Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

Fair enough, I just looked at the facts, Dover abandoned as a Destroyer base, convoys not permitted through the straights of Dover, the fact that the Luftwaffe could put 500-600 Bf109s into the air, fly to Dover and return before a couple of dozen British fighters could intercept and the fact that Fighter Command standing orders said that combat over the sea should be avoided at all costs. To me that adds up to the Luftwaffe having air supremacy over that part of the Channel at least. Obviously you know better and I'd be more than interested to read the source you have that says my assumptions are wrong.

You mean like German Plans for the Invasion of England which draws from among other the German Naval War Diaries and has been linked twice in this thread already. An example of the Navy's appreciation of the Battle of Britain can be found in part 56 (on page 53 in text).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Here.

and

here.



Want to add, that the landward pressure was the reason the Russians evacuated. The troops on the islands had to skedaddle or lose not only the island garrisons, but the bulk of their forces defending Riga. (See Map.)
First :
Your quoted sources : one is a copy-n-paste of the other, therefore (if at all) only one arguement

Second :
What's described as been necessary to be retried 3 times is just a part, one objective under many, that neede 3 attempts to be achieved, what it was.

The operation as a whole was a full success.

Also :
your imaginated "landward pressure", that forced the russians : german troops were somewhere between 150 and 100 kilometers away from the russian lines or retreat in midth october 1917
 

SsgtC

Banned
the fact that Fighter Command standing orders said that combat over the sea should be avoided at all costs.
Fighter Command had a very specific reason for that order, and it had nothing to do with the Germans having air superiority. Goering would have loved nothing more than to engage the RAF over the Channel. In fact that was his plan. But the British realised that. They also realized WHY it was his plan. If a British plane was shot down over the English Channel, then there RAF lost both the plane AND the pilot. If that same plane and pilot are shot down over land in the UK however, they only lose the plane and the pilot could be back up in another one later that same day (ideally, and assuming no injuries during bail out). In short, the whole point in forbidding combat above the Channel was too preserve their trained manpower and not let the Luftwaffe attrite it away
 
Fighter Command had a very specific reason for that order, and it had nothing to do with the Germans having air superiority. Goering would have loved nothing more than to engage the RAF over the Channel. In fact that was his plan. But the British realised that. They also realized WHY it was his plan. If a British plane was shot down over the English Channel, then there RAF lost both the plane AND the pilot. If that same plane and pilot are shot down over land in the UK however, they only lose the plane and the pilot could be back up in another one later that same day (ideally, and assuming no injuries during bail out). In short, the whole point in forbidding combat above the Channel was too preserve their trained manpower and not let the Luftwaffe attrite it away
And of course that order would have been rescinded during the few days that Sealion would last.
 
I have a cunning plan for the invasion of Iceland. Drawing on Clancy and Dowery above as much as Baldrick.

The date is a week or so before Operation Weserbung. A cruise liner is scheduled to sail from Stockholm (or Helsinki?) to Boston with a large party of Swedish (Finnish) students and other young people. Of course, the ship that leaves the Baltic is a similar liner carrying a mix of German infantry, Brandenburgers, combat engineers and women auxiliaries (Admin and communications personnel plus maybe prize specimens of the League of German Maidens - likely to become ex-maidens by the end of the voyage gf course). This ship is passed through by the RN Northern Patrol as being harmless.

As it passes close to Iceland, it claims to have developed engine trouble and has to seek permission to dock at Reykjavik. When this happens, naturally the combat troops seize control, as the British did later. The engineers, with the assistance of conscript labour, develop the airfields to take Fw-200 LMP aircraft that can fly there once Norway is conquered. Supplies - some on the liner, others on ships that sneak out of Germany pretending to be Norwegian, again before Weserbung is launched. Also delivered by submarines, who will have Iceland as a safe haven. And by Ju-52 with special long range fuel tanks - what do you mean these don't exist, Germany can improvise them within days if need be!

Between the seizure and Fall of France the UK clearly won't have the resources to liberate/conquer Iceland itself. And after the Fall of France it will be too busy negotiating aq peace settlement, won't it? I mean, what could possibly go wrong?

I can think of a few things but I'm sure others will have even better objections to this "strategy".
 
