Best British interwar fleet?

[McPherson]

The disadvantage began with the Americans holding Henderson Field. For most of the campaign the Japanese had to fly all the way from Rabaul. They didn't build intermediary air bases till late in the campaign. They also never knew how big the USMC Force was on Guadalcanal, or how much firepower they had. To defeat the Marines they'd need to land at least 2 divisions, with heavy weapons, with supplies for a period of weeks. Since they couldn't do that, they never should have started down that road. They ended up exhausting their air, naval, and logistical resources, and put themselves on the permanent defense

The IJA had faced larger better equipped and positioned enemy forces before; China; Russia; UK; the Americans in the Philippines. They understood, that it was a question of tenacity and sea-power AIRPOWER and supply, not the numbers of troops that decided issues in the terrain over which they fought. Knock out the enemy airpower and deny the use of the sea and the ground campaign should take care of itself. The Japanese also knew that as the attacker, they had the initiative and that they only had to pierce and collapse a perimeter defense on Guadalcanal. A local attack that reached into the interior of the Marine defense could slice the defenders up section by section. This is the part of the campaign that we armchair generals forget. It was what worried Vandegrift. it was why Turner's failure to secure the seas around Savo Island was such a disaster and not just the loss of the four cruisers (no minefields for the channels, no cover of Indispensable Strait, no radar site set up on Savo Island or FREAKING ARTLLERY?) The Japanese figured they had to land their own heavy artillery or float it in and they tried. That was the business with Eastern Solomon Islands, Cape Esperance, The battleship runs against Henderson Field of 14 October was the float attempt. Santa Cruz followed that little exercise and neutered USN floating aviation. The US could not float it (supply) in after that one, so they established AN AIR BRIDGE and flew it in. This was not what the IJA or IJN anticipated. Bullets, artillery shells, aviation gas, planes and even equipment and supplies to repair the shot up runways. The battleship runs after Santa Cruz Islands of November 12-15 November were supposed to finish what they had partially accomplished a month earlier. (Why the delay? It turns out the Japanese had a fuel crisis, so they had to build up stocks at Chu'uk and Rabaul. Also they had to beat Kinkaid and Halsey at Santa Cruz.). It would not have mattered if Lee lost the battle on 15 November 1942, the air bridge would have held because the Japanese could not stop the transport planes coming in after the Marines patched the runways again. No continuous CAP. Still Lee won and after that event, it became the Americans who needed to build up a corps to dislodge the IJA presence on Guadalcanal.

The Japanese actually HAD their 2 divisions on Guadalcanal with sufficient supplies for a whole month despite American efforts. So... They lost the ground campaign soldier against soldier, fair and square, too.

Japan simply faced an insoluble strategic problem. If for no other reason then the Submarine War they were going to run out of oil by the end of 1944. After that they start running out of food, and every other strategic material. Then again they did understand they'd probable lose, no matter what they did. They only started the war from a feeling of desperation, mixed with a suicidal zeal for glory, and a vain hope that somehow destiny would save them. The U.S. Ambassador to Japan in 1941 tried to warn Washington that if pressed to hard Japan could make an irrational move, and they did. A lot of people like to engage in magical thinking.

If the submarine war was to work, then one has to recognize that IGHQ was not stupid. They, the IJN, EXPECTED that a guerre de course based on WWI German performance rates to be mounted against them. The IJN warned that this would cost the Japanese merchant marine about 40% of its lift built or expected tio be built in 3 years of fighting and recommended that any plans for the southern resources area that meant the loss of 3.5 million tonnes of shipping capacity be factored. That 1941-1943 fighting actually yielded only HALF of those losses surprised the IJN.

Why would a nation accept such a slaughter of its merchant marine and go into war without convoy escort forces? (Looking at you, Great Britain and the United States Navy DOWN TO THE PRESENT. Take a look at the CHINESE navy. Lots of frigates and ASW capability has in them appeared recently.)

The IJN looked at their US enemy and thought... even in peacetime, that big bully is twice as big as we are and even though we strain with all our might, we will never be to able to reach defensive/offensive naval parity so that we can attack into the southern resources area. We could, however, if we gave up on trying to protect our merchant marine, which he must do, build to near parity in decisive battle forces and match him that way. One Tsushima, might take three years of belt tightened warfare and then we can negotiate a peace. All offense.

How did that work for them? Exactly as they hoped. They got their three years and... then came the fourth year and it all came apart.

