Battle of San Bernardino Strait?

During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Admiral Kurita was able to sail through the San Bernardino Strait successfully before encountering Taffy 3. In contrast, Admiral Nishimura's force was essentially destroyed by the USN's 7th Fleet during his run through the Surigao Strait.

Suppose Admiral Oldendorf is misinformed and is ordered to cover the San Bernardino Strait. What results could both sides expect in a nighttime/early morning battle in the San Bernardino Strait?

How far does Admiral Nishimura get to the "full" U.S. supply ships in Leyte Gulf by sailing through the Surigao Strait successfully? It is unlikely he will being under substantial air attack as Taffy 1 will be a bit preoccupied with air attacks that morning.

*Note that TF 34 has not been formed as they are with Halsey sailing north.
 
Guess what many naval heads always wanted to see would have happened, namely Yamato fighting against americans BBs, you have 4 IJN vs 6 US (is Musashi still sunk in your TL?) BBs, plus escorting cruisers and DDs on both sides. An extremely bloody brawl with both sides eviscerated is a possible outcome of such an encounter imo, Yamato and probably Nagato are more powerful and definitely faster that any of the american BBs, but the Kongos are relatively fragile. If it gets to be a close combat like in November 1942, Yamato's 18 inch guns will be devastating, but then as such close ranges would Yamato's armour resist 16 inch shells?
 
... If it gets to be a close combat like in November 1942, Yamato's 18 inch guns will be devastating, but then as such close ranges would Yamato's armour resist 16 inch shells?

Penetrations of the main armour are only one part of the equation. Off Guadalcanal a Kongo class was put out of action in minutes when smothered by 15 & 20 cm projectiles. Penetrations if any were irrelevant as the superstructure, gun directors, communications, bridge, and turrets wrecked and set on fire.

The USN had favoured high RoF in design and heavily emphasised it in training since the war started. This helped offset the Japanese strengths.

Found a interesting analysis of USN doctrine for BB design of the old Standards BB & subsequent BB & cruiser design. Hopefully I'll be able to link that later today.
 
The analysis of USN battle line strength I refered to earlier, it seems is too large a PDF file for AHC to upload. Googling >American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2< by Alan D. Zimm, or >NWC comparison of battleline strengths< seems to get you to it eventually.

The core pages concerning USN design doctrine are from page 296 to 304 or 305 depending on how you read it. The short version is the USN calculated decisive hits/damage would start occuring at between 26,000 yards and 20,000 yards range. Perfect conditions enabling reliable decisive damage at 26k & variables degrading effect towards the lower number. Hence the surviving BB post PH were designed for the armor to have optimal resistance between 24 to 14k yards. The calculations the text describe concern armor resistance to main battery projectiles. Secondary damage outside the armor citadel & by secondary caliber weapons were seperate considerations, tho they also were seen with the limit of reliable damage occuring within the 20k yard zone.

Since the oversized 18" guns were unknown in the 1920s/30s they were not a consideration. Neither were problems with reliability in propellants (accuracy), fuzes, explosive charges, given anything less for the Japanese than what was expected from the US. Nor was there a 'Harbor Queen' effect on training (percent of hits).
 
Guess what many naval heads always wanted to see would have happened, namely Yamato fighting against americans BBs, you have 4 IJN vs 6 US (is Musashi still sunk in your TL?) BBs, plus escorting cruisers and DDs on both sides. An extremely bloody brawl with both sides eviscerated is a possible outcome of such an encounter imo, Yamato and probably Nagato are more powerful and definitely faster that any of the american BBs, but the Kongos are relatively fragile. If it gets to be a close combat like in November 1942, Yamato's 18 inch guns will be devastating, but then as such close ranges would Yamato's armour resist 16 inch shells?

Assuming Oldendorf is using similar tactics as Surigao (due to the fact his battleships and cruisers expended a good deal of AP shells bombarding Leyte), the T has been crossed, and the Japanese are likely bloodied from the USN's destroyers and possibly PT boats. I think the Japanese would have a harder time maneuvering simply due to the fact they are in a strait (how wide is the San Bernardino Strait anyway?) and they have 23 ships (no Musashi) trying to dodge and return fire.

