Just getting the beam correct on the Hunt design from the front would be a bonus. So more recruits to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors in the 1920's and early thirties would be a good thing.
Best British interwar fleet?
- Thread starter Hood
- Start date
Maybe, or the budget might get raided for more Cruisers and Destroyers.
It honestly doesn't matter which service it belongs to as long as they can communicate with each other, and as long as the direction coming down from the top is (uniformed and civilian) is right. The advantage of Coastal Command remaining part of the RAF is that the training and aircraft are more common to that of other RAF aircraft then it is to any other RN aircraft.
What happened to the machinery from scrapped destroyers ? Overhaul machinery from scrapped S class destroyer and V and W destroyers and stick in warehouse somewhere next to all the guns navy were squirreling away.
reuse turbines for new class , if I remember rightly turbine blades were a bottleneck in ww2
reuse turbines for new class , if I remember rightly turbine blades were a bottleneck in ww2
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Just for starters
- Keep Tiger as a training ship, not Iron Duke.
- Have one of the R Class Battleships meet an untimely end and build a modern replacement.
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- Don't sign the LNT. Keep funding about £60m+
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- Mothball the machinery removed from scrapped S&T class Destroyers
- Refit the QE's in the early 30's
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- Convert the Glorious and Courageous to super cruisers (quad or triple 8"). Build 2 new 27,000 ton carriers from scratch.
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Convert the Glorious and Courageous to super cruisers (quad or triple 8"). Build 2 new 27,000 ton carriers from scratch.
I can't really see much point in having two such large ships armed only with 8" guns. They wouldn't even be able to go toe to toe with the Graf Spee et al, which were considerably smaller.
Additional heretic view: Press for more radical Washington Naval Treaty - say, 200 000 of capital ships for US and UK etc. Use the saved money for better ships instead of maintaining WWI relics. But even with WNT in force, it is very questionable whether RN lost or gained by maintaining Revenge-class, Renown and Repulse. Money would have been better spent by just scrapping them, not building up to WNT strength and perhaps keeping the guns in reserve for railroad guns, monitors etc.
As was evident already in 1930's, there was no lack of RN capital ships good enough to give enemies a beating.
As was evident already in 1930's, there was no lack of RN capital ships good enough to give enemies a beating.
The Hipper class cruisers were not very efficient designs. They displaced about 5000 tons more than the British county class cruisers for the same armament, half a knot of speed and less belt protection.
HMS Courageous: 6,000 nautical miles at 20 knots
KM Hipper: 6,800 nautical miles at 20 knots
USS Des Moines: 10,500 nautical miles at 15 knots
County: 8,000 nautical miles at 10 knots
... and the Deutschland class armoured cruisers could do 16,000 nautical miles at 18 knots on a hull that displaced considerably less than the Hippers whilst having comperable armour and significantly outgunning them.
Actually, I can see an argument for reconverting Glorious, Courageous and Furious to their original forms and employing them as commerce raider hunters. The Battle of the River Plate would have been a bit shorter if it had been two 15" and one 18" large light cruisers against one pocket battleship. The film version would have been less a stirring tale of men fighting against the odds and more a nightmare horror movie with no escape.
IOTL Handley Page did submit the Hampden to the specification that the Blackburn Botha was built to.
Wellington's or Hampden's off Norway in 1940?
The Hampden first flew on 21st June 1936. The first production contract (for 180 aircraft) was placed in August 1936. The production prototype flew on 24th June 1938 and the first aircraft was delivered to the RAF in August 1938.
The first production contracts for 486 Bothas (242 to be built at Brough and 244 at Dumbarton) were placed in December 1936. The first prototype flew on 28th December 1938 (2½ years after the first flight of the Hampden) and the first aircraft was delivered in October 1939.
IOTL the Hampden was ordered into production after the prototype had flown. However, the Botha was ordered under a new system of ordering production aircraft "straight off the drawing board." That is new aircraft types were ordered into production before a prototype had been built and tested. The Air Ministry was well aware that some of the aircraft ordered under the new system might be failures, but it was considered worth the risk.
