Best British interwar fleet?

yeah, stupid soldiers.
Peopll on the pointy end never know what works, and what doesn't

the A-10 which costs around $6,000/hour to run. The F-16 has hourly operating costs of around $8,000.
The F-22 and F-35 are over 5x as much.

EDIT: the B-2 costs between $135k and $175k/hr, and they are staged from CONUS, so that's a lot of hours to strike in Afghanistan
Does this include the cost (including political) of basing and transporting the short range aircraft to the locality?

A B-2 might cost 135-175k but what does a A10 or F16 cost to run in Afghanistan/Iraq when its entire supply chain need to be imported including a airbase built/provided/supplied and secured for its use in county?

Is the air force dislike of the A10 (and others like of it) not also linked with that fact that it can only do CAS and therefore will, A) be available for CAS B) not help win the start of an air war agaisnt a peer/ near peer opponent and therefore rely on the other limited numbers of F16/F15/F35/F22/B52/B1/B2?
 
Pretty accurate IMHO

The only way the UK would be driven to spending the money needed to at least keep pace with the USN is if it felt the US was planning to use force (or the threat of force) to destroy its commercial interests in Latin America and Asia. Which is not OTL, though I suppose plausible PODs for the immediate post WW1 period could be created.

For the 1920s that would mean building the G3s and probably a second set of modified G3s. Cruisers, mostly I think like Leanders and Arethusas, depending on the USN build up. Also try to regain the Alliance with Japan. In Europe, stay close to France .

Financing this would require creativity. Probably stay off the Gold Standard or return at a much lower level than 1914. Default or unilaterally restructure the USD loans. Fund with sterling bonds and buy from the sterling zone.

Not easy or ideal and only to be done under immediate threat from an openly hostile USA.

Which is, I emphasize, NOT OTL.

From my reading the move back to gold was the last straw in tanking the British economy, keeping up the obligation to support gold drained the treasury and limited its option while the ongoing deflation already pushed the economy into a sort of depression state. Between 1925 and 1931 there is more constriction as debt payments and unemployment relief consume more of the budget. That is why these discussions derail at funding. The notion is that the UK could afford about as much as it did OTL, not much more, and the game is to spend quality not quantity to maintain the RN. That said, the Japanese should be bankrupt or curtailing their spending in any rational scenario. And although the USA has the wealth it does not, barring provocation, the will to spend.
 

marathag

Banned
A B-2 might cost 135-175k but what does a A10 or F16 cost to run in Afghanistan/Iraq when its entire supply chain need to be imported including a airbase built/provided/supplied and secured for its use in county?
You will need local firebases, Camps and FOBs, unless you are planning for B-2s to do logistics drops of bullets and beans to guys out on patrol.

The Airbases were already there, thanks to the USSR. If you can't secure airbases for flying in bullets and beans(given that land routes have/had issues) you can't keep any troops there
 

McPherson

Banned
Does this include the cost (including political) of basing and transporting the short range aircraft to the locality?

A B-2 might cost 135-175k but what does a A10 or F16 cost to run in Afghanistan/Iraq when its entire supply chain need to be imported including a airbase built/provided/supplied and secured for its use in county?

Is the air force dislike of the A10 (and others like of it) not also linked with that fact that it can only do CAS and therefore will, A) be available for CAS B) not help win the start of an air war agaisnt a peer/ near peer opponent and therefore rely on the other limited numbers of F16/F15/F35/F22/B52/B1/B2?

You solve your problem in the weapon, not the launch platform...

The air farce has flyers who do not like to get down in the mud because anything down there that gets in front of you, including rifle bullets can bring you down. Higher up, the problems are surface to air missiles and other planes. Those the flyers can fight with reasonable odds.

Also, being tied to the army means the flyers cannot rove and hunt unmolested which is what they really like to do.

So... Local area CAS aircraft in the platform could be fixed by eliminating the problem of the flyer. Robot launch platforms can be built to pogo up and down (helos). Now that cleans up the solve it in the weapon problem because a cheap solid rocket motor and a 2-d flight steer to target GPS location means a cheap PGM for the robot helo. Reduces the footprint, eliminates the human reluctance factor, keeps to the Johnson McConnell treaty and makes the soldiers happy by giving them positive control of air to ground direct support fires they understand.

As for the flyers, they can battlefield interdict and air superiority all day long.

Now for the navy this means distributed air power which will fit in with a new fleet doctrine of spreading anti-ship and sea control across all launch platforms. CAS, BIM and strategic forces all in one big unhappy fleet.

But that gets off topic.

