Thande
Donor
The KGL was the best cavalry in the British army, generally, but I'm not sure if their infantry was up to the same standards as British regulars.
Berthier at Waterloo
- Thread starter rick007
- Start date
The KGL was the best cavalry in the British army, generally, but I'm not sure if their infantry was up to the same standards as British regulars.
67th Tigers
Banned
You mean in the "Army of the Low Countries"? An allied army in Belgium rather than the British Army (250,000 stong, of which ca 40,000 were foreign:
http://web.archive.org/web/20040812...demics/history/War/Nap/1815-foreign-units.htm )
and http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_lowcountries1814.html
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Flocculencio
Donor
KGL infantry was steady and KGL cavalry was light-years better than most British horse but a lot of the battalions at Waterloo had been freshly levied. Out of 30,000 British and KGL troops, only 7000 were veterans of the Peninsular War- as RPW points out, if Wellington had had his Peninsular Army, Waterloo would probably never have happened as one assumes that Napoleon probably wouldn't have come head on into a battle-hardened, veteran army. Besides that the rest of the troops under Wellington were from the Netherlands, Belgium, Nassau and Brunswick. Many of these were also new recruits and inexperienced and those who were veterans had gained their experience fighting for the Emperor and were thus considered to have divided loyalties.
With the greatest of respect, but I'm not sure what those links are supposed to demonstrate - the first is a list of foreign units in British service as of Christmas 1815 and the second is an account of the 1814 campaign in the low countries. Waterloo of course was in June 1815 - try this for a breakdown at the actual battle.
67th Tigers
Banned
Really? No....
Actually, I thought you were going down an old argument, and was starting to show that the Army of the Low Countries was a subsidery British Army, with some reinforcements from the main Army.
A far better orbat for the low countries campaign would be here:
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterloo1.html
The Hundred Days campaign was lost by two incidents of significant forces of men being absent from critical battlefields - D'Eleron at Ligny / Quatre Bras and Grouchy at Wavre / Waterloo. I'm not sure that without changing the men in command of the Corps you'd get a different outcome, even with Berthiers superlative staffwork. Generals are supposed to be able to act on their own initiative and march to the sound of the guns - something neither D'Eleron (confused by Ney's countermanding the Emporer) or Grouchy (afraid of Napoleon's previous dressing down of him for showing initiative).
My thoughts are that you don't need Davout or Soult (although Davout would certainly have managed to 'be on the field of Mont St Jean with 30 000 men') - swapping the two corps commanders around gives the painstaking, if slow, Grouchy the job of holding up Wellington (and almost certainly not making the same mistakes of over-eagerness that Ney did) while the firey Ney gets the job of pursuit of the Prussians and then attacking onto the Waterloo battlefield.
My thoughts are that you don't need Davout or Soult (although Davout would certainly have managed to 'be on the field of Mont St Jean with 30 000 men') - swapping the two corps commanders around gives the painstaking, if slow, Grouchy the job of holding up Wellington (and almost certainly not making the same mistakes of over-eagerness that Ney did) while the firey Ney gets the job of pursuit of the Prussians and then attacking onto the Waterloo battlefield.
Anaxagoras
Banned
Well, I think it would be very likely that with Berthier present as chief-of-staff, the confusion that lead to D'Eleron marching around aimlessly between Ligny and Quatre Bras would not have taken place. In that case, it is likely that the Battle of Ligny woud have seen the Prussians removed from the equation entirely.
Davout and Berthier would almost certainly do a better job at Quatre Bras than Ney and D'Erlon. For one thing, Ney's delay of the assault let Wellington reinforce enough to hold off the French forces. But, let's assume your right about the corps commander's being more important, and Davout basically does what Ney does. Knowing Napoleon, he gives Davout the job of holding Blucher away from Waterloo. This is Davout's historical job, as at Auerstadt. There is no reason to assume that he would fail in this role. So we have Blucher's forces probably beaten, but deffinatly forced away from Waterloo. Without the Prussians, and with Berthier at the battle, the odds are heavily weighted in Napoleon's favour.
What!
That makes it sound very dodgy! Was wondering why the Duke wasn't included.That would have been a hell of a battle against Napoleon and team at their best. Wellington might still have fought as far back as Waterloo presuming the Prussians still got hammered earlier and possibly a better French performance means the allied army has to withdraw from QB.
Good point although Ney might be better employed in Paris, provided he doesn't do something too rash.