IMHO the Air Ministry should have ordered 486 T.B.G.R. versions of the Hampden from Blackburn in December 1936. The Hampden was 2½ years ahead of the Botha in development so that there was a much better chance of delivering the 486 aircraft required before 31st March 1939, the day that Expansion Scheme F was to have been completed.
However, what I think would have actually happened is that the firs Blackburn built Hampdens would have flown in June 1938. Deliveries to RAF Coastal Command (to replace the Anson) would have begun in October 1938 and the 486th aircraft would have been delivered a year later (i.e. in October 1939). That's about 6 months behind schedule, but so were the deliveries of the first 600 Hurricanes and 310 Spitfires.
I think that Bristol should have built the Hampden instead of the Beaufort for the same reason. IOTL an initial "off the drawing board" contract for 78 aircraft was placed in August 1936. The prototype flew on 15th October 1938 and it entered service with No. 22 Squadron or RAF Coastal Command in November 1939.
Had the Air Ministry ordered 78 Hampdens from Bristol in August 1936 instead of the Beaufort MHO is that Bristol built Hampdens would have been delivered to RAF Coastal Command from November 1938.
Therefore, RAF Coastal Command would have had 13 squadrons of Hampdens in the T.B.G.R. role in September 1939 instead of the 11 Anson G.R. and 2 Vildebeest T.B. squadrons of OTL. The Hampden would also be entering service with the T.B.G.R. squadrons in the overseas commands, which were planned under Scheme F onwards, but not formed because of the Beaufort and Botha were delayed.
AFAIK the first contract for the Lockheed Hudson (200 aircraft ordered in June 1938) was placed because the Beaufort and Botha were behind schedule. ITTL there was no need to do that so that which would allow the money to be spent on something else. According to the Putnams on RAF Aircraft since 1918 over 800 Hudsons were delivered against British contracts before the introduction of Lend-Lease and not having to acquire them ITTL would save Dollars which could be spent on something else.
Handley Page did propose a Hampden with a wider fuselage and Bristol Hercules engines. The Air Ministry liked it, but did not order it because of the time that it would take to develop and because it wanted to maximise production of the Halifax.
However, if the Hampden is also being built by Blackburn and Bristol for the T.B.G.R. squadrons it might order the "Super Hampden" into production. Even if it didn't I think we will see "Standard Hampdens" fitted with Hercules and Merlin engines, because some of the Wellingtons built IOTL were fitted with these engines. Also IOTL 415 of the Bristol built Beauforts and all 700 Australian built aircraft were fitted with P&W Twin Wasp engines producing 1,200hp and the 1,115 Hampdens built in their place ITTL might be fitted with this engine as well.
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The key question for any bigger/stronger interwar Royal Navy. Second issue being tweaking Washington and London Naval Treaties. Third (equal second?) being regaining control of the FAA.
A plausible POD for better economy being Churchill going with his instincts and taking sterling back onto the Gold Standard at a significantly lower rate.
Otherwise, I think the best one can get is minor design tweaks to new build ships as suggested above and a few more of them. Plus more extensive refits of capital ships.
My modest suggestions would be for the 2 Northumberlands and another Exeter to be built rather than cancelled. And 4+ small (under 10k) aircraft carriers for trade protection duties. Along with all R and QE class to have main gun elevation raised.
Probably lots more relatively small improvements possible also.
With a lot more money...
Frigates/sloops came to the fore from the interwar treaties , no torpedoes and slower speed meant they did not count as destroyer's. So if treaties are in place they have to be built to up the numbers, just as the old V and W's can be converted by removing machinery and torpedoes to free up tonnage for more new builds. Cruiser wise the RN 8" do not seem to have done much the 6" could not do as well. So swallow pride and just build 6". Aircraft carriers, C,F&G were counted as experimental so again fancy footwork you can convert them to aircraft maintenance ships ( ensuring a quick way of reverting ) whilst building some new carriers. Same with Hermes and Eagle, turn them into ferries with quick convert back and reuse the tonnage.
