Beating a Dead Sea Mammal: How can a non-ASB Operation Sea Lion thread be created?

Never heard of previous attempts, when were they done? "Heavily supportd from the landward side" = map shows islands taken only by seaborne troops and operation 100 miles away that has no direct impact. The invasion was a successful multi-division operation involving significant land, sea, and air forces against 22,000 defenders equipped with coastal guns up to 15" calibre that did affect German doctrine. Looks like the only thing that would convince you that a successful Sealion operation could be mounted would be a successful Sealion operation - actually no, that wouldn't be enough, as probably you would say they didn't do it properly and it would have to be done again so it could be done the way you think it should be done.

McPherson is not the one moving goalposts here. Okay let us look at the above cited operation and see how it matches up to the Sea Lion prerequisites

Negligible interdiction by enemy airpower? Check
Substantial local naval superiority covering the invasion force? Check
Manageable logistic scenario? Check

Sea Lion itself was failing on all three any one of which had the power to scupper all of it by itself

But the RN didn't know that, and they said they would not put their capital ships into the channel as it was unsuitable for capital ships, unnecessary (50 cruisers and destroyers available) and too risky (plus they expected the Germans to do what was planned - send raiders into the Atlantic sea lanes as a diversion). It took most of the Home fleet plus Force H just to track down and sink one ship in May 1941 (the Bismark) and at the end of 1940 German capital ships did break out into the Atlantic. The Germans had broken the British naval code and had better radar on their capital ships (in 1940 many British ships had no radar) which is why the Scharnhorst was able to evade the British ships early in the war (later in the war the Sharnhorst got sunk because it was afraid of using its radar so it didn't know that it was being shot at until it was too late). So the Germans had to deal with the 50 or so destroyers and light cruisers - well they were scattered around England and on convoy escort duties so they weren't going to be there on S Day. Combats between the German destroyers (your figures are too low and do not include the "T" boats which were the same size as Hunt class destroyers) and the British destroyers in the Channel prior to 1942 usually were resolved in the Germans' favour, as the British destroyers had had most of their torpedoes removed (and had Mountbatten in command) - that's if the British found the German destroyers, who several times came close to the British coastline without detection. So to blockade the invaders the huge number of RN ships have to survive being shot at by channel guns (which got very close to hitting them and made them run away even when they were travelling at high speed at night), the minefields, Luftwaffe attacks, u-boat attacks, S-boat attacks, and the close-in es/corts (which were actually of similar numbers and reasonably well armed - the British called the German minesweepers "channel destroyers"). It's unlikely that the Germans would succeed but this thread is about making them succeed, and it's not impossible, just unlikely. The Germans could build more coastal ships S-boats, minesweepers, and destroyers and fewer capital ships without upsetting any treaty requirements or the British prior to the war.

You really want to be careful with your use of figures here. In 1940 total RN strength was above 50 cruisers plus above 150 destroyers. The 50 destroyers number so often cited in these debates is exclusive of the 22 destroyers assigned to convoy escort and the Western Approaches. There are also additional cruisers plus the battleship Revenge from 15 September.

As to sneaking up on the coast the initial landing required the movement of 640 barges, 215 tugs, 550 motorboats and 45 transport ships for the first wave per German Plans for the Invasion of England 1940 that I have linked previously and draws on among other sources the German Naval war diaries.

It is also worth noting that the Kriegsmarine's Western Command was not at all sanguine about the abilities of its destroyers to hold off the Royal Navy forces in the Channel instead being forced to rely mainly on mining operations which were themselves deemed insufficient (cf part 68 of the German Plans for the Invasion of England linked above). The German war diaries complain of the Royal Navy stationing its forward pickets off the Franco-Belgian coasts, hardly indicative of a situation where German destroyers utterly dominate British ones.
 
Not about to start a debate in favour but numbers must be crunched very carefully. Let's say I accept that the UK had 70+ destroyers able to intercept an invasion fleet. (Which they didn't IMHO, but that's my thing) but how many CREW was available for those destroyers? Look it up and feel as surprised as I was. Hint, it was a frighteningly low number. Cruisers,especially the lighter ones ditto. Battleships less so. Experienced crew? About half again.
Oddly that the German side often gets showered with those crew stats but never the Allies. Let's be honest. In 100 years's time when historians debate the German invasion of France they will probably shake their heads and say' We must have missed at least another 20 divisions in that attack. This could never add up' All it takes is one or two even slight mistakes or shortcomings and chaos ensues. The impossible suddenly not only becomes possible but occasionally 'fait accompli' before the protagonists are aware of it.
 
