Best bet is to kill the 1st and 2nd London Naval Treaties and not keep ever extending the Battleship Holiday.
Best British interwar fleet?
- Thread starter Hood
- Start date
For torpedo bombing, what about the Bristol Beaufort? I've always felt like there was untapped potential there, heck a RAF crew out of Scotland put a torpedo in Lutzow off Norway in 1941, that's a pretty long distance flight. If the RN had control had control over several squadrons of those and crews whose only job was dropping torpedoes, they could be pretty effective.
But what would have been more useful - the same amount of crew trained in destroyers and cruisers (pre-war ships were undermanned, AFAIK, so more crew could have been well squeezed in) than in battleship environment.
As for shortage of capital ships, not really. KM and RM were short of capital ships, but not RN. Besides, even if KM's capital ships had fairly free runs on Allied merchant shipping the damage they could do before conceivably being sunk by hunting forces would have been inconsequential in grand scheme of things.
In the 1930's the only answer to an enemy capital ship is at least 1 and preferably 2 of your own. There was absolutely no chance of any navy that has them or can build them giving them up, and frankly it would have been the height of stupidity to do so.
Consider, there are three nations that have really invested in carriers (plus the French tinkering with Bearn). Some of the Admirals in those navies think carriers might be an answer, but it's never been tested in combat. Most admirals think carriers are at best an auxiliary and a worst a waste of resources. Those same admirals think there is little risk to a capital ship at sea from any aircraft. Almost all land based air specialists think carriers are useless. In that atmosphere doing away with the capital ships is an incredibly risky choice that would never be made.
Consider, there are three nations that have really invested in carriers (plus the French tinkering with Bearn). Some of the Admirals in those navies think carriers might be an answer, but it's never been tested in combat. Most admirals think carriers are at best an auxiliary and a worst a waste of resources. Those same admirals think there is little risk to a capital ship at sea from any aircraft. Almost all land based air specialists think carriers are useless. In that atmosphere doing away with the capital ships is an incredibly risky choice that would never be made.
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marathag
Banned
the USN of that era was getting around $300M+, with a Dollar to Pound being around 4.5, the OTL RN was making do with a lot less than the USN, and that increase would get it slightly lower than the USN funding
That's interesting in itself, but what do you mean?
All I can think of is you're saying that the level of naval spending that I'm proposing can be justified to the Treasury, Cabinet, Parliament and the voters (not necessarily in that order of importance) because it's still less than the USA was spending on the maintenance of its navy.
Also, the USN spending (and personnel numbers) will include shore-based naval aviation. IOTL that was part of the RAF and paid for under the Air Estimates. It wasn't quite the same with sea-based naval aviation because some of the money for that came out of the Navy Estimates and some of the FAA's aircrew were RN officers.
If I could swap the 13 county class (or even better a few Hawkins) for 7+ more Renown and Repulse I would do it in an instant...... (crew 953-1223 v 685 standard, 710 as flagship, 784 during wartime)
Just compare what was spent rebuilding battleships by USN/IJN/RN in the 20s/30s...... RN only started late and did far less cheaper than the others.....
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marathag
Banned
From the WNC, the US and UK had the same tonnage Ratio, but here was USN Spending
1922 to the start of the War
1922 $508,155,000
1923 $330,607,000
1924 $302,855,000
1925 $308,810,000
1926 $310,591,000
1927 $332,071,000
1928 $348,332,000
1929 $383,143,000
1930 $364,693,000
1931 $403,243,000
1932 $359,199,000
1933 $571,927,000
1934 $352,433,000
1935 $346,296,000
1936 $489,005,000
1937 $529,059,000
1938 $524,772,000
1939 $673,792,000
During that time(well till 1936) manpower of the USN and USMC combined was around 115,000, and increased a few thousand each year after 1935. Haven't found a good source for USN flying personnel for that time.
So yeah, RN was really underspending.
Do you mean..... RN started late and did them far less expensively than the others.....
FWIW if more money was available (which there has to be) the Admiralty should have insisted that Hood, Repulse, Renown and all 5 Queen Elizabeths have full modernisations by the end of 1939. It should also have instead that all 5 R class battleships be re-engined by the end of 1939. These measures would be a quid pro quo for extending the battleship building holiday from 1931 to 1936 under the 2nd LNT. The justification was that the RN needed to maintain an effective fore of capital ships until new ships could be built and as the new ships would be built 5 years later than planned the 13 oldest capital ships had to be modernised to keep them effective for longer than previously planned.