I don't see Yamato performing as well as many would like. Assuming Oldendorf used similar tactics as Surigao Strait, the potential for Yamato suffering at least one torpedo hit should not be ruled out considering the number of torpedoes in the water. There is also the fact that Yamato has its T crossed against esesentially 5 battleships that can still hurt her superstructure and fire control systems at the range Oldendorf would likely order them to fire at (about 22-20 thousand yards (Pennsylvania can do what she likes with her not very optimal fire control system). Considering Yamato's position (attempting to sail through the San Bernardino Strait), she is not in the ideal battle conditions she would need to do well.

That's not to say Yamato or the other Japanese ships don't land a few hard blows against the Americans. If anything, I don't think it would be unreasonable for Yamato and possibly Nagato to withdraw effectively mission killed/crippled with 1-3 American battleships, a couple of cruisers, and 5-10 destroyers sinking or heavily damaged from Japanese heavy shells or torpedoes. I don't see the Kongos or many of the Japanese cruisers/destroyers making it back out alive. I doubt all of the US battleships would all concentrate on Yamato, and instead spread their fire our amongst the Japanese battleships and cruisers. Are these numbers too low or too high to be expected by 1944?

So the battle of San Bernardino Strait would finally bring that ultimate final brawl between battleships everyone wants. What is Admiral Nishimura's Southern Force up to?
 
Assuming Oldendorf is using similar tactics as Surigao (due to the fact his battleships and cruisers expended a good deal of AP shells bombarding Leyte), the T has been crossed, and the Japanese are likely bloodied from the USN's destroyers and possibly PT boats. I think the Japanese would have a harder time maneuvering simply due to the fact they are in a strait (how wide is the San Bernardino Strait anyway?) and they have 23 ships (no Musashi) trying to dodge and return fire.

I don't see Yamato performing as well as many would like. Assuming Oldendorf used similar tactics as Surigao Strait, the potential for Yamato suffering at least one torpedo hit should not be ruled out considering the number of torpedoes in the water. There is also the fact that Yamato has its T crossed against esesentially 5 battleships that can still hurt her superstructure and fire control systems at the range Oldendorf would likely order them to fire at (about 22-20 thousand yards (Pennsylvania can do what she likes with her not very optimal fire control system). Considering Yamato's position (attempting to sail through the San Bernardino Strait), she is not in the ideal battle conditions she would need to do well.

That's not to say Yamato or the other Japanese ships don't land a few hard blows against the Americans. If anything, I don't think it would be unreasonable for Yamato and possibly Nagato to withdraw effectively mission killed/crippled with 1-3 American battleships, a couple of cruisers, and 5-10 destroyers sinking or heavily damaged from Japanese heavy shells or torpedoes. I don't see the Kongos or many of the Japanese cruisers/destroyers making it back out alive. I doubt all of the US battleships would all concentrate on Yamato, and instead spread their fire our amongst the Japanese battleships and cruisers. Are these numbers too low or too high to be expected by 1944?

So the battle of San Bernardino Strait would finally bring that ultimate final brawl between battleships everyone wants. What is Admiral Nishimura's Southern Force up to?

The Southern Force is going full throttle towards the beachheads. They will take damage from the defending destroyers and the Taffys' airstrikes. There is no guarantee that the Japanese won't reach the beachhead or the fleeing transports.
 
wasn't the beaches defended by like 100 destroyers IIRC that would be more than enough to smash the southern force
 
The Southern Force is going full throttle towards the beachheads. They will take damage from the defending destroyers and the Taffys' airstrikes. There is no guarantee that the Japanese won't reach the beachhead or the fleeing transports.

Nishimuras southern group came through Surgaio Strait at night & would have made contact with the outer edge of the several transport groups before dawn. Nishimuras force was split, with a smaller second group that was nominally under Nishimuras command, but largely uncoordinated came through the strait a hour or two behind the larger group, attempting to catch up. On the US side there is the question of what orders the PT boat group would receive; move north to reinforce the PT boats near San Bernadino strait, or remain in the south. There is also the question of how many escorts were assigned directly to the transport groups as ASW & AA defense.

Looking at the aftermath of the battle. Nothing is certain here, but it may lead to a early examination of MacAurthurs command methods that contributed to the confusion and misplacement of the US fleets, specifically Halseys group/s. The propensity of Mac & his staff too over control communications & put up barriers in the chain of command was not new, & bode ill for the eventual CORONET & OLYMPIC operations.
 
