Best British Fleet 1945 -1955

SwampTiger

Banned
I would be interested in the RN's response to decolonization and development of a Co-Dominion with ex-colonies. I could see the Navy offer the new nations older and smaller units initially as OTL, while taking orders for new builds. The Navy should consider using these orders to renovate and upgrade selected British shipyards. Develop a Army/Marine support ship class based loosely on the Centaur class, similar to the later Iwo Jima class. Place small task forces of six or eight ships at major ports to provide rapidly deployed forces for emergencies.

The post war prop planes were adequate until better jet powered aircraft were developed. However, you must work through the early jet development cycle. Just buy fewer per type. The post war Navy must cut ships and crew quickly from the older, hard worked designs to cut costs. It should develop a solid core of Reservists. The Navy should realistically review the lessons of the late war. It should plan of fighting both a smaller similar war and try to predict future naval strategies and tactics.
 
I'd change the strategy the RN uses to deal with the Soviet sub threat from defensive to offensive, by striking at the base areas with carriers and amphibious operations to control the naval geography the subs use.

I like this a lot, and it's really more in keeping with RN tradition than a defencive strategy. The sons of Nelson do not wait around to get attacked; the sons of Fisher do not make themselves content with old toys!
 
Scrap the whole thing and spend the money on British citizens instead.

Build one nuclear sub for Buenos Aries in 40 years.

Yes, one must ask the question, what's the minimal one can get away with? USSR is not a threat to the SLOC's as Nazi Germany was, not with the US as an ally and without the US as an ally UK cannot fight USSR anyway.
 
I'd change the strategy the RN uses to deal with the Soviet sub threat from defensive to offensive, by striking at the base areas with carriers and amphibious operations to control the naval geography the subs use
I like this a lot, and it's really more in keeping with RN tradition than a defencive strategy.
Just how well did that work in WWII (and less so WWI).... I'm not sure you can reliably attack land bases without overwhelming force?

"A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort"
 
Just how well did that work in WWII (and less so WWI).... I'm not sure you can reliably attack land bases without overwhelming force?

"A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort"

Nelson's wise words there are important too!

As for the strategy itself, the RN started off on the back foot during WWII and was unable to crack the tough sub pens. As for a Cold War strategy, while protecting ships from attack while underway is important, there should also be efforts made to disrupt the enemy's operations- force them to hold back more subs to defend the bases, force the enemy to disperse, hit at their ability to effectively command and control the fleet they have, and generally make the effort to deny them the sea; it doesn't necessarily have to be another Taranto.
 
"A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort"

"...unless you use nuclear weapons"

Even in late 1940's it was clear that UK cannot fight USSR alone without nuclear weapons, and the UK's ally US had them. Meanwhile, the ability of USSR to create a submarine threat against UK's SLOC's was a decade away by which time UK would even have nuclear weapons of it's own.

And even pre-nukes I'd say a strategic bomber with earth-shattering bombs is more effective ASW method than hundreds of escorts.

So, from late 1940's onwards the best option for ASW would be a strategic bomber with capability to strike against Soviet sub bases with nuclear weapons. If you want a more survivable and more expensive option a carrier based bomber is a good option too. For naval-specific delivery a nuclear torpedo or a nuclear bomb delivered via submarien might be a good secondary option too.

What would this mean for RN? Creation of an intervention fleet, basically. Very roughly carrier task forces comprised of carriers, cruisers and DD's for strike, amphibious forces, sloops or frigates for presence missions. Submarines for reconnaissance, training and special forces support missions. A-class, perhaps built in some higher numbers, maybe up to 24 or so, should be enough.

Use the plenty available low mileage WW II ships to buy goodwill by selling or donating them for friendly countries.
 
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Just how well did that work in WWII (and less so WWI).... I'm not sure you can reliably attack land bases without overwhelming force?

"A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort"

It wouldn't be ships and guns and it wouldn't be forts, it would be jet aircraft against ports.

