Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

Just as a paper exercise... I wanted to see what a ridiculous invasion of Iceland would look like.

Start planning assumptions.

1. Theoretical enemy has disputed command of the sea but cannot interdict by air.
2. Range (one way) 2,400 miles or about 4,025 km).
3. Origin point is metropolitan country A to Iceland.

Means of initial transport. By air. (Flying Boat.)

Means of sustainment, by sea. (You'll love this; cargo sub.)

Iceland is to be invaded in regimental strength (about 2,400 paratroopers).

Assuming 2 weeks beans, bullets and gas. (1 tonne per man, including the man.) and the delivery vehicle; (Douglas DF flying boat, cargo capacity 8 tonnes or 1 equipped [light weapons only] platoon of Paramarines, ferry range one way 5000km), one needs for the initial lift:

120 seaplanes (Douglas DF)

Assuming typical 25% operational losses (accidents and other events), one has to cross-load and plan for the arriving force to lose about 20-30% of their equipment and men, including such vitals items as radios, jeeps, shelters, ammunition, weapons, rations, and the commanders. Hence why all this stuff has to be broken down and distributed across the entire lift in 120 sub-units so that one or two seaplanes does not carry all of the radios for example.

Then there is sustainment.

The USS Nautilus (Narwhal class) 4000 tonne submarine has a cargo capacity (optimistic) of about 20 tonnes. Configured as a pure cargo sub... maybe 50 tonnes. There is your cargo sub. How many to sustain your "garrison"? (2000 tonnes every two weeks?) Minimum of 20 such boats with a need to replace 2 boats (10% losses) every 2 months.*

*You probably need another 15 boats just to maintain ops resupply tempo because some of them (about 30% at any given time) will need extensive refit and repair every two "patrols" or supply runs.

Now that is the US doing it the hard way from Maine... without serious opposition.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
... - airfields. Iceland in 1940 might have had about 1 very small airfield.
Akureyri airport : first scheduled air travel 1928
Reykjavik airport : first flight from there 1919, regular airline operations from 1938 onwards

Other than that : in many locations "all" you need to create an "ad hoc" airfield is a couple (okay 4 would be better, not too much of a cargo for a cargo ship, I'd assume) of bulldozers or similar (plus radio-equipment for operation).
Doesn't seem to be too difficult without military opposition in a few days.

Though ... ofc the James Bonds of ITTL would also already months if not years ahead "smell" it and proper countermeasures would be taken well in time ... as well as with the invasion of Norway.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
...
The USS Nautilus (Narwhal class) 4000 tonne submarine has a cargo capacity (optimistic) of about 20 tonnes. Configured as a pure cargo sub... maybe 50 tonnes.
...
Lil' reminder :
cargo capacity of the cargo/trade sub "Deutschland" in 1916 : 750 tons.

In an ATL, with some thinking/planning ahead, that includes the possible operation where submarine logistic support might be wanted, I could well imagine a sub planned and a prototyp built in maybe 1937/38, that at least matches the capacities of the Deutschland sub of 1916.
Perhaps not even built by the KW but some "private enterpreneurs" for transport trials or research under the arctic ice ? This wouldn't even need any military involment at all. Ideas of trade subs under the ice are still popping almost regularly up and did so frequently after WW 1.
Then it might be possible even earlier ... the prototyp as an (almost) fully private enterprise.

Btw. : the link you provide for the class XX-subs talkes of 50 tons cargo inside the pressure hull. ... but nothing of its full capacity including stuff carried outside the prssure hull, inside the outer hull (i.e. liquids ... like ... gas ??, Diesel ??, etc.)
 
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Not inside the pressure hull. Fuel may be carried "wet" but other cargo (electronics for example; radars) used by troops cannot be. Also combat equipment tends to be bulky and not dense, not counting ammunition and the fuel.

As for cans on the strongback (discussed this elsewhere), They leaked. Want the dry goods ruined? These aren't dyes and pharmaceuticals. These are things like bullets that don't like seawater.
 
It is my understanding that Germany cannot "win" in the sense that it's normally meant. If the RAF gets chewed too badly, well they pull back out of range of German aircraft to refit and regroup. We'll assume that the Blitz never happens, but still, once the German troops start showing up, the RAF WILL be back.
1) RAF - as others have pointed out, it's bit of an issue == if the RAF start to loose big they can pull back . however Luftwaffe COULD have taken down Chain Home transmitters (and stuck to bombing RAF airfields) .. so a surprise dawn landing would be possible, maybe even with local air superiority ..
Donitz suggested narrowing the front to pretty much just the area right across from Calais, and any player character would probably do well to heed his warnings. I imagine the Luftwaffe maybe getting the upperhand (though not total Air Supremacy since the RAF can always retreat out of range) in Britain after a year of focused attacks on Fighter Command, but the Germans will never get Naval Superiority let alone Supremacy.