IOTL Barham had a long refit 1930-33, Repulse had a partial modernisation 1932-36 and Malaya had a partial modernisation 1934-37. ITTL these long refits/partial modernisations would be upgraded to full modernisations. Hood would have her full modernisation between 1932 and 1936 and Tiger would be retained until the end of 1936 so that there would be no reduction (compared to OTL) in the number of battle cruisers that were in service 1932-36.
However, a new capital ship of 35,000 tons was estimated to cost £7.5 million and last 20 years. A fully modernised Queen Elisabeth or Renown would cost £3 million and add 10 years to its service life. A full modernisation of Hood was estimated to cost £4.5 million and extend her service live to 1950. Therefore, the Admiralty could say (with considerable justification) that it would be more cost effective to build new ships from 1931 (as allowed by the WNT) instead of extending the battleship building holiday until the end of 1936 and modernising the existing capital ships as a stop gap.
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This is the British capital ship replacement schedule under the Washington Naval Treaty.
The First London Naval Treaty didn't have a replacement schedule, but I'm guessing that when it was negotiated the Cabinet and Admiralty thought that new ships would be built at a rate of 3 ships every 2 years from 1937 and take 3 or 4 years each to build. Queen Elizabeth would be 25 years old in 1940, Hood would be 29 years old in 1949 and the Nelrods would be 23 years old in 1950.
Therefore, the 13 capital ships from Queen Elizabeth to Hood would at the very least need to be re-engined so that they could be kept in service for another 5-10 years.
The First London Naval Treaty didn't have a replacement schedule, but I'm guessing that when it was negotiated the Cabinet and Admiralty thought that new ships would be built at a rate of 3 ships every 2 years from 1937 and take 3 or 4 years each to build. Queen Elizabeth would be 25 years old in 1940, Hood would be 29 years old in 1949 and the Nelrods would be 23 years old in 1950.
Therefore, the 13 capital ships from Queen Elizabeth to Hood would at the very least need to be re-engined so that they could be kept in service for another 5-10 years.
In relation to the carriers could the Hood, or one or two of her cancelled sisters have been converted to a carrier like Lexington and Saratoga were?
Sure, but with the RAF controlling what and how many aircraft the RN got having larger carriers isn't going to do them much good, and the RAF isn't going let them have more than the barest minimum they can get away with.
Hood could have been rebuilt, but MHO is that it is a very bad idea.
Her sister ships were scrapped in 1919 and as a total of £860,000 (IIRC) had been spent on the them they could not have been very advanced and IMHO it would have been better to build new ships, because new ships would have been better and cost the same (if not less) to build.
This is a fallacy.
The RAF didn't control what and how many aircraft the RN got. The Government did.
Ah so we need a series of car "accidents" to ummm retire the less comptent and anti FAA Air Marshalls
Based on what the Air Marshalls AND Admirals said the FAA needed (which was a function of the capacity of the aircraft carriers) AND more importantly what the Treasury said the Country could afford AND just as importantly what the Cabinet thought Parliament would approve.
The FAA had a front-line strength of 159 (or 162 aircraft depending upon the source) at 31st March 1934 organised into 12 squadrons of carrier aircraft and 6 catapult flights. That was about 75% of what the existing force of aircraft ships, capital ships and cruisers could accommodate.
On the same date the RAF's Home Defence Force had 39 squadrons (26 bomber and 13 fighter). Back in 1923 the Government had set its strength had been set at 52 squadrons (35 bomber and 17 fighter) which was to have been reached by March 1928. However, the completion date was put back several times and at the end of March 1934 the scheme wasn't due to be completed until March 1938. Therefore, the RAF's main force at the end of March 1934 was only 75% of the size that it should have been 6 years earlier. Also the ratio of night bomber squadrons to day bomber squadron should have been 15:20 when it was 8:18 in March 1934.
At the end of March 1934 the RAF had a first-line strength of 953 aircraft in the equivalent of 87 squadrons. This included 162 first-line FAA aircraft in the equivalent of 15 squadrons. Thus, the FAA made up 17% of the RAF's first-line strength measured by the number of aircraft and 17.25% of its first-line strength measured by the number of squadrons.
Therefore, it's had to argue that the RAF wasn't giving the FAA a fair share of the available money during the "Locust Years".
