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No, this is not a joke.

Brison D. Gooch, "Belgium and the Prospective Sale of Cuba in 1837," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Aug., 1959), pp. 413-427, presents evidence not only that Spain, in desperate financial condition in 1837, contemplated selling or "pledging" Cuba, but that the projected buyers, besides Britain and France, included...Belgium!

Unfortunately, only the first page of the article is available online to non-subscribers at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2168%28195908%2939%3A3%3C413%3ABATPSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

To summarize the remainder of the article: Queen-Regent Cristina's Spain in early 1837 was in a bad way, both militarily (against the Carlists) and financially. "The country's credit had fallen rapidly. In the London market on January 1, 1837, Spanish bonds brought less than half what they had brought only a year earlier. And it was not as though the fiscal situation had been good in 1835...

"Palmerston, meantime, was doing all that he could through the Quadruple Alliance to aid Cristina; while Thiers, also favoring active intervention by mid-1836, was suggesting that the treaty was either no longer valid or needed more articles. Bankers were uninterested in any loans to the Spanish unless guaranteed by the British or French government. Such a commitment in London might well have brought the fall of the ministry; so for a time Palmerston could only look to private funds as a source of possible aid for Mendizabal. There were a number of plans for raising money. Most proved abortive...After Palmerston was able to get the Foreign Enlistment Act suspended, British volunteer regiments ignominiously fought in Spain; and by mid-March of 1837, stores had been furnished amounting to over 540,000 pounds sterling.

"From this milieu of urgency created by Spanish military failure and fiscal chaos came the idea of raising funds through the mortgage or sale of Cuba. Apparently as early as December 15, 1836, Palmerston suggested to his colleagues 'that they should help Queen Cristina to negotiate a loan for the payment of British auxiliaries (secured, perhaps, by a mortgage on some Spanish colonies) . . .' His idea met with little response from his associates in office but was shortly to appear and reappear in other contexts and in more detail.

"Though historians waited a century to learn this facet of Palmerston's thinking late in 1836, an interesting account was published by the Fortnightly Review in 1895 telling 'How Cuba might have belonged to France.' In January of 1837, so the story ran, on the initiative of Queen Cristina, the Spanish banker in Paris, Aguado, approached Talleyrand to arrange talks on a scheme for France to buy Cuba for thirty million reals with Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands for another ten million. The French would need to float a loan for this, and from the resultant commissions Aguado, Talleyrand, and others would profit personally. There seemed to be agreement and an envoy, Campuzano, arrived from Madrid to onclude the negotiations. Just as the documents were to be signed, Louis Philippe demanded a reduction of three million reals in the price of the Philippines because, he declared, their acquisition could well embroil France in a war with Great Britain. When the French king began to haggle over the price, Campuzano, who had disliked his task all along, became indignant, and tossed the documents into the fire, ending the negotiations. All the talks had been conducted in overtones of dread that Palmerston might discover what was afoot. Complete secrecy had been insisted upon and only through Talleyrand's secretary, Colmache, was the story eventually published in 1895. Cristina herself was to take full responsibility for the negotiations should word somehow get out, and, considering Palmerston's efforts at this time to raise money for her, we may well understand the Queen's feelings of apprehension.

"This is the most detailed and specific existing evidence that Cuba was for sale in 1837; but for some reason, since 1900 it has been disregarded by all writers on this period of Spanish, French, or Cuban history. Were the story impossible to check, perhaps it could be justifiably ignored, but this is not the case. Besides squaring with hints by Palmerston and Lord Holland that some of Spain's empire could be picked up easily, the characterizations are accurate: Colmache (d. ca. 1847) was the private secretary of Talleyrand at this period; Alejandro Maria Aguado (1784-1842) was the Spanish banker in Paris; and Joaquin Francisco Campuzano (1786-1860), an experienced Spanish diplomat, was in Paris during much of 1837. The Colmache report becomes more and more plausible when considering the rumors current in 1837 about Spain being willing to sell Cuba--rumors which will, of course, hardly stand by themselves but which are supported by other indications....

"Rumors in the United States that the British were trying to get Cuba as a pledge for a loan were especially strong early in the Carlist wars...The documents on the reaction of the United States to hints of a change in Cuban status thus give added weight to the thesis that Cuba was for sale in 1837. By themselves they are inadequate as proof because United States suspicions of British ambitions in the Caribbean were consistent and of long standing. With supplementary documentation, however, the grounds for disbelief are not very convincing."