 

[Belisarius II]

Interesting comments. The IJA hadn't faced the kind of enemy they faced on Guadalcanal. The Chinese weren't a modern, well trained force in the 1930's. They only had a few solid, well trained divisions that put up a strong defense of Nanking at the start of the "China Incident". When they fought the Soviets in 1938-39 they lost badly. Has you say naval, and air control doomed the American/Pilipino Army in 1942. Of the Pilipino troops only the Scouts were fully trained, and the whole army starved because of MacArthur's complete failure to stockpile food on Bataan, while they still had time to do so. With all their disadvantages they still fought the Japanese Army to a standstill for months. The Indian, and Commonwealth troops in Malaya were completely out of their depth, badly trained, and led, and unable to form the only kind of defense lines they understood. The IJA deserves credit for it's strong leadership, moral, mobility, and yes tenacity. Simply put the Japanese had the daring that the Commonwealth Forces in Malaya lacked.

The Japanese actually HAD their 2 divisions on Guadalcanal with sufficient supplies for a whole month despite American efforts. So... They lost the ground campaign soldier against soldier, fair and square, too.

Yes at one point the Japanese did have 2 divisions on Guadalcanal, but they were hardly up to the job. Their artillery was capable of little more then nuisance fire, they never gave effective support in any of the major attacks. Shells were brought forward by hand, or wheelbarrows. The moment fresh troops arrived on the Island they started to go hungry. Medical services were almost none existent. Communications were incredibly crude, making coordinated attacks hit, and miss at best. Just getting from their landing areas to the Marine Perimeter, was a major effort. None of their major attacks managed to penetrate the Perimeter, with every one ending in a massacre.

The USMC on the other hand had extensive experience in jungle fighting, from it's Central American, and Caribbean Banana Wars. They knew how to set up isolated base camps, and form all round perimeters, with overlapping fields of fire, and pre sighted artillery. Marine Artillery was more modern, and far more effective, with good communications for the time. Their 37mm cannister rounds were devastating. The Marines had a small tank force, that was far more effective then the Japanese tank platoon which was wiped out in minutes. Of course Vandergrift was concerned about a breakthrough, but he always had reserves, including that company of light tanks. The USMC had small numbers of jeeps, and trucks that gave them some mobility inside the perimeter, with tractors to reposition artillery. On top of that during daylight the marines had the best close air support in the world, with aircraft on call in minutes. The Marine's position on Guadalcanal was always precarious because of the naval situation, but the perimeter never came close to being overrun, let alone collapsing.

Has for mining the straights leading into Iron Bottom Sound it would have been a bad idea. Mines drift, and the currents north of Guadalcanal flow southward, the mines would have drifted into IBS, where Allied Ships were operating. We would have sunk more of our own ships, then the Japanese. Using Savo Island for a Coast Watch station wouldn't have been very useful. By the time someone on Savo detects IJN Ships it's too late to warn anyone. A radar station wouldn't help much ether. Your thinking a task force could have formed plots based on reports from Savo, they couldn't do things like that in WWII. You'd need something like the Navy Tactical Data System, "NTDS" which the USN didn't have till the 1960's.

Putting a battery of 75mm guns on Savo isn't that helpful ether. (You really don't have any guns to spare anyway, or marines to garrison Savo.) Your not going to be hitting fast moving ships, at night from thousands of yards away, or doing much damage even if you get a lucky hit. You don't have "Identify Friend From Foe" technology, since both sides are passing nearby, shooting at each other, how do you pick targets? It's for the same reasons that Marine Artillery on Guadalcanal didn't do much shooting at Japanese ships, it's just not realistic.



If the submarine war was to work, then one has to recognize that IGHQ was not stupid. They, the IJN, EXPECTED that a guerre de course based on WWI German performance rates to be mounted against them. The IJN warned that this would cost the Japanese merchant marine about 40% of its lift built or expected tio be built in 3 years of fighting and recommended that any plans for the southern resources area that meant the loss of 3.5 million tonnes of shipping capacity be factored. That 1941-1943 fighting actually yielded only HALF of those losses surprised the IJN.

The Japanese got two breaks in the Submarine War. First the USN had defective torpedoes. Second the USN sent most of their subs to attack warships.

Why would a nation accept such a slaughter of its merchant marine and go into war without convoy escort forces? (Looking at you, Great Britain and the United States Navy DOWN TO THE PRESENT. Take a look at the CHINESE navy. Lots of frigates and ASW capability has in them appeared recently.)

