Been Winning So Long, I've Lost It - The Long War TL
- Thread starter Blochead
- Start date
You might be surprised at how many US think tank studies mention Pakistan as a reason to increase the size of the US military for precisely that reason... Even before 9/11.
PART XIII: December 2001-February 2002
“… The intensity of war coverage tends to have a larger impact on support for war than the evaluative tone of that news coverage. We conclude that the dominant opinion process underlying support for major American wars seems to be neither information updating nor attitude reinforcement, but rather the tendency for war news to activate latent patriotism… The tone of war news matters, but the loss of support for war seems not so much a function of the amount of critical coverage as whether the war is receiving any prominent coverage at all.”
-Althaus & Coe, “Priming Patriots,” 2007
“These armies are not substitutes for war – they are for war, and they want war.”
-Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West
---
“… Troop numbers in Afghanistan are extremely low given the expected intensity of future operations… Even in a best-case scenario without transnational interventions, we recommend a 10-20,000 overall strength increase, focused in southern Afghanistan… Given recent developments in Pakistan, however, it would be best to have at least 35,000 US troops in-theater with an additional 100,000+ ready for deployment…”
-Internal NSC memo to the President, January 9th, 2002
“… After attempts at mediation by Vladimir Putin, Colin Powell, and the United Nations, the standoff between India and Pakistan continues… While Powell assured the press that “catastrophe can be averted,” there is growing speculation that the major source of instability may come from within Pakistan itself rather than international tensions… Musharraf, under pressure from both the US and Indian government [2], has begun an extremely unpopular campaign of counterinsurgency against militants in Kashmir…”
-CNN, January 15th
“Given the dislocation of Pakistani forces due to the COIN operations in Kashmir and the military buildup against India, we advise the authorization of airstrikes and CJSOTF[1] incursions into the Pakistani frontier, in order to disrupt the potential of a Taliban spring offensive… We expect the majority of Taliban strength in such an operation to consist of Pakistani insurgents and foreign fighters from the wider Islamic world infiltrating via Pakistan… We are confident Massoud and the Northern Alliance [2] can deal with minor upsurges in violence in the rest of the country, but the southeast should be primarily the domain of ISAF forces…”
-Internal NSC memo to the President, January 14th, 2002
“The Northwest Frontier has erupted into violence this week, as the fundamentalist response to repeated US incursions and missile strikes grew into a full-blown clash between tribal militias and government troops… Meanwhile, Musharraf’s unpopular campaign against the militants of Jammu and Kashmir has provoked massive protests in several major Pakistani cities… Nationalist retired officers such as Muhammad Aziz Khan have even criticized their former ally publicly…”
-The New York Times, January 17th, 2002
“Hopes that the confrontation between India and Pakistan may have dissipated were shattered in Jammu yesterday, when fundamentalist gunmen attacked an Indian army barracks. At least 30 have been killed, not including the 3 gunmen, and diplomatic relations between the two countries may reach their lowest point since the crisis began in December… Pakistan’s government has demonstrated an increasing lack of control over militant operations in Kashmir, and it is likely the US and India will once again force Musharraf to conduct a counterterror campaign against his own people…”
-LA Times, February 2nd
“Death to the betrayer of Afghanistan! Death to the betrayer of Kashmir! Death to the betrayer of Aziz! Death to the betrayer of Pakistan!”
- “Martyr tape” of Pakistani suicide carbombers, before the “8 February Operation” in Rawalpindi
[1] Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
[2] Massoud is the de facto leader of Western-aligned forces in Afghanistan
“… The intensity of war coverage tends to have a larger impact on support for war than the evaluative tone of that news coverage. We conclude that the dominant opinion process underlying support for major American wars seems to be neither information updating nor attitude reinforcement, but rather the tendency for war news to activate latent patriotism… The tone of war news matters, but the loss of support for war seems not so much a function of the amount of critical coverage as whether the war is receiving any prominent coverage at all.”
-Althaus & Coe, “Priming Patriots,” 2007
“These armies are not substitutes for war – they are for war, and they want war.”
-Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West
---
“… Troop numbers in Afghanistan are extremely low given the expected intensity of future operations… Even in a best-case scenario without transnational interventions, we recommend a 10-20,000 overall strength increase, focused in southern Afghanistan… Given recent developments in Pakistan, however, it would be best to have at least 35,000 US troops in-theater with an additional 100,000+ ready for deployment…”
-Internal NSC memo to the President, January 9th, 2002
“… After attempts at mediation by Vladimir Putin, Colin Powell, and the United Nations, the standoff between India and Pakistan continues… While Powell assured the press that “catastrophe can be averted,” there is growing speculation that the major source of instability may come from within Pakistan itself rather than international tensions… Musharraf, under pressure from both the US and Indian government [2], has begun an extremely unpopular campaign of counterinsurgency against militants in Kashmir…”
-CNN, January 15th
“Given the dislocation of Pakistani forces due to the COIN operations in Kashmir and the military buildup against India, we advise the authorization of airstrikes and CJSOTF[1] incursions into the Pakistani frontier, in order to disrupt the potential of a Taliban spring offensive… We expect the majority of Taliban strength in such an operation to consist of Pakistani insurgents and foreign fighters from the wider Islamic world infiltrating via Pakistan… We are confident Massoud and the Northern Alliance [2] can deal with minor upsurges in violence in the rest of the country, but the southeast should be primarily the domain of ISAF forces…”
-Internal NSC memo to the President, January 14th, 2002
“The Northwest Frontier has erupted into violence this week, as the fundamentalist response to repeated US incursions and missile strikes grew into a full-blown clash between tribal militias and government troops… Meanwhile, Musharraf’s unpopular campaign against the militants of Jammu and Kashmir has provoked massive protests in several major Pakistani cities… Nationalist retired officers such as Muhammad Aziz Khan have even criticized their former ally publicly…”
-The New York Times, January 17th, 2002
“Hopes that the confrontation between India and Pakistan may have dissipated were shattered in Jammu yesterday, when fundamentalist gunmen attacked an Indian army barracks. At least 30 have been killed, not including the 3 gunmen, and diplomatic relations between the two countries may reach their lowest point since the crisis began in December… Pakistan’s government has demonstrated an increasing lack of control over militant operations in Kashmir, and it is likely the US and India will once again force Musharraf to conduct a counterterror campaign against his own people…”
-LA Times, February 2nd
“Death to the betrayer of Afghanistan! Death to the betrayer of Kashmir! Death to the betrayer of Aziz! Death to the betrayer of Pakistan!”
- “Martyr tape” of Pakistani suicide carbombers, before the “8 February Operation” in Rawalpindi
[1] Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
[2] Massoud is the de facto leader of Western-aligned forces in Afghanistan
Aside from the stuff below (which is, to be fair, peripheral to the timeline) I'm really enjoying it… albeit in an uncomfortable way.
America is so screwed.
I'm not sure you grasp how entirely the Republican Party is controlled by nutso supply-siders. McCain can say what he wants but neither Phil Gramm nor Congress will back him on his tax plan. They don't want to cut taxes on the poor and are iffy on the middle class.
Could it pass? I honestly doubt it, and if it does it's almost entirely on the backs of Democrats not House Republicans.
As for corporate tax reform… I'd say 50-50. A lower rate is nice for many corporations, but I'd wager that current + loopholes is lower taxes than any reasonable corporate tax rate cut. Honestly I think House Republicans put this out to pasture if corporations aren't fond of it.
Finally, on Social Security, it doesn't actually need reform nor do I think McCain would focus on it but that's easily the most likely to get passed—if McCain threw his lot in and Republicans knew he'd get tanked if they got tanked.
America is so screwed.
I'm not sure you grasp how entirely the Republican Party is controlled by nutso supply-siders. McCain can say what he wants but neither Phil Gramm nor Congress will back him on his tax plan. They don't want to cut taxes on the poor and are iffy on the middle class.
