Battle of the Marne WI

I just finished reading Holger Herwig's "THE MARNE, 1914:THE OPENING OF WORLD WAR I AND THE BATTLE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD". It was QUITE good, I recommend it to anyone with an interest in WWI. It also brought up a number of incidents that we would call, "What If's", here is one of them.
pp 261/262
"Gustave de Cornulier-Luciniere's 5th CD, with 1500 sabers, ten guns, and 357 troops riding bicycles, was sent on that mission, the only one of it's kind in the war. For two daring days, 5th Cavalry rode around the forest of Viller-Cotterets behind German lines. At 6 p.m. on 8 Sept. under a "dark red, cloudy sky", it attacked a German airfield near Troesnes. At that very moment, a cavalcade of cars arrived with First Army's Staff. Kluck, Kuhl and their aides "seized rifles, carbines and revolvers" flung themselves on the ground and formed a broad firing line. The situation was cleared by the arrival of Arnold von Bauer's 17th ID, which "violently" dispatched the French riders, reducing 5th CD to half it's original strength.

So, if the 5th CD encounter or ambush the German 1st Army's staff convoy, they capture or kill them, along with capturing all the documents being carried. Alternatively, if they kill them at the airfield, or if von Bauer's 17th ID is late getting there, 1st Army's staff are again, captured or killed. In all these scenarios, the German 1st Army is without it's senior leadership, and it's plans are now known. How does this affect the Battle of the Marne?
 
Von Kluck reports that incident as well, but in a slightly different tone: French cavalry had attacked the airfield near La Ferté Millon. When the motor column of 1st Army's staff approached that spot, they were warned about the incident. They stopped and formed a defensive position - but did not encounter the enemy. As it then turned out, the enemy cavalry had already been dispersed by other German units. Less drama thus, nevertheless Kluck thought 'that the valiant enemy cavalry had missed a great opportunity.'
Suppose, they didn't miss the great opportunity: The most senior corps commander, in this case von Linsingen, II. AK, would have taken over. There might not even have been a break in the battle, as the incident happened in late evening and all orders for the following day had already been issued. The demise of an experienced army staff (operations section) would, however, have become palpable in the days to come, especially in the retreat to the Aisne and the formation of the defensive line there.
 
Von Kluck reports that incident as well, but in a slightly different tone: French cavalry had attacked the airfield near La Ferté Millon. When the motor column of 1st Army's staff approached that spot, they were warned about the incident. They stopped and formed a defensive position - but did not encounter the enemy. As it then turned out, the enemy cavalry had already been dispersed by other German units. Less drama thus, nevertheless Kluck thought 'that the valiant enemy cavalry had missed a great opportunity.'
Suppose, they didn't miss the great opportunity: The most senior corps commander, in this case von Linsingen, II. AK, would have taken over. There might not even have been a break in the battle, as the incident happened in late evening and all orders for the following day had already been issued. The demise of an experienced army staff (operations section) would, however, have become palpable in the days to come, especially in the retreat to the Aisne and the formation of the defensive line there.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_12_marne1914_6.jpg

The problem is that the Staff of the First Army received the order to retreat on September 9 at noon while the Second Army was already retreating since the morning. Which means there are a lot of chances that the First Army will go on with its attack against the French Sixth Army for at least a few hours (before Hensch manages to reach Lisingen and to inform). It could be enough for the BEF to reach the Ourcq from the Marne (less than 15 kilometres between the two): in which case the entire BEF would be just behind the II and IV Korps which are already worn out and currently attacking the French Sixth Army southern positions. Basically these two corps are doomed if this happens and the First Army will lose 90 000 more men within 24 hours.

In which case, by the 10th, the First Army is reduced to 6 Infantry Divisions against 11 French and 5 British Divisions and forced to fight in a salient with a dense forest in the north, the French Army in the West, the Ourcq river in the East and the BEF in the South East. The only way for the First Army to retreat is to retreat eastwards, between the forest of Villers Coterets and May en Multien (a village on the Ourcq river): this passage is barely 8 kilometres wide, with small bridges you have to cross while the BEF is advancing northwards from May en Multien towards the Forest of Villers Coterets. At the same time, the German IX Corps is NORTH of the forest and thus separated from the bulk of the First Army. So the First Army is basically trapped in a mini-Falaise pocket and will only be able to get a portion of its troops out of this gigantic ambush.