The Chinese Navy is very worried about USN, SSN's. The real problem they have is the USN would shut down all Chinese Ocean Trade from thousands of miles away, without firing a shot. The U.S. and it's Allies control all the trade routes, and are their biggest trading partners to begin with. China better build an oil pipeline from Russia, if they want a wartime oil supply. But again today everyone's subs are gunning for warships. Now if a war went long merchant ships might become major targets, but China isn't going to be forming convoys, accept maybe coastal convoys, since their not going to have any oceanic traffic.

The IJN looked at their US enemy and thought... even in peacetime, that big bully is twice as big as we are and even though we strain with all our might, we will never be to able to reach defensive/offensive naval parity so that we can attack into the southern resources area. We could, however, if we gave up on trying to protect our merchant marine, which he must do, build to near parity in decisive battle forces and match him that way. One Tsushima, might take three years of belt tightened warfare and then we can negotiate a peace. All offense.

How did that work for them? Exactly as they hoped. They got their three years and... then came the fourth year and it all came apart.[/QUOTE]

By December 7 1944 Japan was finished. Most of the IJN was on the bottom of the Ocean, has was most of the merchant fleet. At this point U.S. surface ships, and aircraft are moving into positions to join in on the attack of Japanese merchant ships. The USAAF is getting ready to start bombing Japanese Cities. It's all over but the dying. Japan's continued resistance was insane. "Pride goeth before a fall." What a tragedy.

 

[McPherson]

Interesting comments. The IJA hadn't faced the kind of enemy they faced on Guadalcanal. The Chinese weren't a modern, well trained force in the 1930's. They only had a few solid, well trained divisions that put up a strong defense of Nanking at the start of the "China Incident". When they fought the Soviets in 1938-39 they lost badly. Has you say naval, and air control doomed the American/Pilipino Army in 1942. Of the Pilipino troops only the Scouts were fully trained, and the whole army starved because of MacArthur's complete failure to stockpile food on Bataan, while they still had time to do so. With all their disadvantages they still fought the Japanese Army to a standstill for months. The Indian, and Commonwealth troops in Malaya were completely out of their depth, badly trained, and led, and unable to form the only kind of defense lines they understood. The IJA deserves credit for it's strong leadership, moral, mobility, and yes tenacity. Simply put the Japanese had the daring that the Commonwealth Forces in Malaya lacked.

The Chinese of 1894... (…"Another Splendid Mess You Got Us Into, Teddy!" Current author.) are the modern Chinese of which I speak. Those clowns had German Krupp artillery and a British French trained army. That was Japan's first real test of fighting a bigger stronger more modern enemy.

The Japanese actually HAD their 2 divisions on Guadalcanal with sufficient supplies for a whole month despite American efforts. So... They lost the ground campaign soldier against soldier, fair and square, too.

Yes at one point the Japanese did have 2 divisions on Guadalcanal, but they were hardly up to the job. Their artillery was capable of little more then nuisance fire, they never gave effective support in any of the major attacks. Shells were brought forward by hand, or wheelbarrows. The moment fresh troops arrived on the Island they started to go hungry. Medical services were almost none existent. Communications were incredibly crude, making coordinated attacks hit, and miss at best. Just getting from their landing areas to the Marine Perimeter, was a major effort. None of their major attacks managed to penetrate the Perimeter, with every one ending in a massacre.[/quote]

1. The Americans faced EXACTLY the same conditions. Across the perimeter it was human packed. Medical service was if you could crawl to an aide station. At least the Japanese had wheel barrows. The Americans had to manpack everything to Eisner Ridge.

The USMC on the other hand had extensive experience in jungle fighting, from it's Central American, and Caribbean Banana Wars. They knew how to set up isolated base camps, and form all round perimeters, with overlapping fields of fire, and pre sighted artillery. Marine Artillery was more modern, and far more effective, with good communications for the time. (No; it wasn't; their radios quit and the telephone wires kept getting cut by Japanese infiltrators who also tapped into the lines. McP.) Their 37mm cannister rounds were devastating (True. When they could shoot through the jungle. McP.). The Marines had a small tank force, that was far more effective then the Japanese tank platoon which was wiped out in minutes. Of course Vandergrift was concerned about a breakthrough, but he always had reserves, including that company of light tanks. The USMC had small numbers of jeeps, and trucks that gave them some mobility inside the perimeter, with tractors to reposition artillery. On top of that during daylight the marines had the best close air support in the world, with aircraft on call in minutes. The Marine's position on Guadalcanal was always precarious because of the naval situation, but the perimeter never came close to being overrun, let alone collapsing.