Could it pass? I honestly doubt it, and if it does it's almost entirely on the backs of Democrats not House Republicans.
As for corporate tax reform… I'd say 50-50. A lower rate is nice for many corporations, but I'd wager that current + loopholes is lower taxes than any reasonable corporate tax rate cut. Honestly I think House Republicans put this out to pasture if corporations aren't fond of it.
Finally, on Social Security, it doesn't actually need reform nor do I think McCain would focus on it but that's easily the most likely to get passed—if McCain threw his lot in and Republicans knew he'd get tanked if they got tanked.
Well, that's probably the only way that makes sense to enjoy it... It's certainly how I've felt about writing it.
Yeah, Phil Gramm has said some pretty weird things, but he seems to come up a lot in discussion of McCain's econ circle, so here we are...
America has bigger things to worry about now, anyway.
It's essentially compromise legislation. It's definitely iffy, but the corporate and dividends tax (both of which are much closer to true "supply side" taxes in both theory and practice) are designed to make up for it. The supply siders definitely have a strong grip on the Republican base, but even Bush got a non-supply-sider to chair his CEA once, so I figure he could get away with it. I may be wrong, but then again there's a lot of people who claim McCain couldn't have won in 2000 period, so I guess a lot of this domestic stuff is relatively up to debate.
Given the combined weight of the "double taxation" of corporate profits in the US (through the capital gains tax and corporate tax), the package is probably going to look pretty appealing overall, especially when you combine McCain's support for free trade.
McCain in OTL promised to start reform within his first year, and the plan I mentioned is an OTL plan that has the curious backing of both GMU economists and a progressive think tank. McCain might not focus on it as much as he promised, but I do think McCain would want to tackle Social Security and Medicare reform at some point - there are many in neocon foreign policy circles who believe reforming those are key to maintaining the fiscal health for the US "empire."
I think there will be a lot of wrangling, but perhaps he can push it through before his first term.
PART XIV: January 2002-February 2002
“Refusing to accept a life of submission, the suicide bomber turns life itself into a horrible weapon.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude
“He who blinded by ambition, raises himself to a position whence he cannot mount higher, must thereafter fall with the greatest loss.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Niccolo Machiavelli
“Nobody likes the man who brings bad news.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]The Guard, Sophocles’s Antigone
---
“Where Journalists Fear to Tread: Reporting in Pakistan
… With the assassination of Najam Sethi and attempts on the lives of reporters from the Wall Street Journal and Times, America’s partner in the War on Terror is becoming a dangerous place for journalists… Many reporters say that they feel ‘safer in Afghanistan’ rather than the streets of Karachi or Peshawar…”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Time Magazine, January, 2002
“Much to the dismay of the Indian government and UN, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf indicated today that he does not intend to launch another counterterror campaign in Kashmir after the February 1st attack on Indian soldiers in Jammu… While Pakistan’s neighbors and the United States are disappointed, Musharraf has chosen to risk international estrangement over internal upheaval. Before the first campaign against Islamic fundamentalists in Kashmir ceased on January 20th, Pakistan had to cope with demonstrations in many of its major cities and growing dissent within its military ranks…”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]International Herald Tribune, February 3rd, 2002
Nobody besides a few fanatics wants Pakistan seriously destabilized. The Taliban need a figurehead of some sort to protect their safe haven in the FATA from attack. The US needs that figurehead to manipulate. China wants a client. India wants a common enemy for its people.
Unfortunately, “a few fanatics” is a decent descriptor of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. While they cannot achieve their broader geopolitical goals, they surely can tear up the landscape in the process.
Hence the 8 February Operation. In the last command of the “betrayed” Muhammad Aziz Khan, two men, two cars, and a few hundred pounds of explosive threw Pakistan into dire straits. The first vehicle blocked off the Presidential convoy by detonating itself in the middle of the street. In the ensuing chaos, a second vehicle dove into the middle of the convoy and exploded its own payload.
Musharraf’s armored SUV absorbed some of the blast, but not enough. His guards rushed him to a hospital, but before the day was done, Pakistan’s strongman was dead.