The attacks on uboat bases was the reason why the Germans had to build such huge concrete pens. In contrast the RN subs would submerge in port during the day to avoid air attack. The Bay of Biscay was a very hard fought battleground in the Battle of the Atlantic, where Coastal Command used every trick in the book such as leigh lights, new radars, shallow setting depth charges, big guns and rockets to hunt uboats as the were coming and going. The Luftwaffe didn't just let this happen, mounting covering missions with fighter versions of the Ju88 to protect the uboats.

An offensive strategy is plenty feasible in 1948-55, getting aircraft up in the Norwegian sea to attack the Soviet bases and hunt subs when they were bunched up near port was standard NATO strategy for 40 years.
 
Having the Sea Vixen entering service in 1954 rather than 1959 would be a game-change. I remember reading the Sea Vixen twists and turns in Tony Butler books and shaking my head in disbelief. The DH.116 "Sea Venom without the twin booms" was the worst part.
Naval Hunter, why not ? It had very sane flight characteristics for a first generation swept wing fighter. Doable.
Anything but the Scimitar, it was a dog, a powerful aircraft sure, but a dog nonetheless. Get the Buccaneer in service ASAP, except without the fucking Gyron juniors.

-DON'T try to rebuild an Illustrious or Implacable into a more capable carrier. The result will be too expensive and too small. Jets are the future and the writing is on the wall. Therefore, what I would suggest is cancel all other 1942 Light Carriers still building on the ways, or sell them off.

Spot on. Anchor HMS Victorious out of Montebello, strap the Hurricane nuke on its deck, and blow that lemon into smithereens and tiny atoms of iron.

Audacious class are a go, plus whatever Centaur can be scrounged out of 1946. Give three or four Centaurs the OTL Hermes treatment and they can launch Buccaneers and Spey Twosaders in place of F-4K. Which make them relevant until the end of Cold War.
 
Noting that the French have just borrowed the Audacious class BS-5 catapults for their Clems, give them a pat in the back and help them building the larger PA.58 Verdun with the full length BS-5 at 60 m, and blend that with the 1954 medium fleet carrier, which dimensions were outrageously similar to... a Verdun.

PA.58 Verdun
Displacement: 45,000 tons full load
Dimensions: 860 x 112 x ?? feet/262 x 34 x ?? meters
Extreme Dimensions: 939 x 190 x ?? feet/286.3 x 58 x ?? meters
Propulsion: Steam turbines, 4 shafts, 200,000 shp, 33 knots
Crew: ???
Armor: none
Armament: 2 Masurca SAM, 8 single 100 mm DP

https://erenow.net/ww/rebuilding-royal-navy-warship-design-since-1945/5.php

Contemporaneously with the smaller carrier studies, consideration was being given to the design and construction of a larger 35,000-ton ship. By May 1954 one ship was included in the ongoing amended £1610 Million Plan – a figure first settled upon in the 1953–4 Estimates – with the aim of producing Staff Requirements in the autumn of 1954, laying the ship down in August 1957 with completion in May 1962. A second ship was also envisaged. The cost of each new carrier was very approximately placed at £18 million. One interesting aim was embodying suitable characteristics to enable the ships to be adapted for the operation of vertical take-off aircraft – a far-sighted ambition included as a result of his first visit to Bath by Lord Louis Mountbatten, the new First Sea Lord. The design was duly included in the Book of Studies prepared for the Sea Lords, the ship being considered the smallest carrier that would operate modern aircraft in reasonable numbers, being regarded as ‘in effect a general purpose carrier which while not being so large as to be wasted in the trade protection role, could carry a considerable strike force as an alternative when required’.