3. You and I must have read different sources.

Has for mining the straights leading into Iron Bottom Sound it would have been a bad idea. Mines drift, and the currents north of Guadalcanal flow southward, the mines would have drifted into IBS, where Allied Ships were operating. We would have sunk more of our own ships, then the Japanese. Using Savo Island for a Coast Watch station wouldn't have been very useful. By the time someone on Savo detects IJN Ships it's too late to warn anyone. A radar station wouldn't help much ether. Your thinking a task force could have formed plots based on reports from Savo, they couldn't do things like that in WWII. You'd need something like the Navy Tactical Data System, "NTDS" which the USN didn't have till the 1960's.

4.. Here. (Fair use cited.)

Influence mines were the most difficult to detect and counter. They also drifted less than the other types of mines, and therefore were easier to “reseed” (that is, lay additional mines in the field) and sustain. Moored mines could be either contact or influence and could be laid almost without depth restrictions. They were the easiest to detect and remove, however, and had a tendency to drift with wind and current over time. This made moored minefields more difficult to maintain.

5. Here

Mark 13

Air-dropped mine with magnetic pistol. Did not use a parachute and could be used as a bomb. 1,048 lbs. (475 kg) total with a charge of 640 lbs. (290 kg) TNT or 1,118 lbs. (507 kg) total with a charge of 710 lbs. (322 kg) Torpex.


Aircraft Mines Mark 13 and Mark 19.

Putting a battery of 75mm guns on Savo isn't that helpful ether. (You really don't have any guns to spare anyway, or marines to garrison Savo.) Your not going to be hitting fast moving ships, at night from thousands of yards away, or doing much damage even if you get a lucky hit. You don't have "Identify Friend From Foe" technology, since both sides are passing nearby, shooting at each other, how do you pick targets? It's for the same reasons that Marine Artillery on Guadalcanal didn't do much shooting at Japanese ships, it's just not realistic.

SOURCE.

6. That would be a M1917 or M1918 type gun, used by Marine defense battalions as anti-ship artillery in 1941-1943. NOTICE THE CONCRETE MOUNTABLE BASE PLATE ANTI-SHIPPING PIVOT WHEEL CALLED A PANAMA MOUNT under the truck? That gun is at Guadalcanal off Lunga Point. I see no reason why Savo Island could not have gotten a few along with the mounts.

If the submarine war was to work, then one has to recognize that IGHQ was not stupid. They, the IJN, EXPECTED that a guerre de course based on WWI German performance rates to be mounted against them. The IJN warned that this would cost the Japanese merchant marine about 40% of its lift built or expected tio be built in 3 years of fighting and recommended that any plans for the southern resources area that meant the loss of 3.5 million tonnes of shipping capacity be factored. That 1941-1943 fighting actually yielded only HALF of those losses surprised the IJN.

Not exactly.

The IJN had some luck, but that luck was...

7. This asshole and this asshole and this asshole and this asshole and this asshole, and this asshole who all either were the authors of or compounded the...
8. Mark XIV torpedo problem or ignored the warnings by SUBPAC that their (The assholes I mean, not SUBPAC's engineers or tender force. McP.)) favored HORS engined boats were absolute disasters. First year and a half of the war, where were 25% of the USN's first line modern subs? SENT BACK IN THE UNITED STATES BEING REBUILT WITH NEW POWER TRAINS AND PROPULSION UNITS.
9. RADM Christie and RADM (at the time) Lockwood operated under the delusions that their superiors and predecessors knew what they were doing. Christie gets undeserved blame for the Mark 5 exploder with the Mark 6 influence feature. That was only part of who and what fubared the Goat Island Mark XIV. Enough blame for a hundred court martials and treason trials is there in that fish which never worked right. The post war Mark XIV (now 14) was a completely rebuilt fish from exploder to tail control unit. Actually Christie got decent results for what he had at Fremantle and did what he was told to do (Carpender another asshole.). Lockwood had NIMITZ, who backed him against Stark and Leahy. Nimitz convinced the drunk, King; and THAT is why Uncle Chuck was able to make the subs numero uno in PACFLT in 1944 and get things fixed in 1943.