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I would have had this post ready hours ago, but I was distracted writing other posts...
If more money can be made available the highest priority should be given to modernising the aircraft carrier force and providing them with full strength air groups. If I could change two things between the world wars they would be the things.
IOTL the Admiralty produced a 10 year building programme in 1924. This included four 17,000 ton aircraft carriers which would be completed between 1928 and 1938. These ships would replace Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Vindictive which could be scrapped at any time because they were considered to be experimental ships under the Washington Naval Treaty.
Had the plan gone ahead the Royal Navy would have had seven aircraft carriers at the end of 1938, consisting of the four 17,000 ton ships and the Three Follies. IIRC (and I'm not sure that I do) there were to be 238 aircraft in 1938 to operate from them.
However, I'm not a fan of the Three Follies for several reasons. Firstly, MHO is that the Admiralty should have built the sixth Queen Elisabeth and the 3 Revenge class ordered in the 1914-15 Estimates instead of Repulse, Renown and the Three Follies in the first place. The second reason is that the conversions cost about £2 million each or about half what a new ship of the same displacement would have cost. The third reason is that new ships of the same displacement could have been built in the time that it took to convert the Three Follies IOTL. Fourthly, the Follies carried half to two thirds the number of aircraft that a new ship of the same displacement would have been able to accommodate, that is: Furious, 36; Courageous and Glorious, 48 each; but Ark Royal could carry 72 aircraft. New ships would also have had longer flight decks, better protection and hulls & machinery that would have taken longer to wear out.
IOTL the conversion of Furious into a "proper" aircraft carrier began in 1921 and was completed in 1925 so it would still happen IOTL due to the POD of 1922. However, the conversions of Courageous and Glorious did not begin until 1924 IOTL and IMHO shouldn't have been begun in the first place.
Therefore, my version of the 1924 Plan included six 22,500 ton aircraft carriers to be laid down at the rate of one every other year from 1924 for completion 1928-38 and their air groups.
IOTL the WNT allowed the British Empire to have 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers because the Admiralty wanted five 27,000 ton aircraft carriers (5 x 27,000 tons = 135,000 tons) so that each of the two main fleets could have 2 aircraft carriers and the fifth ship was to cover refits.
In my TL the Admiralty wanted 360 aircraft aboard five aircraft carriers (i.e. 5 ships x 72 aircraft per ship = 360 aircraft) with a sixth ship to cover refits. Each ship would displace 22,500 tons and 6 ships x 22,500 tons per ship = 135,000 tons.
I want the six ships to be modified Ark Royals. The modification being that they had three "single deck" lifts instead of the "double deck" units of OTL so that it was easier to move aircraft from the lower hangar deck to the flight deck.
ITTL the aircraft carrier force of 1934 consisted of four of the 22,500 ton aircraft carriers, Furious and Hermes. The first 5 ships had a combined capacity of 336 aircraft, but "Ship A" was refitting and the 5 remaining ships could carry 264 aircraft.
The FAA was doubled to 252 aircraft in 24 carrier squadrons and 72 aircraft in 12 catapult flights. Under the 1934-35 Air Estimates the four squadrons that were at half-strength would be brought up to full-strength by the end of March 1935.
The longer term plan (which the Treasury was funding) was for 324 carrier aircraft in 27 squadrons at the end of March 1936 and 360 aircraft in 30 squadrons by the end of March 1938. This was because aircraft carrier force in 1936 was to consist of five ships of the 22,500 ton type & Furious and in 1938 it was to have six ships of the 22,500 ton type.
The September 1939 aircraft carrier force would consist of the six 22,500 ton ships, Furious and Hermes. The FAA would have at least 30 squadrons of carrier aircraft plus catapult aircraft aboard the Royal Navy's capital ships and cruisers.
If more money can be made available the highest priority should be given to modernising the aircraft carrier force and providing them with full strength air groups. If I could change two things between the world wars they would be the things.
IOTL the Admiralty produced a 10 year building programme in 1924. This included four 17,000 ton aircraft carriers which would be completed between 1928 and 1938. These ships would replace Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Vindictive which could be scrapped at any time because they were considered to be experimental ships under the Washington Naval Treaty.
Had the plan gone ahead the Royal Navy would have had seven aircraft carriers at the end of 1938, consisting of the four 17,000 ton ships and the Three Follies. IIRC (and I'm not sure that I do) there were to be 238 aircraft in 1938 to operate from them.