As corroboration that Cuba was for sale in 1837, Gooch discovered a heretofore unpublished letter written by Palmerston to Sylvain Van de Weyer (1802-1874), Belgian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the British Government in London. It reads as follows:

***

Foreign Offi[ce] 22 ap. 1837

My dear Van de Weyer,

I ha[ve] received your Letter of the 20 [th] which reached me this Morning and I lose no time in replying to it on account of the Importance of the Subject and I reply in English that I may express myself with more Facility & Clearness. I have consulted with Ld Melbourne upon the subjec[t to] which your Letter related and he agree[s w]ith me in the following observations.

You may easily Suppose that we should both be delighted to find any good means of Supplying the Span [ish Gov] ernment with those pecuniary Resour[ces wh]ich it Stands so much in need; [but] to do any real and effectua[l] good a Sum of 3 or 4 Millions Sterling would be necessary because if a Loan were raised, it would be requisite that the Produce Should be ufficient to pay those Dividends which are due and which are coming to be due, as well as to defray the immediate Exigencies of the Military Servi[ces.] We cannot tell what might be [the] Extent to which Belgium might be able to assist Spain in this Respect, but Millions in Sterling Money are heavy Sums.

That the King of the Belgians should wish to have some Colonial Possession is natural, and though I am not one of those who attach very great Importance to Colonies, but am inclined on the Contrary to believe th[e] value of Such appendages, is in general opinion Much over rated, Still Some Colonial outlet might be advantageous to Belgium, and would at all Events please the Nation. It must be owned however that Cuba Seems to be rather an unwi[e]ldy Colony for Belgium & Somewhat disproportionate to the Mother Country; and it might for this Reason prove [t]o b[e] a doubtful Security for the Loan advanced upon account of it. Cuba is about Two Thirds the Size of Great Britain; it is populous Rich & flourishing; and in many Respects more like a Separate State than a Colony. Spanish Connection, Habits, Prejudices, Laws, Manners, & the Recollections of past Times form a Link which bind Cuba to Spain; The Yoke of the Mother Country sits Easy on the Colony and the Protection of the Mother Country is thought to add to the Safety of the Island. But I much doubt whether the People of Cuba would acquiesce in being transferred to the Dominion of any other State, and Especially of a State not likely to be able by [a] powerful Fleet & a disposable arm[y] to defend Cuba against any foreign attack. It is to be apprehended that when the People of Cuba found themselves so Mortgaged & transferred they might protest against the a[r]rangement, They might say We are Spaniards & we cling to the Spanish Monarchy; we are willing to make Sacrifices [to] uphold that Monarchy if we are to continue to form a Portion of it; But if we are to be discarded & cast off, [or] sold to [a] foreign State for the Benefit of the Mother Country that is a scheme in which neither our Interests nor our Feelings are concerned. We will continue a Colony as long as we are a Colony of Spain, but if we are to cease to belong to Spain we will follow the Example of the [o]ther Spa]nis[h] Colonies in America and of the m[uch] Smaller Island of St Domingo and we will declare ourselves an Independent State. If that were to happen what would you be able to do? Belgium unaided never would be Strong enough to Subdue Cuba to whom would you apply for aid, and *what* woul[d] y[ou] have to *pay* for that aid? Nations Seldom help Each [o]ther by E[xpe]nsive Fleets and armies unless it is directly for their Interest to do so. There could be no Interest for any Nation to help you in Conquering Cuba, upon any general Principle of the Balance of Power. You would be obliged to make it worth the While of Some ally to assist you; & what would you [g]iv[e] that ally?

England would [proba]bly not be tempted to interfere. France might offer you aid, but if Cuba was reduced to Subjection by a French Fleet & army it would become a French & not a Belgian Colony-The Same observation would apply to the Case of your being assisted by any other Power. On th[e] whole then I should Say that you would be risking a large Sum upon a very bad Security; and that if you want a Colonial Establishment you would do better by beginning at least upon a Smaller Scale, & by Some Settlement more within your Means, & more likely to r[emain] an obedient Dependency on the Mother Country. In Short if Belgiu[m w]ants to be a Mother She [ha]d bette[r] have children of her ow[n], & rea[r] them up herself, than adopt a full grown, robust and obstrepulous [sic] offspring of another Parent.

