Bear of the Bosphorus: We had to save the Ottoman Empire in order to destroy it

An Egyptian-Ottoman war scenario from a Russian centered perspective.

Background

Russian policy regarding the Eastern Question was constrained OTL by three primay constraints:
1. A genuine commitment to maintain the post 1815 statues quo in Europe, at least as Russia interpeted it. This commitment was only broken in 1827 when the Ottomans responded to Russian particpiation in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino with closure of the straits.
2. Seeking maintaining good relations with Austria- which had every reason, particularly under Metternicht, to maintain the statues quo in the Balkans.
3. Not pissing off a combination of Britain, France and Austria.

Any major Russian acquisition of territory or influence in the Ottoman Empire conflicted with these constraints. Thus, even when Russia enjoyed overwhelming millitary success against the Ottomans (1828), or seeming opportunities for intervention in the Balkans and the Straits (1833, 1839, 1848) it avoided exploiting them to the utmost.

Russia seemingly, and momentarily, came closest to achieving preeminent influence in the straits when it broke the pattern of conflict with the Ottoman Empire - and supported it against Muhamad Ali in 1833. At that point Muhamad Ali, with the support of France, had the Ottomans on the ropes. Their field armies in Anatolia had been routed in Konya or were unreliable/defecting, and Muhamad Ali had taken Bursa and reached the Marmara. At that point Russia landed forces in the Bosphorus, and bought the Ottomans enough time for the concert of Europe to force Muhamad Ali to settle for Syria south of the CIlician Gates, and autonomy rather than independence.

Russia's price? A Secret Ottoman commitment to keep the straits closed to all non Russian warships. Britain, Austria and France were displeased, but as Russia had upheld the statues quo, and did not blatantly change the balance of power, no immediate coalition formed against it.

Still, Russian gains proved illusionary. The Ottoman Empire sought British and Austrian aid to counteract Russia as soon as the immediate crisis was over, and as soon as Britian reversed Egypt's victory in 1839 and effectively forced it out of Syria, the straits convention was overtunred (1841). Not only did the new 1841 gurantees (blocking the straits to all non Ottoman Warships) prove useless in 1853, the Ottoman Empire continued to support Circassians and Poles struggleing against Russia betwwween 1839-1863, and there was nothing Russia could do about it.

The desired change
What were the alternatives for the Russian intervention, which was in many ways extraordinary and hence quite contingent?

1. The first alternative is NOT to intervene, and let the Egyptian-Ottoman conflict to play out on its own.

Likely outcome: Muhamad Ali takes Istanbul. While Messopotamia (Under Mameluke rule until 1830. It's supression may had triggered muhamad Ali's play for power - he thought he was next) Eastern Anatolia (still filled with autonomous Kurdish and Armenian principalities) and the Balkans (where MA may face irrendentist Serbia and Greece) will take time to integrate, at the end of the day Russia faces a larger, more capable and French influenced (not that that would last any longer than Russia's influence on the Ottoman EMpire OTL) Islamic Empire - and/or rebellions in the Balkans which might force it into conflict with the Ayid Empire and friction with Austria and Britain.

Not good for Russia -which explains why they intervened.

2. Second alternative is to join MA and declare war on the Ottoman EMpire, seeking to grab territory in Eastern Anatolia and the Balkans (or establish client states).

Outcome: Brings Russia into conflict with a hostile Austrian-British-French Coalition. And violates ideological commitment to maintian statues quo.

Not good for Russia- which explains why they didn't do it.

3. Instead of seeking intangible assurances on the Straits, Russia demands territorial concessions in an in the Causacus (Batumi and Kars, as well as recognition of Russian claims to Circassia), and/or Moldova, from the OE.

Likely outcome: moderate gains in Anatolia probably don't piss Austria or Britain. Moldova will piss Austria and Britain off, but probably not enough to go to war (Wallachia probably will result in war).

Possible feeding frenzy as Austria, France and Britain demand "compensation" (Cyprus and/or Crete for Britain, Tunis and maybe Tripoli for France, Part of Bosnia for Austria?)


Probably better for Russia than OTL if it doesn't get yoo greedy. Ottoman recognition of Russian claims to Circassia, especially if folowed by British recognition is of the most benefit as it might lead to earlier end of Caucasian war, which was a major financial and millitary drain for Russia.

