Battle of Midway

Hi All,

I always thought that it was impossible for the United States to have lost World War II due to its potential for titantic production of war materials. In other words, there were times when, had things not gone our way, the outcome of the war would have been delayed only. Examples of this is the Battle of Midway and the Invasion of Normandy.

I recently read something to the contrary which I share here with regard to the Battle of Midway.

Prior to the Battle of Midway, the Japanese Imperial Navy was significantly superior to that of the United States. All things being equal, victory should have been Japan's. The decoding of the Japanese Naval messages alerted us to the time and place of the planned attack and enabled us to be there unbeknownst to the Japanese. Thus, all things were no longer equal.

Admiral Nimitz took a tremendous gamble going into this battle even with the knowledge that he had but he really had no choice. Something needed to be done to stop the Japanese and this was the only game in town. Had he not moved as he did, the Japanese would only have consolidated their very strong position further.

The very troubling "what if" that I read was "What if the United States had lost this battle?". It's troubling because it was a real possiblity and it seems that we came perilously close to losing. We could have lost three carriers without the Japanese losing any.

Had this happened, a respected author who I cannot remember but probably will shortly, stated that the Japanese would have consolidated their gains and the sum total of the production capabilities of the axis would then have been significantly greater than ours. We would have lost the war.

My understanding of losing this war is that the Japanese would have had total control of the western Pacific and Hitler would have won the Battle of the Atlantic, and eventually Britain would have succumbed. We would have continued as we were but would have been isolated.

Please comment.

Thank you,

Bob Guercio
 
I don't see how this will boost axis production capacity. The United States could draw upon two continents with ease. The axis had Europe, numerous islands in the Pacific that werent integrated into Japan's economy. And Nazi Germany was facing gargantuan logistical nightmares holding down Europe. Sure it may have delayed things for a very long time. But the SU, Great Britain and her still majestic empire and the United States had so much more production ability it wasn't funny to compare.
 
I always thought an interesting scenario would be what if the Japanese realized the US was reading it's codes and used this to their advantage by falsifying orders to give the IJN tactical advantages during the Pacific theater.

Prior to Midway especially.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Welcome to the Board!

If you search this subject, I believe you will find a number of threads where this subject is discussed at length.

Put simply, the Japanese could have sunk every ship the U.S. sent to Midway, taken the Island (the two do not necessarily go together), and built a base there, and still have lost the war by late 1945.

One of Japan's great failures was that none of its conquests had any real manufacturing capacity at all, most of the territory Japan acquired wasn't even fully capable of self support. This was in stark contrast to Germany, which did gain greatly from its conquests.

It is worth noting that the U.S. UK AND USSR ALL outproduced Germany duringt the war individually and Germany far outproduced Japan. The thought of the Axis outproducing the Allies is almost silly. The author you mention must have seriously done his sums wrong.

Hi All,

I always thought that it was impossible for the United States to have lost World War II due to its potential for titantic production of war materials. In other words, there were times when, had things not gone our way, the outcome of the war would have been delayed only. Examples of this is the Battle of Midway and the Invasion of Normandy.

I recently read something to the contrary which I share here with regard to the Battle of Midway.

Prior to the Battle of Midway, the Japanese Imperial Navy was significantly superior to that of the United States. All things being equal, victory should have been Japan's. The decoding of the Japanese Naval messages alerted us to the time and place of the planned attack and enabled us to be there unbeknownst to the Japanese. Thus, all things were no longer equal.

Admiral Nimitz took a tremendous gamble going into this battle even with the knowledge that he had but he really had no choice. Something needed to be done to stop the Japanese and this was the only game in town. Had he not moved as he did, the Japanese would only have consolidated their very strong position further.

The very troubling "what if" that I read was "What if the United States had lost this battle?". It's troubling because it was a real possiblity and it seems that we came perilously close to losing. We could have lost three carriers without the Japanese losing any.

Had this happened, a respected author who I cannot remember but probably will shortly, stated that the Japanese would have consolidated their gains and the sum total of the production capabilities of the axis would then have been significantly greater than ours. We would have lost the war.