However, I'm not a fan of the Three Follies for several reasons. Firstly, MHO is that the Admiralty should have built the sixth Queen Elisabeth and the 3 Revenge class ordered in the 1914-15 Estimates instead of Repulse, Renown and the Three Follies in the first place. The second reason is that the conversions cost about £2 million each or about half what a new ship of the same displacement would have cost. The third reason is that new ships of the same displacement could have been built in the time that it took to convert the Three Follies IOTL. Fourthly, the Follies carried half to two thirds the number of aircraft that a new ship of the same displacement would have been able to accommodate, that is: Furious, 36; Courageous and Glorious, 48 each; but Ark Royal could carry 72 aircraft. New ships would also have had longer flight decks, better protection and hulls & machinery that would have taken longer to wear out.
IOTL the conversion of Furious into a "proper" aircraft carrier began in 1921 and was completed in 1925 so it would still happen IOTL due to the POD of 1922. However, the conversions of Courageous and Glorious did not begin until 1924 IOTL and IMHO shouldn't have been begun in the first place.
Therefore, my version of the 1924 Plan included six 22,500 ton aircraft carriers to be laid down at the rate of one every other year from 1924 for completion 1928-38 and their air groups.
IOTL the WNT allowed the British Empire to have 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers because the Admiralty wanted five 27,000 ton aircraft carriers (5 x 27,000 tons = 135,000 tons) so that each of the two main fleets could have 2 aircraft carriers and the fifth ship was to cover refits.
In my TL the Admiralty wanted 360 aircraft aboard five aircraft carriers (i.e. 5 ships x 72 aircraft per ship = 360 aircraft) with a sixth ship to cover refits. Each ship would displace 22,500 tons and 6 ships x 22,500 tons per ship = 135,000 tons.
I want the six ships to be modified Ark Royals. The modification being that they had three "single deck" lifts instead of the "double deck" units of OTL so that it was easier to move aircraft from the lower hangar deck to the flight deck.
- Ship A would be laid down in 1924 and be completed in 1928. This ship would be built instead of converting Courageous.
- Ship B would be laid down in 1926 and be completed in 1930. This ship would be built instead of converting Glorious.
- Ship C would be laid down in 1928 and be completed in 1932. This ship would replace Argus (which would be converted into a depot ship) and Vindictive (which like OTL would be converted into a cruiser).
- Ship D would be laid down in 1930 and be completed in 1934. This ship would replace Eagle (which would be converted into a depot ship. I can't decide whether she would be a depot ship for the MNBDO or an aircraft maintenance ship).
- Ship E would be laid down in 1932 and be completed in 1936. This ship would replace Hermes, which was to have been converted into a seaplane carrier. However, as the Second London Naval Treaty was signed on 25th March 1936 it would be possible to keep Hermes as an aircraft carrier.
- Ship F would be laid down in 1934 and be completed in 1938. This ship would replace Furious, which became due for replacement in 1937. However, as the 135,000 ton quota came to an end on 31st December 1936 there would be no need to scrap Furious.
ITTL the aircraft carrier force of 1934 consisted of four of the 22,500 ton aircraft carriers, Furious and Hermes. The first 5 ships had a combined capacity of 336 aircraft, but "Ship A" was refitting and the 5 remaining ships could carry 264 aircraft.
The FAA was doubled to 252 aircraft in 24 carrier squadrons and 72 aircraft in 12 catapult flights. Under the 1934-35 Air Estimates the four squadrons that were at half-strength would be brought up to full-strength by the end of March 1935.
The longer term plan (which the Treasury was funding) was for 324 carrier aircraft in 27 squadrons at the end of March 1936 and 360 aircraft in 30 squadrons by the end of March 1938. This was because aircraft carrier force in 1936 was to consist of five ships of the 22,500 ton type & Furious and in 1938 it was to have six ships of the 22,500 ton type.
The September 1939 aircraft carrier force would consist of the six 22,500 ton ships, Furious and Hermes. The FAA would have at least 30 squadrons of carrier aircraft plus catapult aircraft aboard the Royal Navy's capital ships and cruisers.
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New Golconda on the History Politics ad Current Affairs board posted a useful suuggestion a while back.
With perfect hindsight it is hard to ignore the need for more 300ft, twin screw 20knot escorts early in the war, though having said that
It seems pretty clear to me the RN and Dominion navies should have ordered more Sloops – 1930-1936.
