Berlin or Bust - An Unthinkable Operation
- Thread starter johnboy
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Only some of these quotes actually appear in the book as you claim. Most do not. Also, how is the WAllies making it only as far as the Elbe supposed to be a victory for Operation Unthinkable? That's not even a fraction of the distance to the ultimate objective.
Erm, no. The Soviets have more tanks (35,000 vs 22,000, in terms of global stock. WAllied figures in Europe were 19,000 total while the Soviets were just shy of 13,000 in operational forces and something on the order of 18,000 non-operational), Soviet logistical net was quite capable of sustaining their forces in Central Europe at record levels, their aircraft were fewer but not that much fewer and of comparable quality, and their economy had ceased to run on fumes in 1943. Soviet corps may only be as strong as WAllied divisions, but the Soviets have more than two corps for every WAllied division (174 Rifle Corps, 36 Tank/Mechanized Corps, and 6 Cavalry Corps as opposed to 80 infantry divisions and 23 WAllied armored). The Soviets would have lost eventually, but they would have been able to score some major victories early on.
Soviet agriculture had been recovering since 1944.
That's hard to say, since Soviet caloric intake was heavily augmented through the use of local foraging. In terms of daily consumption from central command, a US Infantry division in 1944 received 100 tons in rations per day as opposed to a Soviet rifle division which received 66 tons daily. There are two problems with such a base comparison however. Firstly, Soviet supply consumption rose much rapidly with each year of the war as Soviet supply itself improved: in 1943, the same figure had been 35 tons. It would not be unreasonable to assume another increased occurred between 1944 and '45, but I don't have any figures for '45. Secondly, the proper comparison isn't a Soviet rifle division (which by mid-1945 were more regiments with division-level artillery support) but Soviet Rifle Corps (which by mid-1945 were more divisions with corps-level artillery support), which would be about double to quintuple the figure.
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These are all excellent points. It seems to be an endless series of speculation as to the numbers of Divisions and the like. The Russians certainly had the edge in manpower, I have seen figures stating an advantage of anything between 4-1 to less than 2-1. The lower figures are correct and of course the allied armies had a much larger "tail" of non divisional personnel. I have put the allied figures in Europe at 140 Divisions, not counting "phantom" Divisions or ones in the U.K that existed on paper to funnel replacements to the allied armies in Europe. They do include 5 Italian "Divisions that consisted on two-three Regiments only. In actual fact if these are not counted the figure is more like 130, but the Western Allies had 20-30 Independent Brigades.
In regards aircraft, the numbers favoured the allies, 36,000 to almost 20,000 and better aircraft to. Of course, the naval situation is so lopsided it does not rate a mention.
The other two situations that are a conundrum is German forces and the arrival of atomic weapons in July.
Later I found that the numbers roughly corresponded to US planning for 'War Plan PINCHER,' but that was after the fact.
The Allies had far more than 22,000 tanks and TDs worldwide, that number is an approximation for the combined Western European and Mediterranean theaters (and in reality was probably well below the actual total of every single such vehicle on the continent). Looking first at the example of US medium tanks, this is what I mean:
On page 454 of "Logistical Support of the Armies" volume II, it is stated that 'on the eve of the Rhine crossing' (that is, March 1945),
"theater stocks totaled 7,620, only 159 tanks short of the total T/E and reserve requirement of 7,779. Against a T/E requirement for 5,477 the armies actually had 6,606 on hand, giving them a reserve of 1,129 against an authorized reserve of 1,535. While the armies’ stocks included nearly 600 unserviceable tanks, the armies had another 600 in reserve, and additional tanks intended for the army reserves were in theater pipelines."
My interpretation is that the 'unit rosters,' if they can be called that, had 5,477 medium tanks with another 1,129 in immediate army reserve, 600 of which were unserviceable. ETO as a whole had an additional 1,014 on the continent to be delivered to the armies as needed. The figure that Zaloga uses for March 1945 (6,249 M4 75mm/76mm and 612 M4 105mm, a total of 6,821), closely matches the above 6,606 for what the armies actually had on hand without including the additional theater stocks.
