An Egyptian-Ottoman war scenario from a Russian centered perspective.
Background
Russian policy regarding the Eastern Question was constrained OTL by three primay constraints:
1. A genuine commitment to maintain the post 1815 statues quo in Europe, at least as Russia interpeted it. This commitment was only broken in 1827 when the Ottomans responded to Russian particpiation in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino with closure of the straits.
2. Seeking maintaining good relations with Austria- which had every reason, particularly under Metternicht, to maintain the statues quo in the Balkans.
3. Not pissing off a combination of Britain, France and Austria.
Any major Russian acquisition of territory or influence in the Ottoman Empire conflicted with these constraints. Thus, even when Russia enjoyed overwhelming millitary success against the Ottomans (1828), or seeming opportunities for intervention in the Balkans and the Straits (1833, 1839, 1848) it avoided exploiting them to the utmost.
Russia seemingly, and momentarily, came closest to achieving preeminent influence in the straits when it broke the pattern of conflict with the Ottoman Empire - and supported it against Muhamad Ali in 1833. At that point Muhamad Ali, with the support of France, had the Ottomans on the ropes. Their field armies in Anatolia had been routed in Konya or were unreliable/defecting, and Muhamad Ali had taken Bursa and reached the Marmara. At that point Russia landed forces in the Bosphorus, and bought the Ottomans enough time for the concert of Europe to force Muhamad Ali to settle for Syria south of the CIlician Gates, and autonomy rather than independence.
Russia's price? A Secret Ottoman commitment to keep the straits closed to all non Russian warships. Britain, Austria and France were displeased, but as Russia had upheld the statues quo, and did not blatantly change the balance of power, no immediate coalition formed against it.
Still, Russian gains proved illusionary. The Ottoman Empire sought British and Austrian aid to counteract Russia as soon as the immediate crisis was over, and as soon as Britian reversed Egypt's victory in 1839 and effectively forced it out of Syria, the straits convention was overtunred (1841). Not only did the new 1841 gurantees (blocking the straits to all non Ottoman Warships) prove useless in 1853, the Ottoman Empire continued to support Circassians and Poles struggleing against Russia betwwween 1839-1863, and there was nothing Russia could do about it.
The desired change
What were the alternatives for the Russian intervention, which was in many ways extraordinary and hence quite contingent?
1. The first alternative is NOT to intervene, and let the Egyptian-Ottoman conflict to play out on its own.
Likely outcome: Muhamad Ali takes Istanbul. While Messopotamia (Under Mameluke rule until 1830. It's supression may had triggered muhamad Ali's play for power - he thought he was next) Eastern Anatolia (still filled with autonomous Kurdish and Armenian principalities) and the Balkans (where MA may face irrendentist Serbia and Greece) will take time to integrate, at the end of the day Russia faces a larger, more capable and French influenced (not that that would last any longer than Russia's influence on the Ottoman EMpire OTL) Islamic Empire - and/or rebellions in the Balkans which might force it into conflict with the Ayid Empire and friction with Austria and Britain.
Not good for Russia -which explains why they intervened.
2. Second alternative is to join MA and declare war on the Ottoman EMpire, seeking to grab territory in Eastern Anatolia and the Balkans (or establish client states).
Outcome: Brings Russia into conflict with a hostile Austrian-British-French Coalition. And violates ideological commitment to maintian statues quo.
Not good for Russia- which explains why they didn't do it.
3. Instead of seeking intangible assurances on the Straits, Russia demands territorial concessions in an in the Causacus (Batumi and Kars, as well as recognition of Russian claims to Circassia), and/or Moldova, from the OE.
Likely outcome: moderate gains in Anatolia probably don't piss Austria or Britain. Moldova will piss Austria and Britain off, but probably not enough to go to war (Wallachia probably will result in war).
Possible feeding frenzy as Austria, France and Britain demand "compensation" (Cyprus and/or Crete for Britain, Tunis and maybe Tripoli for France, Part of Bosnia for Austria?)
Probably better for Russia than OTL if it doesn't get yoo greedy. Ottoman recognition of Russian claims to Circassia, especially if folowed by British recognition is of the most benefit as it might lead to earlier end of Caucasian war, which was a major financial and millitary drain for Russia.
4. Third alternative is to back OE - but not as MUCH as it did OTL, and possibly while back-dealing with MA.
4a. MA becomes independent, not autonomous.
Outcome: Symbolic but removes the casus belli in 1839, hence denying it the economic and millitary resources of the Levant (and making centralized control of Messopotamia more difficult/impossible.) More importantly, it keeps a permanent rival at the OEs southern border, rendering it more compliant to outside pressure.