My understanding of losing this war is that the Japanese would have had total control of the western Pacific and Hitler would have won the Battle of the Atlantic, and eventually Britain would have succumbed. We would have continued as we were but would have been isolated.

Please comment.

Thank you,

Bob Guercio
 
Welcome to the Board!

If you search this subject, I believe you will find a number of threads where this subject is discussed at length.

Put simply, the Japanese could have sunk every ship the U.S. sent to Midway, taken the Island (the two do not necessarily go together), and built a base there, and still have lost the war by late 1945.

One of Japan's great failures was that none of its conquests had any real manufacturing capacity at all, most of the territory Japan acquired wasn't even fully capable of self support. This was in stark contrast to Germany, which did gain greatly from its conquests.

It is worth noting that the U.S. UK AND USSR ALL outproduced Germany duringt the war individually and Germany far outproduced Japan. The thought of the Axis outproducing the Allies is almost silly. The author you mention must have seriously done his sums wrong.

Thanks for confirming my original thoughts on this subject.

I hope that I remember exactly where I came across that piece of erroneous information. I must check it and, if I read it correctly, I'll let you guys know who the author is. If I didn't read it correctly, just thanks.

Bob Guercio
 
I'm still going to have to say I'm of the opinion a best-case Japanese victory @ Midway would not have any meaningful long-term effects on the PTO. check out that combinedfleet site; one of the sections in there shows how in 1 year (44?) U.S production outpaced something like the 10-year production of Japan. I don't know what author your referring to either, but I hope you didnt buy his book because something tells me it probably isn't worth the paper it was written on, hope this wasn't too "buzzkill", though. Cheers
 
Since this has already been talked about, and with no offense intended to the original poster, perhaps a good way to go is to wonder just what could have been. What I mean by that is, what if Japan had stayed out of the war long enough, to allow what Japan could have built by 1945 to be built?

That link CalBear posted surmised a possible 34 aircraft carriers from the US against 19 from Japan. Move a battle like Leyte Gulf, and have all of that fight in it, complete with the BBs both sides had. Imagine the size of the naval battle that could have been! :eek:
 
I always thought an interesting scenario would be what if the Japanese realized the US was reading it's codes and used this to their advantage by falsifying orders to give the IJN tactical advantages during the Pacific theater.

Prior to Midway especially.

IIRC this is part of THE MOSCOW OPTION, where the IJN gets proof the USN is reading their mail. The Port Morsby operation is cancelled (thus no Coral Sea) and the USN advances to Midway only to have the Decoy Force hit them from behind.
 
Thanks for confirming my original thoughts on this subject.

I hope that I remember exactly where I came across that piece of erroneous information. I must check it and, if I read it correctly, I'll let you guys know who the author is. If I didn't read it correctly, just thanks.

Bob Guercio

I came upon this information in "Choices Under Fire" by Michael Bess. It was discussed in Chapter 7 entitled "Decisions At Midway, 1942". Bess painted a very grim picture.

In general, what are your thoughts about Bess as an historian. For the most part I thought this was a pretty good book but now I'm wondering if I'm totally off base.
Bob Guercio
 

Markus

Banned
One of Japan's great failures was that none of its conquests had any real manufacturing capacity at all, most of the territory Japan acquired wasn't even fully capable of self support. This was in stark contrast to Germany, which did gain greatly from its conquests.

Speaking of territorry, did you read Eric M. Bergerud´s books about the SWPA? What a hellhole that place must have been. Less than half a dozen towns in the 2,000 inhabitants range, no railroads or roads but enough diseases to keep biologists and medical researchers busy for decades.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Speaking of territorry, did you read Eric M. Bergerud´s books about the SWPA? What a hellhole that place must have been. Less than half a dozen towns in the 2,000 inhabitants range, no railroads or roads but enough diseases to keep biologists and medical researchers busy for decades.