The situation is similar for the British/Commonwealth: Zaloga provides a figure of 4,241 tanks in NW Europe on 5 May 1945, but the 21st Army Group's After Action Report gives 9,248 for the same date.
Because of the size of the discrepancy (21st Army Group's number is twice as big), it's hard to say what the two represent. Maybe the British just had a glut of tanks in reserve and 4,200 was TO&E only? In any case we can confidently assume that the western Allies had far more than 19,000 tanks and TDs in Western Europe and that the Soviet operational forces (12.3 k plus 300 STAVKA reserve) would have been greatly outnumbered even before Italy is accounted for. The 'Unthinkable' document also understates the number of Allied divisions available and of course doesn't include nondivisional units, of which there were many.
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These figures for 21st army group may include ranks in France bearing in mind many 1945 French divisions initially reformed with older British gear.Later I found that the numbers roughly corresponded to US planning for 'War Plan PINCHER,' but that was after the fact.
The Allies had far more than 22,000 tanks and TDs worldwide, that number is an approximation for the combined Western European and Mediterranean theaters (and in reality was probably well below the actual total of every single such vehicle on the continent). Looking first at the example of US medium tanks, this is what I mean:
On page 454 of "Logistical Support of the Armies" volume II, it is stated that 'on the eve of the Rhine crossing' (that is, March 1945),
"theater stocks totaled 7,620, only 159 tanks short of the total T/E and reserve requirement of 7,779. Against a T/E requirement for 5,477 the armies actually had 6,606 on hand, giving them a reserve of 1,129 against an authorized reserve of 1,535. While the armies’ stocks included nearly 600 unserviceable tanks, the armies had another 600 in reserve, and additional tanks intended for the army reserves were in theater pipelines."
My interpretation is that the 'unit rosters,' if they can be called that, had 5,477 medium tanks with another 1,129 in immediate army reserve, 600 of which were unserviceable. ETO as a whole had an additional 1,014 on the continent to be delivered to the armies as needed. The figure that Zaloga uses for March 1945 (6,249 M4 75mm/76mm and 612 M4 105mm, a total of 6,821), closely matches the above 6,606 for what the armies actually had on hand without including the additional theater stocks.
The situation is similar for the British/Commonwealth: Zaloga provides a figure of 4,241 tanks in NW Europe on 5 May 1945, but the 21st Army Group's After Action Report gives 9,248 for the same date.
Because of the size of the discrepancy (21st Army Group's number is twice as big), it's hard to say what the two represent. Maybe the British just had a glut of tanks in reserve and 4,200 was TO&E only? In any case we can confidently assume that the western Allies had far more than 19,000 tanks and TDs in Western Europe and that the Soviet operational forces (12.3 k plus 300 STAVKA reserve) would have been greatly outnumbered even before Italy is accounted for. The 'Unthinkable' document also understates the number of Allied divisions available and of course doesn't include nondivisional units, of which there were many.
You mean the French would have given them back after switching to other tanks? I don't know. Maybe tank destroyers are actually lumped in with tanks in the 21st Army Group report, but this seems uncharacteristic (especially in the British Army, the Archer, Wolverine, and Achilles were actually called "self-propelled antitank guns" and operated by the Royal Artillery rather than the Royal Armoured Corps).
Maybe for a brief summary like this they would have made an exception.
EDIT: possibly the discrepancy is caused by the fact that Zaloga lists "British" armo(u)red strength in NW Europe (4 armored divs), but 21 Army Group also had 2 Canadian and 1 Polish armoured divisions plus several armoured brigades. These and the backups for those units may account for the difference.
EDIT EDIT: These tables appear to suggest that Zaloga only included the British. Still, the total of just under 5,000 for December 1944, though higher than Zaloga's 3,500 for January 1945, doesn't really explain the 4000+ tank gap. Maybe they really did include TDs plus all reserves.
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I wonder what Japan is doing right now? Could we see a Soviet-Japanese alliance of convenience?
