Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

Non Supportable Argument. Acronym. Saves time with stuff. (^^^^)

Ain't no white flag. It's an on point label of what I've been reading. Such as crackpot memos and reports sent through the dump mail instead of through official channels. Get it? But that is just me knowing how stuff works.
 
Not sure how this matters anyways, as I think that you probably won't be able to determine how much the British spent on their nuclear weapon program. I certainly did not find that bit of information out. You have no basis to say either way, what kind of money they threw at it.

:p
Briefing for the Prime Minister 12 December 1951, PREM 11/297 National Archives.
 
And if you want more actual facts about the British post-war nuclear programme, this book is quite helpful:

RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces
Humphrey Wynn HMSO 1994
ISBN: 9780117728332
 
Post war Heisenberg claimed he had deliberately miscalculated the amounted of U235 needed for a bomb. The recordings cited above suggest that was not the case. Heisenberg's failure essentially doomed the program, of course if he was deliberately sabotaging the German nuclear program that hardly suggests he's going to help them get a bomb after 1945. What any of this has to do with the impossibility of Sealion eludes me.

A brief summary of the two sides of the argument and some more detailed links about Heisenberg and the bomb here:

http://holbert.faculty.asu.edu/eee460/anv/Why the Germans Failed.html
 
Post war Heisenberg claimed he had deliberately miscalculated the amounted of U235 needed for a bomb. The recordings cited above suggest that was not the case. Heisenberg's failure essentially doomed the program, of course if he was deliberately sabotaging the German nuclear program that hardly suggests he's going to help them get a bomb after 1945. What any of this has to do with the impossibility of Sealion eludes me.

A brief summary of the two sides of the argument and some more detailed links about Heisenberg and the bomb here:

http://holbert.faculty.asu.edu/eee460/anv/Why the Germans Failed.html

No, he came up with the right values in 14 August 1945. Heisenberg came up with 58 kg for the value of the critical mass of a bar sphere of uranium-235. He came up with 15 kg for the critical mass of a sphere of uranium-235 with a reflector. His formulas are near identical to those in modern theory of reactors.

  1. Remarks to Heisenberg's Farm-Hall lecture on the critical mass of fast neutron fission by M.S. El Naschie
"There is little doubt at all that had the Germans been in possession of U235 or PU293 they could have produced at least a gun design bomb any time they wished. It is utterly ridiculous to think that engineering or scientific problems could have been a barrier."
 
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Ian_W

Banned
No, he came up with the right values in 14 August 1945. Heisenberg came up with 58 kg for the value of the critical mass of a bar sphere of uranium-235. He came up with 15 kg for the critical mass of a sphere of uranium-235 with a reflector. His formulas are near identical to those in modern theory of reactors.

  1. Remarks to Heisenberg's Farm-Hall lecture on the critical mass of fast neutron fission by M.S. El Naschie


14 August 1945

ie well after he'd been broken out of his bubble by Hiroshima and realised all his previous work was wrong.

For the German atomic program to be important, this particular lightbulb would have needed to happen in 1942, or earlier.

When you're dealing with 20th century atomic physicists, Heisenberg was on the b-team ... and that was a problem as he was the best the Germans had, in an environment where needing an atomic bomb fast needed enough a- and b-team members to do a lot of difficult work fast.

An example of this is the heavy water blind alley, where the German program accepted greater schedule risk for a smaller physics risk ... and the Allies knew what they were trying, and as a response put particular effort into making sure the Norsk Hydro plant went out of commission to slow down the German program even further.
 
14 August 1945

ie well after he'd been broken out of his bubble by Hiroshima and realised all his previous work was wrong.

For the German atomic program to be important, this particular lightbulb would have needed to happen in 1942, or earlier.

When you're dealing with 20th century atomic physicists, Heisenberg was on the b-team ... and that was a problem as he was the best the Germans had, in an environment where needing an atomic bomb fast needed enough a- and b-team members to do a lot of difficult work fast.

An example of this is the heavy water blind alley, where the German program accepted greater schedule risk for a smaller physics risk ... and the Allies knew what they were trying, and as a response put particular effort into making sure the Norsk Hydro plant went out of commission to slow down the German program even further.

That is because he had not thought seriously about building a bomb yet, they did not even have the fissile material. There was no "bubble" he "broke out of" ??? Once he started thinking seriously about it (as a distraction from being a PoW) he came up with the solutions easily.

