Battle of Britain with the FW190

[juanml82]

Based on this thread https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=77689
The FW190 was already a prototype in 1939, and in small production already in 1940, although it took up to 1942 before the Luftwaffe actually deployed it in large numbers.
So what about if the process speeds up/stars before. Let's say that the cockpit isn't put over the engine in the first design (as they understand that flying a fighter into combat while feeling like in a sauna is not a good idea), but originaly put where it was in the production aircraft, Kurt Tank decides to use the (very) new 801 engine (or at least designs the fighter to accomodate that engine should the engine work). Also the engine is designed some months earlier that OTL and with the overheating problem sort of better worked out from the design stage instead of later.
So we may have a better prototype in 1939, production starts a few months sooner and, let's also say that the Germans noticed that the BF110 won't survive long against state of the art single engine fighters, and they order less bf110 and increase production orders for FW190. So by August 1940 we have between 250 and 300 FW190 in regular service.
What happens now? The Fw190 have a bit more range than the bf109 so they could escort bombers longer - although not much, less than 100 km IIRC without drop tanks. And of course they are far more powerful than anything the RAF could put in the skies in that time.
I don't think the Germans could win the battle with that, bombers, inteligence (ie, on british radar capabilities), [FONT=&quot]accuracy and a larger navy to finish the job later on where more important. But they could have caused far more serious losses to the RAF and furthermore, how would the British react to the Fw190 should they encounter it in 1940?
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[DMA]

Range is still a problem for them. So they'll have to face similar problems to the Bf109 in that regards. The British, meanwhile, still enjoy the fact that they're operating not far from their airfields.

German success will really only come about with changes to strategy, not equipment (unless we're talking about the Me 262).

 

[Tizoc]

No, no, no, no. IIRC the FW 190 prototype was flown in September 1939 - and you want 200+ planes in-line 1 year later? Impossible. You ALWAYS need at least a few months to try the airplane, modifications always take time too... Also, I don't know if BMW 801 was availaible at all in 1939...

Besides, why wouldn't Germans just step up the production of Bf 109, and maybe even give them drop tanks?

 

[stevep]

No, no, no, no. IIRC the FW 190 prototype was flown in September 1939 - and you want 200+ planes in-line 1 year later? Impossible. You ALWAYS need at least a few months to try the airplane, modifications always take time too... Also, I don't know if BMW 801 was availaible at all in 1939...

Besides, why wouldn't Germans just step up the production of Bf 109, and maybe even give them drop tanks?

Tizoc

Agree with your main point on bringing things into production that rapidly,

On the Be109 I think the wings were too narrow to allow drop tanks to be fitted. Greater numbers of them would have been difficult without something else giving in the German economy. There was a reasonable amount of slack in the German system at the time but you would have still have had problems of range, training the pilots etc.

Steve

 

[The Dean]

Tizoc

Agree with your main point on bringing things into production that rapidly,

Yes, you would have to get the prototype in the air by 1938, if FW and Tank could have done that, would BMW have been able to advance the development of the 801?

If the 190 did get into service by the summer of 40 it would have been in a hurried manner beset with problems as was the Typhoon when it was pressed into service too quickly.

Even so it would have meant more losses to the RAF.

On the Be109 I think the wings were too narrow to allow drop tanks to be fitted. Greater numbers of them would have been difficult without something else giving in the German economy. There was a reasonable amount of slack in the German system at the time but you would have still have had problems of range, training the pilots etc.

Steve

109s did eventually use drop tanks, mounted singly under the fuselage.

 

[Steffen]

I don´t want to hijack the thread, but what would the chances of the Luftwaffe be if it was equipped with the Fw 187 instead of the Me 110?

(Historically, the Fw 187 was scrapped in favor of the Me 109, but a single-engine and dual engine combination would make some sense)

Despite an RLM requirement that the Fw 187 use Junkers Jumo 210 engines instead of the planned DB 600, the performance of the Fw 187 was generally superior to that of the Bf 110. In fact, it was 80 km/h (50 mph) faster than the contemporary Messerschmitt Bf 109B, despite having twice the range, more than twice the weight, and using two of the Bf 109's engines. The Fw 187's climb and dive rates were also on par if not superior to the nimble single-seater. The Luftwaffe, however, relied heavily on Messerschmitt products, and the Fw 187 never entered service.

 

[The Dean]

I don´t want to hijack the thread, but what would the chances of the Luftwaffe be if it was equipped with the Fw 187 instead of the Me 110?

(Historically, the Fw 187 was scrapped in favor of the Me 109, but a single-engine and dual engine combination would make some sense)

Do you mean single-seat, dual-engine combination? as in the P-38 and de-Havilland Hornet, if you do then yes it would have been better than the 110.

The plane that could have been available to the Luftwaffe in 1940 though was the Heinkel He 100. Thank god it wasn't because there would have been no answer to it.

