In Summary… (to help me to get back on track with my original post)
My first post related to the question of Fighter Command’s withdrawal from southern England and posed a few questions as well as suggesting a line of bases that were out of effective range of the Bf109.
It was suggested that a withdrawal would result in the RAF being able to maintain some sort of parity with the Luftwaffe over the Channel and I pointed out that the Luftwaffe, with no withdrawal, had already achieved air superiority over parts of the Channel.
Discussions then turned to what constituted air superiority. On that point I can add the following…
Air superiority is defined as – ‘a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.’
As the actions of the Luftwaffe had resulted in Dover being abandoned as a destroyer base and that the Straights of Dover had been closed to convoy movements and that orders had been issued to the RAF fighter squadrons that combat was not to be conducted over the Channel it seems to me that air superiority had been achieved. This may have only been temporary and only during daylight hours but the definition of air superiority says that dominance only needs to be at a given time and place.
Within Fuhrer Directive No. 17 For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England, Section 2 the following was stated –
‘After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.
Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.’
This overrides the German navies requirement for total air supremacy as an objective for the Luftwaffe and was what they were aiming for. My feeling is that this was much greater than just superiority over areas of the Channel and would actually require superiority over much of the south eastern counties of England.
Well then Sea Lion is in a bind is it not, for surely the suppression of Bomber and Coastal Command and FAA assets was the point to which the attack on Fighter Command was merely a preliminary exercise?
Actually the suppression of Bomber Command, Coastal Command and the FAA happened early on with attacks on airfields such as Eastchurch, Thorney Island, Ford, Gosport, Driffield etc. It’s regularly assumed that these were mistaken targets but were all part of the (failed) strategy of destroying the enemy air force. Again from Directive 17 –
‘The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organizations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.’
The Germans made no distinctions between Fighter, Bomber and Coastal commands or the FAA, to them there was just an enemy air force. The preliminary attacks were mostly against non-fighter targets aimed at reducing Britain’s ability to strike back before moving to attack fighter bases, something they obviously failed to do.
So to hopefully get back on track I’ll ask the original question again.
There is always mention of Fighter Command being able to “Pull back” or retreat if the going got tough but I’d be fascinated to know what peoples definition of retreat is. Where would the squadrons be stationed, how far do they retreat, what kind of defence could they offer?
If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.