Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

But so what? This superiority comes from a concious choice, rather than from fundamental inability. Given the stated context of an actual invasion attempt, it's hardly unreasonable to expect that choice to change.
That's right, the Battle of Britain was an ever changing battle, the decision would have been changed at the right time. But a withdrawal of Fighter Command outside effective range of the Bf109 would only make this situation worse... that's what I was originally talking about.
 

SsgtC

Banned
No you're right it had nothing to do with air superiority, however the order was issued as a result of unacceptable and unnecessary losses inflicted whilst fighting over open water. My point was that Fighter Command was willing to withdraw from air battles over the Channel giving the Luftwaffe almost free reign over the seas, that in my book means the Luftwaffe have air superiority over the Channel.
That's not how air superiority works. If an invasion was attempted, or the RAF had a clear reason for flying over there Channel, they would have. And would have flown in force, and at will. That's not air superiority for the Germans. Air Superiority means that you have eliminated your enemy's ability to effectively use their air power in a given air space. The Luftwaffe clearly did not do that
 
It's a great document yes, one that I've read and reread many times over the years. What the navy required was total air supremacy to the point where not even RAF recon aircraft were able to take to the skies and that the Channel was so dominated by the Luftwaffe that RN light forces were not able to operate. This is a long way from localised air superiority over the Channel, something the Luftwaffe did achieve.

I think rather than asking for the impossible the Navy were in fact looking for the minimum required to do their job. "However as experience has shown the bombers and mine-laying squadrons of the RAF are still fully operational, and it must be admitted that the operations of these British squadrons have undoubtedly been successful, though serious interference with or prevention of German transport movements have not resulted so far." That is the Navy saying on the 10th September that air power is being a real pain but thanks to a little forwards planning on their part they had the reserves to make up losses. The no thanks to the Luftwaffe part went unsaid. By the 16th they are complaining of increased air activity and of course the operation was duly cancelled on the 17th.
 
That's not how air superiority works. If an invasion was attempted, or the RAF had a clear reason for flying over there Channel, they would have. And would have flown in force, and at will. That's not air superiority for the Germans. Air Superiority means that you have eliminated your enemy's ability to effectively use their air power in a given air space. The Luftwaffe clearly did not do that
I think there has always been some confusion over the issue of what constitutes air supremacy and air superiority, definitions of both are below:

Supremacy - a degree of superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Superiority - a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.

I think what you are describing is supremacy rather than superiority.
 
I think there has always been some confusion over the issue of what constitutes air supremacy and air superiority, definitions of both are below:

Supremacy - a degree of superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Superiority - a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.

I think what you are describing is supremacy rather than superiority.

But is not the evidence that the Luftwaffe in fact had achieved neither condition.
 
I think rather than asking for the impossible the Navy were in fact looking for the minimum required to do their job. "However as experience has shown the bombers and mine-laying squadrons of the RAF are still fully operational, and it must be admitted that the operations of these British squadrons have undoubtedly been successful, though serious interference with or prevention of German transport movements have not resulted so far." That is the Navy saying on the 10th September that air power is being a real pain but thanks to a little forwards planning on their part they had the reserves to make up losses. The no thanks to the Luftwaffe part went unsaid. By the 16th they are complaining of increased air activity and of course the operation was duly cancelled on the 17th.
The navy are asking for the almost impossible for an air force.in 1940, to either put up an effect night defence against RAF attacks or to knock out all Bomber, Coastal and FAA assets on the ground so they aren't capable of attacking the assembling invasion forces.
 
The navy are asking for the almost impossible for an air force.in 1940, to either put up an effect night defence against RAF attacks or to knock out all Bomber, Coastal and FAA assets on the ground so they aren't capable of attacking the assembling invasion forces.

Well then Sea Lion is in a bind is it not, for surely the suppression of Bomber and Coastal Command and FAA assets was the point to which the attack on Fighter Command was merely a preliminary exercise?
 

SsgtC

Banned
Supremacy - a degree of superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Superiority - a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.
As @RodentRevolution said, the Luftwaffe achieved neither of these. The RAF could conduct operations over the Channel at will if they so chose. They made a strategic decision instead to engage only over the UK in order to preserve their assets (both planes and pilots). However, when called upon to operate over the Channel, the RAF did. And did so effectively.
 
I think there has always been some confusion over the issue of what constitutes air supremacy and air superiority, definitions of both are below:

Supremacy - a degree of superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Superiority - a degree of dominance in an air battle that permits the conduct of operations by one side and it's related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces.

I think what you are describing is supremacy rather than superiority.

You should pay close attention to Neptune/Overlord and Operation Forager. In the case of Overlord, the British insisted on aerial supremacy and I believe rightly, because the risks of even minimal LW aerial opposition to disrupting the assault waves was justified. Unloading and the run into the beach is the most dangerous phase of an amphibious operation, when the troops are exceptionally vulnerable. Operation Forager is all the more remarkable, because Japanese airpower in the Mariana Islands was not completely suppressed nor was naval opposition eliminated as in Overlord. Spruance had his hands full beating off air attacks, fighting a naval battle and acting as bait for Japanese airpower to keep Japanese AVIATION off the Marines' necks. He eventually achieved aerial supremacy, but he had to fight for it while the landings went in. THAT was how risky Forager was, and it marks him as possibly America's greatest admiral that he planned and fought that action so well.