The Japanese got two breaks in the Submarine War. First the USN had defective torpedoes. Second the USN sent most of their subs to attack warships.

9. That is not true since most war patrols were anti-merchant ship.
10. and the USN got lucky that the IJN sent their duds (Braindead Takeo Takagi) to command their 6th fleet which was their version of SUBPAC.

3. Why would a nation accept such a slaughter of its merchant marine and go into war without convoy escort forces? (Looking at you, Great Britain and the United States Navy DOWN TO THE PRESENT. Take a look at the CHINESE navy. Lots of frigates and ASW capability has in them appeared recently.)

The Chinese Navy is very worried about USN, SSN's. The real problem they have is the USN would shut down all Chinese Ocean Trade from thousands of miles away, without firing a shot. The U.S. and it's Allies control all the trade routes, and are their biggest trading partners to begin with. China better build an oil pipeline from Russia, if they want a wartime oil supply. But again today everyone's subs are gunning for warships. Now if a war went long merchant ships might become major targets, but China isn't going to be forming convoys, accept maybe coastal convoys, since their not going to have any oceanic traffic.

The modern way to shut down trade is deniability. Accidents, non-traceable accidents. This is the default form of cold war in the Straits of Hormuz and involves MINES. Shooting unannounced (cruiser rules) at merchant ships happens to be a WAR-CRIME under the naval laws of war since the Hague Convention and accepted as such since WW II. That is why Atlantic Conveyor was Sea Lawyered into helplessness.

The IJN looked at their US enemy and thought... even in peacetime, that big bully is twice as big as we are and even though we strain with all our might, we will never be to able to reach defensive/offensive naval parity so that we can attack into the southern resources area. We could, however, if we gave up on trying to protect our merchant marine, which he must do, build to near parity in decisive battle forces and match him that way. One Tsushima, might take three years of belt tightened warfare and then we can negotiate a peace. All offense.

How did that work for them? Exactly as they hoped. They got their three years and... then came the fourth year and it all came apart.

By December 7 1944 Japan was finished. Most of the IJN was on the bottom of the Ocean, has was most of the merchant fleet. At this point U.S. surface ships, and aircraft are moving into positions to join in on the attack of Japanese merchant ships. The USAAF is getting ready to start bombing Japanese Cities. It's all over but the dying. Japan's continued resistance was insane. "Pride goeth before a fall." What a tragedy.

The stupid shall be punished. Old USN saying.

 

[McPherson]

Back to the topic.

1. G-3 conversion to flattops.

From Shipbucket.com and credited to the artist. The work is not mine.

it is however very close to what I think the British would have done if they had a Hood or two to convert a la Washington Naval Treaty. Some of the things I do not like is the forecastle flyoff platform. Another is the rather ridiculous elevator positions in the very spots that foul the trap runs. The flight deck gives me heatburn as well. if the British had adopted the French style offset flight deck planned for the Joffre class.

Credit shipbucket.com and the artist. Work is not mine.

 

[jsb]

it is however very close to what I think the British would have done if they had a Hood or two to convert a la Washington Naval Treaty. Some of the things I do not like is the forecastle flyoff platform. Another is the rather ridiculous elevator positions in the very spots that foul the trap runs. The flight deck gives me heatburn as well. if the British had adopted the French style offset flight deck planned for the Joffre class.

Comparing early 20s CVs with late 30s for designs, are we not surprised that actually building & operating CV would tell you something about how to do it?

1. G-3 conversion to flattops.

I question this one, is it not Hoods sisters not a G3, its to close to the OTL follies who where much light especially in the bows a G3 with its three turrets two far forward would easily take the weight of a much larger bow structure. Its also very light for surface guns for a 20s CV......

 

[McPherson]

Comparing early 20s CVs with late 30s for designs, are we not surprised that actually building & operating CV would tell you something about how to do it?

I question this one, is it not Hoods sisters not a G3, its to close to the OTL follies who where much light especially in the bows a G3 with its three turrets two far forward would easily take the weight of a much larger bow structure. Its also very light for surface guns for a 20s CV......

There is just one problem with the above.

I don't think the British get it, or ever get it about aircraft operations at sea when it comes to aircraft carriers until they purpose design HMS Ark Royal. Let us look at HMS Furious?

HMS Furious before conversion. Credit to Don Holloway.

The point?