Yrs Sincerely

Palmerston

Monsr Vandeweyer

***

Note, by the way, that the letter doesn't say a word about the Monroe Doctrine or the United States. In a footnote, Gooch remarks "The Monroe Doctrine was no guide to United States policy-making during 1826-1841 and European statesmen held it in 'lofty disregard.' See Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 59-61. The Palmerston message to Van de Weyer and the Colmache account are yet two more specific instances where there is no hint that the United States reaction might be seriously relevant. Incidentally, the United States seems never to have suspected the Belgians of a serious interest in Cuba." (It did suspect the *British* of designs on Cuba, but the US was *always* suspecting this...)

Gooch continues:

"This letter not only proves that Cuba was for sale, but also indicates further the general pattern of international attitudes toward such a sale. A year earlier, on April 1, 1836, a deputy in the Spanish Cortes predicted that should any outside power try to take Cuba, a rival power would appear in opposition. This was indeed the case. In 1837 apprehension toward British ambitions had brought together agents of the United States and France. Britain had bluntly opposed Belgian hopes and it can be safely assumed that both Britain and the United States would have sternly opposed French acquisition of the island had they positively known of the scheme reported by Colmache. Cuba's retention by Spain was, in fact, the only status for the island on which Great Britain, France, and the United States could all agree.

"Spanish finances in early 1837 were at their worst. The Carlists also had monetary difficulties and in February there was a virtual cessation of hostilities since 'Money was much wanted by both parties...' The early months of 1837 were desperate for the government and there can be little doubt that it was ready to negotiate the transfer of Cuba for ready cash. After encountering difficulty finding a buyer by mid-year, there was speculation that if the Carlists proved victorious in the peninsula, the child queen could be proclaimed Isabella II of Cuba, since Great Britain had now guaranteed them the protection of the island.

"Though the war seemed a touch-and-go affair to those living in early 1837, we can now see that it had reached a turning point. The insurgents' best general, Tomas Zumalacarregui (b. 1788), had died in 1835 and after 1837 Carlist prospects grew progressively dimmer. Spanish bonds had improved slightly after January, 1837, and remained fairly constant,
though successive rumors of a loan created fluctuation. With a certain stability achieved in her finances, by the end of the year the plan to offer Cuba as security for a loan was apparently dropped and evidence that it had ever existed remained scant.

"As well as corroborating other evidence of Cuba's availability, Palmerston's letter to Van de Weyer has added Belgium to the list of parties with colonial ambitions regarding Cuba in 1837. Belgium's later activity in the colonial field is a matter of common knowledge, but to find evidence of a serious colonial yearning as early as 1837 is extremely interesting.

"In 1837, Belgium's status in Europe was that of nearly complete independence. The Belgian revolution had succeeded but it was not until March 14, 1838, that the Dutch king, William I, finally accepted the fact that he had lost his southern provinces, leaving the way open for the treaties of April 19, 1839, which recognized Belgian independence and neutrality. This acquiescence had been a consistent point in the foreign policy of Belgian statesmen since 1831. Until it was achieved, they could never feel safe from northern attack and problems of defence loomed large in their thinking. While the young nation owed its life to past French and British support, the question of what future paths to follow was seriously debated. That the Belgians intended to decide their own destiny came as a surprise to Talleyrand and probably to other outsiders as well. Belgium's Liberals favored closer relations with France while the Catholic party saw the country's best hopes resting in close understanding with the German States. Continued friendship with Great Britain was assumed whether Palmerston to whom the Belgians owed so much was in the Foreign Office or his political opponents.

"Belgium's separation from the Netherlands created initial disorder and confusion in many areas. The metallurgical and textile industries were particularly upset and Dutch consumption of Belgian goods dropped markedly. A swiftly growing Belgian industry needed markets and, while France served this function somewhat, more outlets were needed. Belgium's economy was basically healthy, but the nation as a whole was too small to make effective reprisals and to break into most of Europe's protectionist systems.

"On the surface, at least, Cuba gave the appearance of being what the Belgian economy required since the needs of Belgium and Cuba complemented each other. Cuba used Belgian-made bricks, tile, various oils, linens, and other manufactured goods; while Belgium depended on Cuba and Puerto Rico in this period for seventy per cent of her tobacco and sixty-five per cent of her sugar. But, despite a rapid expansion of Cuban trade between 1831 and 1835, commercial relations with Holland and Belgium were in a state of temporary paralysis from 1830 to 1836 as a result of the separation. After the Belgian revolution, there were few former Dutch ships which became Belgian and so there were more Dutch than Belgian ships in Cuban harbors. Thus Cuban imports from Belgium were greatly diminished and more Cuban exports went to Holland.