Above all don't stick to rules strictly , as the others are gaming them, bite the bullet and count weight when fitted for but not with and all the other tricks. Build ships with more forward planning, carriers with taller hangers, bigger lifts etc. Battleships , forget the 14" and 5.25, just make a triple 15" with twin 4.5's, forget about 0 degree forward fire , no aircraft , more AA and lengthen docks if needed.
Above all don't stick to rules strictly , as the others are gaming them, bite the bullet and count weight when fitted for but not with and all the other tricks. Build ships with more forward planning, carriers with taller hangers, bigger lifts etc. Battleships , forget the 14" and 5.25, just make a triple 15" with twin 4.5's, forget about 0 degree forward fire , no aircraft , more AA and lengthen docks if needed.
The RAF did give Coastal Command more priority and Bomber Command less priority than is popularly thought.
Bomber Command had 816 aircraft in 68 squadrons at 31st March 1938, but it had been reduced to 57 squadrons by 31st March 1939 because squadrons had been transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command, Fighter Command and the overseas commands. Though I have to acknowledge that there were still 816 aircraft in the Command because there were more aircraft per squadron. There was a further reduction of 2 squadrons between April and September 1939 because 2 Bomber Command squadrons were transferred overseas.
Therefore, on 3rd September 1939, Bomber Command was well below the strength of 68 squadrons by March 1939, which had been set in 1936 by Scheme F. Meanwhile, Coastal Command had reached the strength of 19 squadrons on 31st March 1939 that had been set by Scheme F by 31st March 1939.
The reason why Coastal Command's aircraft were so bad in September 1939, wasn't so much the higher priority being given to Bomber Command (which IMHO is exaggerated) than the aircraft that should have equipped it in September 1939 being about a year behind schedule. IMHO that was because they decided to order the wrong aircraft in 1936 for Coastal Command (and the maritime squadrons in the overseas commands) rather than the wrong priorities.
IMHO, no it wouldn't.
Also, having the Admiralty and Air Ministry compete for the available aircraft production on the open market could do much more harm than good. IOTL during WWI, the Admiralty would outbid the War Office, which increased prices and arguably meant the Navy had more aircraft than it should have and the Army less with the result that RNAS squadrons had to be sent to the Western Front, which is somewhere where they should not have been. That's one of the reasons why the RAF was formed in the first place.
AIUI, you're only going to have more naval aircraft by having more money to spend. That can be found by the Treasury being able to find more money to spend. Or the Admiralty decides to spend more of its OTL budget on naval aviation at the cost of spending less than it did IOTL on something else.
If it was up to me the POD would be the early 1920s - that is no "Geddes Axe" and increase total defence spending by £50 million per annum from 1922-23 onwards. See the following table.Don't sign the LNT. Keep funding about £60m+
The extra defence spending would be roughly £15 million each for the Army and Royal Navy and the balance of £20 million for the Air Ministry (which includes spending more on Civil Aviation as well as the RAF).
IOTL an average of £55 million was spent annually on the Royal Navy in the 13 financial years from 1922-23 to 1934-35. An increase of £15 million per annum over those financial years would increase the average to £70 million a year, which is 27.3% more.
Here's another table.
It's from the Royal Navy Museum at Portsmouth's copy of the Navy Estimates 1939-40
It's from the Royal Navy Museum at Portsmouth's copy of the Navy Estimates 1939-40
And in this one I've attempted to match the personnel numbers and expenditure in the Navy Estimates against when the ships were ordered.
I've noticed two mistakes. Which are, that the expenditure up to 1937-38 is the actual net expenditure - and that the expenditure for 1938-39 & 1939-40 are the estimates for those years.
I strongly disagree, RN was very short of capital ships and even revenge class where useful convoy escorts for the first half of the war, Renown and Repulse where easily worth the money as they can deal with any CA or PB with ease. Even more important the main cost of the crew where vital for the RN WWII build up.
For a more radical treaty environment with the money from,
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- Don't sign the LNT. Keep funding about £60m+
Would be to have the LNT not stop construction but also agree to keep the old ships as training/reserve ships......
Come 39 the KM and RM would be totally unable to compete with such an RN that could afford to deploy second class battleships with 15" guns to fight KM CA/PBs with 8/11"....