The Monty-Patton thingie...
Oh, dear, the old debate of whether Monty was a lucky dimwitted primadonna or not once again turned into a Patton versus Monty contest! Well, my opinion is clear, Monty was at best a mediocre army commander and more or less a catastrophe at higher levels.
As mentioned already, Alexander did play a rather important role in Monty’s success in North Africa. Not surprisingly Monty did his best to claim all the credit. Monty as a general had a nasty habit of taking credit for other people’s work and plans – one of the reasons why he was fairly unpopular among his peers. As did the fact that the British finally stopped (to the best of my knowledge, that is) using all-armoured brigades and shifting brigade from division to division unendingly. And to be quite frank, at Al-Alamain Monty only did what Rommel had done to the British on numerous occasions, meaning that he held back and let concealed guns take out the enemies tanks and then counter-attacked (with an overwhelming advantage). So nothing really ground breaking here… not like say, Patton and Ike experimenting with armoured warfare in the US pre-war or using mechanized warfare to win the big Louisiana manoeuvres or commanding a training centre or… well, you get the point…
Anyway, with an impressive superiority in men, guns, tanks, planes and supplies, Monty nonetheless took a good awful long time to cross North Africa, in spite of the Germans running, more or less, for dear life. Always been a bit slow, that Monty… Oh, and the Mareth-line, yes, that was not exactly the most well defended place in the world, and Monty kinda just drove around it, which I suppose is the least you can expect of a general.
What have we then, oh, yes, Sicily. Monty did as good a job as any, I suppose, but again he had Alexander to hold his hand and Patton to show how you should do things. Still, with a battle hardened army of veterans I think it strange that Patton and his relatively green troops should outperform Monty’s Brits… Could it be, that Patton was more flexible and capable and his staffers generally more open-minded?
Right, onwards to Normandy! So D-Day kicks off with Monty in charge, mostly of the Brits and Canadians in the 21st Army Group (I think it was). For some reason the British armour ends up in one big traffic jam on the beaches and are unable to support the fairly unopposed drive inlands.
And now we come to the important part. Some people claim that Monty always intended to tie up the German reserves, so that the Americans could break out in open country. First of all, with Monty personality in mind, I find this highly unlikely. Second Monty was always sticking to the plan, he did not change anything unless it was already too late, so if he intended to keep the Germans occupied and Caen unoccupied, it would have been down in writing (and it is not, not before after the entire Goodwood debacle, that is… hmm, why is that one wonders). Third Caen was to be taken on D-Day+1 (right?), not be fought over for God knows who long to bind enemy reserves. Besides now Monty really show his colours as an old fashioned general with a baggage train stretching back to WW1, he orders a frontal attack on Caen, which fails even though the Brits and especially the raw Canadians fight like mad men. Finally around the 9th Monty calls the thing off and orders Caen enveloped – still to be taken, mind you -, which leads to the 7th Armoured charging in to Villiers-Bocage on the 13th and, well, having their infamous meeting with one herr Wittman, and that was that. Again one can wonder why Monty didn’t funnel all available armour through the gap the 7th had found and exploited for 4 days, but well, Monty always was a slow one… as seen again at the Falaise Gap, where he failed to close the northern part and, apparently, prevented Patton from doing it from the south.
Basically Goodwood was a way to correct something that had already gone wrong. And Goodwood in itself was not a very impressive operation. Again the Brits and Canadians fought hard, but for some reason they couldn’t break the Germans… unlike Patton and the Americans at the West Wall….
And then we have Marked Garden. I have one thing to say, only a total idiot will use ONE road to move an entire armoured corps forward, and not only move forward, but actually fight the enemy at the same time. The very same road that would serve as a supply route as well… sigh, whoever allowed Monty to go ahead with this plan was criminal negligent…
Then we have Patton. Generally speaking, don't give in to the charges-blindly-ahead hype. Patton knew what he was doing (look at his pre-war career fx.).