Eh? Warplan Pincher involved far more pessimistic figures (and results) than anything for Unthinkable, given that the US had canned 90 percent of it's combat power by then and lacked the mobilization system to rapidly regenerate it. Even just bringing any of the existing divisions on the CONUS and shipping it over to Europe would take over half-a-year. By contrast, the Red Army retained much of it's combat power by retaining it's equipment rather then scrapping it and retained the ability to fully mobilize and deploy all of it's active formations within a month, with the first wave of newly remobilized forces appearing within the next month. Hence, in Pincher, there was absolutely zero doubt the Soviets would roll all the way to Pyrennees (and even beyond) there, as well as to the Suez in the Middle East. Any postulation of Pincher holding the Soviets at the Inner-German Border, much less drive them back to the Elbe, was never even considered and even in hindsight is insane to suggest.
Rechecking my sources, it turns out my specific error here was a misremembered figure: I recalled the US had a global stock of 18,000 AFVs by 1945, but it turns out I was one digit over: the figure was 28,000.
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"In light of this increasingly favorable situation the War Department notified the theater in mid-April that it contemplated eliminating the 35-percent reserve being created for ETOUSA in the United States. The theater first opposed such action, pointing out the difficulty of maintaining the full 28-percent reserve in the army areas in view of the large percentage of total theater stocks that was constantly in the pipeline or under repair. " Page -455
Worth noting that by Soviet accounting, AFVs in transit or under repair are considered part of "nonoperational forces". Given that 14 percent can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered a "large percentage" and that SHAEF was complaining about it's reserve getting reduced precisely because such amounts were either in-transit or under repair, it's clear that the figures of on-hand AFVs is once against not equivalent to that of the Soviet figure for operational AFVs.
Seems more likely it was a misprint or miscount. I cannot find any other source which credits the British in Europe with having 9,000 AFVs.
No it doesn't? If anything, it overstates it given that the number of divisions actually in theater in May 1945 was 89 as opposed to the 103 posited by Unthinkable. And yeah, it doesn't count non-divisional units, but that goes for the Soviets as much as it does for the WAllies (mostly: the Unthinkable planners did seem to count some of the independent tank brigades). You toss those in, the advantage still is with the Soviets.
No, they are part of Zaloga's count, as he discusses them right after mentioning the 4 British armored divisions:
"Montgomery's 21st Army Group was filled out by other formations with Canada providing two armoured divisions and three infantry divisions; one Polish division also served with the Canadians. There were also several small Allied formations attached, inlcuding the Belgian Brigade, the Royal Netherlands Brigade, the Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade, and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade."
He then proceeds to list them in the brief OOB chart, so clearly his AFV figures includes them too.[/quote]
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No, I meant "SBP was taking his numbers from Pincher" not "pincher would have held the Soviets in Germany." IIRC the JWPC estimated that the Russians could have reached the Pyrenees in 30-45 days.
In that case, to include all nonoperational forces of both sides it would be necessary to add in tanks available in the CONUS and British Isles. From the above, we can see that the Americans alone had about 6,000 operable medium tanks immediately on hand in the field armies in ETO even excluding the Mediterranean, the same number as for the Soviets (6,059).
I assume for the time being that it counts reserve tanks and TDs.
According to Unthinkable, "total forces in Europe on 1 July" would be 103 divisions, of which 64 would be American, 35 British/Commonwealth, and 4 Polish; the 22 May version puts projected strength in north Europe as 50 infantry divisions, 20 armored divisions, 5 airborne divisions, and the equivalent in brigades of 8 more divisions (83 total), of which 47 would be available for offensive operations.