Steve
Thande
Not an expert on the period but suspect it was as good as the better British units. Don't forget this is a unit of exiles who choose to stay with the Hanoverians when their homeland was annexed so both pretty highly motivated and a lot of experience. [This is the unit as in the peninsula. May have been thinned out by a lot of new recruits like many of the British units].
Steve
I believe that if the Iron Marshal had commanded at Quatre de Bras history would have change. Wellington would have found his army in serios trouble. With Berther there Napoleons orders would have been clearer and a corp would not have been wasted marching back and forth between battlefield. Thus the Prussians would have been crushed at Ligny and it would have been Soult that was given the command of the forces to complete their distruction. He would have marched to the sound of the guns at waterloo and thus taken the British -allied forces in the flank.
Redbeard
Banned
Considering Schwarzenberg I'd say on the contrary. In combination with his chief of staff Radetzky he was a very capable commander of large forces. He always showed the necessary caution needed vs. an opponent like Napoleon. I would be much more worried about a hotheaded lunatic like Blûcher (but at least he had Gneisenau) or Alexander, seeing himself as nothing less than the personification of salvation in general, but with very little military understanding.
Allied numbers in a prolonged 1815 campaign would simply be too overwhelming - even Bavaria sent more than 50.000 men towards France - the biggest and best army Bavaria ever had fielded.
So if he like in 1814 try to "pinch" the allies he might give them some scrathces but he ends up himself bled white in an corner ready for the coup de grace.
If he goes for decisive battles he can of course hope for a row of miracles, but more likely he will be finshed off for good in the first major battle the allies choose to give. His problem is that the allies from 1809 had learned too much about how to operate armies to let themselves catch on the wrong leg, and successfully in 1813 had implemented a strategy of only giving battle to Napoleon hmself when having very good odds. Like one of Napoleons ministers wrote to him about the 1813 autumn campign (quote from memory):"Your Majesty might win a great battle, but only to learn that your subordinates have lost two!"
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
The problem is going to be actually pinning down Napoleon and his subordinates. The allies will have such large armies that concentration will be nearly impossible. And don't get me started on the logistic's. Naponeon will have an easy job, picking off isolated corps and detachments. After losing over 100,000 men, the allies may be in trouble. Davout was a far better general than the main Corps Commanders in the 1813 campaigns (MacDonald, Oudinot, Vandamme). Put him in similar circumstances to those campains, and the coalition is in trouble. And Napoleon actually defeated Schwarzenburg at Dresden. Finally, time will give Napoleon time to rebuild his cavalry and the Imperial Guard. Said Guard is undefeated now, and possibly the most effective force in the world.
The most likely outcome will be a peace of exhaustion. Napoleon will have massive casualties, and no real options as to the offensive. But the allies will have lost gargantuan amounts of troops, and have been stopped cold. Either the allies leave Napoleon alone, but make sure to confine him to France, or they gamble it all on one final clash of Titans.
Leipzig or Borodino on a greater scale, with more at stake.
How that battle ends is hard to tell. Napoleon, Davout, and Berthier, along with the other marshalls, are probably the best team of the day. Against them are the massive numbers of the allies, with the commanders possibly including Blucher, Schwarzenburg, Archduke Charles, Wellington, de Tolly, Kutuzov, and possibly even Bernadotte (although whether he would be a positive addition is questionable). With Davout on the field, and Berthier calling the shots, I would say that Napoleon has a good chance of victory. But there is always chance.
If I ahd a time machine, I would change history, just to get this outcome, so I could watch the battle.
Redbeard
Banned
In the Leipzig campaign Napoleon had the central position, but nevertheless ended up chasing enemies dancing at least as well as him, and eventually he only escaped with the remnants because the Zar refused any Russian troops west of the Elster/Pleisse. Schwarzenberg/Radetzky's original plan had been to go far a blocking position west of Pleisse, which would have meant the French moving over very difficult terrain with three(four) allied armies converging on them. Instead Schwarzenberg/Radetzky had to do with probes west of Elster Pleisse and inbetween, but they attarcted enough French attention for Napoleon to loose in the north and at the main front at Wachau. Schwarzenberg/Radtezky's swift deployment of the Bohemian Army reserve on day one IMHO was brilliant.
Dresden was the very important lesson for the allies. It was the result of mainly Alexander wanting that city, but of not enough forces being committed in time and of giving battle even if Napoleon was present. After this Schwarzenberg usually lead from an advanced HQ away from the allied Monarchs and the Trachtenberg plan worked perfect. Remark that Napoleon gave priority to the Bohemian Army under Schwarzenberg whenever he had the chance. He never dared that job for his subordinates.