My guess, the IX Corps, still relatively frest, would be able to retreat by following the railroad north of the forest but the other Corps will be lucky if they can savalge 40 000 men while abandoning all their heavy equipment. So the First Army with luck is reduced to 80 000 men and separated into two formations while the VII R. Korps hurries the frack up to reach the Aisne after Maubeuge and while the Seventh Army must hurry the frack up as well since this Army must now fulfill its role AND the role of the First Army at the same time for the coming battle of the Aisne.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...king_moves,_15_September_-_8_October_1914.jpg

Joffre will be even more convinced than OTL that he has to bypass the Chemin des Dames from the West (between Compiegne and Noyon), while the Seventh Army, with at best 12 Divisions (6 Divisions properly belonging to the Seventh Army, at best two exhausted Corps from the former First Army and lacking heavy equipment, notably heavy artillery, plus the VII R. Korps coming from Maubeuge and thus relatively exhausted), must hold the line against at least 15 French (Sixth Army plus Territorial Divisions of General d'Amade near Amiens and able to use the railway system to quickly reach the front) and 5 British Divisions. Plus Joffre can use the railway system as OTL to quickly send Divisions from the East to the West while the Germans have to do it mostly on foot.

Finally the German Seventh Army must defend a elongated frontline between Noyon and Craonne while OTL it just had to hold the line against the BEF from Soissons to Craonne. The frontline just doubled but the troops allocated for this task are 50% lower than OTL. Basically, the battle of the Aisne is way shorter and the French Sixth Army is very likely to take Noyon before the heavy rains of September 19, thus bypassing the Chemin des Dames and threatening Heeringen's right flank. So the the Seventh Army is again forced to retreat before Rupprecht and his Sixth Army arrives to stabilize the situation.

After the Chemin des Dames, the best defensive positions are along the Ailette rivers, with ridges just South of Laon. Problem, this ridge isn't as elongated as the Chemin des Dames (it stops after east of Chauny) after this ridge, the terrain is FLAT until the Ardennes and Charleville-Mézieres. So in order to cease their retreat, the Germans must hold the Laon ridge at all cost (job for the Seventh Army) while Chauny and the territories north of this city must be protected in order to secure the ridge's right flank (job for the Sixth Army). My guess, Heeringen and Rupprecht being competent generals (plus Falkenhayn not being incompetent either), would be able to hold the line, at least partially (the exhaustion of the French Army would help as well). The Germans would be able to hold the line along the Oise then Sambre Rivers while still holding Maubeuge which would be turned into a formidable fortified aera. Then the German would at least able to hold Belgian lands east of the Dendre river (perhaps even holding the line along the Scheld river but that's less certain while still possible). Antwerp would still fall and Germany would still have the salpetre.
But France keeps his coal (plus a little Belgian coal) while the Race of the Sea is a decisive Entente success. Germany tooks a further 100 000-150 000 or so permanent casualties (killed or captured) compared to OTL but keeps most of industrial Belgium (but loses most of agricultural Belgium which is controlled by the Entente) and still firmly controls the Luxembourg and French iron mines (even if OTL they didn't use the French mines THAT much). Globally a win for the Entente.

maps_13_german_retreat1914_(1600).jpg

Possible Frontline in October 1914. The Germans could perhaps be more successful and hold a Scheld river line though.

PS: BTW Belgian fate would be interesting: Free Belgium would a Flemish one with most of the soldiers and population speaking flemish plus Free Belgium would have the agriculture to feed them (see the rich plains of Flanders). On one hand it probably reduces flemish collaboration with Germany to zero. OTOH, Flemish people would have the legitimacy to ask for linguistic/cultural and perhaps political concessions to Albert I. I dunno here, would a expert on the subject and I'm not.
 
Flank attack against 6th FR Army commenced in the morning of Sept 9th as ordered on Sept 8th anyway. Only at about noon did Hentsch arrive at 1st Army HQ. Orders for breaking battle and retreat went out at 15:00 hours and 19:00 hours on the 9th, which means that 1st Army's attack on 6th FR Army lasted approximately until late afternoon of Sept 9th. - The difference ITTL would rather be that Linsingen doesn't decide to break battle. With 6th FR Army beaten and retreating in his direction, would Sir John French - whose forces had been stopped and driven back by von der Marwitz' cavalry and 5th Division on Sept 9th - really advance?
 
