(e) D-Day: Monty was quite correct in wanting to expand the area of first bridgehead. His problem lay in his love of publicity. He declared he was going to take Caen on D+1. This was the first worm in the apple so far as the newspapers were concerned. However, it seems to me clear that the whole concept of the easternmost forces (the Anglo-Canadians) soaking up the German counterattacks, whilst the westernmost forces (the Americans) consolidated for a mass breakout, was certainly in senior planners' minds. If you look at the road net, it is the obvious plan to pursue. Whether it was Monty's idea is another question. Also, like any good general, Monty was an opportunist and if there was a chance of, say, Epsom or Goodwood succeeding, then he would take it.
(f) Goodwood: The massed bomber raid had nothing to do with the failure of Goodwood, quite the reverse, it enabled the tanks to make good progress at first (the axis of attack was outside, not inside, the city of Caen.) No-one ever seems to rate the strength of the German opposition. May I point out that the Germans fielded no less than 10 panzer divs against the Allies in Normandy, half of them SS (to cite a comparison, the Russian destruction of Army Group Centre was done in the face of 3 panzer divs, two of them understrength, and subsequently 2 more, a total of 5.)
(g) The British Army: Goodwood and Market Garden have something in common, which was that the UK was running out of men to do the fighting. By the time Goodwood came around, the fighting had sopped up most of the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions. On the other hand, the 3 tank divs were unoccupied, and ready. So Monty used them, but with inadequate infantry support (which is why the offensive foundered on dug-in German A/T forces.)
(h) Elbow-room: Goodwood and Market Garden have something else in common, which was a narrow axis of advance. The geography of the area next to the Odon prohibited extended deployment of the armour and also Monty's options to change the plan, when it wasn't working. The fact is that most people don't consider D-Day to D+60 as a single operation, ultimately carried out in accordance with the original plan, and they should (the Red Army would certainly have done so.) Hitler played into the Allies' hands by launching the Falaise offensive and the end result was that the whole German army in France, including all those panzerdivs, ceased to exist as operational units.
(f) Goodwood: The massed bomber raid had nothing to do with the failure of Goodwood, quite the reverse, it enabled the tanks to make good progress at first (the axis of attack was outside, not inside, the city of Caen.) No-one ever seems to rate the strength of the German opposition. May I point out that the Germans fielded no less than 10 panzer divs against the Allies in Normandy, half of them SS (to cite a comparison, the Russian destruction of Army Group Centre was done in the face of 3 panzer divs, two of them understrength, and subsequently 2 more, a total of 5.)
(g) The British Army: Goodwood and Market Garden have something in common, which was that the UK was running out of men to do the fighting. By the time Goodwood came around, the fighting had sopped up most of the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions. On the other hand, the 3 tank divs were unoccupied, and ready. So Monty used them, but with inadequate infantry support (which is why the offensive foundered on dug-in German A/T forces.)
(h) Elbow-room: Goodwood and Market Garden have something else in common, which was a narrow axis of advance. The geography of the area next to the Odon prohibited extended deployment of the armour and also Monty's options to change the plan, when it wasn't working. The fact is that most people don't consider D-Day to D+60 as a single operation, ultimately carried out in accordance with the original plan, and they should (the Red Army would certainly have done so.) Hitler played into the Allies' hands by launching the Falaise offensive and the end result was that the whole German army in France, including all those panzerdivs, ceased to exist as operational units.