"Van de Weyer's inquiry regarding Cuba which prompted Palmerston's reply can be thought of as initiated by Leopold personally rather than by the Belgian government. The popular bases of the Liberals and Catholics were such that coalition cabinets prevailed--united in the 1830's against the menace from the north. Since neither party dominated policy at the expense of the other, Leopold was able to exercise far more authority than he would later after the Liberals were successful at the polls in 1847. Indeed, Leopold favored coalition government for just this reason. While in Great Britain (1816-1831) Leopold had learned a great deal about the economic aspects of national life. As King of the Belgians he recognized that, for Belgium's continued growth and independence, markets outside Europe were particularly important. It is interesting that Leopold would be thinking of colonies in 1837 while politicians in Belgium were concentrating more on the problem of Dutch acquiescence. This, however, was also the case later when Belgian politicians were generally indifferent and even hostile to the ill-fated project at Saint-Thomas in Guatemala, which Leopold enthusiastically promoted during its brief life.

"Leopold was no newcomer to Iberian affairs in 1837. As an intermediary between his brother and Palmerston, he had helped to arrange the marriage of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and the Portuguese Queen Dona Maria. On Leopold's behalf Van de Weyer accompanied the prince to Lisbon, arriving on April 9, 1836, and staying in Portugal until Christmas. Use of Van de Weyer for this mission typifies the way in which Leopold operated freely in the field of diplomacy. Leopold had also shown concern with the problems of the Spanish monarchy and it was at his intercession in mid-1836 that Louis Philippe (father-in-law of Leopold) had granted Thiers' plea to enlarge the French Foreign Legion in the Pyrenees. Earlier, the government of Cristina had been recruiting troops and supplies in Belgium apparently with the tacit approval of Belgian officials who ran the double risk of the enmity of Don Carlos and Prussian disapproval. Thus Leopold had had an interest in Spain's difficulties for some time and could reasonably have been approached for a Spanish loan with the offer of Cuba as collateral. This would have prompted an inquiry of the type which Palmerston was answering.

"In the context of Belgian colonial history the Palmerston reply to Van de Weyer is also highly important. Palmerston in April of 1837 advised a smaller colony for a beginning, and a study of Belgium's diplomatic correspondence reveals that, starting in 1838, Belgium made inquiries regarding the acquisition of the Isle of Pines, and in 1839 Cozumel was considered. Belgium's first attempt at actual colonization was the vain effort started at Saint-Thomas in Guatemala in 1841. As Belgian interest in the Isle of Pines followed logically after the rebuff by Palmerston regarding Cuba, so the opportunity which developed in Guatemala helps to explain the end of efforts to acquire either the Isle of Pines or Cozumel. Thus the broader colonial pattern contributes to our picture of the separate inquiries and attempts made by Belgian officials between 1837 and 1845.

"Palmerston's letter to Van de Weyer suggests the beginning of what became a consistent eight-year effort by Belgium to gain some sort of colony in the Caribbean area. After this discussion of pertinent documents, there can be little doubt of Belgium's interest in Cuba proper in 1837 and that Cuba then was really for sale."

So...suppose Palmerston had given his blessing to Van de Weyer? Do we get the Belgian-American War of 1898? Admiral Dewey's conquest of the Belgian Congo? Probably not. The Cubans were restless enough under the Spaniards, and Palmerston was probably right that a transfer to Belgium would lead to a successful revolution--which the US wouldn't mind, provided that the revolutionaries were white and determined to keep slavery. (The transfer to Belgium would violate the "no-transfer"principle of US diplomacy, which I have discussed several times in soc.history.what-if, e.g., at http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/7e06b89fb2c0843d and http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/c7659f9aabd02360 This principle antedated the Monroe Doctrine, but was eventually associated by most Americans with it, though Monroe never mentioned it in his famous 1823 message. However, the US generally objected to transfers only when they were from a less powerful to a more powerful European power, and a transfer to Belgium would not count as such--unless of course Palmerston's support in this ATL for the transaction would lead the US to regard it as a disguised transfer to Britain. But the question is, whether the action be considered a violation of the Monroe Doctrine or of the No Transfer principle, what the US could *do* about it if opposed by the British fleet.)

Incidentally, anyone want to comment on some of the other what-ifs raised in Gooch's article? I confess to being skeptical of the Colmache story, but what if Cuba were indeed sold or pledged to France? And finally what about the idea of a Carlist victory on the Peninsula followed by the child queen being proclaimed Isabella II of Cuba?
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