The biggest problem was no airfields. We're talking about Guadalcanal a bit. The objective of that landing was an airfield. Most amphibious landings were for airfields. Norway and Crete - airfields. Iceland in 1940 might have had about 1 very small airfield.

Plenty of airfields in the UK. British patrol planes can pretty much the whole North Sea from their home bases.
 
McPherson said:
No.



You're kidding about this?

Operation_Albion_Map.jpg


That failed twice against a disorganized mob in the middle of a civil war. Third time was the charm. Short ranged operation, heavily supported from the landward side.

Never heard of previous attempts, when were they done? "Heavily supportd from the landward side" = map shows islands taken only by seaborne troops and operation 100 miles away that has no direct impact. The invasion was a successful multi-division operation involving significant land, sea, and air forces against 22,000 defenders equipped with coastal guns up to 15" calibre that did affect German doctrine. Looks like the only thing that would convince you that a successful Sealion operation could be mounted would be a successful Sealion operation - actually no, that wouldn't be enough, as probably you would say they didn't do it properly and it would have to be done again so it could be done the way you think it should be done.

Here.

and

here.

This rare German film shows the World War I assault known as Operation Albion. This was the German land and naval operation in September–October 1917 to invade and occupy the West Estonian Archipelago, then part of the Autonomous Governorate of Estonia, Russian Republic. The land campaign opened with landings at the Tagalaht, Saaremaa on 11 October 1917, after extensive naval activity to clear mines and subdue coastal artillery batteries. The Germans secured the island by 16 October. The Russian Army evacuated Muhu on 18 October.

After two failed attempts, the Germans managed to land on Hiiumaa on the 19th and captured the island on the following day. The Russian Baltic Fleet had to withdraw from the Suur Strait after major losses (see Battle of Moon Sound). The Germans claimed 20,000 prisoners and 100 guns captured during the Operation Albion from 12 October.

Want to add, that the landward pressure was the reason the Russians evacuated. The troops on the islands had to skedaddle or lose not only the island garrisons, but the bulk of their forces defending Riga. (See Map.)
 
Not about to start a debate in favour but numbers must be crunched very carefully. Let's say I accept that the UK had 70+ destroyers able to intercept an invasion fleet. (Which they didn't IMHO, but that's my thing) but how many CREW was available for those destroyers? Look it up and feel as surprised as I was. Hint, it was a frighteningly low number. Cruisers,especially the lighter ones ditto. Battleships less so. Experienced crew? About half again.

Someone has been reading too much Forcyzk.

1. There were about 7 destroyer divisions (38-43 the numbers vary, with 65% or better manning level, which is perfectly adequate for emergency sortie and combat.) within sortie range of the expected German invasion lanes. They would be on station before the Germans laid their mine fields or were able to assemble their barge trains, an operation expected to take 2 days. The British not only had intact (WW I) coastal defense assets including railroad guns to back them, but some more modern aerial defenses. Blenheims, Wellingtons and other medium bombers, (actually a considerable force of them) for example. The Germans, in lunatic fashion, planned a night crossing of the channel. What we take away from the Taranto lesson, is that the British were good at night torpedo and bombing attacks on large stationary or slow moving floating objects. They were doing that anyway, (something that "gentlemen" like Forcyzk seem to ignore.), causing no end of problems to the poor KM scupper monkeys trying to repair all the barges the RAF tore up.

Oddly that the German side often gets showered with those crew stats but never the Allies. Let's be honest. In 100 years's time when historians debate the German invasion of France they will probably shake their heads and say' We must have missed at least another 20 divisions in that attack. This could never add up' All it takes is one or two even slight mistakes or shortcomings and chaos ensues. The impossible suddenly not only becomes possible but occasionally 'fait accompli' before the protagonists are aware of it.

2. We have Orbats. The French and Germans kept and keep good records. So do the English, or we would not have manning levels or deployment schemes. *(see above and further about poison gas, flame trenches, RAF barge raids, counter-minefields, the destroyers, and the coastal defense scheme in general.) The Russians and Barbarossa? Now that is a different story.
 
Last edited:
So, reading your post just made me think of something here. The Germans know that the RN is out in force to keep their raiders out of the Atlantic. How plausible would it be for the Germans to make ALL the outward preparations for Sealion, including actually having their soldiers embarking onto the barges, tugs, etc in order to bluff the Royal Navy into thinking the invasion is coming and pulling the fleet out of the GIUK gap to defend Britain. Thus opening a window for Germany to sortie the fleet into the Atlantic and raise pure bloody hell with the convoys?