“February 8th was the worst day I’d had since 9/11. There was not as much of a visceral or emotional pull, of course, but it was utter confusion. We did not know what was going on. Nobody was talking to us. Nobody was talking to the Generals, and they weren’t talking to the Indians. We did not know who was going to succeed this guy – obviously it wasn’t going to go by the constitution. It was a question of which General it was going to be, but there were a lot of hungry dogs in Pakistan that day.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Norman Pell, Present at the Destruction: A Memoir of My Service
“50,000 troops? I don’t think we’re talking about just fighting guys in caves anymore, are we?”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Unknown reporter, White House Press Conference, February 9th
“Refusing to accept a life of submission, the suicide bomber turns life itself into a horrible weapon.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude
“He who blinded by ambition, raises himself to a position whence he cannot mount higher, must thereafter fall with the greatest loss.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Niccolo Machiavelli
“Nobody likes the man who brings bad news.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]The Guard, Sophocles’s Antigone
---
“Where Journalists Fear to Tread: Reporting in Pakistan
… With the assassination of Najam Sethi and attempts on the lives of reporters from the Wall Street Journal and Times, America’s partner in the War on Terror is becoming a dangerous place for journalists… Many reporters say that they feel ‘safer in Afghanistan’ rather than the streets of Karachi or Peshawar…”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Time Magazine, January, 2002
“Much to the dismay of the Indian government and UN, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf indicated today that he does not intend to launch another counterterror campaign in Kashmir after the February 1st attack on Indian soldiers in Jammu… While Pakistan’s neighbors and the United States are disappointed, Musharraf has chosen to risk international estrangement over internal upheaval. Before the first campaign against Islamic fundamentalists in Kashmir ceased on January 20th, Pakistan had to cope with demonstrations in many of its major cities and growing dissent within its military ranks…”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]International Herald Tribune, February 3rd, 2002
Nobody besides a few fanatics wants Pakistan seriously destabilized. The Taliban need a figurehead of some sort to protect their safe haven in the FATA from attack. The US needs that figurehead to manipulate. China wants a client. India wants a common enemy for its people.
Unfortunately, “a few fanatics” is a decent descriptor of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. While they cannot achieve their broader geopolitical goals, they surely can tear up the landscape in the process.
Hence the 8 February Operation. In the last command of the “betrayed” Muhammad Aziz Khan, two men, two cars, and a few hundred pounds of explosive threw Pakistan into dire straits. The first vehicle blocked off the Presidential convoy by detonating itself in the middle of the street. In the ensuing chaos, a second vehicle dove into the middle of the convoy and exploded its own payload.
Musharraf’s armored SUV absorbed some of the blast, but not enough. His guards rushed him to a hospital, but before the day was done, Pakistan’s strongman was dead.
“February 8th was the worst day I’d had since 9/11. There was not as much of a visceral or emotional pull, of course, but it was utter confusion. We did not know what was going on. Nobody was talking to us. Nobody was talking to the Generals, and they weren’t talking to the Indians. We did not know who was going to succeed this guy – obviously it wasn’t going to go by the constitution. It was a question of which General it was going to be, but there were a lot of hungry dogs in Pakistan that day.”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Norman Pell, Present at the Destruction: A Memoir of My Service
“50,000 troops? I don’t think we’re talking about just fighting guys in caves anymore, are we?”
-[FONT="] [/FONT]Unknown reporter, White House Press Conference, February 9th
PART XV: February-March 2002
It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. As well ask men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way is was and will be. That way and not some other way.
-The Judge, in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian
“War is wretched beyond description, and only a fool or a fraud could sentimentalize its cruel reality.”
-John McCain
---
“Due to the extraordinary circumstances of this present crisis, I am assuming emergency leadership of Pakistan. The Constitution will be temporarily suspended until the situation is resolved.”