It is why I think Sea Lion had about as much chance as invading Mars for the Germans in 1940. They had no clue as to what can go horribly wrong in the offload and movement to shore phase in the face of an intact air-sea defense such as the British planned.
 
it may have been considered an obsolete concept but have always felt the WWI FL-Boat should have been revived https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FL-boat for shore batteries and carried on ships (not suggesting as substitute for torpedoes)

Problem is, they could only do 30 knots. That makes it essentially useless against anything other than very slow moving targets like cargo ships. Against a warship, it's got almost no chance at all. Not to mention, it's significantly bigger, heavier and slower than a torpedo for not that much more of a bang

2.5 times the range and payload and comparable speed of German torpedo using WWI specs? assume the KM would be able to shrink dimensions of the boat, their Kleinstschnellboot Projekt (a shrunken S-boat) was approx. 3/4 size of FL-Boat and est. 47 knots.
 
Last edited:
just for arguments sake, lets say that the Germans manage to break through the lines at Dunkirk and the great evacuation doesn't happen, and all those men are lost (which in itself is a kinda hard POD, but whatever). What does the UK have at home right afterwards to defend the island? In OTL, the UK famously lost all the equipment but saved the men to fight another day... without those men, what forces are there?
 
just for arguments sake, lets say that the Germans manage to break through the lines at Dunkirk and the great evacuation doesn't happen, and all those men are lost (which in itself is a kinda hard POD, but whatever). What does the UK have at home right afterwards to defend the island? In OTL, the UK famously lost all the equipment but saved the men to fight another day... without those men, what forces are there?

Here.

Based on what I see there: at least 10 division equipment sets by August. Plus in an emergency the US and Canada can empty their stocks and send another 7 division stocks within 2 weeks. By September, Sea Lion looks like a doomed effort, even if the Germans struggle ashore.
 
Here.

Based on what I see there: at least 10 division equipment sets by August. Plus in an emergency the US and Canada can empty their stocks and send another 7 division stocks within 2 weeks. By September, Sea Lion looks like a doomed effort, even if the Germans struggle ashore.
okay, but another question is just how many men were available if all those at Dunkirk had been lost... it seems that equipment was kinda tight at first, but more became available pretty fast...
 
How long was basic infantry training in the British army? To stand up a US WW II army division took 1 year. In an emergency, maybe 6 months. How fast could a command cadre organize a British equivalent if the pressure is on? 3 months?

Plus the British are standing up units during the Battle of France and training as fast as they can anyway, so I think they would be equipping units as they produce the stuff.
 
Last edited:
Assuming few men got home from Dunkirk it would be tight but activating the Home Guard plus what those troops still in England together with those who got back wouldn't be an inconsiderable number. Unless the Germans get a lot more men ashore than I believe they will there should be enough to keep the beachhead contained until more help can arrive.

The only chance the Germans really had was to jump the channel just after France surrendered, and they needed much time to prepare. And this time wasn't going to waste on the UK side of the channel...
 
Assuming few men got home from Dunkirk it would be tight but activating the Home Guard plus what those troops still in England together with those who got back wouldn't be an inconsiderable number. Unless the Germans get a lot more men ashore than I believe they will there should be enough to keep the beachhead contained until more help can arrive.

The only chance the Germans really had was to jump the channel just after France surrendered, and they needed much time to prepare. And this time wasn't going to waste on the UK side of the channel...
that's kinda what I was thinking... the only way the Germans could do it would be to invade immediately after France fell, and I don't see that happening, since their forces would have to rest and refit after that major campaign... time the UK could use to rearm pretty fast...
 
Assuming a total loss at Dunkirk, which I think is unlikely, there's going to be a long-term hit to the British army that shouldn't be underestimated in terms of the loss of professional NCOs and officers. New recruits can be trained. New soldiers with 10 years' experience, not so much, by definition.

That said, the British army on the continent was not large. There should be a hint in this for how we look at Sea Lion. I wonder why the British didn't bother to invest in a large army. It's almost like they didn't consider their army their main line of defence...

The bigger question is what might happen politically in the event of the total loss. Maybe if that happens and France falls rapidly, you set up a political crisis in Britain that leads to a new government that opens peace talks with Germany. Before I get shouted down, I don't think that's the most likely outcome, but at least there's a plausible alternative pathway there. There isn't by September in our timeline.

And the Germans can't invade "immediately after the fall of France" for the simple reason that they don't have the sealift capacity organized. Hence the need for improvisation, hence Sea Lion.

If you rewind back and have the Germans spend years developing a credible amphibious force -- and we've gone down this road before -- then the British will respond by increasing their naval assets in the Channel, increasing their fixed fortifications in England, and standing up and keeping at home a much larger army for defensive purposes. Then, the loss of the expeditionary force in France still won't help the Germans.
 
Last edited:
that's kinda what I was thinking... the only way the Germans could do it would be to invade immediately after France fell, and I don't see that happening, since their forces would have to rest and refit after that major campaign... time the UK could use to rearm pretty fast...

Something brought out in RAILS AT WAR (an excellent book on railways in wartime) was that the one thing France did right was wreck their rail system as they retreated. Thus there was much rebuilding that had to take place before the system was back on-line. This helped delay Eagle Day...

[Quote="DaveBC]And the Germans can't invade "immediately after the fall of France" for the simple reason that they don't have the sealift capacity organized. Hence the need for improvisation, hence Sea Lion.[/QUOTE]

This exactly. Even seizing French fishing vessels and any other ship they could wouldn't help much...
 
Even if they lose every man and piece of equipment from Dunkirk, that still leaves around 12 divisions worth of troops ( more units existed but I'm allowing for most being under strength ) plus the Home guard in the UK. They have 250 tanks ( more if you include training vehicles etc) and a minimum of 600 mobile artillery pieces with UK production of over 100 artillery pieces and 130 tanks per month ( and would be importing everything they could ). With hindsight , the window for Sea lion is illusionary even if the German's teleport the first wave, the invasion panic was just that , panic.
 
Top