRIOUS for the Taranto attack is great POD to start things off.
 
There was still plenty of racism among the Allies WRT the fighting capabilities of the Japanese including beliefs that they were poor pilots because of a weak middle ear.
That didn't stop Admiralty concentrating on preparations for a war against Japan between 1922 and 1933 and then lobbying for a Royal Navy large enough to fight the Kriegsmarine and IJN at the same time between 1933 and 1939.
 
That didn't stop Admiralty concentrating on preparations for a war against Japan between 1922 and 1933 and then lobbying for a Royal Navy large enough to fight the Kriegsmarine and IJN at the same time between 1933 and 1939.

Understood but we are talking about two different things. You are talking about long term strategy and policy. I am talking about the crucial months prior to December 1941 where perhaps a less contemptuous view of the Japanese by civilian and military officials in Burma, Malaya, the DEI, the Philippines, and Hawaii could lead to better war preparations by lighting a fire under some rear ends and in general shaking people out of their collective torpor brought on by living the good life in the colonies.

Now, in fairness to the Allies, the Japanese were just as bad, maybe worse. Apparently Genda reported back to Tokyo from London during the Battle of Britain that the RAF was bad and the Luftwaffe even worse.
 
EAGLE not having that fire is a great POD although I thought the problem was issues with her aircraft refueling system that required repairs. Either, having EAGLE and ILLUSTRIOUS for the Taranto attack is great POD to start things off.
Considering the unreliability of German torpedoes at the time Courageous being hit by duds in September 1939 might be another good one. However, neither is really within the scope of the OP.

One that is would be is holding Force Z back at Ceylon while the Eastern Fleet was built up, which the Admiralty wanted to do, instead of giving in to Churchill and sending it to Singapore to overawe the Japanese. There is an example of not taking the Japanese seriously as opponents that I do agree with.

Repulse and Prince of Wales along with he destroyers Electra, Encounter and Jupiter would have been useful additions to the British naval strength in the Indian Ocean in 1942.
 
Here's another quote from Hyperwar, this time from Chapter 1 of The War at Sea Volume II
The main task of the surface forces of the A.B.D.A. command was initially to convoy supplies and reinforcements to Singapore. The Japanese advance down the Malay peninsula soon closed the Malacca Straits to our convoys, which thereafter had to be routed south of Sumatra and approach Singapore through the Sunda Straits.8 Between the 1st of January and the 8th of February, when it was decided that it was useless to throw in more reinforcements, the British and Dutch warships escorted in seven convoys comprising forty-four ships, many of them large troop transports. In all 45,000 fighting men of all services, besides large quantities of stores and equipment, were safely taken to Singapore during those five weeks. Considering the scale of sea and air attack to which our convoys were constantly exposed, the achievement was remarkable. Only in the last one, when the liner Empress of Asia ( 16,909 tons) was bombed and set on fire, was a ship lost. It was when escorting one of these convoys that the destroyer Jupiter scored a success by sinking a large Japanese submarine off the Sunda Straits.

Not only were military reinforcements poured into Singapore, but the desperate need for more aircraft, and especially for fighters, had to be met. The convoy which arrived on the 8th of January carried fifty-one crated Hurricanes, which were at once erected and flung into battle. Next the fleet carrier Indomitable came round the Cape to Port Sudan, embarked fifty more there and at once sailed east. They were flown off to Batavia on the 27th and 28th from a position south of Java; and most of them went straight on to Singapore. Early in February the aircraft transport Athene delivered to Batavia forty more Hurricanes, which she had embarked at Takoradi on the Gold Coast. It is not the smallest of the many tragedies which scar this terrible period that all these successful sea-borne reinforcement operations were of no avail.
With hindsight all the seven convoys to Singapore did was provide the Japanese with 45,000 extra labourers for the Burma Railway.

With hindsight would it have been better to send the 45,000 fighting men of all services and the 91 Hurricanes to build up the defences of Burma?
 
I think I've read that paper. IIRC he also wrote that Eagle should have taken part in the attack. However, I've read elsewhere that Eagle didn't take part because of a hangar fire and 6 of her 18 Swordfish were transferred to Illustrious.

Is Eagle not having the hangar fire a permissible POD?

The hangar fire took place on Illustrious and 3 aircraft were damaged (IIRC by Salt water damage to the electrics) before the attack

Eagle was originally going to take part but damage to her aircraft fuel tanks was discovered and some leaks had resulted - it was deemed prudent to withdraw her with 6 of her aircraft and best pilots sent to Illustrious - I do not believe that there was an actual fire per se...just potential risk of one

However an earlier attack might have involved her before the damage was discovered

Found the piece - By Lt Col Angelo Caravaggio
 
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