However, if the Allies were forced to fight right at the end of the war in May, the situation was different. According to Appendix 5 of "The War in Western Europe, part II," the breakdown in NW Europe was as follows:
British/Commonwealth: 18 divisions (including 6 armored and 1 airborne - the British 1st Airborne Division does not appear here)
Poland: 1 armored division
USA: 61 divisions (including 15 armored and 4 airborne)<-- two of which, the 2nd and 3rd, were "heavy" armored divisions that had 6 tank battalions instead of 3
France: 13 divisions (including 3 armored)
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Therefore, just in northwest Europe the Allies had 94 active divisions, of which 25 were armored and 5 airborne. In addition to this the 21st Army Group had 9 independent armoured brigades and at least one infantry brigade, the 214th. The armored brigades were large, each with about 200 tanks, maybe the equivalent of 7 tank divisions.
In the US Army, 31 separate tank battalions and 52 TD battalions were active in ETOUSA on 1 January 1945, with 6 more tank and 4 more TD battalions en route. There were additionally 13 mechanized cavalry groups (regiments), 7 separate infantry regiments, a parachute infantry regiment (the 517th), the 117th cavalry squadron (battalion), and about 3 independent battalions. By May 8th, non-divisional artillery forces amounted to 238 separate battalions:
4 x75mm
36 x 105mm
16 x 105mm SP
17 x 4.5 inch gun
71 x 155mm howitzer
30 x 155mm gun
6 x 155mm SP
38 x 203mm howitzer
5 x 203mm gun
15 x 240mm howitzer
Almost all US artillery battalions had three batteries and 12 tubes total, the exceptions being the 105mm SP (which had 18), the 203mm gun (which had 6), and the 240mm howitzer (also 6). In the whole US Army there were 347 AAA battalions (without breakdown of location). One exception was the 18th Field Artillery Battalion (72 x 4.5 inch "Xylophone" 8-tube rocket launchers); the 79th (provisional) field artillery battalion and the 244th field artillery battalion also temporarily operated German weapons.
Last but not least, there were a large number of Engineer Combat Battalions that could and did fight with distinction as infantry in an emergency. These were distributed at a rate of 3-6 battalions per engineer group, which would in turn be allocated at a rate of 1-2 per Corps or Army as needed.
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These forces are equivalent to about 20 armored divisions in tanks and TDs, 3 mechanized cavalry divisions, and 3 infantry divisions. There was enough artillery to form 20 divisional artillery regiments (limited by the number of 105mm howitzers), with 51 x 155mm battalions and all the heavier weapons still left over. The British also had at least 8 AGRAs (typically 8 x 7.2" (183mm) howitzers, 8 x 155mm guns, and 48 x 5.5" (140mm) cannon) in NW Europe.
This doesn't even include Italy. In the Mediterranean, the 15th Army Group consisted of approximately the following:
UK/Commonwealth: 9 divisions (2 armoured), 4 tank/armoured brigades
USA: 7 divisions (1 armored)
Poland: 2 divisions, 1 armored brigade
Brazil: 1 division
Greece: 1 brigade
- In addition to these there were also various Free Italian troops and the Jewish Brigade, though these probably would have been limited to the theater.
Smaller non-divisional forces included at least 4 AGRAs, 6 US separate tank battalions, 4 US separate TD battalions, the 91st Cavalry Squadron (battalion), 2 infantry regiments (including the famous 442nd), and 16 separate field artillery battalions (1 x 105mm howitzer, 2 x 105mm SP, 7 x 155mm howitzer, 4 x 155mm gun, 2 x 203mm howitzer) plus AAA and combat engineers. These are roughly equivalent to a further 3.5 armored divisions and two-thirds of an infantry division.
Therefore, in Western Europe the Allies had the equivalent of about 54 armored divisions, 70 infantry or mechanized divisions, and 5 airborne divisions. In the Mediterranean they had the equivalent of 7 armored divisions, 16 infantry divisions, and 1 mountain division. Combining the two, the Allied ground forces totalled approximately 153 division-equivalents (including 61 armored) at the close of hostilities in May 1945, without drawing on CONUS or the Pacific.
The OOB for the 21st Army Group was not the same thing as "British" tank strength, since there were non-British units under Montgomery.