There is always mention of Fighter Command being able to “Pull back” or retreat if the going got tough but I’d be fascinated to know what peoples definition of retreat is. Where would the squadrons be stationed, how far do they retreat, what kind of defence could they offer?

If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.

The Navy would not have been gutted, even by a catastrophic failure of Dynamo. They would have lost some forty destroyers and a cruiser, and maybe some auxiliaries. Even the RAF would not be gutted by catastrophic losses. Yes, it would hurt, but not enough to cause an invasion. I believe only 14 squadrons of aircraft were committed.

Just a quick look through the Fighter Command claims shows that there were at least 41 squadrons posting claims during the Battle of France and Dunkirk including a Defiant and two Blenheim squadrons. This total obviously doesn't include those squadrons sent out on patrol that made no contact with the enemy. I can’t off hand remember but I believe there was less than a handful of the available Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons that did not take part in some way or another.
 
If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.

So basically they would be reduced to covering the Channel about as effectively as the German fighter force and of course Bomber and Coastal Command stations with increasing effectiveness the further north you fly.
 
So basically they would be reduced to covering the Channel about as effectively as the German fighter force and of course Bomber and Coastal Command stations with increasing effectiveness the further north you fly.
Not really... The Germans already had effective air supremacy over large parts of the Channel from the end of July 1940, the straights of Dover are at extreme range for fighters stationed at Coltishall and out of range for those at Wittering. Filton would still be able to send fighters to Portsmouth and surroundings however. As far as I'm aware Bomber Command had no airfields in the south of England but Coastal Command and the FAA did.
 
Not really... The Germans already had effective air supremacy over large parts of the Channel from the end of July 1940, the straights of Dover are at extreme range for fighters stationed at Coltishall and out of range for those at Wittering. Filton would still be able to send fighters to Portsmouth and surroundings however. As far as I'm aware Bomber Command had no airfields in the south of England but Coastal Command and the FAA did.

Yes really... contrary to the notion of effective air supremacy the Kriegsmarine were pissed at the Luftwaffe for failing in their eyes to support the Sea Lion mission at all. If enemy air is preventing your Navy from carrying out its mission that is ergo not air supremacy.
 
There is always mention of Fighter Command being able to “Pull back” or retreat if the going got tough but I’d be fascinated to know what peoples definition of retreat is. Where would the squadrons be stationed, how far do they retreat, what kind of defence could they offer?

If the aim is to withdraw out of effective range of the Bf109 then Fighter Command is left to operate from a line north of Filton/Colerne, Wittering and Coltishall.
.
I believe the effective combat range of the Me109 was London and the Thames. Airfields like Duxford, Debden, North Weald etc. could be (and were) bombed but weren't as vulnerable as those south of the Thames. With mobile radar stations on the North Downs, plus the ROC, Fighter Command would have remained an operational force able to contest airspace over the Channel and escort bomber missions over the beaches or littoral. Not sure how many targets the RN would have left them though by Day 3.
 
Yes really... contrary to the notion of effective air supremacy the Kriegsmarine were pissed at the Luftwaffe for failing in their eyes to support the Sea Lion mission at all. If enemy air is preventing your Navy from carrying out its mission that is ergo not air supremacy.
Fair enough, I just looked at the facts, Dover abandoned as a Destroyer base, convoys not permitted through the straights of Dover, the fact that the Luftwaffe could put 500-600 Bf109s into the air, fly to Dover and return before a couple of dozen British fighters could intercept and the fact that Fighter Command standing orders said that combat over the sea should be avoided at all costs. To me that adds up to the Luftwaffe having air supremacy over that part of the Channel at least. Obviously you know better and I'd be more than interested to read the source you have that says my assumptions are wrong.
 
I believe the effective combat range of the Me109 was London and the Thames. Airfields like Duxford, Debden, North Weald etc. could be (and were) bombed but weren't as vulnerable as those south of the Thames. With mobile radar stations on the North Downs, plus the ROC, Fighter Command would have remained an operational force able to contest airspace over the Channel and escort bomber missions over the beaches or littoral. Not sure how many targets the RN would have left them though by Day 3.
The effective range of the Bf109 during the September attacks on London was limited by the need to take off and linger whilst the bombers formed up and by the requirement to provide a close escort to the bombers. The typical distance to central London following the path of the Thames is approximately 100 miles, the distance to Duxford, the most northerly of the airfields mentioned is 110 miles in a more direct route. Without the need for close escort or linger time for the larger bomber formations used against London this is easily within effective range.

I assumed that the withdrawal would be done to preserve, regroup and refit battered squadrons in anticipation of the expected invasion at which point the fighters would reclaim their former bases and attack, attack, attack... however there will be a couple of weeks where limited or no cover is available.
 
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