They are essentially unlimited by the London treaty. Their cost is very low - in the 100-200,000 pounds band.
Their main limitation is the dual role minesweeping. This limited their draft – which in turn influenced seakeeping. It also set their power as that required to tow the sweep at 12 knots – which worked out to a top speed of 16.5-17 knots. They dropped the minesweeping role for the Bitterns – added 50% more power for 19knots and produced some pretty useful units – DP AA – asdic – depth charges 1200 tons – but not in enough numbers, and built to warship standards with turbines, not suited to mass production.
Building a full 8 sloop flotilla every year 1930-1936 adds roughly 1 million pounds to each year’s estimates in terms of construction and repair – as well as spread work through the depressed shipbuilding industry. The end result is over 30 additional ocean going escorts. And there is no need to maintain these additional ships in commission – they can sit in reserve, rotating with the historic ships in commission, foregoing much increase in operating cost.
This leads back to – IMHO – one of the main issues that dogged the RN 1939-1942. It’s not the Treaties, it’s not so much the ten year rule, though the ravages of that were bad – it was rescinded in 1935 and its worst excesses made good 1935-1936 through some supplementary estimates. The worst problem the RN faced between the wars was the drop in its annual estimate from the early mid 20’s plateau of 57-61 million pounds per annum from 1923-1928 (pretty much the Beatty years) through a trough of 1928-1935 with a nadir in 1932 of 50.5 million pounds.
Maintaining the estimates at 57 million pounds through 1928-1935 results in a cumulative additional expenditure of 22 million pounds.
The RN could not do too much more with cruisers and destroyers 1930-1936 because of treaties, but what they could do with this money would include.
* Building a full flotilla of sloops each year – 6 million pounds.
*Avoid economies in cruiser and destroyer programs - 1 million pounds.
*Bring forward the carrier program – laying down Ark Royal in 1931 rather than 1935 – 4 million pounds, to be followed by a second new carrier with the benefit of Ark Royal experience as per historic in the 1934 estimate.
*Building up FAA numbers and aircrew reserves - $? Here – Chatfield roughly costed operational embarked aircraft including replacement, maintenance and operating costs at 15,000 pounds per annum. – prices forming an additional squadron in 31, 33, 34, 35 at 2 million pounds. Aircraft are dear.
* This leaves 9 million pounds that could be spent on modernisation of the battlefleet 1930-1936 – an area where the RN significantly underspent the USN and IJN in this era. The RN spent 1940-41 trying to face off the modern Italian fleet in the Mediterranean using heterogeneous squadrons of battlecruisers, modernised QE’s and unmodernised and desperately slow R class ships, leading to multiple situations were a single ship was exposed and isolate against multiple enemy capital ships with the distant support of an 18knot R with short ranged guns. It’s a bit early for modernisations that incorporate DP armament – but re-machining to re establish original speeds, modernised horizontal protection, modern directors and fire control and increased main armament elevation are possible – and on roughly 2-2.5 million pounds. At this rate we could fit in another 3-4 reconstructions in the 1930-1936 period – giving the RN are far more capable and homogenous battlefleet by 1940.
Background data – largely from Conways.
RN program year, annual total naval estimate, orders of new ships that program year.
1923, 58m, 1 submarine
1924, 56m, 5 8in cruisers, 2 destroyers
1925, 61m, 4 8in cruisers
1926, 58m, 3 8in cruisers , 6 submarines
1927, 58m, 1 8in cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 submarines, 2 sloops
1928, 57m, 9 destroyers, 4 submarines, 4 sloops
1929, 56m, 1 6in cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 submarines, 4 sloops
1930, 51.7m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 4 sloops
1931, 51.6m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1932, 50.5m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1933, 53.6m 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 2 minesweepers
1934, 56.6m, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 2 minesweepers.
1935, 60m, 3 6in cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 sloops, 2 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1936, 70m, 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 6in cruisers, 5 5.25in cruisers, 18 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1937, 78.1m, 3 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 6in cruisers, 2 5.25in cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sloops, 3 patrol vessels, 4 minesweepers.