-General Yusaf Khan
Khan’s succession to leadership of Pakistan was not the worst possible case – at least the country was not in complete anarchy. However, this man was a hawk, one of the strongest voices urging the present confrontation with India. His theory to unify the country was quite simple – end American breaches of Pakistani sovereignty, throw government support behind the freedom fighters of Kashmir, and bring Pakistan together against its traditional enemy of India.
It was a decent plan, except it was formulated with little knowledge of the diplomatic situation between the US and Pakistan. Musharraf had suppressed knowledge about Armitage’s bellicose calls to avoid appearing weak to his countrymen. He’d done his job a bit too well. When Yusaf informed the Americans they’d no longer be allowed violate Pakistan’s territory, they did not receive his decision well. Spring was coming, and militants were crossing the mountain passes in an attempt to break out of the Kandahar pocket.
“This jackbooted motherf----r thinks he can play hardball with the United States? We’re taking them down. Let’s throw the book at them. We’re going to start releasing as much as we can on these guys. We’re going to make the case for war.”
-Norman Pell quoting John McCain in Present at the Destruction: A Memoir of My Service
The numbers looked good. After a week of “leaks,” releases, and public statements to Pakistan, at least 70% supported a resumption of counterterrorist operations. Many now believed that Pakistan was a state sponsor of terror that needed to be dealt with. The mania caught on. Some in the media even began speculating that Musharraf had been assassinated in concert with the new government to push out the US. The intervention was making a case for itself.
Operation Anaconda began in March, 2002. It thoroughly disproved the idea that killing bin Laden would break the spirit of al Qaeda. Instead, American forces encountered higher numbers of foreign fighters than expected – al Qaeda had become a martyr cult, not just a terrorist organization. The fact that insurgents were flocking to the battlefield also indicated Pakistani complicity to this new phase of the war.
McCain resumed bombing on March 13th, striking insurgent targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Meanwhile, the first brigades of the 50,000 troop surge to Afganistan were apparently all destined for the border, with NATO picking up most of the slack in the rest of Afghanistan.
CJSOTF forces crossed the border for the first time since operations ceased on March 15th, attacking command positions in the FATA. Meanwhile, American intelligence services began making outreaches to Pakistan’s more secular members of the officer corps – expecting they’d need to be able to put pressure on Yusaf from within. All of the aforementioned operations were done in secret, and while Yusaf accused the US of violating his borders, he could prove nothing – even the ground forces were using local weapons and tribal dress.
In retaliation, Pakistani soldiers began firing across the Afghan border at UAVs and aircraft, downing a Predator drone on March 18th. In response, Americans began jamming Pakistani communications.
[FONT="]On March 20th, the straw broke the camel’s back. Pakistani soldiers began firing on CJSOTF soldiers in tribal dress and Northern Alliance soldiers, operating on the Afghan side of the border. They returned fire, and the Pakistani troops pursued. Perhaps since Pakistani electronics were being jammed, a company inadvertently crossed the Afghan border. After continuing the firefight, the Pakistani soldiers were wiped out by gunships and heliborne regular troops from the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. It was officially the end of Operation Anaconda. It was the beginning of something worse.[/FONT]
It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. As well ask men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way is was and will be. That way and not some other way.
-The Judge, in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian
“War is wretched beyond description, and only a fool or a fraud could sentimentalize its cruel reality.”
-John McCain
---
“Due to the extraordinary circumstances of this present crisis, I am assuming emergency leadership of Pakistan. The Constitution will be temporarily suspended until the situation is resolved.”
-General Yusaf Khan
Khan’s succession to leadership of Pakistan was not the worst possible case – at least the country was not in complete anarchy. However, this man was a hawk, one of the strongest voices urging the present confrontation with India. His theory to unify the country was quite simple – end American breaches of Pakistani sovereignty, throw government support behind the freedom fighters of Kashmir, and bring Pakistan together against its traditional enemy of India.
It was a decent plan, except it was formulated with little knowledge of the diplomatic situation between the US and Pakistan. Musharraf had suppressed knowledge about Armitage’s bellicose calls to avoid appearing weak to his countrymen. He’d done his job a bit too well. When Yusaf informed the Americans they’d no longer be allowed violate Pakistan’s territory, they did not receive his decision well. Spring was coming, and militants were crossing the mountain passes in an attempt to break out of the Kandahar pocket.
