Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

I mean, I think probably the dominons (well teh white ones anyways, assuming we're writing of anything dodgy with S.C.Bose happening) would carry on the fight, independently or in co-operation with the US. Plus of course there's the possibility that the RN is instructed to put itself at the disposal of an allied government if a surrender is about to be sure to happen. What relation that has to any British government at home or in exile I don't know.
 
We can agree to disagree on this issue then. I believe that by 1940 the Dominions, with their own governments post-Westminster, entered the War 'voluntarily' and the capture of Britain would be a challenge to be met, as opposed to an opportunity to exit the conflict. The mission to 'recapture the Mother Island' would be a rallying call to the Dominions (maybe not Ireland or South Africa) and the War for the British Empire would be dedicated to recovering Britain pretty much above all else.

If Germany can invade Britain, then obviously they've solved the logistical problem of the English Channel. I'm guessing they can fortify Britain more easily than the Dominions can coordinate an amphibious assault launched all the way from North America or at the very least from some last stand in the Mediterranean.

What they really need is the U.S., but I have to think the loss of Britain makes the U.S. more isolationist with respect to Europe, not less so.

Anyhow,

Agreed. I just think with any POD post-1930, the USM is ASB.

Yeah, we're so far outside the realm of plausibility here that I'm happy just to end on a note of mild disagreement with you. The reality is that Britain is simply, objectively superior to Germany in all of the ways that really matter, ca. 1940, to the continued sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and once everyone got over fretting over paratroopers disguised as nuns, I think this was very clear at least to everyone in the upper echelons of government. Why on Earth would Britain surrender when it is virtually impregnable?
 
In Summary… (to help me to get back on track with my original post)

My first post related to the question of Fighter Command’s withdrawal from southern England and posed a few questions as well as suggesting a line of bases that were out of effective range of the Bf109.

It was suggested that a withdrawal would result in the RAF being able to maintain some sort of parity with the Luftwaffe over the Channel and I pointed out that the Luftwaffe, with no withdrawal, had already achieved air superiority over parts of the Channel.

Discussions then turned to what constituted air superiority. On that point I can add the following…

Air superiority is defined as – ‘a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.’

As the actions of the Luftwaffe had resulted in Dover being abandoned as a destroyer base and that the Straights of Dover had been closed to convoy movements and that orders had been issued to the RAF fighter squadrons that combat was not to be conducted over the Channel it seems to me that air superiority had been achieved. This may have only been temporary and only during daylight hours but the definition of air superiority says that dominance only needs to be at a given time and place.

Within Fuhrer Directive No. 17 For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England, Section 2 the following was stated –

‘After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.’

This overrides the German navies requirement for total air supremacy as an objective for the Luftwaffe and was what they were aiming for. My feeling is that this was much greater than just superiority over areas of the Channel and would actually require superiority over much of the south eastern counties of England.

Well then Sea Lion is in a bind is it not, for surely the suppression of Bomber and Coastal Command and FAA assets was the point to which the attack on Fighter Command was merely a preliminary exercise?

Actually the suppression of Bomber Command, Coastal Command and the FAA happened early on with attacks on airfields such as Eastchurch, Thorney Island, Ford, Gosport, Driffield etc. It’s regularly assumed that these were mistaken targets but were all part of the (failed) strategy of destroying the enemy air force. Again from Directive 17 –

‘The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organizations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.’

The Germans made no distinctions between Fighter, Bomber and Coastal commands or the FAA, to them there was just an enemy air force. The preliminary attacks were mostly against non-fighter targets aimed at reducing Britain’s ability to strike back before moving to attack fighter bases, something they obviously failed to do.

So to hopefully get back on track I’ll ask the original question again.

There is always mention of Fighter Command being able to “Pull back” or retreat if the going got tough but I’d be fascinated to know what peoples definition of retreat is. Where would the squadrons be stationed, how far do they retreat, what kind of defence could they offer?

If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.
 
In Summary… (to help me to get back on track with my original post)

Snip..

So in summary by which you mean an expanded repetition

1) Claimed the Luftwaffe had achieved superiority

2) defined air superiority according to the commonly accepted definition
‘a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.’