She could operate 47 aircraft, a typical mixture of types including 12 Scimitars, 12 Sea Vixens, 8 Gannets, 9 Buccaneers, 4 airborne early-warning aircraft and 2 search-and-rescue helicopters. The defensive armament consisted of four twin 3in/70 cal. with MRS3 directors and a secondary Bofors armament provided below the flight deck on the transom. Some 2700 tons of protection was worked into the design, the hangar being protected at the top by 1¾in plate, the sides being 1¼Ain. There was 3in side armour by way of a citadel, whilst the top of the citadel and vital compartments in the island benefited from 1½in protection. The ship had an angled deck and two catapults. The machinery was to be a three-shaft arrangement with 45,000shp on each shaft which produced a speed of 29.9kts ‘deep and dirty’. Endurance was 5000 miles under operational conditions. The design was still evolving at this stage, with the armament and the machinery subject to discussion. In the latter case a twin-shaft arrangement was being considered, each unit having greater power. It was expected that weight would be saved. The ship would have accommodated a crew of 300 officers and 2100 ratings.6

Development of the design continued throughout 1955 with Staff Requirements being discussed and as late as 1956 outline drawings of a fleet carrier were shown at a meeting in Bath. How the project evolved thereafter is not known but three 45,000-ton aircraft carriers were included in the 1959–60 Long Term Costing. They were to complete in the 1970–1, 1971–2 and 1972–3 financial years. This project was, however, succeeded by CVA-01.7

Or alternatively, hire doctor Who and his Tardis and make him read this thread before passing his notes to the 1953 RN carrier designers.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...intaining-carrier-based-airpower.32516/page-2
 
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I'd change the strategy the Royal Navy uses to deal with the Soviet submarine threat from defensive to offensive, by striking at the base areas with carriers and amphibious operations to control the naval geography the submarines use.
I like this a lot, and it's really more in keeping with Royal Navy tradition than a defensive strategy. The sons of Nelson do not wait around to get attacked; the sons of Fisher do not make themselves content with old toys!
I've never really been convinced by the 'offensive' anti-submarine warfare argument, especially once the Soviets start launching nuclear powered ones. At that point the submarines can theoretically stay out for years with the only limiting factor being food supplies and ammunition in wartime. NATO were never going to be the ones to launch the first strike so the Soviets have the initiative, if a large number of their submarines are already at sea then striking a half-empty port seems rather ineffective – at that point ASW frigates are the greatest need. As for talk of Nelson try refighting the Battle of Copenhagen against the USSR and see where that gets you.
 
"...unless you use nuclear weapons"

Even in late 1940's it was clear that UK cannot fight USSR alone without nuclear weapons, and the UK's ally US had them. Meanwhile, the ability of USSR to create a submarine threat against UK's SLOC's was a decade away by which time UK would even have nuclear weapons of it's own.
Nukes are expensive and limited early in cold war (40-60s) and by the time UK would be dropping them on Soviet ports would the RAF not want them all of them to hit Soviet Cities?
 
I've never really been convinced by the 'offensive' anti-submarine warfare argument, especially once the Soviets start launching nuclear powered ones. At that point the submarines can theoretically stay out for years with the only limiting factor being food supplies and ammunition in wartime. NATO were never going to be the ones to launch the first strike so the Soviets have the initiative, if a large number of their submarines are already at sea then striking a half-empty port seems rather ineffective – at that point ASW frigates are the greatest need. As for talk of Nelson try refighting the Battle of Copenhagen against the USSR and see where that gets you.

There is a bit of 'devil is in the details' and assumptions here.

This thread is about the fleet until 1955, which is when defence policy started to change around the world from re-fighting WW2 with a few hundred kiloton nukes where the ASW task was to keep Britain's trade routes open to enable a months and even years long war. After 1955 the defence policy and strategy changed because it was considered WW3 wouldn't last for months or years, it would likely be a single Blitzkrieg style campaign ending in surrender or nuclear conflagration. This was the reason why the 2nd (and more active in practice) leg of defence strategy was fighting limited wars 'out of area'. The requirements for these 2 tasks are different, the former requires lots of escorts to escort lots of ships for months whereas the latter is more akin to a Malta convoy climactic sea battle/convoy where less ASW escorts are needed and carrier strikes against home bases are more practical.

In the particular case of the Soviet Union, their subs including their SSNs from 1958, spent less time at sea than NATO subs and didn't travel as far afield as NATO subs. This meant that in a WW3 scenario there are more Soviet subs at home at the start and a breakout must occur means there is more scope to take the fight up to them at the start of the war.
 
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