Decades? Try Centuries.:eek:

I especially liked Fire in the Sky. A wider view of the Theater than found in Lundstrom's excellent, but tightly focused, works.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I came upon this information in "Choices Under Fire" by Michael Bess. It was discussed in Chapter 7 entitled "Decisions At Midway, 1942". Bess painted a very grim picture.

In general, what are your thoughts about Bess as an historian. For the most part I thought this was a pretty good book but now I'm wondering if I'm totally off base.
Bob Guercio

I haven't read this book, but I am generally leery of any effort to find a moral similarity between the Western Allies and the Axis during WW II.

For further reading on Midway, I would suggest Shattered Sword by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. The book is brilliantly researched and documented, including a number of Japanese language sources that have not previously been accessed by Western researchers. It explodes a number of the many myths that have grown over the years regarding the battle while still being extremely readable.

http://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-Untold-Battle-Midway/dp/1574889249/ref=pd_sim_b_5
 

Markus

Banned
Decades? Try Centuries.:eek:

I especially liked Fire in the Sky. A wider view of the Theater than found in Lundstrom's excellent, but tightly focused, works.

The emphasis he put on infrastructure was very informative. No wonder things moved so seemingly slow. I have not finished "Touched by Fire" yet, but the invasion fleet the sailed to Buna could have come straight from Crete: fishing boats and small sailing ships! But not even trying to bring artillery with them? *gulp*
 

Hnau

Banned
In Robert Cowley's What If it goes over this scenario. For one thing, the U.S. population is going to face another Pearl Harbor scare... the Japanese are perceived as even more terrifying foes. No turning of the tide. More people are going to push for a Japan First course of the war. What could such butterflies do to the American participation on the European Front? Perhaps Overlord or the invasion of Italy is delayed. That could be bad.

Worst-case scenario, it says in What If, is that the Japanese could somehow attack Hawaii again, this time with occupation forces, around December 1942. Even the writer says that its unlikely they'd succeed, but maybe the U.S. loses the islands. San Francisco becomes the main headquarters for the Pacific War. Legislators and generals over-react, calling for so many more soldiers to be drafted, thus jamming the system and causing massive inefficiencies. They also decide that it would probably be easier to end the war by taking the Alaska Option. A "superhighway" is built, a series of military bases, air strips, huge ice-free roads, all they way up to Juneau and other important ports on the Alaskan coast. The American fleet is to be gathered off of Alaska and fight its way down the Aleutian Isles, then to the Kuriles, and finally launch an invasion of Hokkaido. No island-hopping across the entire Pacific Ocean. Just a swift strike to the head.

That entire endeavor, though, the building of some Alaskan superhighway, probably means less money is diverted to the Manhattan Project. Nuclear bombs could be delayed. And, as I've mentioned, the Nazis might still be in power in Europe if the U.S. freaks out and decides that they need to take out Japan before decisively attacking the Third Reich.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
In Robert Cowley's What If it goes over this scenario. For one thing, the U.S. population is going to face another Pearl Harbor scare... the Japanese are perceived as even more terrifying foes. No turning of the tide. More people are going to push for a Japan First course of the war. What could such butterflies do to the American participation on the European Front? Perhaps Overlord or the invasion of Italy is delayed. That could be bad.

Worst-case scenario, it says in What If, is that the Japanese could somehow attack Hawaii again, this time with occupation forces, around December 1942. Even the writer says that its unlikely they'd succeed, but maybe the U.S. loses the islands. San Francisco becomes the main headquarters for the Pacific War. Legislators and generals over-react, calling for so many more soldiers to be drafted, thus jamming the system and causing massive inefficiencies. They also decide that it would probably be easier to end the war by taking the Alaska Option. A "superhighway" is built, a series of military bases, air strips, huge ice-free roads, all they way up to Juneau and other important ports on the Alaskan coast. The American fleet is to be gathered off of Alaska and fight its way down the Aleutian Isles, then to the Kuriles, and finally launch an invasion of Hokkaido. No island-hopping across the entire Pacific Ocean. Just a swift strike to the head.