1938, 93.7m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 3 5.25in cruisers, 3 fast minelayers, 3 submarines, 1 aircraft maintenance ship
1939 69.4m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 6in cruisers, 1 fast minelayer, 16 destroyers, 20 hunts, 2 sloops, 56 corvettes, 20 minesweepers
The correspondence between Britain and the US in the 20’s on modernisation focuses on what the British government termed “unnecessary cost” of modernisations – if you don’t do it, we don’t need to do it – we are all better off. This I suggest points out one of the major problems with the whole treaty system – Britain and the US were firm friends with common interests – and all strict compliance with the treaties did was harm their friend’s interests while comforting their enemies.
Probably the most critical deficiencies aboard the R’s (and the QE’s) was the horizontal protection, it was made up of laminations of HT plates, and its design left gaps where it interacted with the horizontal scheme such that a cheap shot into the vitals was possible. Against the German and Italian 15in battleships, the R’s were no better than five minute ships.
The RN recognised this problem – and Barham was the first to get the rebuilt (and treaty compliant horizontal upgrade) 4in KNC on 1in HT over the mags, less over the machinery Jan 1931- Jan 1934.
Royal Oak got 4in KNC over magazines and 2.5in on machinery – all over 1in HT in her 1934-36 refit
Plans were in place to get this upgrade at least aboard the remaining R’s in 1939 – the war intervened – though Royal Sovereign and Ramilies did get 2in KNC over magazines in 1942.
Main armament elevation got all the headlines, but what was probably more important was the adoption of the new 1938 5/10 crh 1938lb shell. This shell achieved several thousand additional yards range at any given range in any case – and more importantly, its danger space increased at any given range.
The new fire control the high elevation ships got pre war – deleting the WWI era modified Dreyer tables for the all new director control tower (DCT) and admiralty fire control table, as well as associated improvements in cross level correction, improved electrical transmission, compensation for own ships course and other errors. The DCT was weather tight – unlike the old aloft spotting positions – and integrated all the key fire control people in the one structure – in conditions where they could work to their full potential – and the lack of this in Hood probably explained why that ship did not fire accurately through the high speed approach at Denmark Straits.
All the R’s got 4in twin HA armament, HACS and pom-poms – essentially giving them the Royal Navies idea of a proper AA suite for a modern cruiser. These were fitted in staged refits through the 1930’s along with other changes – modifications to bridges, suppressing torpedo tubes etc.
Machinery upgrades were not in the plans for the R’s (nor the QE’s modernised pre 1935) – probably due to plans for the replacement. However – the advantages were significant – aside from restoration of original speed (22 knots pre bulging) – there is significantly greater endurance (on the order of +50%) – much greater machinery subdivision and hence torpedo protection – and reliability.
It is commonly stated that these ships were not able to be modernised due to their reduced size and margins of stability over the QE’s. While that might be true to a point, the protection upgrades fitted to Royal Oak, and planned for other ships shows something could be done. Increases to main armament elevation, modification for the new shells, and swapping the fire control out did not add significant weight. The replacement of old machinery did save weight low in the ship in the fully rebuilt QE’s and Renown – if this change in weight distribution was a problem for the low margin R’s – you could always ballast the machinery spaces back to the original machinery weight – leaving a ship with the original margins of stability accepted for the Royal Oak partial rebuild.
The resulting ships would have had limitations – 22knot top speed – cruiser level AA armament – underwater protection. But in the business of engaging and sinking enemy heavy units they would have been very tough little nuts to crack. Modern 1938lb shells – well directed out to 30,000 yards – 13in vertical protection and 4+1in horizontal over magazines.
Another aspect of earlier reconstruction is the possibility of doing something with Nelson and Rodney. Hood had received her mid life deep refit 1929-1931 leaving her last in the queue for reconstruction. Nelson and Rodney – brand new in 1927 – were due or overdue in 1939 – and they were planned to be taken in hand over the next year or two for full reconstruction, machinery overhaul and complete replacement of their electronics as well as a number of revisions to protection and armament yet to be determined. The modernised version of these ships would have been extremely powerful vessels – limited to 23knots – but forming homogenous tactical units with the rest of the British old ships. Nelson struck a mine, and a lot was able to be done during the period of repair – though Rodney – in the worst condition, had to be continuously patched over – her machinery suffering severe steam leaks, her top speed down to 19 knots, and her endurance significantly down as well.
Starting the battle fleet reconstruction in a serious way in 1930 – rather than 1934 – may give you the time, and the number of high value modernised units to cover operational commitments to start their mid life refits in 1937 or 1938.
