Battle of Peachtree Creek with Johnston in Command

Anaxagoras

Banned
IOTL, Jefferson Davis removed General Joe Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee on July 17, 1864, and replaced him with General John Bell Hood. Three days later, the Army of Tennessee attacked the Army of the Cumberland as it crossed Peachtree Creek north of Atlanta and, after bitter fighting, was beaten back.

Both Hood and Johnston essentially said later on that the plan to attack the AotC as it crossed Peachtree Creek was Johnston's general idea. Considering that the two men could otherwise not be counted on to agree as to the color of an orange, it seems reasonable to assume that they were both telling the truth. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that Johnston would have attacked the AotC (commanded by General George Thomas) in rather the same manner as Hood did IOTL had he been retained in command.

How would the Battle of Peachtree Creek have been different had Johnston been in command?

A few things jump out at me. First, Benjamin Cheatham would still have been in command of his Tennessee division, since IOTL he was appointed to take over the command of Hood's corps. IOTL, the division was taken over by General Maney, who clearly had a very hard time adapting to the role of division commander and scarcely fired a shot during the entire battle. This played a major role in the failure of the Confederate effort. Had Cheatham been in command, he could have been counted upon to hit the Union forces hard and effectively.

Second, it seems to me that General Hardee was irritated and upset by having General Hood promoted over him and that this may well have affected his performance at Peachtree Creek. Had Johnston remained in command, it may well have been that he would have fought on July 20 with a good deal of greater effectiveness.

Third, whatever his flaws, Johnston was a more thorough administrator than was Hood. IOTL, the troops attacking the Yankees at Peachtree Creek had done a very poor job of reconnaissance. Had Johnston been in command, it is possible that the planning would have been much better. There is an inevitable confusion when a new commander takes over from an old one and this disorder seems to have had a bad effect on the AoT just before Peachtree Creek.

Thoughts?
 
IOTL, Jefferson Davis removed General Joe Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee on July 17, 1864, and replaced him with General John Bell Hood. Three days later, the Army of Tennessee attacked the Army of the Cumberland as it crossed Peachtree Creek north of Atlanta and, after bitter fighting, was beaten back.

Both Hood and Johnston essentially said later on that the plan to attack the AotC as it crossed Peachtree Creek was Johnston's general idea. Considering that the two men could otherwise not be counted on to agree as to the color of an orange, it seems reasonable to assume that they were both telling the truth. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that Johnston would have attacked the AotC (commanded by General George Thomas) in rather the same manner as Hood did IOTL had he been retained in command.

How would the Battle of Peachtree Creek have been different had Johnston been in command?

A few things jump out at me. First, Benjamin Cheatham would still have been in command of his Tennessee division, since IOTL he was appointed to take over the command of Hood's corps. IOTL, the division was taken over by General Maney, who clearly had a very hard time adapting to the role of division commander and scarcely fired a shot during the entire battle. This played a major role in the failure of the Confederate effort. Had Cheatham been in command, he could have been counted upon to hit the Union forces hard and effectively.

Second, it seems to me that General Hardee was irritated and upset by having General Hood promoted over him and that this may well have affected his performance at Peachtree Creek. Had Johnston remained in command, it may well have been that he would have fought on July 20 with a good deal of greater effectiveness.

Third, whatever his flaws, Johnston was a more thorough administrator than was Hood. IOTL, the troops attacking the Yankees at Peachtree Creek had done a very poor job of reconnaissance. Had Johnston been in command, it is possible that the planning would have been much better. There is an inevitable confusion when a new commander takes over from an old one and this disorder seems to have had a bad effect on the AoT just before Peachtree Creek.

Thoughts?

The Confederates will lose the war. :D

But seriously speaking, I have no idea...
 
The problem was not so much Hood as an administrator or tactician, it was the same old "We in the Army of Tennessee obey orders only when it suits us" problem in a new form. Given why J.J. was fired IOTL I don't think *that* problem is going to change regardless of who's in charge, nor do I think Johnston's any better against the defensive genius of George Thomas than Hood will be.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The problem was not so much Hood as an administrator or tactician, it was the same old "We in the Army of Tennessee obey orders only when it suits us" problem in a new form. Given why J.J. was fired IOTL I don't think *that* problem is going to change regardless of who's in charge, nor do I think Johnston's any better against the defensive genius of George Thomas than Hood will be.