4. Third alternative is to back OE - but not as MUCH as it did OTL, and possibly while back-dealing with MA.
4a. MA becomes independent, not autonomous.

Outcome: Symbolic but removes the casus belli in 1839, hence denying it the economic and millitary resources of the Levant (and making centralized control of Messopotamia more difficult/impossible.) More importantly, it keeps a permanent rival at the OEs southern border, rendering it more compliant to outside pressure.
Better for Russia than OTL, though from the contemporary persepective it means leaving a seeming French client more secure.

4b. Russia refuses to pressure MA to leave Anatolia. Brokers agreement whereby he keeps what he takes (all of Asia basically), possibly in return for backroom concessions to Russia (Batumi and Kars, perhaps influence/protection of christians in Six Vilayets and Trebizond).

Immediate outcome: Rump OE remains in control only of Europe. Becomes completely dependent on Russia for protection from MA, and for internal security as well - since the Muslim population of the European portion of the OE (without Serbia and the Danubian Principalities) is between 20-25%. It will

Medium term outcome- Rump OE manuvers and seeks to retain independence by seeking Austrian and British aid.

Long Term Outcome - European pressure to give Christians equal legal rights and proportionational representation in the Gendermane, Army, Government, etc, will be difficult to withstand. And of course, if the OE does this, at some point the Christians will overthrow the Sultan and establish a Christian Kingdom/Repblic and/or invite the Tsar/Greece/Serbia to take over. Or the Muslim officers watching their privellages erode will do the same and invite MA in. Or both happen at once.

The question is when. If in 1848 then Austria is too torn up to intervene or block Russia. WHich clears the stage for a Russian-British confortation (with MA possibly weighing in).


Possible POD's:
1. MA moves more quickly after Konya, or possibly moves to establish control of the Anatolian hinterland rather than pressing on to the Marmara.
2. Delayed Polish Rebellion leads Russia to avoid as much commitment to OE as OTL.
3. Daoud Pasha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawud_Pasha_of_Baghdad puts up more of a fight to OE attempts to ouster him from Messopotamia in 1830 than OTL and MA invades in partneship with him rather than in the wake of his supression. Or else he doesn't piss off the brits quite as much and is not deposed, but joins MA when he makes his move. Either way, MA doesn't need to worry about his Euphrates flank when he advances into Anatolia, wins even bigger at Konya, and OE looks even more shaky than OTL

I think #3 is probably the best POD, and some combination of less support for the OE given their shakier position, and greater territorial demands in return for help seems most likely. A rump OE in Europe alone is the most interesting scenario, but probably a less reslistc one. It would look too unstable to all concerned.

Thoughts?
 
An Egyptian-Ottoman war scenario from a Russian centered perspective.

Background

Russian policy regarding the Eastern Question was constrained OTL by three primay constraints:
1. A genuine commitment to maintain the post 1815 statues quo in Europe, at least as Russia interpeted it. This commitment was only broken in 1827 when the Ottomans responded to Russian particpiation in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino with closure of the straits.
2. Seeking maintaining good relations with Austria- which had every reason, particularly under Metternicht, to maintain the statues quo in the Balkans.
3. Not pissing off a combination of Britain, France and Austria.

Any major Russian acquisition of territory or influence in the Ottoman Empire conflicted with these constraints. Thus, even when Russia enjoyed overwhelming millitary success against the Ottomans (1828), or seeming opportunities for intervention in the Balkans and the Straits (1833, 1839, 1848) it avoided exploiting them to the utmost.

Russia seemingly, and momentarily, came closest to achieving preeminent influence in the straits when it broke the pattern of conflict with the Ottoman Empire - and supported it against Muhamad Ali in 1833. At that point Muhamad Ali, with the support of France, had the Ottomans on the ropes. Their field armies in Anatolia had been routed in Konya or were unreliable/defecting, and Muhamad Ali had taken Bursa and reached the Marmara. At that point Russia landed forces in the Bosphorus, and bought the Ottomans enough time for the concert of Europe to force Muhamad Ali to settle for Syria south of the CIlician Gates, and autonomy rather than independence.

Russia's price? A Secret Ottoman commitment to keep the straits closed to all non Russian warships. Britain, Austria and France were displeased, but as Russia had upheld the statues quo, and did not blatantly change the balance of power, no immediate coalition formed against it.