Patton is often criticized for two things; Metz – well, actually Fort Driant – and the move to free captured Americans in the last days of the war (Opr. Baum, which I won’t really get into as it was more like a commando raid). The fighting along the Rhine and West Wall could have been avoided - I'll contribute the entire thing to Monty's and Ike's general lack of vision and battlefield understanding, and again Monty’s slow ways-, but that said it is important to notice that Patton did better than Hodges, who literally burnt out entire divisions further north, and better than Monty at Caen. Patton and his men did as good, and probably better, than could be possibly expected. Bad weather, few supplies, well-designed fortifications in a build-up area and a heavily mechanized army is not the best of combinations (all this in sharp contrast to Monty at Caen btw). I hope, you all realise that Patton is generally praised for this campaign. Russel Wiegly, whom I usually dislike because of his Ike-obsession, has a fairly balanced view on this campaign. Or a more popular historian might be Stephen Ambrose - I believe it's the D-Day book that has a good account on the storm of Fort Driant and the whole mess around Metz! Or Blumenson's brilliant bio (where one in addition can find a good deal about what really happened regarding Opr. Baum).
Sitting here years later, it is easy to see when an attack should have been called off, but on the spot it's a way tougher call to make. The American and British mess further north is an excellent example. Patton and his 3rd Army broke the West Wall the hard way, what else could they do?! In that regard, I'm pretty confident that they suffered fewer casualties doing so than Hodges and co.
Again, with an under-strength (lacking at least 9,000 combat troops) mechanized army with few supplies - they were down to 7 rounds for the howitzers pr day at one time - little fuel, extremely bad weather and heavy enemy fortifications, it's a wonder the 3rd Army did as well as they did.
Wiggy has a curious remark, I seem to remember it's him at least, that the 3rd Army paid for their hubris at Metz. I take it as an indication that the entire 3rd Army was fired up and saw no obstacle to large to hammer through (Patton was extremely good at building morale, as seen with the US II Corps in NA), and they might have been right had Patton had his way...
The morale thing is btw the reason why Patton demanded that support personelle, MP's, staffers and the like should always be dress according to the book! I can't remember any sources claiming he ordered the same for line units...
All in all Patton did much to generate a certain image among the enlisted men, and the media. Most sources states very firmly that Patton was two men, so to say, one man among this men, and he really thought of them as his, and the media and a second extremely charming and intelligent man among ladies, fellow officers and civilians.
Another good example of Patton as a General: he had good men around him - most of them he picked before commanding 7th Army in Italy and brought most of them along with him to 3rd Army -, he did plan ahead, he thought anything was possible if one threw oneself behind it and he had complete faith in his men (and the American soldier in general)!
Patton was in many ways a planner. He helped Ike plan Torch, along with Clark, he helped plan the invasion of Sicily. Apparently he also made the arrangements for the Casablanca meeting. Patton had plans waiting for the Ardennes counter-attack he and his 3rd Army launched, because his staff had smelled the proverbial rat on the 9th of December, 1944, and forewarned Patton, who himself felt the Jerries were up to something. Furthermore he ran the desert training centre and did remarkably well in the great pre-war Louisiana manoeuvres.
The way he fine tuned the 3rd Army’s relationship with their supporting tactical air unit – I can’t remember the unit designation - was also quite impressive.
As noticed before by another poster, Patton did indeed have a speed saves lives doctrine - he fought more or less as the Germans did early in the war and they're praised for it. Patton had a knack for mordern combat that few other, if any, Allied generals had!
Regarding Patton’s temper and the slapping incidents. I think Patton was a weak man who willed himself to be strong – his letters to Beatrice indicates as much – and thus had little sympathy for people who could not overcome their weaknesses as he himself had done. Furthermore with a war going on, everybody who somehow avoided combat would only send another young man to fight in his stead, and I for one find that distasteful, and Patton did too, apparently.
I often think it odd that Patton is portrayed as a lunatic and dilettante, even though he always won his battles and was well-liked by his men despite the typical occasional GI-mutter! And Monty for some reason is the great hero even though he was a fumbling fool, who stole others people’s ideas and took credit for their actions as well, not to mention he caused the North African campaign to go longer than needed, nearly f’ed up the invasion at Caen and finally got a lot of people killed in Marked Garden.
That said, I feel inclined to say that I'm an anglophile of the fist order, and find it annoying beyound belief that men like Wavel, Alexander and especially William (Bill, yes) Slim always comes second in regards to Monty. That is perhaps my real beef wiht Monty...