But assuming the general dispositions remain the same (and there is no reason to assume otherwise, given the dispositions that existed at the time of the POD three days before), the corps commanders in question in this case would be Hardee and Stewart, both of whom had a solid relationship with Johnston. Hood, who had botched the earlier counter attack at Cassville, would have been off to the east side of the city keeping an eye on McPherson and Schofield.
 
But assuming the general dispositions remain the same (and there is no reason to assume otherwise, given the dispositions that existed at the time of the POD three days before), the corps commanders in question in this case would be Hardee and Stewart, both of whom had a solid relationship with Johnston. Hood, who had botched the earlier counter attack at Cassville, would have been off to the east side of the city keeping an eye on McPherson and Schofield.

That's still not going to change the friction of war issues that delayed the attack which Hood, at least, had no direct control of. Changing commanders won't change that aspect of friction and if they charge at Thomas's army when it's all over the river the outcome will be the same as OTL in the broad picture and only differ in some of the details.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
That's still not going to change the friction of war issues that delayed the attack which Hood, at least, had no direct control of. Changing commanders won't change that aspect of friction and if they charge at Thomas's army when it's all over the river the outcome will be the same as OTL in the broad picture and only differ in some of the details.

The details of how and when the attack would be mounted would obviously be affected by minor butterflies. IOTL, however, it would have been much worse for the Confederates had they attacked when scheduled and from their original positions.
 
Both Hood and Johnston essentially said later on that the plan to attack the AotC as it crossed Peachtree Creek was Johnston's general idea.

After-the-fact spin control that may have to be taken with at least a small grain of salt. Look at the list of strong positions from which Johnston had previously retreated (some with good reason, true). He made it clear that he did not regard the all-out defense of Atlanta as a thing worth wrecking his army for; Atlanta was on its own if he felt there was a chance of a dangerous defeat. The point of which is simply that, with Johnston in command, there is no guarantee of a Battle of Peachtree Creek occurring. His priority was the maintenance of his army rather than the retention of Atlanta, a reasonable (if flawed) priority which his civilian superior did not, apparently, share.
 

Flubber

Banned
IOTL, however, it would have been much worse for the Confederates had they attacked when scheduled and from their original positions.


In the OTL, however, they didn't attack when scheduled or from their original positions and this POD doesn't plausibly change that.

As Sanke correctly pointed out, the Army of the Tennessee suffered from the same debilitating "We obey orders how and when we choose" problem which the Army of the Potomac labored under for the course of the war.

Hood or Johnston, it doesn't matter. The AoT is still going to be dysfunctional in that regard just as it was throughout the war and nothing in the POD has changed that.
 
After-the-fact spin control that may have to be taken with at least a small grain of salt. Look at the list of strong positions from which Johnston had previously retreated (some with good reason, true). He made it clear that he did not regard the all-out defense of Atlanta as a thing worth wrecking his army for; Atlanta was on its own if he felt there was a chance of a dangerous defeat. The point of which is simply that, with Johnston in command, there is no guarantee of a Battle of Peachtree Creek occurring. His priority was the maintenance of his army rather than the retention of Atlanta, a reasonable (if flawed) priority which his civilian superior did not, apparently, share.

Eh, even Johnston realized it was sink or swim at that point if he wanted any chance of preserving his career at all as far as a combat post. So I don't doubt he would have fought Peachtree Creek. Whether a Siege of Atlanta or another patented retreat would have followed Peachtree Creek is the bigger question.
 
After-the-fact spin control that may have to be taken with at least a small grain of salt. Look at the list of strong positions from which Johnston had previously retreated (some with good reason, true). He made it clear that he did not regard the all-out defense of Atlanta as a thing worth wrecking his army for; Atlanta was on its own if he felt there was a chance of a dangerous defeat. The point of which is simply that, with Johnston in command, there is no guarantee of a Battle of Peachtree Creek occurring. His priority was the maintenance of his army rather than the retention of Atlanta, a reasonable (if flawed) priority which his civilian superior did not, apparently, share.