Flank attack against 6th FR Army commenced in the morning of Sept 9th as ordered on Sept 8th anyway. Only at about noon did Hentsch arrive at 1st Army HQ. Orders for breaking battle and retreat went out at 15:00 hours and 19:00 hours on the 9th, which means that 1st Army's attack on 6th FR Army lasted approximately until late afternoon of Sept 9th. - The difference ITTL would rather be that Linsingen doesn't decide to break battle. With 6th FR Army beaten and retreating in his direction, would Sir John French - whose forces had been stopped and driven back by von der Marwitz' cavalry and 5th Division on Sept 9th - really advance?
OTL around 1 PM on September 9 the BEF and French cavalry were holding a line between Bézu/Dhuisy and Etrépilly, positions which were NORTH of the defensive line held by the Germans on September 8 or EXACTLY WHERE the german defensive line was. This means the Germans (bravely) holding the line on the 8th September are already retreating and that the BEF is barely 8 kilometres east of May en Multien (less than 2 hours on foot), right behind the German IV Corps. Kluck received the order to retreat at 12 AM when the BEF reached Bézu/Druisy one hour later OTL, with no troops to block the British to advance westwards. It's a matter of hours, if Linsingen doesn't order to the II and IV Corps to retreat at 2 PM, they're doomed.
 
1st Army command wasn't overly worried by the presence of the BEF. It was more like: "Oh, the English again? Okay, we'll send a brigade to chase them away." This may sound arrogant, but they did have some experience in fighting the BEF, which in turn had a solid reputation of running away when facing von Kluck's army. - What really alarmed them was the news that FR 5th Army was also starting to feel forward into the gap. Now, that was an enemy who was truly considered capable of manoeuvre. - Anyway, von Kluck did not receive order to retreat. He himself decided to break battle and retreat, after Hentsch had briefed his CoS that 2nd Army had already beaten the retreat. If he didn't join the general movement towards the Aisne in time, the presence of FR 5th Army and BEF would force him to retreat straight north, away from the bulk of the German forces.
 
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1st Army command wasn't overly worried by the presence of the BEF. It was more like: "Oh, the English again? Okay, we'll send a brigade to chase them away." This may sound arrogant, but they did have some experience in fighting the BEF, which in turn had a solid reputation of running away when facing von Kluck's army. - What really alarmed them was the news that FR 5th Army was also starting to feel forward into the gap. Now, that was an enemy who was truly considered capable of manoeuvre. - Anyway, von Kluck did not receive order to retreat. He himself decided to break battle and retreat, after Hentsch had briefed his CoS that 2nd Army had already beaten the retreat. If he didn't join the general movement towards the Aisne in time, the presence of FR 5th Army and BEF would force him to retreat straight north, away from the bulk of the German forces.
Which is also a good thing for the Entente since the Fist Army would be isolated and threatened by the BEF and the French 5th and 6th Armies and won't be near von Bülow to form a coherent defensive line. Once the French arrive at the Aisne River, they will bypass the Chemin des Dames because there will be no or far less Germans to protect Von Bülow's right flank (again resulting in a different race to the sea). Let's be honest: A First Army retreating north is an Army which will have extreme difficulties to reach the German lines in the near future and Manaury+d'Espérey will do everything to push Von Kluck North and to keep it that way. Eventually, the First Army will be completely isolated and will begin lack supplies: food, ammo, medecine. That's 250 000 men which will lack the means to launch counter-offensive actions or coordinated defensive operations.
 
Kluck said going north would entail long exhausting marches, while joining the general retreat to the Aisne required only a short hop. - However, 1st Army would not lack supplies, on the contrary. They sat astride the only working rail connection, the one coming down through Belgium. During the Marne battle, their latest rail head had been at Compiègne. So, actually, they would fall back along the main supply line. - It were the armies in the centre, 3rd and 4th - and 2nd after going east, who were specifically suffering from lack of supplies, because all lines of communication across the Meuse had been thoroughly destroyed, while to the west of Hirson there was almost no damage to the rail net at all.
 
Kluck said going north would entail long exhausting marches, while joining the general retreat to the Aisne required only a short hop. - However, 1st Army would not lack supplies, on the contrary. They sat astride the only working rail connection, the one coming down through Belgium. During the Marne battle, their latest rail head had been at Compiègne. So, actually, they would fall back along the main supply line. - It were the armies in the centre, 3rd and 4th - and 2nd after going east, who were specifically suffering from lack of supplies, because all lines of communication across the Meuse had been thoroughly destroyed, while to the west of Hirson there was almost no damage to the rail net at all.

I'm not sure about this. The problem is that the railway centres of Liege and Namur had been methodically destroyed by the Belgian Army and I'm not sure they were operational (or fully operational) again in early September. The problem is these two cities connected the railway lines between Belgium and Germany/Luxembourg. Without Liege or Namur, munitions and troops (if troops can take trains) must practically bypass Belgium. And from what I understood, these destructions gave the German logistics headaches during the first part of the race to the sea. So I'm not sure Kluck (or his successor ITTL) would have had his supplies.
Here is a picture to show you how Liege and Namur were kind of neurons regarding Belgian railway system:

mil03.jpg
 
The forward railhead behind 1 st Army was located like this: 14 AUG Liège, 21 AUG Hasselt, 26 AUG Bruxelles, 30 AUG Valenciennes, 03 SEP Peronne, 04 SEP Roye, 05 SEP Chauny, 08 SEP Noyon, 09 SEP Compiègne.
 