But mysteriously ignored the very pointed opinion of the Kriegsmarine that "Preparations for Sea Lion, particularly mine clearance, are being affected by the inactivity of the Luftwaffe..." from part 55 of the aforementioned and linked Germans Plans for the Invasion of England. Clearly that definition of air superiority was not being achieved.

3) point out that what some (Len Deighton) supposed to be attacks in error upon the assets of other commands than Fighter Command was in fact a correctly functioning feature not a bug. Which seems valid.

4) then claim that fighters alone would be able to pursue Fighter Command even further North than the planned withdrawal "North of the Thames" despite the evidence that fighter operations, supported and enhanced by bomber operations were only tentatively effective toward forcing a retreat OTL.

So all in all we have two claims, one definition that you then ignore when it does not suit you and one valid point. The conclusion from your argument in full is that the Luftwaffe was failing to provide sufficient conditions for the successful prosecution of Sea Lion.
 

hipper

Banned
In Summary… (to help me to get back on track with my original post)

My first post related to the question of Fighter Command’s withdrawal from southern England and posed a few questions as well as suggesting a line of bases that were out of effective range of the Bf109.

It was suggested that a withdrawal would result in the RAF being able to maintain some sort of parity with the Luftwaffe over the Channel and I pointed out that the Luftwaffe, with no withdrawal, had already achieved air superiority over parts of the Channel.

Discussions then turned to what constituted air superiority. On that point I can add the following…

Air superiority is defined as – ‘a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.’

As the actions of the Luftwaffe had resulted in Dover being abandoned as a destroyer base and that the Straights of Dover had been closed to convoy movements and that orders had been issued to the RAF fighter squadrons that combat was not to be conducted over the Channel it seems to me that air superiority had been achieved. This may have only been temporary and only during daylight hours but the definition of air superiority says that dominance only needs to be at a given time and place.

Within Fuhrer Directive No. 17 For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England, Section 2 the following was stated –

‘After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.’

This overrides the German navies requirement for total air supremacy as an objective for the Luftwaffe and was what they were aiming for. My feeling is that this was much greater than just superiority over areas of the Channel and would actually require superiority over much of the south eastern counties of England.



Actually the suppression of Bomber Command, Coastal Command and the FAA happened early on with attacks on airfields such as Eastchurch, Thorney Island, Ford, Gosport, Driffield etc. It’s regularly assumed that these were mistaken targets but were all part of the (failed) strategy of destroying the enemy air force. Again from Directive 17 –

‘The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organizations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.’

The Germans made no distinctions between Fighter, Bomber and Coastal commands or the FAA, to them there was just an enemy air force. The preliminary attacks were mostly against non-fighter targets aimed at reducing Britain’s ability to strike back before moving to attack fighter bases, something they obviously failed to do.

So to hopefully get back on track I’ll ask the original question again.

There is always mention of Fighter Command being able to “Pull back” or retreat if the going got tough but I’d be fascinated to know what peoples definition of retreat is. Where would the squadrons be stationed, how far do they retreat, what kind of defence could they offer?

If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.


I always thought the entire pull back Fighter Command was rather silly if you look at what they actually did which was to disperse fighter squadrons to satilite airfields and use other forward airfields for refuelling aircraft. After all the LW was operating from fields in France thevarAF could also operate from bare bones facilities. With the heavy maintence being done at the original Sector airfields.
 
So in summary by which you mean an expanded repetition

1) Claimed the Luftwaffe had achieved superiority
By definition they had over parts of the Channel although it was only temporary and only during daylight hours.

2) defined air superiority according to the commonly accepted definition


But mysteriously ignored the very pointed opinion of the Kriegsmarine that "Preparations for Sea Lion, particularly mine clearance, are being affected by the inactivity of the Luftwaffe..." from part 55 of the aforementioned and linked Germans Plans for the Invasion of England. Clearly that definition of air superiority was not being achieved.
(From memory it was part 57 but that's just a nit pick). I haven't ignored it, the Navy was looking for total air supremacy, Hitler told the Luftwaffe they only needed temporary air superiority. This is possibly the navy's attempt to delay proceedings, who knows?