We get on topic by wondering if the IJN would have been better off building small cruisers for their decrease and attrit strategy. The RN and the USN have to build big to reach the battle area. The IJN with a short sortie requirement only needs to be build big enough ships and aircraft to reach the decisive battle area and those in enough numbers to bring the hurt as to effectors (torpedoes, shells and bombs). Mogamis are impressive, but a lot more I-boats and Kates = more sunk allied warships and freighters.

In the RN equation of the era.... escorts, subs and cruisers and a fleet train. Zerg the opposition.

 
I think the small cruisers matches up with your earlier comment about torpedoes. But I am not sure that it works. While Long Lances had some great successes over all their accuracy was pretty poor. It makes me very nervous about relying upon it.

Cruisers give you reach, but they are going to get chewed up? Are they expendable? Is some kind of large destroyer a better option for the attrition phase? Where is the battle area going to be? The attrition phase always seemed too much like relying on computer game AI to run a gauntlet. How do you keep the gauntlet cheap and convince the enemy to run it?

I think aircraft are probably the one thing that stands out as uncontroversial. If only as search platforms.
Would some kind of submarine configured for high speed surface runs be useful? You need to be able to get them into place.

We always hear about Plan Orange and the Japanese counter, but what about the English version? What is the Japanese counter to the slow build up through the South China Sea?
 
Agree with most but,
The RN and the USN have to build big to reach the battle area.
In the RN equation of the era.... a fleet train. .
Don't see why RN needs the range it isn't coming across the pacific like USN.....?

The problem with small CLs is once the WNT standard was set at 10,000t 8" they become the default second class battleships and you need to fight them, something small and 6" will have issues doing it.
 
You need a fleet train to get from Singapore to Japan.

But that is the problem with any war against Japan. There are two end games. Invasion or Blockade. In theory the RN could use some kind of long range subs, maybe take Taiwan to put the screws on, and hope like hell Japan give up. But what if they don't...
 
You need a fleet train to get from Singapore to Japan.

Singapore - Saigon 646 nautical miles
Singapore to Sanya (southern Hainan) 1068 nautical miles
or longer range,
Singapore - HK 1460 nautical miles
Singapore - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 1621 nautical miles

then for example,
Saigon - Sanya (southern Hainan) 476 nautical miles
Saigon - HK 927 nautical miles
Sanya (southern Hainan) to HK 358 nautical miles
Saigon - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 1121 nautical miles

then final push to decisive basttle,
HK - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 342 nautical miles
HK - Shanghai 845 nautical miles
Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) - Okinawa 538 nautical miles

Not needed (apart from for long subs etc),
Singapore - Nagasaki 2417 nautical miles
Singapore - Yokohama 2892 nautical miles

Honolulu - Bataan 4759 nautical miles the USNs need for very long range is made clear from just this.......

In comparison in Europe,
Alex to Valletta 822 nautical miles
Gibraltar to Valletta 984 nautical miles
Gibraltar to Glasgow 1372 nautical miles

I don't see why RN would need a real fleet train rather than simply capturing bases and slowly moving up? IJN will have to fight its decisive battle to defend Formosa/Okinawa even if they don't to prevent GB opening up the Chinese coast? This also shows the help that China and FIC would be.
 
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McPherson

Banned
I think the small cruisers matches up with your earlier comment about torpedoes. But I am not sure that it works. While Long Lances had some great successes over all their accuracy was pretty poor. It makes me very nervous about relying upon it.

You have to stop thinking Jutland which was a huge anomaly and very locally specialized to the geography of the North Sea and think globally as in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Plus you have to conduct fleet problems. This was very much a situation where the clash of battle-lines was not going to happen in a naval campaign. Understanding that Corbett was the guy driving RN thinking in the 1920s, but like many others who ignored Mahan or get Alfred Thayer wrong, he still bought into the idea that in the end a navy has to seek decision by decisive battle to ensure decisive victory. Conversely, the structure and use of a navy could be used for a strategy of limited political or military objectives, such as in the Clauswitzian sense, which is the kernel of the flawed Singapore Bastion Defense fleet in being and strategy.

IOW, the RN intended to bluff the IJN with a battle fleet instead of FIGHT to control the sea which is Mahan and what the RN did in the North Atlantic and to a lesser extent the task they carried forward in the Mediterranean Sea and actually what they failed to do in the Indian Ocean in 1942.