Still, Russian gains proved illusionary. The Ottoman Empire sought British and Austrian aid to counteract Russia as soon as the immediate crisis was over, and as soon as Britian reversed Egypt's victory in 1839 and effectively forced it out of Syria, the straits convention was overtunred (1841). Not only did the new 1841 gurantees (blocking the straits to all non Ottoman Warships) prove useless in 1853, the Ottoman Empire continued to support Circassians and Poles struggleing against Russia betwwween 1839-1863, and there was nothing Russia could do about it.

The desired change
What were the alternatives for the Russian intervention, which was in many ways extraordinary and hence quite contingent?

1. The first alternative is NOT to intervene, and let the Egyptian-Ottoman conflict to play out on its own.

Likely outcome: Muhamad Ali takes Istanbul. While Messopotamia (Under Mameluke rule until 1830. It's supression may had triggered muhamad Ali's play for power - he thought he was next) Eastern Anatolia (still filled with autonomous Kurdish and Armenian principalities) and the Balkans (where MA may face irrendentist Serbia and Greece) will take time to integrate, at the end of the day Russia faces a larger, more capable and French influenced (not that that would last any longer than Russia's influence on the Ottoman EMpire OTL) Islamic Empire - and/or rebellions in the Balkans which might force it into conflict with the Ayid Empire and friction with Austria and Britain.

Not good for Russia -which explains why they intervened.

2. Second alternative is to join MA and declare war on the Ottoman EMpire, seeking to grab territory in Eastern Anatolia and the Balkans (or establish client states).

Outcome: Brings Russia into conflict with a hostile Austrian-British-French Coalition. And violates ideological commitment to maintian statues quo.

Not good for Russia- which explains why they didn't do it.

3. Instead of seeking intangible assurances on the Straits, Russia demands territorial concessions in an in the Causacus (Batumi and Kars, as well as recognition of Russian claims to Circassia), and/or Moldova, from the OE.

Likely outcome: moderate gains in Anatolia probably don't piss Austria or Britain. Moldova will piss Austria and Britain off, but probably not enough to go to war (Wallachia probably will result in war).

Possible feeding frenzy as Austria, France and Britain demand "compensation" (Cyprus and/or Crete for Britain, Tunis and maybe Tripoli for France, Part of Bosnia for Austria?)


Probably better for Russia than OTL if it doesn't get yoo greedy. Ottoman recognition of Russian claims to Circassia, especially if folowed by British recognition is of the most benefit as it might lead to earlier end of Caucasian war, which was a major financial and millitary drain for Russia.

4. Third alternative is to back OE - but not as MUCH as it did OTL, and possibly while back-dealing with MA.
4a. MA becomes independent, not autonomous.

Outcome: Symbolic but removes the casus belli in 1839, hence denying it the economic and millitary resources of the Levant (and making centralized control of Messopotamia more difficult/impossible.) More importantly, it keeps a permanent rival at the OEs southern border, rendering it more compliant to outside pressure.
Better for Russia than OTL, though from the contemporary persepective it means leaving a seeming French client more secure.

4b. Russia refuses to pressure MA to leave Anatolia. Brokers agreement whereby he keeps what he takes (all of Asia basically), possibly in return for backroom concessions to Russia (Batumi and Kars, perhaps influence/protection of christians in Six Vilayets and Trebizond).

Immediate outcome: Rump OE remains in control only of Europe. Becomes completely dependent on Russia for protection from MA, and for internal security as well - since the Muslim population of the European portion of the OE (without Serbia and the Danubian Principalities) is between 20-25%. It will

Medium term outcome- Rump OE manuvers and seeks to retain independence by seeking Austrian and British aid.

Long Term Outcome - European pressure to give Christians equal legal rights and proportionational representation in the Gendermane, Army, Government, etc, will be difficult to withstand. And of course, if the OE does this, at some point the Christians will overthrow the Sultan and establish a Christian Kingdom/Repblic and/or invite the Tsar/Greece/Serbia to take over. Or the Muslim officers watching their privellages erode will do the same and invite MA in. Or both happen at once.

The question is when. If in 1848 then Austria is too torn up to intervene or block Russia. WHich clears the stage for a Russian-British confortation (with MA possibly weighing in).