Of course the allied armies could not expect to march in one big lump, as they could not in 1813 - that is why their plan of slowly tightening the circle was so brilliant. It preconditioned however, that the allied staffs had a certain level. By 1805 they probably would not have had that level, by 1813 they had, and even more so in 1815.
You're welcome to get started on logistics, I'll gladly follow.
Davout was left in Paris for a reason, Napoleon needed a person there he could trust and one who could act. No Davout in Paris and it might all be over hardly before it has started.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
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Redbeard
Banned
In the Leipzig campaign a similar size force was manoeuvred in a landscape already campaigned (i.e. emptied of resources) several times. France in the summer and autumn will be the land of milk and honey in comparison. That the allied succeded in keeping 2-300.000 in the field in the winter campaign in 1814 just show the potential of the allied army management and of the French landscape. The French never revolted, altough the strains of winter 1814 must have been very tough. Anyway there are plenty of troops approaching from the smaller German states (even from Denmark) to garrison the French cities and towns.
I'm afraid your "plan":
"If Napoleon was smart, he would fall back towards Paris, while picking off wings of the allied armies. As the logistical system gets stretched to the breaking point, he counterattacks. Let the allies fight their way out of this mess"
is easier said than done.
Why should the allies let their wings pick off, and why should their logistic system break down now? They didn't in 1813 or 1814, and each time Napoleon tries to "pick wings" he risk a battle where he takes heavy casualties. He can't afford that, the allies can much better.
And falling back on Paris would only tighten the noose around his neck and he will anyway last no longer than the the depots of Paris can supply the army and the Parisians. And if he or Davout tries a sortie all the allied armies will be in short distance from each other but can draw on a large hinterland for supplies. It will be another Leipzig, but with the allies even more superior and with nowhere to go for Napoleon.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
But, as stated earlier, it would be nearly impossible to coordinate the allied armies, and concentrate them on short notice. It will be much easier for Napoleon to pick off segments of the armies than it will be for the allies to concentrate for the hammerblow, or for them to kill subordinates managed by Berthier. And with Davout in the field, images of Jena-Auerstadt come to mind. It should be noted that during the German campaign, Napoleon also did not have his experienced Cavalry, which had often proved decisive. And it is unlikely that Leipzig would have been fought, or had a similar outcome, if the Marshals had not blundered in the ways they did, or if Napoleon had not accepted the truce offer midway through. And the battle itself was a close run thing. The French held off 350,000+ men for 9 hours, before sheer numbers carried the day. And much of the army would have escaped intact, had that one bridge not been blown.
Regards
Atreus
Redbeard
Banned
The allied DID coordinate and they DID concentrate in the Leipzig campaign (Autumn 1813) and in 1814 - that is the big difference to earlier campaigns inkl. Jena-Auerstedt - the allies had copied and to a degree even improved Napoleon's staff system and operational doctrines.
In the Leipzig Campaign Napoleon's cavalry was as experienced as it would be in 1814 or 1815. You mix with the situation in spring 1813 when indeed the French cavalry was short of good mounts and many of the recruits "sat in the saddle like a bag of potatoes".
As Leipzig was run by the allies I don't think it was close run. They had enough forces in contact or approaching and as long as they kept up the pressure from as many sides as possible they would eventually prevail. So instead of the old image of Napoleon picking his opponents and finsihing him off one at a time we saw French armycorps marching and countermarching inside the tightening French perimeter and not really influencing the situation anywhere but taking up road.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
But could they coordinate their forces well enough to concentrate on Napoleon when he was alone, or on his subordinates? I would also like to point out that Davout is probably the best general of the Napoleonic wars. It will be harder trapping and killing him than it was against, say, Ney. In fact, if the allies try to replay the 1813 campaigns, they will get bloodied against him fairly quickly. And if they try to replay 1814 instead, I see the eagle rising again. In that case, the seperated allied armies, each hungry for glory, would be in danger of Napoleon cuting them off and cutting them up.
Actually, I am not. I was refering to the German campaigns of 1813, which included Leipzig. If it came out wrong, my apologies, but the point stands. Napoleon with his cavalry is much more dangerous than Napoleon without it.
I beg to differ. As one example, the allies who had just recieved over 150,000 reinforcements to 14,000 French, were unable to truly defeat the french. To quote wikipedia:
And if the allies could not gain a decisive advantage over Napoleon until the bridge was destroyed, I would not say that they were running it. So claiming that the allies will crush Napoleon in a rerun of the battle is a little rash.
Regards,
Atreus