The USN was stuck on stupid in a similar vein with the Through Ticket to Manila. By 1925, those Mahanists figured out that the Japanese were not going to fight a Jutland; but instead would do something like their Orange Team players at the Naval War College and in the Caribbean fleet problem area (chosen because it mimics the South Pacific for weather effects and geographical problems and not because it was a vacation spot.) kept doing to the US Combined Fleet. Slashing ambush attacks by subs, cruiser destroyer surface action groups and attacks on fleet trains, soon had the Battle-line whittled down, immobilized in place and on the defensive allowing the Orange player to pick the time and place for the final decision. This resulted in US defeat. Aircraft carriers made it worse. Instead, Orange 1935 envisioned a series of lunges forward covered by land based air with island hopping and then a submarine commerce warfare and air bombardment of the enemy homeland from seized forward bases campaign to finish the job. Decisive battle became a campaign and an actual fight to first deny the sea. it was based on the geographical factors of naval warfare which is the heart of what Mahan tells you when he says a navy fights for "command of the sea" in peace and war. Decisive battle is a means to deny the sea, NOT THE desired end result. If the enemy does not come out to fight (Singapore Bastion defense.) then the enemy has given the initiative to you and you use it as the IJN did.

You will note that the USN sought battle and tried to contest every Japanese use of the sea from the start? The concept with Mahan was to use the sea and the tools upon it to make war on an enemy, not to fort up.

Cruisers give you reach, but they are going to get chewed up? Are they expendable? Is some kind of large destroyer a better option for the attrition phase? Where is the battle area going to be? The attrition phase always seemed too much like relying on computer game AI to run a gauntlet. How do you keep the gauntlet cheap and convince the enemy to run it?

A 4,000 tonne destroyer for Japan or a 7,000 tonne destroyer for the US, or a Dido for the British; what is in a name? As will be shown RTL, rapid gunfire from 15-15.5 cm guns will be enough for 90% of the anti-ship artillery work. I mean when US destroyers with their puny 12.7 cm guns can rip Japanese cruisers and battleships to bits at point blank ranges (2,000 meters First Guadalcanal look at what happened to the Hei) then a Baltimore might be the wrong solution?

What is really needed is a 500 second run at 25 m/s torpedo (7 nm @ 48 knots) with a probability to hit of 25% within 7,000-10,000 meters which matches the 7,000 to 10,000 meter GUN effective ranges that will be the expected night battle ranges in the expected battle spaces. (US fleet problem results 1930-1935 and what actually happens during CARTWHEEL in the surface battles in the Solomon Islands. In case one wonders, that is what happens during Java Sea, too. All predictable and PREDICTED in fleet exercises by various navies.)
I think aircraft are probably the one thing that stands out as uncontroversial. If only as search platforms.

We cannot wank it. By 1925, the RN knows aircraft can...

a. scout.
b. torpedo crippled or stationary ships.
c. spot gunfire.

as a result of their WWI and immediate postwar experience. So they will develop aircraft at sea accordingly. Thanks to Sempill, that rat-bastard, the IJN follows suit but develops its own ideas later from its China war experience. I know the USN before 1935 is about midway between the RN (good) and the IJN (gold standard) when it comes to naval aviation, at least as far as aircraft carrier use and employment is concerned. After 1935, except for the remarkable Bismarck hunt and Lymley Lister's op (Operation Judgment) the RN FAA goes into the toilet and stays there. This is because their best is siphoned off into the RAF pre-war or gets killed off early in WWII and are never replaced by equally good air tacticians as they had in 1935. The USN suffers a similar annihilation of its NAS during Coral Sea and Midway and has to rebuild during 1943 while still losing pilots and planes at an alarming rate during CARTWHEEL. Contrary to popular opinion and History Channel bull-documentaries, and unlike the war in Europe, the Pacific allies (ANZACS and Americans) do not really get the upper hand on things Japanese in the air, until about September of 1943. The British from the available evidence to hand, never do in the Pacific. They just don't have presence, which is where that fleet train comes in. Without it, air warfare in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is IMPOSSIBLE.

Would some kind of submarine configured for high speed surface runs be useful? You need to be able to get them into place.

Since combat is by torpedo run time from launch platform to target and is independent of launch platform speed (Ha! Relativity theory applied to submarine warfare!), the sub has to be nimble, a fast diver, able to get the fish out quickly, reload during battle (US subs took 10 minutes to reload tubes because they used manual block and tackle with come-alongs and not chain and ram like the French did in 5 minutes.) and it has to be able to turn out from under a destroyer drop or shot off pattern of depth charges. Guess what the GATO did not do well? Had high surface speed though!.

We always hear about Plan Orange and the Japanese counter, but what about the English version? What is the Japanese counter to the slow build up through the South China Sea?

RIKKO. It worked. The British bastion defense failed.

Agree with most but, Don't see why RN needs the range it isn't coming across the pacific like USN.....?