There are force-to-space ratio problems inherent with any North Atlantic convoy raiding strategy. The best ever achieved was by the 'twins' in 1940, but nothing of the magnitude to rise to decisive strategy
 
Plenty of airfields in the UK. British patrol planes can pretty much the whole North Sea from their home bases.

I don't think you'll find the UK airfields were available for Luftwaffe usage. So German planners will have looked at what was on Iceland, seen next to nothing anywhere, and written it off as a potential invasion target on the spot. Even if there were large numbers of airfields there, there is the question of the air range of German air transport elements operating from Norway - I doubt they could fly to Iceland and return.
 

nbcman

Donor
But the RN didn't know that, and they said they would not put their capital ships into the channel as it was unsuitable for capital ships, unnecessary (50 cruisers and destroyers available) and too risky (plus they expected the Germans to do what was planned - send raiders into the Atlantic sea lanes as a diversion). It took most of the Home fleet plus Force H just to track down and sink one ship in May 1941 (the Bismark) and at the end of 1940 German capital ships did break out into the Atlantic. The Germans had broken the British naval code and had better radar on their capital ships (in 1940 many British ships had no radar) which is why the Scharnhorst was able to evade the British ships early in the war (later in the war the Sharnhorst got sunk because it was afraid of using its radar so it didn't know that it was being shot at until it was too late). So the Germans had to deal with the 50 or so destroyers and light cruisers - well they were scattered around England and on convoy escort duties so they weren't going to be there on S Day. Combats between the German destroyers (your figures are too low and do not include the "T" boats which were the same size as Hunt class destroyers) and the British destroyers in the Channel prior to 1942 usually were resolved in the Germans' favour, as the British destroyers had had most of their torpedoes removed (and had Mountbatten in command) - that's if the British found the German destroyers, who several times came close to the British coastline without detection. So to blockade the invaders the huge number of RN ships have to survive being shot at by channel guns (which got very close to hitting them and made them run away even when they were travelling at high speed at night), the minefields, Luftwaffe attacks, u-boat attacks, S-boat attacks, and the close-in escorts (which were actually of similar numbers and reasonably well armed - the British called the German minesweepers "channel destroyers"). It's unlikely that the Germans would succeed but this thread is about making them succeed, and it's not impossible, just unlikely. The Germans could build more coastal ships S-boats, minesweepers, and destroyers and fewer capital ships without upsetting any treaty requirements or the British prior to the war.

My post was in response to a proposal for sending the KM out to raid in the Atlantic in lieu of USM. The Type 35 Torpedo boats don't have the range to be used as a raider as they barely have range to sail one way to Iceland (2200 km range, 2100 km Kiel to Reyjavik)-nor were any of these available until June 1940 or thereafter.

Torpedo Boats
T.1 (Kptlt Hansfrieder Rost, Kptlt Carl Aug Richter-Oldekop from Sep) 1st Fl, working up until Oct 40.
T.2 (Kptlt Niels Batge, Kptlt Heinrich Godecke from Sep) 1st Fl, working up until Jun
T.3 (Kptlt Heinrich Bruns) 1st Fl, working up until Jul
T.4 (Kptlt Erwin Hesse) 1st Fl, working up until Oct
T.5 (Kptlt Rudolf Koppenhagen) 2nd Fl, working up until Jun
T.6 (Kptlt Ralf-Reiman Wolfram) 2nd Fl, working up until Jul
T.7 (Kptlt Wolfgang Erhardt) 2nd Fl, working up until Jul
T.8 (Kptlt Heinrich Erdmann) 2nd Fl, working up until Jun
T.9 (Kptlt Hans Blose) 1st Fl, working up until Aug
T.10 (Kptlt Aug Hoepner) 1st Fl, working up until Sep
T.11 (Kptlt Heinrich Hoffman) 2nd Fl, working up until Jul
T.12 (Kptlt Viktor Mellin) to comp 3 Jul, to join 2nd Fl, working up comp Sep
 
Plenty of airfields in the UK. British patrol planes can pretty much the whole North Sea from their home bases.

WE SHALL FIGHT ON THE BEACHES: DEFYING NAPOLEON AND HITLER 1805 and 1940 by Brian Lavery includes a map of Coastal Command flights over Europe and Norway during this period. Between these flights, any other aircraft over the Channel and any ships/subs/convoys in the Channel (not to mention Resistance members with radios watching the ports) there is absolutely ZERO chance of any invasion force departing without being noticed. And such notice might be as much as 48 hours in advance depending on the source.