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I have been thinking about the long term impact on Germany of a SU/Western Allies war. Assuming that the Western Allies held at the Rhine, then most of the war would be fought on Germany soil. It is my understanding that in Eastern Germany, the SU extracted revenege for the war crimes that the Germans did in the SU. In the Western part of German, the Western Allies did not do wholesell destruction but did what was needed to win the war.
With the additional destruction from a new war, will we see a repeat of the deaths and destruction of the 30 year war where Germany suffered from different armies fighting on their soil?
With the additional destruction from a new war, will we see a repeat of the deaths and destruction of the 30 year war where Germany suffered from different armies fighting on their soil?
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Which nicely misses the point: my quoted section indicates a large portion of the on-hand AFVs are in fact inoperable by Soviet figures. Thus, that 6,000 American "operable" mediums figure is not, in fact, equivalent to the Soviets own operational forces figure, but rather combines the operational forces figure and a chunk of the nonoperational forces by Soviet accounting.
But even leaving that aside, are we seriously going to pretend that a American tank which would take months to get across the Atlantic and deploy to the frontline thus have no chance of participating in the opening phase of the war is the equivalent of Soviet vehicles which would only take days or weeks at most to deploy to the frontlines and thus very much be able to participate in the opening phase of the war? Seriously?
Too which, as I already noted, the Soviet equivalent would be their 174 infantry corps, 36 tank/mechanized corps, and 6 cavalry corps.
Too which the Soviet equivalent would be their 143 independent tank regiments/brigades* (breaking down into 45 medium tank brigades, 63 medium tank regiments, 34 heavy tank regiments, 1 heavy tank brigade) and 148 independent Su-regiments/brigades (136 regiments, 12 brigades), for a total of 291 AFV regiments/brigades. 15 anti-tank regiments were also re-equipped with Su-85 tank destroyers during the course of 1944 and the start of 1945.
*The difference between a regiment and a brigade was about 10 tanks.
Miscellaneous Soviet forces not listed above or below includes a corps of mountain divisions operating under 4th Ukrainian Front, three fortified regions (essentially machine gun/light artillery regiments), a ski rifle corps, three airborne corps made up of guards rifle divisions (which basically means another three rifle corps), and around 50-60 rifle divisions that had not been organized into corps (which as I noted earlier, are essentially regiments with division-level artillery support), three mechanized brigades, and 10 flamethrower companies.
Meanwhile, Soviet non-divisional artillery forces constituted 37 tube artillery divisions, 7 rocket artillery divisions, 80 independent tube and rocket artillery brigades, 243 independent tube and rocket artillery regiments, and 70 independent tube and rocket artillery battalions. This is excluding independent mortar units, of which there are 151 of (1 battalion, 142 regiments, and 8 brigades) and the firepower of their 120mm heavy mortars is equivalent to that of a similarly sized 105/122mm howitzer units (although, obviously, not the range). There were 551 AAA battalions/regiments in Soviet forces west of the Urals, although this figure also does not otherwise take into account location. There were also thirty-four tank-destroyer artillery brigades and 87 AT regiments (a mix of 45mm and 57mm AT guns, and 76.2mm field guns, with the odd 85 or 100mm lurking about).
To which the Soviet equivalent were the sappers, which not only could fight with distinction, but were expected too when assaulting fortified positions. These were organized into 83 brigades, close to three times the size of a US Engineer Combat Battalion (1,700 vs 600 men, respectively).
Great. Conglomerate the Soviet units I've listed above together along the same lines and tell me how many division-equivalents they are worth. I'm willing to bet just at a glance that the resulting number remains much higher than what the WAllies possess.
He pretty specifically discusses them in both the text and the OOB, thus there is no reason not to believe they are not included in the numerical figures given.
Although I think we should probably wind up ending this discussion before we wind up hijacking what is johnboys TL. I'll let you have the last word, if you'd like?
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Actually I am enjoying the discussion and there are many varying sources of information.
OK, if you want.
According to the text citation, there were 7,620 mediums in theater stocks in March, of which 6,606 were directly on hand in the armies. Out of this number 600 were inoperable, meaning that the various field armies still had 6,000 working mediums on hand to fill a TO&E requirement of 5,477. Since the said 6,000 tanks were neither in transit or under repair, they were, by your accounting, "operable."