Fast task forces burn fuel at incredible rates. A destroyer with 400 hours at 10.7 knots (20 k/h or 5.5 m/s of book endurance; burns through that same 500 tonnes of fuel oil in 100 hours at 30 knots ; 55 km/h ; 15.5 m/s. That is 4 days and refuel. If you read my accounts of Midway and Coral Sea, TANKERS are what hamstring the Americans. The IJN figured they needed 1 tanker per flattop for battle to survive against an USN CTF, and 1 tanker for every four battleships or cruisers. A squadron of four destroyers ate up a half tanker load of fuel at those speeds. If you tried to fight at 10 knots, the Americans would eat you alive. Besides a WWII flattop has to drive into the wind at least 20 knots (8 m/s) to launch aircraft.

The problem with small CLs is once the WNT standard was set at 10,000t 8" they become the default second class battleships and you need to fight them, something small and 6" will have issues doing it.

15.2cm L53 Brooklyns tore Japanese heavies apart. It took torpedoes to stop those CLs. Why should a CL have to be larger than the mission requires?
 
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As someone who is only alive because an A-10 flew a danger close air support mission for my unit, that big gun is well worth the cost of keeping them in service. That warthog driver came in far lower and slower than any F-16 or F-35 would even think about doing and put every single round on target just feet from where I was. So IMVHO, the money spent on the A-10 is worth every single penny.

I'm not going to argue against your experience but I believe the Air Force line is that other aircraft could get there quicker, can carry more, can hang around longer, don't need expensive upgrades and can live anywhere outside of an almost totally permissive environment like the ones we were lucky to have (for our aircraft at least) over Iraq and Afghanistan. They just need to find a way to get their pilots to lower themselves to shooting at something that costs less than £30m...
 

McPherson

Banned
Singapore - Saigon 646 nautical miles
Singapore to Sanya (southern Hainan) 1068 nautical miles
or longer range,
Singapore - HK 1460 nautical miles
Singapore - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 1621 nautical miles

then for example,
Saigon - Sanya (southern Hainan) 476 nautical miles
Saigon - HK 927 nautical miles
Sanya (southern Hainan) to HK 358 nautical miles
Saigon - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 1121 nautical miles

then final push to decisive basttle,
HK - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 342 nautical miles
HK - Shanghai 845 nautical miles
Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) - Okinawa 538 nautical miles

Not needed (apart from for long subs etc),
Singapore - Nagasaki 2417 nautical miles
Singapore - Yokohama 2892 nautical miles

Honolulu - Bataan 4759 nautical miles the USNs need for very long range is made clear from just this.......

In comparison in Europe,
Alex to Valletta 822 nautical miles
Gibraltar to Valletta 984 nautical miles
Gibraltar to Glasgow 1372 nautical miles

I don't see why RN would need a real fleet train rather than simply capturing bases and slowly moving up? IJN will have to fight its decisive battle to defend Formosa/Okinawa even if they don't to prevent GB opening up the Chinese coast? This also shows the help that China and FIC would be.

How good is that RN fleet that can only stay at sea 4 days from a sortie port? You need fleet
trains and the ability to refuel in the middle of a battle. The IJN could in 1941 and 1942 and the RN could not in the Indian Ocean.

The USN until late 1943 could not either. Coral Sea was lost because the Neosho was sunk. Midway was a knuckle biter because Spruance was low on fuel. If Yamamoto had not turned chicken and ran for it, Spruance would have been hobbled in air ops. He was that low on fuel and his tanker support (2 ships),
was barely adequate to keep him on station until the IJN retired.

1,000 miles as a speed run at 30 knots? How empty are your destroyers' bunkers, Admiral Somerville? Bone dry Admiral Pound. I need TANKERS! When Somerville ran for it after the Sri Lanka debacle, he was worried about FUEL. He needed tanker support.
 
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15.2cm L53 Brooklyns tore Japanese heavies apart. It took torpedoes to stop those CLs. Why should a CL have to be larger than the mission requires?
Calling the Brooklyns CLs...... when we are talking about building smaller (not just gun size) cruiser is slightly misleading,
by wondering if the IJN would have been better off building small cruisers for their decrease and attrit strategy.
Kind of implies 5000-7500t ships with 6" guns and TTs not 10,000t+ with many more 6"......