Absent landing craft and supplies to sustain a serious assault, surely the "window" for any invasion of Iceland at least begins to close in April 1940 and is fully closed by June 1940.

Invading Iceland is a non-starter for the reasons already discussed. Too far by sea, insufficient airfields.
 
You know you're right. I don't even know why any military in the world even bothers with Supply Officers or Quartermaster Corps. Just wing it! It'll work out. Who needs to plan this stuff out anyway?

The 1940 armies in Europe did not have the US Marine Corps sitting around. They were continental armies that, when confronted with amphibious problems such as Sealion or Norway, worked with improvised solutions using existing army units and existing equipment.
 
First :
Your quoted sources : one is a copy-n-paste of the other, therefore (if at all) only one argument;

That is sophistry and not refutation.

Second :
What's described as been necessary to be retried 3 times is just a part, one objective under many, that neede 3 attempts to be achieved, what it was.

The operation as a whole was a full success.

It was a success on the third try and after the Germans had their version of Gallipoli at sea.^1

Reiterated.

Also :
your imaginated "landward pressure", that forced the russians : german troops were somewhere between 150 and 100 kilometers away from the russian lines or retreat in midth october 1917

Ahm.... The Russians retreated rather than be cut off by the closing German armies on the landward side who were close enough to cut them off (100-150 km is nothing for determined infantry in rotten weather as any student of the American Civil War or the Korea Police Action can tell you.), which is more than the Germans ever did when the Russians did it to them...

... at Stalingrad.

^1 If Project MUSE is not your bag, try WorldCat.
 
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Between the seizure and Fall of France the UK clearly won't have the resources to liberate/conquer Iceland itself. And after the Fall of France it will be too busy negotiating aq peace settlement, won't it? I mean, what could possibly go wrong?

I can think of a few things but I'm sure others will have even better objections to this "strategy".

You mean other than the fact that this was precisely the period during which the British DID conquer Iceland in our timeline?

Beyond that, you're probably right. The trick is to think of it as just a really wide river crossing.
 
You mean other than the fact that this was precisely the period during which the British DID conquer Iceland in our timeline?

Beyond that, you're probably right. The trick is to think of it as just a really wide river crossing.
While my cunning plan isn't really meant to be taken seriously, the German occupation is intended to happen before the occupation of Denmark and invasion of Norway.

So the British will be too late to prevent it and need a much greater force than iOTL.

Clearly they might still find that and there are other serious flaws with it. It's probably ASB for them to think of it,!

But it shows that to put more pressure on the UK than they did, Germany needs some preparations earlier than July 1940.
 
While my cunning plan isn't really meant to be taken seriously, the German occupation is intended to happen before the occupation of Denmark and invasion of Norway.

Ingenious. Once Iceland is in German hands, the French and British will be surrounded and fighting a war on two fronts!

Or at least, they will until Britain simply interdicts any further shipping to Iceland.

They sent 800-odd Marines that spring and the 2nd Canadian Division in the summer. The first expedition had four cruisers and two destroyers. How much more can it take to defeat a German force that has no supplies and no reinforcements?

Anyhow, I agree, this is a distraction. We've gone from wondering whether Sea Lion is feasible to wondering if the Germans should invade Iceland instead. This is worse than the Isle of Wight.
 
I wish someone would make a thread about Sealion in a Nazi Cold War scenario, when they'd have time to prepare, that would be really interesting. I feel like anti-ship missiles are needed for Sealion to be at all contemplated as the Nazis aren't going to outproduce the British in warships. Simplistically in terms of naval warfare strategy, the Germans either need to get a lot of warships from out of nowhere, or get the means to wage asymmetric warfare in their absence which basically seems to mean anti-ship missiles or advanced mines, 'advanced' weapons tech, no way around it. Asymmetric warfare as pertains to navies at this point was reduced to things like the battle of the Atlantic. Not particularly helpful for Sealion.
 