When you convert a battleship or a battlecruiser into an aircraft carrier, one has the following problems.

1. Barbettes are part of the ship framing as are the engine spaces. These voids cannot be moved; especially the engines. So wherever the firerooms are, that is where the intakes and outflows for the firerooms begin. The trunking for an aircraft carrier is sideways and OUT. It intrudes into hanger space and forms a HEAT TRAP inside the hanger. The funnels and uptakes on the G3 rendition are wrong.

2. Taking into account the barbettes' voids, the hull flow lines and the engine spaces... (^^^) and the desire to keep the trunk runs short and to reframe as little as possible from the raze to the strength deck and the sponsoning difficulties and counter-massing to ballast the starboard bulge: that is what I think a G3 flattop, with lessons learned by 1928 from the Curiosities, will look like in 1936.

 

[Alanith]

Midway is a small, flat corral atoll, with no natural cover. It wasn't deeply fortified by concrete, and log bunkers like Tarawa. They didn't have any guns bigger then 5". It couldn't have held out against that kind of firepower. It would have been a larger scale version of Wake Island. The American's would have died bravely, and killed a lot of Japanese, but not enough to win. They didn't do it because it would have made no strategic sense. They couldn't have kept it supplied, anymore then the Americans could have supplied Wake Island.

Problems with that assessment:

1. The defenders outnumbered the attackers. And with the addition of non-line personnel as well as Navy, and Army Air Force personnel, out numbered the 1500 man assault force quite handily. Lovely start for the Japanese here.

2. The Japanese would have had to wade through chest deep water for several hundred yards while under intense American machine gun fire, as well as small arms, and canister shot from the half dozen tanks on the island and any survivors of the anti-boat guns.

3. The IJN has no NGS doctrine, and anything bigger then the four heavy cruisers and Two destroyer pre-invasion bombardment group is over a days sailing away hunting the American battleline. That same bombardment would be ninety minutes long. Compare that to any of the later American invasions.

4. The Japanese did not have the fleet train to hang off midway for more then a few days, maybe a week or two. They might be able to stretch that, but it would require long periods of time anchored or proceeding at little more then steering speeds. Ideal submarine targets. And the Mark XIV wasn’t THAT bad. Eventually a sub skipper gets lucky and sends Akagi, Nagato, or maybe even Yamato herself to the ocean floor. Or worse for the Japanese, with so many reported failed attacks in the same area, at the same time, against ideal targets, someone in authority threatens to send BuOrd to the front lines unless they figure out why the torpedoes are fucked.

 

[Zheng He]

Problems with that assessment:

1. The defenders outnumbered the attackers. And with the addition of non-line personnel as well as Navy, and Army Air Force personnel, out numbered the 1500 man assault force quite handily. Lovely start for the Japanese here.

2. The Japanese would have had to wade through chest deep water for several hundred yards while under intense American machine gun fire, as well as small arms, and canister shot from the half dozen tanks on the island and any survivors of the anti-boat guns.

3. The IJN has no NGS doctrine, and anything bigger then the four heavy cruisers and Two destroyer pre-invasion bombardment group is over a days sailing away hunting the American battleline. That same bombardment would be ninety minutes long. Compare that to any of the later American invasions.

4. The Japanese did not have the fleet train to hang off midway for more then a few days, maybe a week or two. They might be able to stretch that, but it would require long periods of time anchored or proceeding at little more then steering speeds. Ideal submarine targets. And the Mark XIV wasn’t THAT bad. Eventually a sub skipper gets lucky and sends Akagi, Nagato, or maybe even Yamato herself to the ocean floor. Or worse for the Japanese, with so many reported failed attacks in the same area, at the same time, against ideal targets, someone in authority threatens to send BuOrd to the front lines unless they figure out why the torpedoes are fucked.

Overall I agree with you but the Japanese landing force was actually about 2500 regulars (one SNLF battalion and one battalion from the 28th Infantry Regiment) plus two battalions of construction troops (another 2500 men) although their combat valuable was probably marginal at best.

http://www.midway1942.com/order.shtml

 

[jsb]

They didn't have any guns bigger then 5".

7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Ralph A. Collins, Jr.
7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Harold R. Warner, Jr.
backing up,
6x5" and 28x3"

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

There is just one problem with the above.

I don't think the British get it, or ever get it about aircraft operations at sea when it comes to aircraft carriers until they purpose design HMS Ark Royal. Let us look at HMS Furious?