Fast task forces burn fuel at incredible rates. A destroyer with 400 hours at 10.7 knots (20 k/h or 5.5 m/s of book endurance; burns through that same 500 tonnes of fuel oil in 100 hours at 30 knots ; 55 km/h ; 15.5 m/s. That is 4 days and refuel. If you read my accounts of Midway and Coral Sea, TANKERS are what hamstring the Americans. The IJN figured they needed 1 tanker per flattop for battle to survive against an USN CTF, and 1 tanker for every four battleships or cruisers. A squadron of four destroyers ate up a half tanker load of fuel at those speeds. If you tried to fight at 10 knots, the Americans would eat you alive. Besides a WWII flattop has to drive into the wind at least 20 knots (8 m/s) to launch aircraft.
But RN could OTL operate in ETO/MTO at the sort of ranges it needs for a harbour hop strategy up the coast of China so this makes the need for an actual fleet train rather than lots of OTL available real merchants questionable?

Ask and answered. How good is a fleet that can only stay at sea 4 days from a sortie port? You need trains.
Singapore - Saigon 646 nautical miles
Saigon - Sanya (southern Hainan) 476 nautical miles (can be broken down with more moves up FIC)
Sanya (southern Hainan) to HK 358 nautical miles
HK - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 342 nautical miles
Keelung (northern city of Formosa) - Okinawa 330 nautical miles
This might be slow due to the number of stops but its easy in terms of a fleet train no leg is more than the first at 650 Nm at 15 knots that's only 1 day 19 hours so RN can do it without underway refuelling.

The IJN could in 1941 and 1942 and the RN could not in the Indian Ocean.
Might some of that be due just slightly to it being RNs third most important ocean come 41/42............?
1,000 miles as a speed run at 30 knots?
Why would you run that fast...... the first few 100 miles will be under your own land based air so very safe and you can do most of it at 15-20Kn to save fuel as RN battle fleet and the invasion transports certainly are not doing more than that.
 
You have to stop thinking Jutland which was a huge anomaly and very locally specialized to the geography of the North Sea and think globally as in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Plus you have to conduct fleet problems. This was very much a situation where the clash of battle-lines was not going to happen in a naval campaign. Understanding that Corbett was the guy driving RN thinking in the 1920s, but like many others who ignored Mahan or get Alfred Thayer wrong, he still bought into the idea that in the end a navy has to seek decision by decisive battle to ensure decisive victory. Conversely, the structure and use of a navy could be used for a strategy of limited political or military objectives, such as in the Clauswitzian sense, which is the kernel of the flawed Singapore Bastion Defense fleet in being and strategy.

IOW, the RN intended to bluff the IJN with a battle fleet instead of FIGHT to control the sea which is Mahan and what the RN did in the North Atlantic and to a lesser extent the task they carried forward in the Mediterranean Sea and actually what they failed to do in the Indian Ocean in 1942.
I don't see why the RN Bluffed a battle fleet in the Atlantic (or Med apart from a short period with QE and V sitting a bit deep in Alex)?

That KM and RM refused to stand and fight Jutland II for fear they would probably lose it doesn't make it a wrong strategy deterrent can work without being used and having the opponent give you sea control by default rather than have to fight for it is no worse?

Why was RN early plans to force the IJN to fight a classic battle fleet class off Malaya (under massive CV and RAF air cover) if they wanted to come south wrong, apart from that with WWII in ETO/MTO the RN could not send sufficient BBs due to WNT/LNT limits to actually carry it out?


A 4,000 tonne destroyer for Japan or a 7,000 tonne destroyer for the US, or a Dido for the British; what is in a name? As will be shown RTL, rapid gunfire from 15-15.5 cm guns will be enough for 90% of the anti-ship artillery work. I mean when US destroyers with their puny 12.7 cm guns can rip Japanese cruisers and battleships to bits at point blank ranges (2,000 meters First Guadalcanal)
Only if the aircraft stop you fighting surface actions in daytime that was not a sure thing until far to late to plan for it pre war ie during WWII..... Look at what happens to German/Italian cruisers/DDs when they get engaged by 15" fire....

... I know the USN before 1935 is about midway between the RN (good) and the IJN (gold standard) when it comes to naval aviation, at least as far as aircraft carrier use and employment is concerned. After 1935, except for the remarkable Bismarck hunt and Lymley Lister's op (Operation Judgment) the RN FAA goes into the toilet and stays there. This is because their best is siphoned off into the RAF pre-war or gets killed off early in WWII and are never replaced by equally good air tacticians as they had in 1935. The USN suffers a similar annihilation of its NAS during Coral Sea and Midway and has to rebuild during 1943 while still losing pilots and planes at an alarming rate during CARTWHEEL. Contrary to popular opinion and History Channel bull-documentaries, and unlike the war in Europe, the Pacific allies (ANZACS and Americans) do not really get the upper hand on things Japanese in the air, until about September of 1943. The British from the available evidence to hand, never do in the Pacific. They just don't have presence, which is where that fleet train comes in. Without it, air warfare in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is IMPOSSIBLE..
.......
RIKKO. It worked. The British bastion defense failed.
None of the above had anything due to deliberate priority decision making made by HMG from 35-45....for quite logical reasons that Japan/the Pacific is a long way from GB and much less important than Germany/Italy, Atlantic/Med?
 

