I realize that we always have to allow some chance for a war to go the other way, and it's not ever zero. But the Pacific War was about as foreordained a major war as one can come up with. After Pearl Harbor, the United States was in to the finish, barring some other major intervening setback. That determination was only magnified once knowledge of Japanese atrocities against U.S. POW's started become public. A setback at Midway or the Solomons may delay when that "finish" happens a little, but the finish will come just the same.
Even with what Zuikaku had on hand of her own survivors along with Shokaku's, that's still not far off (6 short) of her nominal complement, and even by itself (even allowing for the fact that these crews had no experience working with each other) would still have provided a substantial augmentation of Naguma's striking power. Shattered Sword (p. 66-7) makes a a sound argument that Zuikaku could have been available had Yamamato deemed her presence necessary, and the difference would have been significant - certainly it would have increased the odds for a better IJN result, or at least driven up the costs of the victory for Nimitz. (Ask Nimitz whether he'd rather have faced four Japanese decks or five; I think we all know how he would answer.) And having Yamamoto decide to add Zuikaku is arguably the easiest and most plausible "helpful" P.O.D. one can come up with on the Japanese side. It doesn't require any change at all to his strategy, or to Japanese tactics or capabilities.
That said, what Calbear has said here and else where must be kept in mind: Even with different numbers of decks and planes on either side, certain IJN disadvantages are not going away. The U.S. still has detailed and accurate intelligence on what Yamamoto plans to do where, when and how (a tremendous advantage), whereas Yamamoto (and perhaps more to the point, Nagumo) almost completely lacks such information about Nimitz's forces. The Japanese still have very poor damage control, poor CAP tactics and coordination, problematic and inflexible carrier doctrine, and very poor AA capability that offset their well known advantages. Her planes are also more fragile. That doesn't mean that the U.S. victory is inevitable, with or without Zuikaku or Saratoga on hand, but it does mean that there's no changing the fact that the U.S. had some rather profound advantages at Midway. But that's what Shattered Sword tries to point out.
Thank you for your thoughtful reply. A few points if i may.
Actually the CardDiv5 aviators flew together practically since the start of the war, as you know the japanese routinely sent combined strikes by carrier division. I don't think the fact that they would fly from the same ship would make things for them any worse in regards to coordination. They would probably be tired and weary in a way after Coral Sea, but if they get into the air they will have a few accounts to settle, so they will be as dangerous as ever.
As for the japanese disadvantages, indeed they were there but i think they are overblown to a certain extent. Their carrier doctrine imo was excellent in 1942, they could launch large, balanced strikes in 10 minutes, while the americans were bumbling for up to an hour to put their planes in the air. Imo, if the americans would have followed a similar doctrine, i.e. launch a portion of the strike at the time and combine carrier groups where possible, they could have achieved more than they did during IOTL 1942. Imagine TF16 flying together 36 SBD, 29 TBD and 20 F4F and leaving at 07.30 after a quick launch, no messing about with waiting, forming, airgroups going in different directions and all that. Just clear orders to Ring, "go on course 240 to 155 miles (or whatever it was)" They could be followed by the second wave of say another 36 SBD and 10 F4F leaving about 08.30. This not mentioning Yorktown's strike of 6 F4F, 17 SBD and 12 TBD leaving at 09.00, probably the Yorktown strike wouldn't find any carrier intact by the time they got there! The americans would almost certainly avoid the massacre of the torpedo planes in this case, their CVs historically lost 70 planes on June 4, but the losses imo would have been half that at most if they would have operated as described above.
Also note how during the major carrier battles of 1942 almost always the US strike groups either obtained disproportionally low results for their numbers (with exception of Midway, the decisive exception i might say), or they got lost, or attacked the wrong ships, or going in strikes piecemeal and all that.
Eventually the americans adopted multiple 3 or 4 carriers in the same screen task forces, like the japanese did. If Yorktown would have been in the same screen with Hornet and Enterprise or at least close to them, you can bet your boots she is likely not sunk, Kobayashi's and Tomonaga's brave men would have had to face 30 or 40 Wildcats, not 12 or whatever it was.
As for CAP, despite having no radar, at Midway the Zeros still massacred five waves of american aircraft, but they were finally overcame by numbers. Yes they had no radar, that was a serious flaw, but i'm sure the american CAP doctrine would have been very similar the year before, when they had no radars on their ships either. Conversely, even if despite having radar, the american CAP was frequently misplaced and many times they failed to intercept japanese strikes during the CV battles of 1942.
Regarding damage control, maybe the USN was better comparatively in 1942, but they lost Lexington when they shouln't have really. Conversely, all four japanese CVs at Midway were scuttled, rather than sinking because of the devasation atop. If they didn't had hangars full with armed and fueled aircraft when hit, it's very likely most or all would have survived. The attack happening right at the time when the carriers were at their most vulnerable, apart from the risks inherent of the japanese doctrine and the particular circumstances pertaining that morning, must be partly blamed on the uncontrolable fortunes of war too.
Certainly, both sides had their strenghts and weaknesses, but both sides were formidable in their own right, and really the naval battles of 1942 could have gone either way, which would be alot more difficult to argue for 1944 for instance. That it went the way it did, could, like i said earlier, be also put on the banal fortunes of war. I of course have read Shattered Sword many times, and i don't necessarily agree with all that is written in there, especially the scathing aimed at the japanese. They haven't got that far by being dumb.
Thanks for reading.
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