As much as I would like to see Sea Lion it just isn't going to happen, it will be stopped.
 
Someone has been reading too much Forcyzk.

1. There were about 7 destroyer divisions (38-43 the numbers vary, with 65% or better manning level, which is perfectly adequate for emergency sortie and combat.) within sortie range of the expected German invasion lanes. They would be on station before the Germans laid their mine fields or were able to assemble their barge trains, an operation expected to take 2 days. The British not only had intact (WW I) coastal defense assets including railroad guns to back them, but some more modern aerial defenses. Blenheims, Wellingtons and other medium bombers, (actually a considerable force of them) for example. The Germans, in lunatic fashion, planned a night crossing of the channel. What we take away from the Taranto lesson, is that the British were good at night torpedo and bombing attacks on large stationary or slow moving floating objects. They were doing that anyway, (something that "gentlemen" like Forcyzk seem to ignore.), causing no end of problems to the poor KM scupper monkeys trying to repair all the barges the RAF tore up.



2. We have Orbats. The French and Germans kept and keep good records. So do the English, or we would not have manning levels or deployment schemes. *(see above and further about poison gas, flame trenches, RAF barge raids, counter-minefields, the destroyers, and the coastal defense scheme in general.) The Russians and Barbarossa? Now that is a different story.

In fact I've never read Forzyck's book on Sealion. If it is as good as his Case Red book on the campaign in France I will however. Your comments are a bit biased aren't they? Your first statement to an operational status is 'They would be on station...' that's your first mistake. You cannot even presume that they would be anywhere near where they were supposed to be until it actually happens. Way too many variables, not in the least the abysmal communication and command structure of the British armed forces in general during that period. And that sir, is a proven fact if you just look at the campaign in France. All the British so far managed was to throw penny packets of uncoordinated troops in ultimately futile attempts to stem the German advance. Do you have any indication that suddenly it would be otherwise? 'Intact WWI coastal defence assets' and 'modern aerial defences' is your next. Try to figure it out for yourself. Let me give you a hint. Take a look at the much more formidable Maginot Line and in fact ALL of the other defensive structures in France. Compare those seemingly all- telling orbats and come to the same conclusion as I did 20-30 years ago, that they are but vague indications of what is at best possible, not even plausible. Not facts. Describing the German plan as 'lunatic' shows your colours. Poor scupper monkeys only enhances that. History should be studied with passion not bias. What I learned from the Taranto action is that it is not a good idea to assemble all your magnificent floating assets in one place without adequate cover. Would I dare draw a parallel with what COULD happen in the Channel? Absolutely not. 'They were good on torpedo and BOMBING ATTACKS on large stationary or slow moving objects'. Correct me if I'm wrong but I think not a single bomb hit a ship? If I'm right however you whole statement becomes simply hot air and only because you couldn't simply state that the torpedo attacks were indeed successful. I'm not stepping into fantasy realms of possible poison gas use, flame trenches, counter- mine fields? and such.
 
I can do sortie rates, time to warm up boilers, and calculate simple things like steaming times from various ports. Maybe a little rusty, but given the 24 hours notice that the Germans are trying to assemble barge trains and lay minefields (air-recon and a rather large air battle that would be in progress.) and the fact it takes time to concentrate from Ostend to Calais, (The Germans estimated 2 days, but figure at 2 knots more like NEVER.) the RN will be sinking minelayers and chomping to get at the German barge trains within 24 hours of first sortie warnings.

WW1NavyBritish-ShipbuildingMapBritishIsles2.GIF


As you can tell. (I believe in maps.)

Not to mention that the British are on home ground, that their telecom system was first rate and that the British comms foulups in France were FRENCH engendered and not British.

Sorry, but your case is just not valid. Never has been.

P.S. You might try to look at the WW I (1908) defenses of Manila Bay and the US Coast Defense that operated there. It took the Japanese 2 months to reduce them. That was with them enjoying air supremacy and siege artillery of their own. Germans are going to be slaughtered if they try Sea Lion based on your erroneous assumptions.
 
Last edited:
I can do sortie rates, time to warm up boilers, and calculate simple things like steaming times from various ports. Maybe a little rusty, but given the 24 hours notice that the Germans are trying to assemble barge trains and lay minefields (air-recon and a rather large air battle that would be in progress.) and the fact it takes time to concentrate from Ostend to Calais, (The Germans estimated 2 days, but figure at 2 knots more like NEVER.) the RN will be sinking minelayers and chomping to get at the German barge trains within 24 hours of first sortie warnings.