McPherson

Banned
Calling the Brooklyns CLs...... when we are talking about building smaller (not just gun size) cruiser is slightly misleading,

Kind of implies 5000-7500t ships with 6" guns and TTs not 10,000t+ with many more 6"...…

4 x 2 guns and 5 x 2 TT. Good enough.

But RN could OTL operate in ETO/MTO at the sort of ranges it needs for a harbour hop strategy up the coast of China so this makes the need for an actual fleet train rather than lots of OTL available real merchants questionable?

Chinese ports do not have the facilities to repair battle damage, cannot be held against the IJA and are vulnerable to the Japanese air forces, BOTH of them.

Singapore - Saigon 646 nautical miles
Saigon - Sanya (southern Hainan) 476 nautical miles (can be broken down with more moves up FIC)
Sanya (southern Hainan) to HK 358 nautical miles
HK - Kaohsiung (southern city of Formosa) 342 nautical miles
Keelung (northern city of Formosa) - Okinawa 330 nautical miles
This might be slow due to the number of stops but its easy in terms of a fleet train no leg is more than the first at 650 Nm at 15 knots that's only 1 day 19 hours so RN can do it without underway refuelling.

Where are you marines?

Might some of that be due just slightly to it being RNs third most important ocean come 41/42............?

Used to think that, but it comes down to incompetence. Andrew Boyd actually, though he never intended it, makes that case in The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters, when he says Pound and Phillips screwed up the Singapore Bastion Defense without factoring in that they needed to HOLD THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO as far east as Borneo and failed to include the Americans in their cockamamie estimates, or rather assumed that the American admirals (the best strategists in WWII) would be so incredibly stupid as to base their fleet in Singapore as a substitute for the proposed British fleet.

Why would you run that fast...... the first few 100 miles will be under your own land based air so very safe and you can do most of it at 15-20Kn to save fuel as RN battle fleet and the invasion transports certainly are not doing more than that.

Because Force Z tried that and look at what happened to them? You have to run fast and carry own organic air power or you will die under IJN air attack. Somerville will find this out again at Sri Lanks.
 
4 x 2 guns and 5 x 2 TT. Good enough.
That's still only 8x6" guns agaisnt a 8" CA or a 10,000t 12/15 gun 6" CL it will be easily destroyed if it has to fight in daylight (or radar) outside of TT range.
Chinese ports do not have the facilities to repair battle damage, cannot be held against the IJA and are vulnerable to the Japanese air forces, BOTH of them.
Where are you marines?
Used to think that, but it comes down to incompetence. Andrew Boyd actually, though he never intended it, makes that case in The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters, when he says Pound and Phillips screwed up the Singapore Bastion Defense without factoring in that they needed to HOLD THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO as far east as Borneo and failed to include the Americans in their cockamamie estimates, or rather assumed that the American admirals (the best strategists in WWII) would be so incredibly stupid as to base their fleet in Singapore as a substitute for the proposed British fleet.
Because Force Z tried that and look at what happened to them? You have to run fast and carry own organic air power or you will die under IJN air attack. Somerville will find this out again at Sri Lanks.
The title of the thread is "Best British interwar fleet?" assuming that France and the rest of Europe has fallen and RN is fighting a three front war with the army having been depleted from Dunkirk and Tobruk etc is going to get you very funny looks......
 

McPherson

Banned
I don't see why the RN Bluffed a battle fleet in the Atlantic (or Med apart from a short period with QE and V sitting a bit deep in Alex)?

They didn't. They tried to bluff the most dangerous navy on Earth at Singapore and the IJN called their bluff.

That KM and RM refused to stand and fight Jutland II for fear they would probably lose it doesn't make it a wrong strategy deterrent can work without being used and having the opponent give you sea control by default rather than have to fight for it is no worse?

Jutland II is nonsense when one side has correctly deduced "ye old merchant ship" is the proper target. The Germans make the war a guerre de course and what happens? They FIGHT and it is on their terms forcing the RN, the RCN and the USN to expend 4x the resources the Germans spend on subs. That is rather smart war making. The Japanese get it wrong coming and going and lose their merchant fleet, get blockaded and have their battle fleet massacred mainly by... wait for it... US subs.

Why was RN early plans to force the IJN to fight a classic battle fleet class off Malaya (under massive CV and RAF air cover) if they wanted to come south wrong, apart from that with WWII in ETO/MTO the RN could not send sufficient BBs due to WNT/LNT limits to actually carry it out?