HMS Furious before conversion. Credit to Don Holloway.

View attachment 504989

The point?

When you convert a battleship or a battlecruiser into an aircraft carrier, one has the following problems.

1. Barbettes are part of the ship framing as are the engine spaces. These voids cannot be moved; especially the engines. So wherever the firerooms are, that is where the intakes and outflows for the firerooms begin. The trunking for an aircraft carrier is sideways and OUT. It intrudes into hanger space and forms a HEAT TRAP inside the hanger. The funnels and uptakes on the G3 rendition are wrong.

View attachment 505006

2. Taking into account the barbettes' voids, the hull flow lines and the engine spaces... (^^^) and the desire to keep the trunk runs short and to reframe as little as possible from the raze to the strength deck and the sponsoning difficulties and counter-massing to ballast the starboard bulge: that is what I think a G3 flattop, with lessons learned by 1928 from the Curiosities, will look like in 1936.

Furious was the result of a series of modifications done on the fly during wartime with the aim of "get something to support the Grand Fleet in service as quickly as possible". Only after the war did they have the time to sit down and work out what was needed, something that had never been done before and like all prototype they made mistakes, some of which were forced on them by the original design they had to work with. That said the only truly glaring mistake they made with Furious's final configuration was the flush deck and venting the exhaust over the stern which cost her a quarter of her air group. Something they corrected with her sisters. Could she have economically been rebuilt to match them? Possibly, I don't know. All told she was a successful ship who served the RN well for nearly 30 years of peace and war.

 

[McPherson]

Furious was the result of a series of modifications done on the fly during wartime with the aim of "get something to support the Grand Fleet in service as quickly as possible". Only after the war did they have the time to sit down and work out what was needed, something that had never been done before and like all prototype they made mistakes, some of which were forced on them by the original design they had to work with. That said the only truly glaring mistake they made with Furious's final configuration was the flush deck and venting the exhaust over the stern which cost her a quarter of her air group. Something they corrected with her sisters. All told she was a successful ship who served the RN well for nearly 30 years of peace and war.

I picked on the poor old Furious, because she was where the British learned their lessons. For the USN it was the USS Ranger. Everyone, new to aircraft carriers, has to start from zero and for the RN it was HMS Furious. No reflection on her service was intended, though as an aircraft carrier she was "never quite right". Shrug. McP.

 

[alspug]

7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Ralph A. Collins, Jr.
7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Harold R. Warner, Jr.
backing up,
6x5" and 28x3"

Those 7 inch guns had a good rate of fire and armour penetration . 4 rds per minute out to 12,000 yards . pen at that range is over 3 inches rising to 6.3 at 6,000 yards .
The 5 inch was no slouch either , 2 inch pen at 8,000 yards and a high velocity .


In my opinion any Japanese heavy cruiser would have been roughly handled if engaged at less then 9,000 yards . I suspect the Japanese may have lost a few destroyers and a Cruiser or two .

 

[Alanith]

Overall I agree with you but the Japanese landing force was actually about 2500 regulars (one SNLF battalion and one battalion from the 28th Infantry Regiment) plus two battalions of construction troops (another 2500 men) although their combat valuable was probably marginal at best.

http://www.midway1942.com/order.shtml

Well that’s what working off memory at work gets me.

 

[Belisarius II]

7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Ralph A. Collins, Jr.
7" Battery: 2×7" (178 mm)/45 Mark 2 Capt. Harold R. Warner, Jr.
backing up,
6x5" and 28x3"

I stand corrected. I didn't know the navy had shipped these guns to Midway. I still don't see these guns driving off battleships.

 

[SsgtC]

I stand corrected. I didn't know the navy had shipped these guns to Midway. I still don't see these guns driving off battleships.

They don't have to drive off Battleships. The Japanese did not use their Battleships for shore bombardment at the time the Battle of Midway took place. At most they would go up against heavy cruisers during the 90 min shore bombardment

 

[Belisarius II]

Problems with that assessment:

1. The defenders outnumbered the attackers. And with the addition of non-line personnel as well as Navy, and Army Air Force personnel, out numbered the 1500 man assault force quite handily. Lovely start for the Japanese here.

2. The Japanese would have had to wade through chest deep water for several hundred yards while under intense American machine gun fire, as well as small arms, and canister shot from the half dozen tanks on the island and any survivors of the anti-boat guns.