Possible POD's:
1. MA moves more quickly after Konya, or possibly moves to establish control of the Anatolian hinterland rather than pressing on to the Marmara.
2. Delayed Polish Rebellion leads Russia to avoid as much commitment to OE as OTL.
3. Daoud Pasha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawud_Pasha_of_Baghdad puts up more of a fight to OE attempts to ouster him from Messopotamia in 1830 than OTL and MA invades in partneship with him rather than in the wake of his supression. Or else he doesn't piss off the brits quite as much and is not deposed, but joins MA when he makes his move. Either way, MA doesn't need to worry about his Euphrates flank when he advances into Anatolia, wins even bigger at Konya, and OE looks even more shaky than OTL

I think #3 is probably the best POD, and some combination of less support for the OE given their shakier position, and greater territorial demands in return for help seems most likely. A rump OE in Europe alone is the most interesting scenario, but probably a less reslistc one. It would look too unstable to all concerned.

Thoughts?

A member of this page who was banned 7 years ago had stated that the Ottoman Balkans had a Muslim population of 43% in 1876 according to his research. The Ottoman Balkans have not changed too much between 1830 and 1877.

To add to your TL. In the 1830s and 1840s the European Great Powers did not favor a Rump Ottoman State especially being so close to Russia. Keeping them in tact is what keeps the Russian power in check (along with the existence of Austria). To add to your pod:
1. Ibrahim Pasha cannot move faster to Istanbul than the Ottoman Navy (which was Ottoman in the first war but not in the second...). Same for the Russian Navy, they'll reach the streets before Ibrahim Pasha can even deploy his artillery in Uskudar.

2. Maybe... but how do you delay it? And delaying it results in different situations. Like the Belgian revolt. Isn't Europe and thus Russia going to look at Belgium, as the wife of the Dutch King Willem II married a Romanov?

3. Davud Pasha cannot hold off the Ottomans for too long. He has no forces Mehmed Ali Pasha had. Hussein Gradascevic tried it but he was overrun as well. The only reason Egypt wasn't overrun was due to its Army already being modernised and experienced since the 1810s instead of the late 1820s of the Ottomans. Hell, if he did Mehmed Ali might once again be asked to move against him, this time getting Palestine and Cyprus promised. Mehmed Ali did all the "dirty work" Mahmud II asked from him ever since 1808.

To answer your last question... in 1848 Mehmed Ali was already senile. He was in no position to lead Egypt anywhere.
 
A member of this page who was banned 7 years ago had stated that the Ottoman Balkans had a Muslim population of 43% in 1876 according to his research. The Ottoman Balkans have not changed too much between 1830 and 1877.

First of all, The Ottoman Balkans did take in a significant infusion of Muslim refugees from Algeria, Crimea, Circassia, Greece and Crete between 1830-1877. Indeed, that was part of the reason for the Bulgarian troubles- the resettled Muslims did not get along well with the local Orthodox. As to the 43% claim- well, If you are referring to Abdul Hamid, I would need to see his sources before I took this claim without a grain of salt. The 43% may have been true, or near true, for Bosnia, But not for Macedonia, Thrace and "Bulgaria", even according to the suspect Ottoman censuses.

According to the official Ottoman census in 1831, http://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Shaw, Ott Census System and Pop, 1831-1914 (1978).pdf the total Muslim population in Rumelia (all of "Turkey in Europe" was 513,448/1,369,766 (only adult males were counted) which makes for 37%. These figures do not count Istanbul (then more Greek than it would later become) since the inhabitants of the city were exempt from conscription, which was the point of the census. However, it is generally recognized by non-Turkish historians that Ottoman censuses tended to over-report Muslim demographics, partially because the non Muslim Millet leaders encouraged evasion to reduce tax burden and control over their population. Moreover, in Rumelia Muslim populations tended to be more urban and were therefore more accesible to census takers.

So let's say 25-30%. That's still too few Muslims for a rump OE to field a credible Muslims army, and too few to exclude Christians from political and millitary power in the face of European pressure. I don't think such a situation would be stable.

To add to your TL. In the 1830s and 1840s the European Great Powers did not favor a Rump Ottoman State especially being so close to Russia. Keeping them in tact is what keeps the Russian power in check (along with the existence of Austria).