RIKKOs.

Only if the aircraft stop you fighting surface actions in daytime that was not a sure thing until far to late to plan for it pre war ie during WWII..... Look at what happens to German/Italian cruisers/DDs when they get engaged by 15" fire....

Cunningham brought along... wait for it... an aircraft carrier. He was a shrewd admiral. The RM did not have organic air cover and he Matapanned them. After that set-too, the RM get very excited about... wait for it... aircraft carriers.

None of the above had anything due to deliberate priority decision making made by HMG from 35-45....for quite logical reasons that Japan/the Pacific is a long way from GB and much less important than Germany/Italy, Atlantic/Med?

Read my above comments. Britain lost her empire because she lost the use of the 2 oceans that mattered to holding India and the Middle East the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as far east as the South China Sea. When your enemy steaming from Kogashima mauls you off Sri Lanka and demonstrates globally that you are no-good and then parks an army in Burma because he can use the sea and you can't then you are through as a world power.

This is a hard truth that makes the USN sweat bullets. The RN did not pay attention to naval geography and that cost Britain enormously. The lesson learned is that "The Influence of Seapower Upon History" remains relevant, the fighting and the peacekeeping is on the sealanes for a navy, the land adjacent to a sea dictates the shape of naval and air warfare. Corbett was dead wrong.
 

McPherson

Banned
That's still only 8x6" guns against a 8" CA or a 10,000t 12/15 gun 6" CL it will be easily destroyed if it has to fight in daylight (or radar) outside of TT range.

Actually as USS Juneau proved, it is torpedoes that do you in. Not guns, or at least Japanese guns from those big scary IJN heavy cruisers. So the lesson learned is that you need enough guns to do enough arty and it is the torpedo that sinks you. "Get your fish into him first."

The title of the thread is "Best British interwar fleet?" assuming that France and the rest of Europe has fallen and RN is fighting a three front war with the army having been depleted from Dunkirk and Tobruk etc., is going to get you very funny looks......

How did the Pitts do it against Napoleon? One step at a time and clean out one ocean at a time. Odd that FDR remembered it?
 
The RN did not pay attention to naval geography and that cost Britain enormously.
Britain lost her empire because she lost the use of the 2 oceans that mattered to holding India and the Middle East the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as far east as the South China Sea.
GB lost due to failing to diplomatically avoid dealing with the three major Axis powers at once without sufficient allies to help, not the RN fault apart from the RN not getting a three (none US) power standard in the 20/30s.......
The problem with the concentration on the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (and Med) is that they are very secondary to the Atlantic (and Channel / North sea) in the minds of the far more important home islands.
They didn't. They tried to bluff the most dangerous navy on Earth at Singapore and the IJN called their bluff.
What choice did they have apart from perhaps a more defensive withdraw by 1941...?
How did the Pitts do it against Napoleon? One step at a time and clean out one ocean at a time. Odd that FDR remembered it?
What did he remember RN in WWI....? Just doesn't work with a major power (or two depending on definition) outside the home area that RN has to concentrate to protect and only one fleet due to WNT/LNT and money.
 
Pretty accurate IMHO

The only way the UK would be driven to spending the money needed to at least keep pace with the USN is if it felt the US was planning to use force (or the threat of force) to destroy its commercial interests in Latin America and Asia. Which is not OTL, though I suppose plausible PODs for the immediate post WW1 period could be created.

For the 1920s that would mean building the G3s and probably a second set of modified G3s. Cruisers, mostly I think like Leanders and Arethusas, depending on the USN build up. Also try to regain the Alliance with Japan. In Europe, stay close to France .

Financing this would require creativity. Probably stay off the Gold Standard or return at a much lower level than 1914. Default or unilaterally restructure the USD loans. Fund with sterling bonds and buy from the sterling zone.

Not easy or ideal and only to be done under immediate threat from an openly hostile USA.

Which is, I emphasize, NOT OTL.

If I were the Britain/RN, using what looks good at first glance without giving too much regard as to whether I'm drawing in too much hindsight, I would say:

-I'm for the purpose of this exercise assuming there is a Washington treaty per OP parameters, but a "mild" one. No 18" guns, no poison gas shells, and allows relatively generous if not unrestricted replacement schedules; capital ship size limits are either not in place or so generous that they really don't matter.

- Keep Winston way the hell away from the Treasury- the man has a hundred ideas a day, two of which are good, not a good quality for the post. No gold standard.