The forward railhead behind 1 st Army was located like this: 14 AUG Liège, 21 AUG Hasselt, 26 AUG Bruxelles, 30 AUG Valenciennes, 03 SEP Peronne, 04 SEP Roye, 05 SEP Chauny, 08 SEP Noyon, 09 SEP Compiègne.
Again, very valuable information and you seem very knowledgeable on the subject but without Liege fonctionning properly as a railway centre, it would be (and was) a pain in the back to send supplies by train through Belgium for weeks after the fall of the fall of the Belgian Fortress.
It will be slow. Plus, once again, even in the case of a well-supplied First Army (and I maintain my doubts about it), there is still the issue of being isolated and facing an ennemy with much more men and attacking you from two sides. That's a major disadvantage for Germany during the First Battle of the Aisne since Von Bülow cannot rely on the First Army to protect the Chemin des Dames's right flank, instead relying on the weaker 7th Army which will be stretched very thin.
So again, different race to the Sea with one advantage to the Entente. Not a war winner and a serious possibility that France and Britain control the Belgian Coast, including Bruges and possibly Ghent.

PS: could you please quote me if you post an answer to this very post? Simpler for me to know plus I quote you everytime when I give an answer and debate with you: I would appreciate the courtesy if you were doing the same. Thanks.
 
PS: could you please quote me if you post an answer to this very post? Simpler for me to know plus I quote you everytime when I give an answer and debate with you: I would appreciate the courtesy if you were doing the same. Thanks.

Sorry, no offence intended. - Well, actually, v. Bülow couldn't rely on 1st Army to cover his right flank. There was a considerable gap between where 1st and 2nd Armies settled down, and another large unit, 7th Army, had to be inserted hastily between them. Nevertheless, 1st Army would be missing in line. However, with v. Kluck lurking at Ham or Noyon, would there be an attempt to outflank 2nd Army at all?
 
Sorry, no offence intended. - Well, actually, v. Bülow couldn't rely on 1st Army to cover his right flank. There was a considerable gap between where 1st and 2nd Armies settled down, and another large unit, 7th Army, had to be inserted hastily between them. Nevertheless, 1st Army would be missing in line. However, with v. Kluck lurking at Ham or Noyon, would there be an attempt to outflank 2nd Army at all?
None taken, dear lad. :)
So let's go back to this debate, shall we?
-OTL after the Battle of the Marne the First and Second German Armies retreated until reaching the Northern bank of the Aisne River, occupying the Chemin des Dames which is a plateau with many slopes and reverse slopes dominating the Aisne and a excellent defensive position where German howitzers can use the slopes at their advantages. This plateau and succession of ridges goes from Craonne in the East to roughly Compiègne/Noyon in the West (actually those two cities are a few kilometres west of the ridge).
-OTL this position was manned by the First Army (5 Corps) from Noyon to Soissons by the First Army, from Soissons to Craonne by the Seventh (3 corps) with the Second Army (4 Corps) East of Craonne. The VII Reserve Corps is at Maubeuge where the siege has ended and could reach the Aisne if needed. So you have a compact defensive line with at least 8 German Corps (not including isolated units here) whose left is protected by the 4 Corps of Von Bulow.

-ITTL, and assuming the POD presented by Odbill occurs, the First Army delays his retreat by a few hours. Let's try to draw an optimistic scenario for Germany with this pro-Entente POD. This time, the First Army during his retreat is pursued by the French Sixth Army on his left/back and the BEF on his back/right while the French Fifth Army pursues von Bulow.
-Like you said, the First Army is forced to adopt a straight north retreat instead of a slightly northeastern one. So instead of being on a Noyon-Soissons line with a relatively small hole between him and Von Bulow, a hole where Heeringen placed his Seventh Army, you have a First Army being at Ham (like you proposed it) and a gigantic hole between the First Army and Von Bulow. Heeringen still arrives as OTL but will be stretched thin in order to man the elongated Chemin des Dames ridge. Let's say that he still receives the VII R. Corps from Maubeuge. Instead of 8 Corps to defend the Aisne, you have 4 now.
-As OTL, Joffre is persuaded that he must outflank the Chemin des Dames from the West. Heeringen lacks men to prevent this move: the French takes Noyon and bypass the Chemin des Dames between 15-18th September. From Noyon they can easily reach Chauny, threatening to envelop Heeringen but heavy rains plus exhaustion will likely prevent them to totally do so. Plus Heeringen and Bulow will probably be able to retreat in good order. Problem: after the chemin des dames, the next decent defensive position is the succession of low ridges on a Saint-Quentin/Rethel line, roughly 40 kilometres further North.
-The German First is at Ham and decides to retreat eastwards in order to reach Heeringen. My guess that he will be able to do this time, due to Entente's exhaustion. The unti will probably meet the Seventh Army east of Saint Quentin.
-The French Second Army and the German Sixth Army, as OTL, reach northwestern France. Problem: the Entente controls Saint-Quentin due to the German First Army's retreat while OTL the German Sixth Army had Saint-Quentin as a base for its race to the sea.
-It means that the race to the sea will not have Arras as first step but more likely Lille. If the Entente manages to keep Arras OTL, it would be logical that they reach Lille first ITTL.