By doing further investigating (using Navweaps), Oldendorf had 28 US and 1 Australian destroyers. The Taffy groups have 23 destroyers and destroyers escorts. Since Oldendorf is covering the San Bernardino against the possibility of attack from the Center Force, he likely takes more destroyers (40?). This would leave anywhere from 40-60 destroyers/destroyer escorts and the USS Nashville directly defending the transport groups

If Admiral Nishimura arrived unexpectedly from the south, I suspect Kincaid would panic and order all escort ships (including the USS Nashville as his heaviest surface ship in the immediate area) to defend his transports. How many ships (escorts and transports) can Nishimura realistically expect to damage or sink before he is eventually overwhelmed or withdraws?

In the highly unlikely event McArthur or Kincaid (or both) are killed, what would be the overall implications of this alt-Battle of the Leyte Gulf (comprised primarily of alt-"Kincaid's Last Stand", OTL Cape Engano, OTL Battle of the Sibuyon, and alt-Battle of the San Bernardino Strait)?
 
One possibility is Oldendorfs command is ordered south to deal with the emergency, leaving the Bernadino strait open when the Japanese northern force arrives hours later. That is dependent on the USN not understanding what or where the northern force is. A second possibility is Oldedorfs group is split, leaving a portion in place and the new group rushing south to deal with the new emergency.
 
Quick look at Wikipedia says Nishimura entered the Surigao Strait at around 0200 hours. He could reach the first serious naval opposition at the invasion beaches by anytime from 0430 to 0600

Kurita exited the San Bernardino Strait at 0300 hours in OTL. I think Oldendorf would be quite busy by the time Nishimura arrives. Therefore Kincaid is truly alone until the Taffy air groups arrive.

If anyone has the hours from a more reputable source of when both Japanese admirals were in the straits, that would be appreciated.
 
The lead group of the South TF was destroyed between 03:00 & 04:00. The smaller following group turned back a little after 04:00.

The Central TF, Nishimuras group came under fire between 04:00 & 05:00 shortly after dawn. This location was well clear of the San Bernardino Strait. A look at the maps should make sequence of events clear.
 
That's not to say Yamato or the other Japanese ships don't land a few hard blows against the Americans. If anything, I don't think it would be unreasonable for Yamato and possibly Nagato to withdraw effectively mission killed/crippled with 1-3 American battleships, a couple of cruisers, and 5-10 destroyers sinking or heavily damaged from Japanese heavy shells or torpedoes.
Nishimura's fleet didn't get a single hit on the American BBs IOTL. I don't see how Kurita's force would perform any different.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Nishimura's fleet had also been ravaged and disrupted by PTB and DD attacks before running into Oldendorf's battle line. The Japanese also only had 2 battleships with them in the Southern Force (only one by the time Oldendorf engaged) verses the 4 that the Center Force had. It's not unreasonable to assume a stronger, more effective response from Kurita's battle line.


Nishimura's fleet didn't get a single hit on the American BBs IOTL. I don't see how Kurita's force would perform any different.
 
The Japanese have three problems
1) The Americans have 4 destroyers for every Japanese destroyer
2) It would be a night battle,with Superior radar the Americans would see the Japanese first.
3) The Japanese fleet was stationed near their oil supplies in Malaysia, they hadn't had proper gunnery practice in over a year.That's why their gunnery was so atrocious in OTL.
The Japanese fleet wouldn't know the American fleet was there until the lead ship took 6-12 torpedos (probably Yamato) and find their T crossed by the American fleet.
 
The Japanese also only had 2 battleships with them in the Southern Force (only one by the time Oldendorf engaged) verses the 4 that the Center Force had. It's not unreasonable to assume a stronger, more effective response from Kurita's battle line.
More BBs doesn't mean a thing when the US has superior fire control systems.
 
I'm asking myself two things. One, what happens to the sub sighting report? Two, what happens to the "stooging about" that left Halsey thinking the Japanese TF had turned back, when it was just killing time? Or do these two things combine to give Nishimura his opportunity? It seems he got by two USN subs, Darter (David McClintock) & Dace (Bladen Claggett; yes, that's his name), off the southwestern end of Palawan. (The rest were further north, all in the South China Sea; there were none in the Sulu Sea.)
 
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