3) point out that what some (Len Deighton) supposed to be attacks in error upon the assets of other commands than Fighter Command was in fact a correctly functioning feature not a bug. Which seems valid.
. Attacking none Fighter Command assets was an error in judgement rather than errors in pilot target recognition BUT only if the sole aim of the Luftwaffe was to destroy Fighter Command, which it wasn't. Can you point me to the passage(s) where Deighton says the attacks were errors as I don't seem to be able to find it in either his book 'Fighter' or 'Battle of Britain' though I have only done a quick scan.

4) then claim that fighters alone would be able to pursue Fighter Command even further North than the planned withdrawal "North of the Thames" despite the evidence that fighter operations, supported and enhanced by bomber operations were only tentatively effective toward forcing a retreat OTL.
Escorted bomber raids would be the thing Fighter Command would be trying to avoid which are restricted by the range of the Bf109... to be honest I'm not quite sure what you are saying here... sorry I must be a little thick.

So all in all we have two claims, one definition that you then ignore when it does not suit you and one valid point. The conclusion from your argument in full is that the Luftwaffe was failing to provide sufficient conditions for the successful prosecution of Sea Lion.
OTL yes. But my original post was about where Fighter Command would withdraw to not about air superiority, something you still haven't commented on.
 
I always thought the entire pull back Fighter Command was rather silly if you look at what they actually did which was to disperse fighter squadrons to satilite airfields and use other forward airfields for refuelling aircraft. After all the LW was operating from fields in France thevarAF could also operate from bare bones facilities. With the heavy maintence being done at the original Sector airfields.
I'm in total agreement but want to know why people still insist that Fighter Command would even consider such an option.
 
Refit free from enemy fighter bomber air attack is why you have airbases out of known enemy fighter sortie range. That is kind of obvious.
 
I'm in total agreement but want to know why people still insist that Fighter Command would even consider such an option.

The main reason is that it is one of the worse case scenarios for defence of the Realm versus Sea Lion. The Luftwaffe needs a window in which it can conduct operations against bomber and anti-shipping assets and the Royal Navy's south coast bases while critically retaining enough strength to be able to interdict Home Fleet during the sea lift of the crucial second wave of the invasion.

The second reason is that it was one of the options genuinely considered at the Air Ministry and it would be unfair to assume that the British would always benefit from ideal decision making (especially considering the history of said Air Ministry).
 

Deleted member 94680

I always assumed the “pull back” scenario meant that by moving the base airfields further North, that the field of operations would shift from the Channel and the South of England to the Midlands. The RAF wanted to intercept and fight over the Channel, with the North of the AoO being the South of England or the London region. This was the extent of the Luftwaffe’s fighter range (or the range limited their loiter time). By pulling North, if the strategic scenario demanded it, this meant that Luftwaffe fighters would be unable to dogfight with the RAF, leaving their bombers unescorted. The continued use of unescorted bombers (striking ‘Northern’ RAF bases) would eventually allow the RAF to reduce the Luftwaffe bomber force to the point a move South could be made to re-engage the Luftwaffe’s fighter force.

I could be entirely wrong (feel free to point it out).
 
The Air Ministry did indeed suggest to Dowding that he should make preparations to withdraw his forces, a suggestion Dowding was happy to ignore. When Park received direct orders to prepare his air fields for destruction prior to an invasion lest the Germans captured them he took as much time as possible implementing the orders. Later in life he said he would never have blown the charges as his aim was to keep his forces as far forward as possible for as long as possible.

The whole notion of withdrawal for these two men went completely against the way they were conducting the defence.

In reality the defence in the south and south east of England was reliant on roughly 30 squadrons of single seat fighters, no more than 480 aircraft and a similar number of pilots at any one time. So as long as they can keep that many aircraft in the front line the strength of defence can be maintained. Obviously that would mean that the rest of Britain would be defenceless and the vital role of training pilots on type in the squadrons further north would not be possible. This really is the crunch point.