It's not unreasonable: the time needed to ship cargo across the Atlantic is measured in days and there were already fully staffed armored forces in the US. On the Soviet side, how many of their remaining tanks were in remote theaters (Manchuria, Central Asia), undergoing repairs, or stripped for parts? They would also need the necessary support (motor transport, mechanics, POLs, etc) to operate large armored forces and would have to do so under air attack.
Several questions:
- First, what was the proportion of the above that were actually available in Europe? For example, this source has 154 Rifle Corps in the European Fronts and VGK reserve at the end of the war. What kind of forces did the Soviets actually have opposite the Allies in Germany and the Balkans?
- Second, what were the actual strengths, on average, of the Soviet armored and artillery forces? The non-divisional artillery units were probably at or near full strength (guesstimating), but I don't know about tanks. According to Niehorster the armored regiments had about 10 to 21 vehicles during the Berlin offensive while brigades had an authorized strength of 65. I know that in Manchuria there were several tank brigades whose strength at the start of the fighting were at about that level, but of course the Far East forces were not broken up and reorganized to the same extent as those in Europe.
- Third, what kind of artillery forces were really available to the average rifle division or corps? If the average rifle division had an authorized strength of 3,600, 4,000, or 4,500 (and many were below even this), to properly staff a division artillery regiment (3-4 battalions) would on its own require over 2,000 men.
According to Peter Brown's accounting, the 21st Army Group had about 4,900 tanks in its units and in Army Group Reserve during December 1944, (Zaloga credits them with 3,500 in January 45). Clearly there's something more there.
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I also wonder what effect round the clock strategic bombing would have on the Russians. AFAIK they had never experienced anything like it, in the sense that Germany (and Japan) had. After all the Luftwaffe was a tactical Air Force. The Wallied heavy bomber force could rain destruction down on the Russian forces and staging areas to terrible effect. Especially since the further west they went, the greater number of “choke” points would be created. They would also have a tough time trying to intercept those bombers given their operational altitudes, and fighter cover, and little if any early force detection. Plus the Russian Air Force would have it’s hands full covering tactical Wallies air attacks.
ric350
ric350
Also according to the text citation, SHAEF objected on an attempt to reduce the reserve inventory on the basis that a large percentage of those listed as on-hand were either in-transit or under repair, so yes, clearly the 6,000 figures includes inoperable vehicles by Soviet accounting. The 600 tanks you are claiming were listed as more then inoperable: they were unserviceable, which meant they had broken down in a manner that couldn't be repaired. So it's pretty clear that the American "on-hand" figure is not the same as the Soviet "operational forces" figure.
Also worth considering: the 6,059 Soviet medium tanks is not for May of 1945, but for January of 1945, and in the intervening time, the Soviets produced 22,672 AFVs (of which 12,576 were medium tanks) while suffering 13,700 irrecoverable losses (although the breakdown for the losses by type are not available: total losses of medium tanks throughout the war were 44,900 out of a production figure of 58,701, which would put end-of-war medium tank stock at 13,801). So not only are we comparing disparate accounting methods, we are also comparing disparate dates.
The time needed to ship cargo across the Atlantic was considerably more than days. Crossing the Atlantic even today takes about a week (6-to-8 days) but the big time waster was the issue of loading and unloading: prior to the mid-1950s, cargo ships could spend weeks at the mooring in order to load and unload cargo. The Soviets already showed they had all the support to operate large armored forces and even do so under air attack.
As for the Soviets, out of the 35,000 total AFVs in it's global inventory, I do recall actually once seeing a table which broke down the number of nonoperational forces. But only figures I really recall for sure in terms of the Far East and Central Asia are 3,000 and 2,000 AFVs by May, respectively.