True, but:
a. France favored MA.
b. The willingness of European powers to commit themselves to reverse facts on the ground (so long as those facts were not established by Russian boots) was limited. If it hadn't been, MA would have been booted back to EGypt by the British Navy in 1833, not 1839. But of course, in 1833 the impact of British occupation of the Levantie ports would have been more limited since the Ottoman army had not undergone the modernization necessary to plausibly challenge MA at that point, and since after Konya the OE lacked any credible field army in Anatolia. So if the Ottoman position in Anatolia and/or Messopotamia is weaker than OTL, the willingness of Austria, Russia and Britain to restore it will also likely be lower.

To add to your pod:
1. Ibrahim Pasha cannot move faster to Istanbul than the Ottoman Navy (which was Ottoman in the first war but not in the second...). Same for the Russian Navy, they'll reach the streets before Ibrahim Pasha can even deploy his artillery in Uskudar.

First, the Ottoman navy may not remain loyal if OE does even worse TTL. Second, you need to distinguish between the theoretical amount of time it would take the Russian navy to sail from Sevastopol to Istanbul (4 days), to the amount of time it would take word of events in Anatolia to reach St.Petersburg, and for the order to be relayed back to Sevastopol. At this point there is no telegraph, and not even a semaphore system in place. Also, the Ottomans need to decide to ask for help, and the Russians need to decide to grant it. There is a window here.

That said, this scenario does not assume that MA can actually reach Istanbul before the Russians deploy, only that he can demonstrate that the position of the OE is even more hopeless than it was OTL, and that he can carry more of the Anatolian administration and army to him than he did OTL.

2. Maybe... but how do you delay it? And delaying it results in different situations. Like the Belgian revolt. Isn't Europe and thus Russia going to look at Belgium, as the wife of the Dutch King Willem II married a Romanov?

One way is that Russia decides NOT to intervene in the July revolution and/or the Belgian revolution (which the Polish revolution prevented it from doing OTL) and/or don;t try to use the Polish army to do it- Maybe Prussia nixes the idea in the bud. That was the spark for the 1830 revolution. Butterfly net. Since other issues (Eastern borderlands, riding roughshod over Polish constitution, etc) remain in place, that won't stave off the revolt by more than a few years- but it might cause it to break out just when the Oriental crisis reaches it's climax.

3. Davud Pasha cannot hold off the Ottomans for too long. He has no forces Mehmed Ali Pasha had. Hussein Gradascevic tried it but he was overrun as well. The only reason Egypt wasn't overrun was due to its Army already being modernised and experienced since the 1810s instead of the late 1820s of the Ottomans.

Agreed- Davud can't hold the Ottomans off indefinately on his own. However, if he holds on only a little bit longer (not even as long as Gradascevic did), MAs invasion saves his bacon. Alternatively, if he avoids antagonizing the British over custom duties they might not encourage the OE to do away with him and he remains a player when MA does his thing.

Mind you Hussein Gradascevic's Bosnian rebellion also seems to be an interesting POD (Maybe a secondary one, if Davud holding out longer> earlier MA invasion> less troops avaliable to crush Gradascevic is plausible). The battle of Stup seems to have been a very near thing, and victory might trigger rebllions elsewhere in the Balkans and/or Greek/Serbian entry into the war.

Hell, if he did Mehmed Ali might once again be asked to move against him, this time getting Palestine and Cyprus promised. Mehmed Ali did all the "dirty work" Mahmud II asked from him ever since 1808.

Now there's an interesting possibility. OTOH, that leaves MA in effective control of the Mashriq once Davud is suppressed. How long before that comes to blows? As intriguing as exploring that possibility might be, by 1830 MA was alienated from the OE, since it had denied him his just wages for intervening in Greece. It seems more likely to me that if the OE performs more poorly against Davud MA will go for the kill.

To answer your last question... in 1848 Mehmed Ali was already senile. He was in no position to lead Egypt anywhere.

Right, I meant Ibrahim... but I see he died in 1848. Abbas is a rather less imposing figure, but if Russia and Britain come to blows over the Balkans (in a "Rump Rumelian Empire" scenario) I can still see him weighing in at the invitation of Rumelia's Muslims.[/QUOTE][/QUOTE][/QUOTE]
 
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