With perfect hindsight it is hard to ignore the need for more 300ft, twin screw 20knot escorts early in the war, though having said that
It seems pretty clear to me the RN and Dominion navies should have ordered more Sloops – 1930-1936.
They are essentially unlimited by the London treaty. Their cost is very low - in the 100-200,000 pounds band.
Their main limitation is the dual role minesweeping. This limited their draft – which in turn influenced seakeeping. It also set their power as that required to tow the sweep at 12 knots – which worked out to a top speed of 16.5-17 knots. They dropped the minesweeping role for the Bitterns – added 50% more power for 19knots and produced some pretty useful units – DP AA – asdic – depth charges 1200 tons – but not in enough numbers, and built to warship standards with turbines, not suited to mass production.
Building a full 8 sloop flotilla every year 1930-1936 adds roughly 1 million pounds to each year’s estimates in terms of construction and repair – as well as spread work through the depressed shipbuilding industry. The end result is over 30 additional ocean going escorts. And there is no need to maintain these additional ships in commission – they can sit in reserve, rotating with the historic ships in commission, foregoing much increase in operating cost.
This leads back to – IMHO – one of the main issues that dogged the RN 1939-1942. It’s not the Treaties, it’s not so much the ten year rule, though the ravages of that were bad – it was rescinded in 1935 and its worst excesses made good 1935-1936 through some supplementary estimates. The worst problem the RN faced between the wars was the drop in its annual estimate from the early mid 20’s plateau of 57-61 million pounds per annum from 1923-1928 (pretty much the Beatty years) through a trough of 1928-1935 with a nadir in 1932 of 50.5 million pounds.
Maintaining the estimates at 57 million pounds through 1928-1935 results in a cumulative additional expenditure of 22 million pounds.
The RN could not do too much more with cruisers and destroyers 1930-1936 because of treaties, but what they could do with this money would include.
* Building a full flotilla of sloops each year – 6 million pounds.
*Avoid economies in cruiser and destroyer programs - 1 million pounds.
*Bring forward the carrier program – laying down Ark Royal in 1931 rather than 1935 – 4 million pounds, to be followed by a second new carrier with the benefit of Ark Royal experience as per historic in the 1934 estimate.
*Building up FAA numbers and aircrew reserves - $? Here – Chatfield roughly costed operational embarked aircraft including replacement, maintenance and operating costs at 15,000 pounds per annum. – prices forming an additional squadron in 31, 33, 34, 35 at 2 million pounds. Aircraft are dear.
* This leaves 9 million pounds that could be spent on modernisation of the battlefleet 1930-1936 – an area where the RN significantly underspent the USN and IJN in this era. The RN spent 1940-41 trying to face off the modern Italian fleet in the Mediterranean using heterogeneous squadrons of battlecruisers, modernised QE’s and unmodernised and desperately slow R class ships, leading to multiple situations were a single ship was exposed and isolate against multiple enemy capital ships with the distant support of an 18knot R with short ranged guns. It’s a bit early for modernisations that incorporate DP armament – but re-machining to re establish original speeds, modernised horizontal protection, modern directors and fire control and increased main armament elevation are possible – and on roughly 2-2.5 million pounds. At this rate we could fit in another 3-4 reconstructions in the 1930-1936 period – giving the RN are far more capable and homogenous battlefleet by 1940.
Background data – largely from Conways.
RN program year, annual total naval estimate, orders of new ships that program year.
1923, 58m, 1 submarine
1924, 56m, 5 8in cruisers, 2 destroyers
1925, 61m, 4 8in cruisers
1926, 58m, 3 8in cruisers , 6 submarines
1927, 58m, 1 8in cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 submarines, 2 sloops
1928, 57m, 9 destroyers, 4 submarines, 4 sloops
1929, 56m, 1 6in cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 submarines, 4 sloops
1930, 51.7m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 4 sloops
1931, 51.6m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1932, 50.5m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1933, 53.6m 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 2 minesweepers
1934, 56.6m, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 2 minesweepers.
1935, 60m, 3 6in cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 sloops, 2 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1936, 70m, 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 6in cruisers, 5 5.25in cruisers, 18 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1937, 78.1m, 3 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 6in cruisers, 2 5.25in cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sloops, 3 patrol vessels, 4 minesweepers.