“This jackbooted motherf----r thinks he can play hardball with the United States? We’re taking them down. Let’s throw the book at them. We’re going to start releasing as much as we can on these guys. We’re going to make the case for war.”
-Norman Pell quoting John McCain in Present at the Destruction: A Memoir of My Service
The numbers looked good. After a week of “leaks,” releases, and public statements to Pakistan, at least 70% supported a resumption of counterterrorist operations. Many now believed that Pakistan was a state sponsor of terror that needed to be dealt with. The mania caught on. Some in the media even began speculating that Musharraf had been assassinated in concert with the new government to push out the US. The intervention was making a case for itself.
Operation Anaconda began in March, 2002. It thoroughly disproved the idea that killing bin Laden would break the spirit of al Qaeda. Instead, American forces encountered higher numbers of foreign fighters than expected – al Qaeda had become a martyr cult, not just a terrorist organization. The fact that insurgents were flocking to the battlefield also indicated Pakistani complicity to this new phase of the war.
McCain resumed bombing on March 13th, striking insurgent targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Meanwhile, the first brigades of the 50,000 troop surge to Afganistan were apparently all destined for the border, with NATO picking up most of the slack in the rest of Afghanistan.
CJSOTF forces crossed the border for the first time since operations ceased on March 15th, attacking command positions in the FATA. Meanwhile, American intelligence services began making outreaches to Pakistan’s more secular members of the officer corps – expecting they’d need to be able to put pressure on Yusaf from within. All of the aforementioned operations were done in secret, and while Yusaf accused the US of violating his borders, he could prove nothing – even the ground forces were using local weapons and tribal dress.
In retaliation, Pakistani soldiers began firing across the Afghan border at UAVs and aircraft, downing a Predator drone on March 18th. In response, Americans began jamming Pakistani communications.
[FONT="]On March 20th, the straw broke the camel’s back. Pakistani soldiers began firing on CJSOTF soldiers in tribal dress and Northern Alliance soldiers, operating on the Afghan side of the border. They returned fire, and the Pakistani troops pursued. Perhaps since Pakistani electronics were being jammed, a company inadvertently crossed the Afghan border. After continuing the firefight, the Pakistani soldiers were wiped out by gunships and heliborne regular troops from the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. It was officially the end of Operation Anaconda. It was the beginning of something worse.[/FONT]
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Oh, no. This cannot be good. This can only be very, very bad. Unless of course it's a very, very quick war that reinstates constitutional rule or the like. I doubt it will be though.
Which of course means I look forward to seeing how it unfolds!
Chances of Democratic winning in 2004 just went up, IMO.
Which of course means I look forward to seeing how it unfolds!
Chances of Democratic winning in 2004 just went up, IMO.
No apocalypse. But it's not going to be quick. Pakistan is due for another government change, though.
Yup. Although McCain has a much stronger case for what he's doing than Bush did for Iraq, as far as the public of 2004 is going to be concerned, this is going to be a bit uglier than Iraq was in 2003, for obvious reasons.
Hillary's surely going to run at some point... I'd want to double-check her reasons for sitting '04 out to see why they'd change, though.
And there will almost certainly be a troop surge in Pakistan - there will be nearly 60,000 American troops in Central Asia by the summer, and there may be more depending on how Pakistan goes.
The real jump in American troop numbers may not come until after the election, though... I forget if I've hinted to it, but the next big war for the McCain administration is going to throw things for a real loop.
Wouldn't it be funny if W. ran against this "irresponsible" McCain in 2004 a la Kennedy in 1980?
It would indeed. However, it takes someone like Reagan to get away with that sort of tomfoolery on the Republican side...
Interestingly enough...Another twist would be if TTL, that the american people are so tired of McCain warmongering administration...That someone as extreme as the Rev. Al Sharpton might seem a more appealing candidate to become the nominee for the Democrats. Then we would really be in for some hell in the last few ATL years.