-One can never have too many friends. Keep the AJA intact, explain calmly and slowly to Messrs. Meighen and Hughes that the AJA doesn't mean the USA will invade Canada or shut off trade and that Australia is still Britain's favourite partner in the Pacific, and realize that there is no forseeable reason that the USA would start a war with Britain so stay calm about that.

Now, the fleet, keeping in mind the above optimal circumstances.

Our biggest threats are, in no particular order, Italy going stupid, Japan going insane, Germany going revanchist and HM Treasury going as usual.

We can save a lot of money by ditching anything pre-Dreadnought, all old dreadnoughts and battlecruisers with 12" or 13.5" guns bar Tiger (Iron Dukes to reserve if the Treaty and Exchequer allow it), the K-class subs, armoured cruisers and foreign battleships pressed into service can be dispensed with.

First, our capital ships, our core fleet units:

As @jsb pointed out, one can pretty safely consider all 15" gunned ships to be "modern", or at the very least modern enough. The Follies are far too squishy for anything but carrier conversions or scrap, and I'd argue that in these early days, they are more useful as the former.

That leaves us with:

Queen Elizabeth
Revenge
Renown
Hood

Tiger
could also be kept, she's capable of 28 kn on mixed-firing and there are enough 13.5" shells left for her to use, although unique ammunition restricts her usefulness, and likely her deployment to the Home or Channel fleets. Bulge, lengthen, and repower with all-oil firing boilers and she's good for 30-31 kn.

Of the battleships, 5 are slow and 5 more faster than slow but slower than fast, which puts them into the slow category. As for battlecruisers, 2 are fast but squishy, 1 is fast and strong, good for now, but will need work later as everyone else catches up.

As for the Revenges, not really all that much can be done with them. They can't be made faster, but they are strong (protection is better than the QEs) and they pack a punch. Mediterranean or Home service should be suitable for them. Anti-torpedo bulges are just about the most work that should be done for them, along with increased AA fits and radar as they become available.

The Queen Elizabeths, although they are more capable than their slower cousins, are really not that much so. They are not fast enough to roll with truly fast ships, as WWI demonstrated. However, they're the best thing the RN has right now. They should get bulging, better AA, perhaps one or two get trial block superstructures to study the optimal layout. Still, they should be targeted for replacement.

R&R are swift but squishy, and relatively lightly armed. Still, they are useful right now. Hood we will set aside for now. She isn't perfect, but she's probably the best capital ship afloat right now, and protection is really no worse than a QE. She'll need work or replacement later, but that is a ways off.

The G3 and follow-on "G3a" ships are what we really want. Something that, while not as muscular as a South Dakota, can challenge it, run, and then challenge it again, using superior speed to decide the range and when battle will occur. Will a G3 ever face a SoDak? No, but you're using what's out there as a benchmark. Under ideal circumstances, cost no object, it would be nice to have 3 groups of 4 plus Hood, replacing all current first line battleships and battlecruisers save 'Ud, one-for-one. That isn't happening. If the best you can get is 6, the best way would probably be to slow walk construction. Aim for 4 laid down in 1922. If you can't get that, ask for 3. If even 3 doesn't sell it, ask for 2. Then, don't stop researching! If you're laying down 2 per year every other year, include improvements in successive series. Let's say a G3a gets a stretch amidships to mitigate blast issues and accommodate more machinery so one is as fast or faster than a Lexington, and a BL 16" Mk. II gun that reverts to heavy shell, low velocity. The next two G3b-IIs go to a two-fore, one-aft, no midships turret arrangement, and a BL 16" Mk. III gun that duplicates the performance of the Mk. II in a lighter package, that kind of stuff.

Cruisers should be big enough for long voyages, decently fast to run from bigger threats, and armed for trade protection, giving destroyers the business and giving raiders a bad day. Hawkins and the like are the screen probers and punchers, but there won't be too many of those.

Don't slack off on destroyers and sloops! You need them, seeing how much misery subs cost you the last time around.

Get the Dominions and Crown Colonies involved fully. Sweeten the pot if you have to and recoup the investment later.

AUS can keep HMAS Australia, and wave the White Ensign in the Pacific.

CAN, you don't want a capital ship, fine, but nobody is going to invade you without coming across an ocean. You get a light cruiser and a squadron of destroyers for each coast. Both of the bigger kids should also be encouraged to develop the facilities to maintain these and other ships.

ZA, NZ- you guys get some destroyers and sloops, or you can contribute a watch for a bigger ship.

Crown Colonies- send your best and brightest for officer training schemes and bring back the expertise. One never knows when it will be needed. More hands are better too, so reserve seaman training schemes would be beneficial as well, provided they aren't too expensive. Even fishermen can be eyes and ears when necessary.
 
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