When Bragg arrived with the Army of Tennessee and was debriefed by Johnston he was told of Johnston's general plan to attack in the Peechtree Creek area and the Federals tried to cross. There was no concrete plan, nothing written down. It was known amongst the AoT's commanders that Johnston's intent was to do this.

Bragg neglected to tell Davis of this intent and he, Hood and Wheeler conspired to tell him that Johnston intended to pull out without a fight. Of course Johnston's wasn't helped but his refusal to corispond with Davis via Telegram about his intention.

Johnston's stated plan was to use the militia to man the Atlanta defenses and use that as a kind of hinge to maneuver his army around to meet the different Federal attempts to advance. Undoubtedly he would not hold the city if there was a chance that it would destroy his army but that does not mean he wouldn't put up a fight.
 
Eh, even Johnston realized it was sink or swim at that point if he wanted any chance of preserving his career at all as far as a combat post. So I don't doubt he would have fought Peachtree Creek. Whether a Siege of Atlanta or another patented retreat would have followed Peachtree Creek is the bigger question.


I'm not claiming that he was certain to have performed another patented Johnston retreat. It is possible that his claims, and those of others, that he was just about to launch that long-looked-for big fight that he had assiduously avoided for months, but was relieved at the midnight hour, so to speak, have some merit. I don't believe that, as is probably clear, but I grant that he MAY have fought. More than some skirmishing, I mean.

My own opinion is that he would have kept retreating until the Army of Tennessee became the Army of Florida.
 
I'm not claiming that he was certain to have performed another patented Johnston retreat. It is possible that his claims, and those of others, that he was just about to launch that long-looked-for big fight that he had assiduously avoided for months, but was relieved at the midnight hour, so to speak, have some merit. I don't believe that, as is probably clear, but I grant that he MAY have fought. More than some skirmishing, I mean.

My own opinion is that he would have kept retreating until the Army of Tennessee became the Army of Florida.

Joe Johnston realized at the crudest level if he retreated from Atlanta without a fight even his political backers would abandon him. This would be simple self-preservation.
 
I'm not claiming that he was certain to have performed another patented Johnston retreat. It is possible that his claims, and those of others, that he was just about to launch that long-looked-for big fight that he had assiduously avoided for months, but was relieved at the midnight hour, so to speak, have some merit. I don't believe that, as is probably clear, but I grant that he MAY have fought. More than some skirmishing, I mean.

My own opinion is that he would have kept retreating until the Army of Tennessee became the Army of Florida.

Johnston had fought two big fights in the Atlanta Campaign in OTL. Resaca and Kennessaw Mountain. Neither were on the scale of the titanic struggles between Lee and Grant but they were in insignificant.

At Resaca pretty much the entirity of Johnston's Army of Tennessee was engaged in combat against Sherman - about 60,000 men against about 99,000.

At Kennessaw Mountain Johnston's whole army was arranged in defensive positions while Sherman's three Armies opposed him. The Federal Army of the Tennessee attacked and were repulsed.

Additionally there the case of the Cassville offensive which Hood blew. So saying Johnston avoided big fights is not wholely accurate, saying he avoided big fights where the circumstances weren't in his favour would be a more accurate assessment.

And Johnston would never have gone to Florida with an Army. He knew Florida well and knew it wasn't a place for big armies. Furthermore, if driven to the coast, he would head towards Virginia in the hope of linking up with Lee.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Eh, even Johnston realized it was sink or swim at that point if he wanted any chance of preserving his career at all as far as a combat post. So I don't doubt he would have fought Peachtree Creek. Whether a Siege of Atlanta or another patented retreat would have followed Peachtree Creek is the bigger question.

I pretty much agree with you here. My belief is that a Confederate attack at Peachtree Creek would have had a better chance had it taken place under Johnston's command than it actually had under Hood's. The plan was very good and had the potential to inflict substantial damage to the Army of the Cumberland.

IOTL, Hood attacked Sherman three times in a bit more than a week, always losing and always suffering much heavier losses than he inflicted. Even so, he was able to hold Atlanta for a month-and-a-half. If Johnston had remained in command, he might possibly have done even better. I do not believe that Johnston had the resources to defeat Sherman outright. At best, a major victory at Peachtree Creek might have forced Sherman to withdraw temporarily to the north bank of the Chattahoochee River. But it certainly opens the doors to many possibilities.
 
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