I wish someone would make a thread about Sealion in a Nazi Cold War scenario, when they'd have time to prepare, that would be really interesting. I feel like anti-ship missiles are needed for Sealion to be at all contemplated as the Nazis aren't going to outproduce the British in warships. Simplistically in terms of naval warfare strategy, the Germans either need to get a lot of warships from out of nowhere, or get the means to wage asymmetric warfare in their absence which basically seems to mean anti-ship missiles or advanced mines, 'advanced' weapons tech, no way around it. Asymmetric warfare as pertains to navies at this point was reduced to things like the battle of the Atlantic. Not particularly helpful for Sealion.

I'd love to see a thread like that, too. Sealion 1950 would be very interesting (if you handwave away nukes on both side).

(CalBear's AANW already covers the opposite scenario, US/UK invading the Reich, very nicely, of course.)
 
I feel like anti-ship missiles are needed for Sealion to be at all contemplated as the Nazis aren't going to outproduce the British in warships. Simplistically in terms of naval warfare strategy, the Germans either need to get a lot of warships from out of nowhere, or get the means to wage asymmetric warfare in their absence which basically seems to mean anti-ship missiles or advanced mines, 'advanced' weapons tech, no way around it. Asymmetric warfare as pertains to navies at this point was reduced to things like the battle of the Atlantic. Not particularly helpful for Sealion.

Asymmetric warfare is a working wake homing torpedo. And that you can [barely] do with the technology of the day. It would be devastating in its efficacy.

the KM was too busy trying to raise the High Seas Fleet from the bottom of Scapa Flow to consider asymmetrical warfare!

my suggestion(s) in this thread have centered around S-boat improvements as it was not a pre-war red flag for British, and post-war German ships have been (basically) enlarged wartime models. they were pressed into service as minelayers but carried only 6 -8 vs. immediate post-war version that could carry over 20.

it may have been considered an obsolete concept but have always felt the WWI FL-Boat should have been revived https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FL-boat for shore batteries and carried on ships (not suggesting as substitute for torpedoes)
 

SsgtC

Banned
it may have been considered an obsolete concept but have always felt the WWI FL-Boat should have been revived https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FL-boat for shore batteries and carried on ships (not suggesting as substitute for torpedoes)
Problem is, they could only do 30 knots. That makes it essentially useless against anything other than very slow moving targets like cargo ships. Against a warship, it's got almost no chance at all. Not to mention, it's significantly bigger, heavier and slower than a torpedo for not that much more of a bang
 
You mean like German Plans for the Invasion of England which draws from among other the German Naval War Diaries and has been linked twice in this thread already. An example of the Navy's appreciation of the Battle of Britain can be found in part 56 (on page 53 in text).
It's a great document yes, one that I've read and reread many times over the years. What the navy required was total air supremacy to the point where not even RAF recon aircraft were able to take to the skies and that the Channel was so dominated by the Luftwaffe that RN light forces were not able to operate. This is a long way from localised air superiority over the Channel, something the Luftwaffe did achieve.
 
Fighter Command had a very specific reason for that order, and it had nothing to do with the Germans having air superiority. Goering would have loved nothing more than to engage the RAF over the Channel. In fact that was his plan. But the British realised that. They also realized WHY it was his plan. If a British plane was shot down over the English Channel, then there RAF lost both the plane AND the pilot. If that same plane and pilot are shot down over land in the UK however, they only lose the plane and the pilot could be back up in another one later that same day (ideally, and assuming no injuries during bail out). In short, the whole point in forbidding combat above the Channel was too preserve their trained manpower and not let the Luftwaffe attrite it away
No you're right it had nothing to do with air superiority, however the order was issued as a result of unacceptable and unnecessary losses inflicted whilst fighting over open water. My point was that Fighter Command was willing to withdraw from air battles over the Channel giving the Luftwaffe almost free reign over the seas, that in my book means the Luftwaffe have air superiority over the Channel.
 
No you're right it had nothing to do with air superiority, however the order was issued as a result of unacceptable and unnecessary losses inflicted whilst fighting over open water. My point was that Fighter Command was willing to withdraw from air battles over the Channel giving the Luftwaffe almost free reign over the seas, that in my book means the Luftwaffe have air superiority over the Channel.

But so what? This superiority comes from a concious choice, rather than from fundamental inability. Given the stated context of an actual invasion attempt, it's hardly unreasonable to expect that choice to change.
 
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