Any withdrawal would be to refit, regroup and retrain... an German invasion would probably come no later than two weeks after this and Fighter Command in that time would probably be able to put another 250 aircraft in the field. HOWEVER in doing so they will have left targets such as Dover, Harwich, Sheerness, Chatham, Portsmouth, Southampton and London (plus a lot of other targets including the main Spitfire and Hurricane factories) completely exposed and defenceless. Those are where the RN would hope to launch strikes against an invasion and where the main form of defence, the vital fighters, are made.

To me it makes no sense to do this, you're giving the Germans the exact conditions they require if you withdraw. I'm pretty sure Dowding and Park knew this as well.
 
A little history and data helps orient the discussion.

UK-RAF-I-5.jpg



Main-BoB-map.jpg



BoB_1.png


And I do believe in maps. You do notice the single axis threat vector? and the range limits?

LW bombers may operate out of Norway and Denmark but their fighters cannot. In fact, It is the LW that has to base far forward, exposed as the geography dictates, and be slaughtered caught on the ground by RAF night raids on their air fields. (RTL). It is why they could not hold France.
 
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A little history and data helps orient the discussion.

UK-RAF-I-5.jpg



Main-BoB-map.jpg



BoB_1.png


And I do believe in maps. You do notice the single axis threat vector? and the range limits?

LW bombers may operate out of Norway and Denmark but their fighters cannot. In fact, It is the LW that has to base far forward, exposed as the geography dictates, and be slaughtered caught on the ground by RAF night raids on their air fields. (RTL). It is why they could not hold France.
Which is all well and good but the third map is inaccurate in many ways... firstly the Group boundaries are not in the right places and secondly the Bf109 arc from the Calais area is inconsistent... the right hand portion is only about 60% of the distance of the left hand portion. In reality the Bf109 would be able to and did travel further north than this.
 
That is why I gave you the THREE maps and the hyperwar BoB link, because I knew you would pull a bit of sophistry and ignore the obvious main point illustrated.
 
If the Germans somehow successfully invaded, Churchill would simply flee, along with much of the royal family and parts of the government.

German plans were for after an unspecified period of occupation, to simply place a puppet government in power. This would most likely be lead by Oswald Mosley and perhaps Edward VIII. This puppet government would immediately become the right hand man of the Reich.

The USA simply doesn't have the resources to do an Operation Overlord-type liberation from across the Atlantic.

Partisan movements across Europe certainly take a heavy blow as the British helped with giving them supplies, and without a British-led coup in Yugoslavia, it remains loyal to the Axis. This has profound effects on the Russia campaign. The entire might of the Wehrmacht can be hurled at the Soviets.

In addition, Operation Barbarossa can not be delayed until June 22nd, and may be executed instead on its intended date of May 15th. This gives crucial weeks for the Germans to sweep into Moscow before Autumnal rains bog down the advance. Most likely, it is a stalemate on the Urals, as Stalin would probably not surrender.

What happens in the long run is we may have a fatherland-type Cold War between the Reich and the United States, and to a lesser degree, the Soviets.
 
Churchill was determined to die fighting if it came to it and was often seen practising with rifle, SMG and pistol (he was apparently a very good pistol shot).

I don't believe he'd have done a runner.

Perhaps, but he might see the point of attempting to rally the battered empire from Canada.

Maybe here in a highly ASB alternate history where Germany successfully invades:

Churchill, rather than fleeing or surrendering, grabs a rifle and joins the fight. He is killed in the Battle of Liverpool (Where the British fled after the fall of London).

Britain surrendered, but the royal family and parts of the government did manage to flee into Canada. They receive support from the Americans, but the empire rapidly fell apart. By the end of 1941, all of Africa is either independent or an axis colony. India revolted and declared independence, and soon America seized many British overseas possessions in an effort to protect itself. With those actions the British Empire was no more.

Japan at this point openly supported the Axis, and launch a campaign subjugating the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, and British Malaysia in a matter of 6 weeks. They also prepared to strike at India and Australia.

In May of 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, and managed to sweep into Moscow by September. Stalin fled, and the Nazi empire stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals. Both America and the Axis prepared for an all-out war, and this is where it gets too fantastical to be accurate.
 
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