-Conclusion of this optimistic scenario for Germany: no loss of any German Field Army but the partial loss of the initiative in the race to the sea. It's very likely that the Entente controls the Belgian Coast with a frontline following the Scheld River. Ghent will perhaps be German or the Entente, here I dunno (let's say it will be German) Antwerp still falls.

upload_2017-11-14_20-49-53.png
 
That's a goodly sized chunk of France and Belgium not occupied. Some nice ramifications from a cavalry raid. :)
 
The German First is at Ham and decides to retreat eastwards in order to reach Heeringen. My guess that he will be able to do this time, due to Entente's exhaustion. The unti will probably meet the Seventh Army east of Saint Quentin.View attachment 354865

Not so sure this is going to happen. - IOTL, Falkenhayn, the new head of OHL, had two choices basically: withdraw substantially, marshal the armies and attack once more - or cling to the positions taken under Moltke and try to outflank the enemy. - Now, in our scenario, you have a substantial outflanking force, whole 1st Army. Their losses during the Marne were heavy (approx. 330 WIA and KIA/MIA per regiment of infantry), but not crippling. Their supply situation is excellent, at least compared to the other armies. So, they will not prevaricate or move away, but - after a short period of refit - be on the attack again. Neither FR 6th Army nor BEF - or both together - will be able to stop them in a meeting engangement, which is the one form of combat engagement where in 1914 the Germans were clearly superior to all their enemies. - So, you will have FR 2nd Army arriving to dig in somewhere between Meaux and Vailly in order to stop v. Kluck and save FR 5th Army from encirclement.
 
Not so sure this is going to happen. - IOTL, Falkenhayn, the new head of OHL, had two choices basically: withdraw substantially, marshal the armies and attack once more - or cling to the positions taken under Moltke and try to outflank the enemy. - Now, in our scenario, you have a substantial outflanking force, whole 1st Army. Their losses during the Marne were heavy (approx. 330 WIA and KIA/MIA per regiment of infantry), but not crippling. Their supply situation is excellent, at least compared to the other armies. So, they will not prevaricate or move away, but - after a short period of refit - be on the attack again. Neither FR 6th Army nor BEF - or both together - will be able to stop them in a meeting engangement, which is the one form of combat engagement where in 1914 the Germans were clearly superior to all their enemies. - So, you will have FR 2nd Army arriving to dig in somewhere between Meaux and Vailly in order to stop v. Kluck and save FR 5th Army from encirclement.

So for you, the fact that the First Army is closely followed by the French Sixth Army (10 divisions) and the BEF (5 Divisions) during a hasty retreat with a 50 kilometres gap between the First and Second Armies is actually an advantage?

Allow me to have doubts about this. Plus I maintain that the supply situation of the First Army, with Belgian railway system being still damaged, will be mediocre at best.
And the Sixth Army+ BEF have a superior numbers against the First Army and, at worse, must just prevent the First Army to join Bülow and maintaining the gap the time the Chemin des Dames is bypassed. So how the First Army will be able to retreat then attack a superior ennemy, repulsing him and reach Meaux, thus threatening the French Army. All of this on foot, with days of fighting and actually limited supplies?

-Plus, if we're following the POD of this thread (the one which justifies its existence), then Kluck and his staff are mostly gone. While this perhaps won't result in the destruction of the First Army, it will still result in a significant lack of organization for at least a couple of days. Add this problem to the ones already quoted.

-I'm sorry but you're turning serious problems for the German Army into very interesting advantages for the race to the sea. At least this is how I understand it. If it is, then it's borderline hand-waving and all of this justified by the myth of the superiority of the German Army in all things.
 
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