154 rifle corps sounds about right from what I've seen. Pretty much all the tank and mechanized corps were in Europe until June, when several were transferred eastward and an additional one was formed in the Far East. 4 of the cavalry corps were also in Europe. I know that mountain corps was also in Europe: it was with the 4th Ukrainian Front. All of the sapper, AA, and AT units I mentioned are all on the European side of the Urals, although it seems something like 1/5 to 1/4th of the AA forces were part of the PVO to protect Soviet cities rather then the supply lines across Eastern Europe or the frontline formations. I'm less certain about the disposition of the other artillery and armored forces, but the same proportion can probably be applied as with the rifle formations. For the larger artillery formations (ie: the brigades and divisions), probably between or 90+% to all of them were deployed in the west.
Zaloga deals with this quite perfunctorily in the introduction to the Red Army handbook: armored formations by 1945 were staffed and equipped at or near full-strength. As for the difference in the regiments: it sorta depended on the regiments. Heavy tank regiments had 21 tanks while medium tank regiments had 41 (I misremembered and thought that tank brigades had 52 AFVs rather then 65).
First off, rifle divisions tended to bottom out at 3,600 men. It was not common for them to be substantially below that and the average was 4,000 men. Rifle and corps artillery were sustained at or near their full complement in guns, but their manpower complement was generally substantially reduced and they had to rely on non-divisional support attachments from higher headquarters to deal with anything more than routine, light combat situations. The Soviets preferred a "command-push" style of logistical resupply and support over the WAllies "demand-pull" style because it permitted army and front commanders more economical use of stocks and transport in furthering the operational aim. This system worked quite well, as C.J. Dick observes:
"As with transport, most other rear services were centralized. Tactical formations [ie: corps and below] held only enough organic rear services units to cope with routine, light combat situations. This conferred two advantages. With light logistic tails, they were more agile and maneuverable than if they had been encumbered with masses of noncombat vehicles and personnel. It also ensured that specialist and service support elements were used economically and to maximum effect. For instant, there was no point in giving a rifle division the means to deal with high levels of casualties if it was in reserve or deployed on a passive sector; a small medical battalion would suffice for day-to-day needs. If, however, that division and the rest of its corps were advancing in the expectation of carrying out an opposed river crossing in the near future, army and, if necessary, front would ensure the concentration of sufficient resources from their medical reserves to cope with the anticipated flow of casualties. The same applied to the recovery and restoration of damaged equipment. Mobile corps possessed enough technical support to cope with routine maintenance and some breakdowns. When they were committed to battle, higher-echelon recovery and repair units were directed to the area of the most intense fighting to collect and then repair damaged hardware in situ." -From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944, Page 149.
Walter Dunn summarizes the state of organic rifle division in 1945 thusly:
"At the end of the war, the average rifle division had only 4,000 men. Divisions became the equivalent of regiments in their rifle strength but were heavily armed with automatic weapons and had the healthy support of a divisional artillery regiment, not a bad situation. The Soviets strove to give the riflemen maximum support. When a division withdrew to refit, the artillery regiment remained at the front to provide extra support to other divisions. The Russians did not maintain large rifle companies in 1945 but instead relied heavily on artillery and tanks for firepower. The rifle units were given lavish numbers of submachine guns and light machine guns, and a long as there were enough men to fire the automatic weapons, the combat value of the company was not depleted seriously." -Stalin's Keys to Victory: The Rebirth of the Red Army in WWII, Page 60-61.
Well, Soviet industry doesn't have to worry yet because it's simply out of range: the infrastructure for more anything more than pinprick bombing raids from the Middle Eastern bases doesn't exist. Given a year of development, however, that can change. The threat against Soviet LoCs is vastly more serious, but the Germans also made efforts at interdiction bombing and Soviet maskirovka methods proved quite effective both against them and against the Americans own attempts at interdiction in far more favorable air settings in some later wars against their clients. It's worth keeping in mind that throughout the history of airpower, there is no example of a military forces LoCs being completely severed through air power alone and even several instances of supply throughput managing to increase in the face of opposing air supremacy.
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kind of new additions to either front: how about the addition of the 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion and the 477th Composite Group?