If we now take into account that Heisenberg was talking from memory and had no references or any
other books at his disposal in his captivity in Farm-Hall, then one should make the correct conclusion, and
that is not related to Heisenberg genius, but to the fact that the theoretical design of a primitive ``bomb'' of
the Hiroshima type is a relatively trivial matter.
There is little doubt at all that had the Germans been in
possession of U235 or PU293 they could have produced at least a gun design bomb any time they wished. It
is utterly ridiculous to think that engineering or scientific problems could have been a barrier.
 

Ian_W

Banned
That is because he had not thought seriously about building a bomb yet, they did not even have the fissile material. There was no "bubble" he "broke out of" ??? Once he started thinking seriously about it (as a distraction from being a PoW) he came up with the solutions easily.

Please re-read the bolded bits you wrote, and then consider your position.

Remember, the actual a-team of 20th century physicists alerted their political leadership of the possibility of an atomic bomb on 2 August 1939. Heisenberg was six years late.
 
Trip-trap, trip-trap, trip-trap…

Still NSA. Since your "facts" have nothing to do with what you claimed the example proved about the RAF communications system during the BoB. \

And THAT should have been your clue why I replied the way I did.

In other words, if you have something to say about controller nodes and the BoB, don't bring up incidents that have nothing to do with the situation discussed.

FOR THE SECOND TIME READ MY POSTS PROPERLY BEFORE COMMENTING.

So your physics tells you about the state of radio telephony available to Fighter Command in 1940, about the signal degradation, frequency interference and susceptibility to atmospheric conditions... possibly also about the constraints imposed by the requirement for pip squeak following incidents such as the battle of Barking Creek?

It always helps to read a post before you reply, I did not say that radio had anything to do with Barking Creek only that as a consequence of incidents like Barking Creek additional constraints were introduced that limited sector control to just four squadrons.

FOR THE THIRD TIME – The Battle of Barking Creek is not being used as an example of anything but as an explanation of a constraint on Fighter Command’s ability to control more than four squadrons per sector. This was more than enough to control all of the Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons with plenty left to spare under normal conditions. This is why it only becomes a problem if Fighter Commands withdraws, one of the reasons I doubt very much that they would withdraw.

Pipsqueak is IFF plotter information transmitted from Friendlies to sort from Foes. Get it?

IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH GCI CONTROL.

Yes thanks I think I do get it… but then you probably haven’t read this bit of my post before.

Pip Squeak – using the existing TR9 HF radio sets a timer was used to transmit a 14 second signal each minute from one aircraft in each formation and, using a triangle of receivers, the position of that formation could be plotted in real time. There was a 1 second delay between each formations transmission and as you can see there are sixty seconds in each minute, divide that by 15 seconds and you get that each sector can only effectively control 4 squadrons in the air at any time even without the radio problems.
 
NSA.

I can read quite well; thank you. (^^^^) Maybe it is your inability to distinguish what a thing is used for, that is the problem?
 
That is funny. Still does not solve the problem of not knowing the difference between an IFF tracking method and GCI control.
 
The more you post the more it becomes apparent that you know very little of the Dowding System. Without Pip Squeak the controller would not know where his own formations are in relation to the enemy and would therefore not be able to vector his fighters to the correct location.
 
It appears that you don't know the Dowding system at all or you would not understand the IRONY of this...

Without Pip Squeak the controller would not know where his own formations are in relation to the enemy and would therefore not be able to vector his fighters to the correct location.

The limiter is NOT the repeat cycle (15 seconds on the IFF per squadron) but rather the number of controllers who can competently vector with refresh information that can be up to two or three minutes old. IOW, it is a human bottleneck. GCI NOT IFF.
 
That is because he had not thought seriously about building a bomb yet, they did not even have the fissile material. There was no "bubble" he "broke out of" ??? Once he started thinking seriously about it (as a distraction from being a PoW) he came up with the solutions easily.

That is simply not the case, there is ample evidence, some of it from Heisenberg himself, that he worked on the idea of a nuclear bomb during the war. The only real argument is whether he deliberately sabotaged the program or simply made a series of errors that led the German project into a dead end.
 
It appears that you don't know the Dowding system at all or you would not understand the IRONY of this...

The limiter is NOT the repeat cycle (15 seconds on the IFF per squadron) but rather the number of controllers who can competently vector with refresh information that can be up to two or three minutes old. IOW, it is a human bottleneck. GCI NOT IFF.
At last you're willing to accept that there was a four squadron limit for each sector... we can move on now.
 
Nope. You are not getting it about radio, communications in general, time management, ground controlled intercept procedures, and you NEVER will apparently. Your sophistry does not disguise what mistakes you STILL make here.
 
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