Better for Russia than OTL, though from the contemporary persepective it means leaving a seeming French client more secure.
4b. Russia refuses to pressure MA to leave Anatolia. Brokers agreement whereby he keeps what he takes (all of Asia basically), possibly in return for backroom concessions to Russia (Batumi and Kars, perhaps influence/protection of christians in Six Vilayets and Trebizond).
Immediate outcome: Rump OE remains in control only of Europe. Becomes completely dependent on Russia for protection from MA, and for internal security as well - since the Muslim population of the European portion of the OE (without Serbia and the Danubian Principalities) is between 20-25%. It will
Medium term outcome- Rump OE manuvers and seeks to retain independence by seeking Austrian and British aid.
Long Term Outcome - European pressure to give Christians equal legal rights and proportionational representation in the Gendermane, Army, Government, etc, will be difficult to withstand. And of course, if the OE does this, at some point the Christians will overthrow the Sultan and establish a Christian Kingdom/Repblic and/or invite the Tsar/Greece/Serbia to take over. Or the Muslim officers watching their privellages erode will do the same and invite MA in. Or both happen at once.
The question is when. If in 1848 then Austria is too torn up to intervene or block Russia. WHich clears the stage for a Russian-British confortation (with MA possibly weighing in).
Possible POD's:
1. MA moves more quickly after Konya, or possibly moves to establish control of the Anatolian hinterland rather than pressing on to the Marmara.
2. Delayed Polish Rebellion leads Russia to avoid as much commitment to OE as OTL.
3. Daoud Pasha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawud_Pasha_of_Baghdad puts up more of a fight to OE attempts to ouster him from Messopotamia in 1830 than OTL and MA invades in partneship with him rather than in the wake of his supression. Or else he doesn't piss off the brits quite as much and is not deposed, but joins MA when he makes his move. Either way, MA doesn't need to worry about his Euphrates flank when he advances into Anatolia, wins even bigger at Konya, and OE looks even more shaky than OTL
I think #3 is probably the best POD, and some combination of less support for the OE given their shakier position, and greater territorial demands in return for help seems most likely. A rump OE in Europe alone is the most interesting scenario, but probably a less reslistc one. It would look too unstable to all concerned.
Thoughts?
Background
Russian policy regarding the Eastern Question was constrained OTL by three primay constraints:
1. A genuine commitment to maintain the post 1815 statues quo in Europe, at least as Russia interpeted it. This commitment was only broken in 1827 when the Ottomans responded to Russian particpiation in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino with closure of the straits.
2. Seeking maintaining good relations with Austria- which had every reason, particularly under Metternicht, to maintain the statues quo in the Balkans.
3. Not pissing off a combination of Britain, France and Austria.
Any major Russian acquisition of territory or influence in the Ottoman Empire conflicted with these constraints. Thus, even when Russia enjoyed overwhelming millitary success against the Ottomans (1828), or seeming opportunities for intervention in the Balkans and the Straits (1833, 1839, 1848) it avoided exploiting them to the utmost.
Russia seemingly, and momentarily, came closest to achieving preeminent influence in the straits when it broke the pattern of conflict with the Ottoman Empire - and supported it against Muhamad Ali in 1833. At that point Muhamad Ali, with the support of France, had the Ottomans on the ropes. Their field armies in Anatolia had been routed in Konya or were unreliable/defecting, and Muhamad Ali had taken Bursa and reached the Marmara. At that point Russia landed forces in the Bosphorus, and bought the Ottomans enough time for the concert of Europe to force Muhamad Ali to settle for Syria south of the CIlician Gates, and autonomy rather than independence.
Russia's price? A Secret Ottoman commitment to keep the straits closed to all non Russian warships. Britain, Austria and France were displeased, but as Russia had upheld the statues quo, and did not blatantly change the balance of power, no immediate coalition formed against it.
Still, Russian gains proved illusionary. The Ottoman Empire sought British and Austrian aid to counteract Russia as soon as the immediate crisis was over, and as soon as Britian reversed Egypt's victory in 1839 and effectively forced it out of Syria, the straits convention was overtunred (1841). Not only did the new 1841 gurantees (blocking the straits to all non Ottoman Warships) prove useless in 1853, the Ottoman Empire continued to support Circassians and Poles struggleing against Russia betwwween 1839-1863, and there was nothing Russia could do about it.
The desired change
What were the alternatives for the Russian intervention, which was in many ways extraordinary and hence quite contingent?