That entire endeavor, though, the building of some Alaskan superhighway, probably means less money is diverted to the Manhattan Project. Nuclear bombs could be delayed. And, as I've mentioned, the Nazis might still be in power in Europe if the U.S. freaks out and decides that they need to take out Japan before decisively attacking the Third Reich.

Japan COULDN'T make a second attack on Pearl Harbor. By the time of Midway, the U.S. had over 150 modern fighters on the Oahu, as well as roughly 36 heavy bombers, a couple squadrons of medium bombers, a couple squadrons of Navy SBD squadrons working up, and tons of AAA, all of which was manned or on alert at all times. Pearl Harbor worked for a lot of reasons, the biggest, by far, being total tactical surprise. That would not have been the case in a second attempt half a year later. The Kido Butai would have died off Oahu, just a certainly as it died off Midway.

As far as invading Oahu, it was a ABSOLUTE impossibility. The Japanese invasion force for Midway was 2,500 men TOTAL. That was all the Japanese could bring together. Imagine invading Oahu, which by the time of Midway had several DIVISIONS of troops on duty, with a reinforced regiment. The invaders would have been lucky to get a squad on the beach alive and with their equipment.

In order to get more troops, the IJN would have needed the Army to reduce forces in China. That was flat not going to happen. China was where the Army wanted to fight, it was where the Army was going to fight, and anyone interfering in that goal was as likely to be assassinated as have morning tea. As far as the IJA was concerned the Fleet was already over extending the perimeter it was expecting the Army to defend. Even then the IJN would have to be able to support a multi-divisional landing force several thousand miles from any useful bases (the closest would be in the Mandates). Japan couldn't logistically support a force that size at that distance, not a chance on Earth. Actually, in mid 1942 there wasn't ANY nation on Earth that could support a multi-division assault more than 2,500 miles of open water from the nearest land base (The August 1942 U.S. landing on Guadalcanal (~1,400 miles from Brisbane) was by roughly two brigades and it stretched allied resources to the limit. Operation Torch had support facilities as close as Gibraltar, not to mention heavy air resources in the Western Desert, but it qualified as the first true long range amphibious assault of divisional during the war.)

If you look at Japan's conquests during the war, you will note that they were not done by very large forces using amphibious assaults. the assaults were done by small force, generally regimental in size, with a couple of larger landings in the Gulf of Siam and on Luzon. In those cases the attacks were supported by land bases less than 300 miles away and under land based air cover, with the largest attack, by roughly 44,000 men happening on Luzon against scattered resistance and with total command of the air and seas with several large Japanese bases only a few hundred miles distant on Formosa. Japan lacked the sea lift to transport and support a multi-divisional force at any distance from a land facility.
 

Markus

Banned
Worst-case scenario, it says in What If, is that the Japanese could somehow attack Hawaii again, this time with occupation forces, around December 1942. Even the writer says that its unlikely they'd succeed, but maybe the U.S. loses the islands. San Francisco becomes the main headquarters for the Pacific War. Legislators and generals over-react, calling for so many more soldiers to be drafted, thus jamming the system and causing massive inefficiencies.

That entire endeavor, though, the building of some Alaskan superhighway, probably means less money is diverted to the Manhattan Project. Nuclear bombs could be delayed. And, as I've mentioned, the Nazis might still be in power in Europe if the U.S. freaks out and decides that they need to take out Japan before decisively attacking the Third Reich.


Typical example of American over pessimism! The US was so filthy rich they could have financed that easily. In case you don´t want to raise taxes again you can always look at the way you spend the money. Montana class BB, Alaska class not-BC and light tanks are items you don´t need at all or in smaller numbers.
But I admit I like the northern option. Ok, the weather sucks and there is next to no infrastructure but that is the same as in the SWPA. At least its too cold for Malaria and Co. Speaking of the SWPA.

After a success at Midway the Japanese intended to target the LOC to Australia by invading islands like Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. While they would have little to fear from US carriers each of the islands was guarded by at least one Army or Marine regiment. Given how incredibly bad the Japanese infantry did against well prepared western troops, this offensive would not have gone far.
 
Top