WW1NavyBritish-ShipbuildingMapBritishIsles2.GIF


As you can tell. (I believe in maps.)

Not to mention that the British are on home ground, that their telecom system was first rate and that the British comms foulups in France were FRENCH engendered and not British.

Sorry, but your case is just not valid. Never has been.

P.S. You might try to look at the WW I (1908) defenses of Manila Bay and the US Coast Defense that operated there. It took the Japanese 2 months to reduce them. That was with them enjoying air supremacy and siege artillery of their own. Germans are going to be slaughtered if they try Sea Lion based on your erroneous assumptions.

Sir, I'll make an exception and try to explain it to you. I'm not the one making assumptions. I'm the one telling you NOT to make assumptions. Not based on paper orbats or maps. PLease read my original post again.
 
the UK invaded on the morning of 10 May 1940. The initial force of 746 British Royal Marines commanded by Colonel Robert Sturges disembarked at the capital Reykjavík. Meeting no resistance, the troops moved quickly to disable communication networks, secure strategic locations, and arrest German citizens. Requisitioning local transport, the troops moved to Hvalfjörður, Kaldaðarnes, Sandskeið, and Akranes to secure landing areas against the possibility of a German counterattack.

I was curious to see what SsgtC's professional opinion would be on 746 Royal Marines going up against the 15,000 (or whatever) troops thought to be on Iceland, should some German invasion actually get ashore.
 

SsgtC

Banned
I was curious to see what SsgtC's professional opinion would be on 746 Royal Marines going up against the 15,000 (or whatever) troops thought to be on Iceland, should some German invasion actually get ashore.
Well, seeing as in August of 1940 a Royal Marine Division was formed, I highly doubt that 746 Marines was the total number of Marines available to take Iceland back. At any rate, you can't seriously believe that the UK would send a single battalion to take back Iceland knowing that it's under heavy occupation. That's what they sent IOTL because the island was undefended.
 
Primarily a lack of effective guided munitions. Ships have transmitters that are powerful enough to jam the control signal.

And hitting a moving target is a hell of a job unless you've got the practice.


Submarines was mostly a numbers and effectiveness of escorts problem.

I would tend to agree here. PGM would really make this into an absolute slaughter house, but in their absence what happened in the 1974 Sealion wargame is a pretty good indication of how spectacularly bad I would expect the German air force to do.
 
Last edited:
Well, seeing as in August of 1940 a Royal Marine Division was formed, I highly doubt that 746 Marines was the total number of Marines available to take Iceland back. At any rate, you can't seriously believe that the UK would send a single battalion to take back Iceland knowing that it's under heavy occupation. That's what they sent IOTL because the island was undefended.

So in your professional opinion 746 is not sufficient against an estimated garrison of lets call it 25,000 for no reason. No surprise there. Therefore the British have two choices. Either wait until they have properly trained and equipped amphibious forces in the numbers required, (let's say 50,000), or they improvise on the fly with regular infantry divisions supplementing their marines and go in with what they have available.
 

SsgtC

Banned
So in your professional opinion 746 is not sufficient against an estimated garrison of lets call it 25,000 for no reason. No surprise there. Therefore the British have two choices. Either wait until they have properly trained and equipped amphibious forces in the numbers required, (let's say 50,000), or they improvise on the fly with regular infantry divisions supplementing their marines and go in with what they have available.
No. They use the Marines to train the regular line infantry divisions in how to conduct a proper amphibious assualt. It's not an either or here.

Edit: they will also use the Marines as the spearhead of the assualt to grab that first toehold on the beach with the Army coming in behind them
 
Last edited:
No. They use the Marines to train the regular line infantry divisions in how to conduct a proper amphibious assualt. It's not an either or here.

Absolutely! Churchill gets Hitler on the phone the day after Germany occupied Iceland, tells Hitler that he needs three months to train and equip the available regular infantry with Royal Marines for amphib assault, would the Germans kindly leave off making too much trouble in Iceland in the meantime?

Edit: they will also use the Marines as the spearhead of the assualt to grab that first toehold on the beach with the Army coming in behind them

I agree. Use the core elements best at amphibious work to lead the way. Now, what caused you to conclude the German army would not do the same thing, knowing as we do that the German army had already conducted a successful amphibious assault in Norway in 1940?
 
Top