Then we would really be in for some hell in the last few ATL years.Interestingly enough...Another twist would be if TTL, that the american people are so tired of McCain warmongering administration...That someone as extreme as the Rev. Al Sharpton might seem a more appealing candidate to become the nominee for the Democrats.
Maybe in 2008... But given the heightened intensity of the 9/11 attacks and the lack of an "unjustified" Iraq-type war, 2004 isn't looking good for a McGovernite candidate so far. Pakistan would have to go really poorly for that.
Interesting Scenario...So Wesley Clark, maybe annoucing his candidacy earlier, and outright calling out Johnny Boy on the way his admninistration conducted the War(s)...should do better in TTL and possibly get the nomination...A Clark/Clinton ticket actually might get some traction
I think Clinton would want to wait to be able to win the whole thing, but Clark is definitely going to be more of a factor.
Here's the next section.
PART XVI: March-April 2002
“As we go on, effects will grow less simple, less predictable, and political operations and even armed intervention, in short, obvious and direct action, will not turn out as anticipated… It will no longer be enough to combine desire and power to undertake an enterprise.”
-Paul Valery
---
The campaign in Pakistan was only against the government to the extent one could say Yusaf Khan was governing it. Operation Swift Guardian was more of an exercise in containment, with multiple goals – firstly, neutralizing the Taliban’s logistical support in the Northwest Frontier and FATA, secondly, keeping its nuclear weapons out of play and thirdly, to prevent a regional war with India.
This would be no mean feat. Despite Yusaf Khan’s belligerence, he still did not have direct control over the entire military or any of the Islamist insurgent groups. Nor did he command the loyalty of much of the population. Many Pakistanis were pining for the days of Bhutto and Sharif, while the Jundallah terrorist group in Balochistan intensified its secessionist efforts. American major combat operations in Pakistan officially began on March 29th, 2002. Stealth aircraft began striking Pakistani nuclear and air defense sites, while the US negotiated with India to hold their forces back. Nevertheless, given the confused state of the Pakistani military, not everything could go so perfectly.
“At least 100 Indian soldiers have been killed in firefights in Kashmir as Pakistani soldiers began bombarding Indian positions along the Line of Control… Many blame confusion from US attacks on Pakistani command and nuclear infrastructure for the chaos, which some Pakistani officers may have mistaken as the prelude to an Indian advance in Kashmir. Meanwhile, Indian defense officials pledged that while the military would “respond to any attacks on its forces,” Indian troops would not cross the LOC.”
-AP release, March 30th, 2002
By April 1st, thousands of American soldiers had crossed into the Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier, engaging in major battles with militants and Pakistani troops. While casualties were higher here, McCain was easily able to justify his actions to the American people. “By fighting the extremists and flushing them from their havens in Pakistan, we protect the new democracy in Afghanistan from being smothered in its cradle.” Indeed, between Operation Anaconda and Operation Swift Guardian, violence in Afghanistan began to abate. Of course, it had mainly shifted across the border – but violence in Pakistan was what Americans had come to expect. Here was a “rogue state,” a threat to its neighbors and the world. By the end of April, there were 20,000 US troops engaged in “transnational operations” in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Engaged on every front, many Pakistanis felt the Khan government was doomed. Most critically, many Pakistani nuclear scientists began a “fire sale” on nuclear technology, after the governments of several countries offered extravagant bribes for knowledge they feared the US or India would soon destroy. But for now, the West knew nothing of this. The American government especially was more concerned with taking advantage of populist anger against the current regime. Khan was losing credibility even among the officer corps, thanks to a bungled assault across the LOC in mid-April. The CIA began to set a new plan in motion.
“Kayani was not a dark horse, as far as the White House was concerned. We were grooming him… In him, the administration saw a strongman more effective and useful than Khan and one more open to democracy than Musharraf… The only trick was getting him into power before the country destroyed itself.”
-Norman Pell, Present at the Destruction: A Memoir of My Service