3. The IJN has no NGS doctrine, and anything bigger then the four heavy cruisers and Two destroyer pre-invasion bombardment group is over a days sailing away hunting the American battleline. That same bombardment would be ninety minutes long. Compare that to any of the later American invasions.

4. The Japanese did not have the fleet train to hang off midway for more then a few days, maybe a week or two. They might be able to stretch that, but it would require long periods of time anchored or proceeding at little more then steering speeds. Ideal submarine targets. And the Mark XIV wasn’t THAT bad. Eventually a sub skipper gets lucky and sends Akagi, Nagato, or maybe even Yamato herself to the ocean floor. Or worse for the Japanese, with so many reported failed attacks in the same area, at the same time, against ideal targets, someone in authority threatens to send BuOrd to the front lines unless they figure out why the torpedoes are fucked.

If the Japanese are using Daihatsu Class landing craft, which is their most common type they have a 2.6 feet draft. That means the Japanese aren't doing what the Marines had to do at Tarawa and wade through hundreds of yards of chest deep water. The Battleships Kongo, and Hiei are part of the invasion group, as well as patrol boats to close in with the landing craft. They may not have a good NGS doctrine but they know how to hit shore batteries, they knocked out the guns on Wake Island. They don't have to sit off Midway for weeks, one way or the other it'll be over in a day, or two.

 

[marathag]

They don't have to sit off Midway for weeks, one way or the other it'll be over in a day, or two.

So they hoped.

Don't forget, the US expected Peleliu to a be a four day campaign too, and that was after a lot of other Island assaults

 

[Belisarius II]

So they hoped.

Don't forget, the US expected Peleliu to a be a four day campaign too, and that was after a lot of other Island assaults

Respectfully Peleliu was a much bigger island, with jungle covered mountains, and extensive cave systems which the Japanese fortified. Midway's a flat corral atoll, with no natural cover.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Midway_Atoll_aerial_photo_2008.JPG

Just where do you take cover, and conceal your forces on these two spits of land?

 

[Dorknought]

It would have been the 3rd time the IJN bombarded Midway:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Bombardment_of_Midway

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I took these notes from a passage called, "Notable Riddles of the Sky," from Night Fighters by Bill Gunston.

The cathode ray tube was developed by World War One and GEC of the USA invented a magnetron in 1921. By the middle 1920s the basic ingredients of radar existed. Indeed workable systems could have been used in World War One. Hülsemeyer had pestered the Admiralty with a system in 1908.

The US Navy began radar work in 1922 and in 1930 the US Army was brought in. The Kriegsmarine began work in radar in 1933 after deciding that if it worked with sonar it could work for radar. By 1938 it had developed a gunnery radar and was fitting it to large warships. The Royal Navy did not have any until 1941. Seekat was joined by Freya an early warning set, which was mobile, had 360⁰ coverage and a range of 75 miles. There was also Würzburg a gun laying set for the Flak. These 50 centimetre sets were the best mass produced sets in the world before World War II.

By comparison the British did not begin radar development until 1935.

However, Gunston also wrote that a 50 centimetre naval radar was suggested by the Admiralty Signals Research Establishment (ASRE) in 1931 and that King George V suggested it in 1931 after hearing about asdic at an Admiralty lecture, but the speaker thought it was not yet possible.

ITTL I want King George V's and the ASRE's suggestions to be taken seriously enough for the British to begin their radar programme in 1931 instead of 1935. There should be enough money available because @Hood has allowed us to spend £50 million a year more on defence 1919-39 with £20 million of it spend on the RAF & Civil Aviation, £15 million on the British Army and £15 million on the Royal Navy.

I think making British radars of 1939 ITTL equal to 1943 IOTL due to the earlier start would be taking it too far. However, I think that making 1939 IOTL equal to 1941 ITTL is reasonable and would increase the effectiveness of the warships the RN had IOTL in the first third of the war.

AIUI the Royal Navy's 50-cm radars were superior to the early radars used by the British Army and RAF because their radars used higher wavelengths.

For example the GL Mk I & II radars used by Anti-Aircraft Command during the Blitz used a 6-metre wavelength. Would they have shot down more aircraft had they been using 50-cm GL radars?

Again, IIRC (and I'm not 100%) sure the Airborne Interception radars Mks I to VI worked on a wavelength of 1.5 metres. Would the RAF's night fighters have shot down more aircraft if they had been fitted with a 50-cm AI radar?