1938, 93.7m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 3 5.25in cruisers, 3 fast minelayers, 3 submarines, 1 aircraft maintenance ship
1939 69.4m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 6in cruisers, 1 fast minelayer, 16 destroyers, 20 hunts, 2 sloops, 56 corvettes, 20 minesweepers
The correspondence between Britain and the US in the 20’s on modernisation focuses on what the British government termed “unnecessary cost” of modernisations – if you don’t do it, we don’t need to do it – we are all better off. This I suggest points out one of the major problems with the whole treaty system – Britain and the US were firm friends with common interests – and all strict compliance with the treaties did was harm their friend’s interests while comforting their enemies.
Probably the most critical deficiencies aboard the R’s (and the QE’s) was the horizontal protection, it was made up of laminations of HT plates, and its design left gaps where it interacted with the horizontal scheme such that a cheap shot into the vitals was possible. Against the German and Italian 15in battleships, the R’s were no better than five minute ships.
The RN recognised this problem – and Barham was the first to get the rebuilt (and treaty compliant horizontal upgrade) 4in KNC on 1in HT over the mags, less over the machinery Jan 1931- Jan 1934.
Royal Oak got 4in KNC over magazines and 2.5in on machinery – all over 1in HT in her 1934-36 refit
Plans were in place to get this upgrade at least aboard the remaining R’s in 1939 – the war intervened – though Royal Sovereign and Ramilies did get 2in KNC over magazines in 1942.
Main armament elevation got all the headlines, but what was probably more important was the adoption of the new 1938 5/10 crh 1938lb shell. This shell achieved several thousand additional yards range at any given range in any case – and more importantly, its danger space increased at any given range.
The new fire control the high elevation ships got pre war – deleting the WWI era modified Dreyer tables for the all new director control tower (DCT) and admiralty fire control table, as well as associated improvements in cross level correction, improved electrical transmission, compensation for own ships course and other errors. The DCT was weather tight – unlike the old aloft spotting positions – and integrated all the key fire control people in the one structure – in conditions where they could work to their full potential – and the lack of this in Hood probably explained why that ship did not fire accurately through the high speed approach at Denmark Straits.
All the R’s got 4in twin HA armament, HACS and pom-poms – essentially giving them the Royal Navies idea of a proper AA suite for a modern cruiser. These were fitted in staged refits through the 1930’s along with other changes – modifications to bridges, suppressing torpedo tubes etc.
Machinery upgrades were not in the plans for the R’s (nor the QE’s modernised pre 1935) – probably due to plans for the replacement. However – the advantages were significant – aside from restoration of original speed (22 knots pre bulging) – there is significantly greater endurance (on the order of +50%) – much greater machinery subdivision and hence torpedo protection – and reliability.
It is commonly stated that these ships were not able to be modernised due to their reduced size and margins of stability over the QE’s. While that might be true to a point, the protection upgrades fitted to Royal Oak, and planned for other ships shows something could be done. Increases to main armament elevation, modification for the new shells, and swapping the fire control out did not add significant weight. The replacement of old machinery did save weight low in the ship in the fully rebuilt QE’s and Renown – if this change in weight distribution was a problem for the low margin R’s – you could always ballast the machinery spaces back to the original machinery weight – leaving a ship with the original margins of stability accepted for the Royal Oak partial rebuild.
The resulting ships would have had limitations – 22knot top speed – cruiser level AA armament – underwater protection. But in the business of engaging and sinking enemy heavy units they would have been very tough little nuts to crack. Modern 1938lb shells – well directed out to 30,000 yards – 13in vertical protection and 4+1in horizontal over magazines.
Another aspect of earlier reconstruction is the possibility of doing something with Nelson and Rodney. Hood had received her mid life deep refit 1929-1931 leaving her last in the queue for reconstruction. Nelson and Rodney – brand new in 1927 – were due or overdue in 1939 – and they were planned to be taken in hand over the next year or two for full reconstruction, machinery overhaul and complete replacement of their electronics as well as a number of revisions to protection and armament yet to be determined. The modernised version of these ships would have been extremely powerful vessels – limited to 23knots – but forming homogenous tactical units with the rest of the British old ships. Nelson struck a mine, and a lot was able to be done during the period of repair – though Rodney – in the worst condition, had to be continuously patched over – her machinery suffering severe steam leaks, her top speed down to 19 knots, and her endurance significantly down as well.
Starting the battle fleet reconstruction in a serious way in 1930 – rather than 1934 – may give you the time, and the number of high value modernised units to cover operational commitments to start their mid life refits in 1937 or 1938.