1. The first alternative is NOT to intervene, and let the Egyptian-Ottoman conflict to play out on its own.
Likely outcome: Muhamad Ali takes Istanbul. While Messopotamia (Under Mameluke rule until 1830. It's supression may had triggered muhamad Ali's play for power - he thought he was next) Eastern Anatolia (still filled with autonomous Kurdish and Armenian principalities) and the Balkans (where MA may face irrendentist Serbia and Greece) will take time to integrate, at the end of the day Russia faces a larger, more capable and French influenced (not that that would last any longer than Russia's influence on the Ottoman EMpire OTL) Islamic Empire - and/or rebellions in the Balkans which might force it into conflict with the Ayid Empire and friction with Austria and Britain.
Not good for Russia -which explains why they intervened.
2. Second alternative is to join MA and declare war on the Ottoman EMpire, seeking to grab territory in Eastern Anatolia and the Balkans (or establish client states).
Outcome: Brings Russia into conflict with a hostile Austrian-British-French Coalition. And violates ideological commitment to maintian statues quo.
Not good for Russia- which explains why they didn't do it.
3. Instead of seeking intangible assurances on the Straits, Russia demands territorial concessions in an in the Causacus (Batumi and Kars, as well as recognition of Russian claims to Circassia), and/or Moldova, from the OE.
Likely outcome: moderate gains in Anatolia probably don't piss Austria or Britain. Moldova will piss Austria and Britain off, but probably not enough to go to war (Wallachia probably will result in war).
Possible feeding frenzy as Austria, France and Britain demand "compensation" (Cyprus and/or Crete for Britain, Tunis and maybe Tripoli for France, Part of Bosnia for Austria?)
Probably better for Russia than OTL if it doesn't get yoo greedy. Ottoman recognition of Russian claims to Circassia, especially if folowed by British recognition is of the most benefit as it might lead to earlier end of Caucasian war, which was a major financial and millitary drain for Russia.
4. Third alternative is to back OE - but not as MUCH as it did OTL, and possibly while back-dealing with MA.
4a. MA becomes independent, not autonomous.
Outcome: Symbolic but removes the casus belli in 1839, hence denying it the economic and millitary resources of the Levant (and making centralized control of Messopotamia more difficult/impossible.) More importantly, it keeps a permanent rival at the OEs southern border, rendering it more compliant to outside pressure.
Better for Russia than OTL, though from the contemporary persepective it means leaving a seeming French client more secure.
4b. Russia refuses to pressure MA to leave Anatolia. Brokers agreement whereby he keeps what he takes (all of Asia basically), possibly in return for backroom concessions to Russia (Batumi and Kars, perhaps influence/protection of christians in Six Vilayets and Trebizond).
Immediate outcome: Rump OE remains in control only of Europe. Becomes completely dependent on Russia for protection from MA, and for internal security as well - since the Muslim population of the European portion of the OE (without Serbia and the Danubian Principalities) is between 20-25%. It will
Medium term outcome- Rump OE manuvers and seeks to retain independence by seeking Austrian and British aid.
Long Term Outcome - European pressure to give Christians equal legal rights and proportionational representation in the Gendermane, Army, Government, etc, will be difficult to withstand. And of course, if the OE does this, at some point the Christians will overthrow the Sultan and establish a Christian Kingdom/Repblic and/or invite the Tsar/Greece/Serbia to take over. Or the Muslim officers watching their privellages erode will do the same and invite MA in. Or both happen at once.
The question is when. If in 1848 then Austria is too torn up to intervene or block Russia. WHich clears the stage for a Russian-British confortation (with MA possibly weighing in).
Possible POD's:
1. MA moves more quickly after Konya, or possibly moves to establish control of the Anatolian hinterland rather than pressing on to the Marmara.
2. Delayed Polish Rebellion leads Russia to avoid as much commitment to OE as OTL.
3. Daoud Pasha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawud_Pasha_of_Baghdad puts up more of a fight to OE attempts to ouster him from Messopotamia in 1830 than OTL and MA invades in partneship with him rather than in the wake of his supression. Or else he doesn't piss off the brits quite as much and is not deposed, but joins MA when he makes his move. Either way, MA doesn't need to worry about his Euphrates flank when he advances into Anatolia, wins even bigger at Konya, and OE looks even more shaky than OTL
I think #3 is probably the best POD, and some combination of less support for the OE given their shakier position, and greater territorial demands in return for help seems most likely. A rump OE in Europe alone is the most interesting scenario, but probably a less reslistc one. It would look too unstable to all concerned.
Thoughts?