 

[juanml82]

Yes, you would have to get the prototype in the air by 1938, if FW and Tank could have done that, would BMW have been able to advance the development of the 801?

If the 190 did get into service by the summer of 40 it would have been in a hurried manner beset with problems as was the Typhoon when it was pressed into service too quickly.

Even so it would have meant more losses to the RAF.

The biggest delays in the development of the FW190 were relocating the cockpit and modifying it for the 801 after the prototype was made. My idea was WI the cockpit was located where it was in the production aircraft from the begining and the design allowed the 801 engine to be added should the engine prove good (witch should be a really strange decision). The 801 was already developed in the first half of 1939, overheating was the main issue. Add to that a WI the FW190 program begins a few months before that in OTL, it could have been a production aircraft by summer 1940. Not entirely reliable, in particular the engine, but flying nonetheless.

 

[Steffen]

Do you mean single-seat, dual-engine combination? as in the P-38 and de-Havilland Hornet, if you do then yes it would have been better than the 110.

The plane that could have been available to the Luftwaffe in 1940 though was the Heinkel He 100. Thank god it wasn't because there would have been no answer to it.

Yes. It was built the same time as the Me 109 but didn´t enter service.

 

[ranoncles]

Tizoc

Agree with your main point on bringing things into production that rapidly,

On the Be109 I think the wings were too narrow to allow drop tanks to be fitted. Greater numbers of them would have been difficult without something else giving in the German economy. There was a reasonable amount of slack in the German system at the time but you would have still have had problems of range, training the pilots etc.

Steve

There was no aircraft-related technical reason for drop tanks not being used by the Bf109 during the BoB. The Germans were well aware of the advantages of drop tanks. The Bf109 actually used drop tanks in the Spanish Civil War and they were widely used by Bf 109's during ferry flights. From 1941 onwards, they were also in use in combat operations.

The only reason given for this lack of use in the BoB I ever saw was that the drop tanks in use in 1940 by the Luftwaffe weren't reliable, e.g. they didn't always detach when triggered . This could have spelled disaster for the aircraft as it created so much drag in air combat, the advantage would have shifted dramatically to the opposing aircraft.

While this explanation makes sense (considering the fact that the Germans had drop tanks since 1937 and started using them extensively from 1941 onwards), it is not one that is repeated in many books so it's anybody's guess if this was indeed the reason and the 1941 general use came about after boffins finally fixed the problems after it became abundantly clear reliable drop tanks were a must.

 

[Michele]

Range is still a problem for them. So they'll have to face similar problems to the Bf109 in that regards. The British, meanwhile, still enjoy the fact that they're operating not far from their airfields.

I agree. The British will take more losses. Not enough to change the outcome.

German success will really only come about with changes to strategy, not equipment (unless we're talking about the Me 262).

I wonder. I mean, yes, equipment isn't going to cut (not even the Me 262, I think), but by the way you talk about changes in strategy, I'd like to ask you if you have come up with any strategic changes that would really give the Germans air superiority. I have come up with ideas that make it much harder for Fighter Command, but not enough to really change the final outcome.

 

[DMA]

I wonder. I mean, yes, equipment isn't going to cut (not even the Me 262, I think), but by the way you talk about changes in strategy, I'd like to ask you if you have come up with any strategic changes that would really give the Germans air superiority. I have come up with ideas that make it much harder for Fighter Command, but not enough to really change the final outcome.

Well for starters, whatever the Germans do, life won't be easy for them as the RAF will fight tooth & nail. But I'd dare say the Germans can't get carried away with themselves & start bombing London &/or other cities. In other words they can't go "strategic". They must concentrate on the RAF's airfields & anywhere else the RAF operates from. Likewise they must not dismiss the RAF's radar units: they've got to be bombed into oblivion. Furthermore there can't be any unescorted missions based out of Norway or anywhere else for that matter. At first, they should only operate their bombers where there's fighter escort, whilst their fighters must be given every opportunity to shoot down as many RAF fighters as possible that manage to get airbourne.

Now by ensuring the RAF can't operate anymore, in the south-eastern regions of England, the RAF loses any advantages that come with using their local airfields. Instead they have to operate from the west & north of London. This means their time in the air is dramatically cut to the point that their combat time isn't much better than their counterparts. Plus, instead of conducting six to ten sorties are day, the RAF may only get two or three sorties a day out of their pilots. Again this means that the RAF's ability to counter the Germans is limited.

Range, though, still remains the problem for the Germans in the end, because the minute their bombers start operating out of the range of their fighter escorts, the RAF will pounce on them akin to the OTL. So the Germans will have to be very methodical by, once more, concentrating on the next lot of airfields to the north & west of London. And they'll have to repeat this procedure time & again.

Somewhere, though, in the middle of all this, the Germans will have to go after British factories: especially the factories producing fighter aircraft & the like. And they'll have to watch themselves, in this regards, because again if they slacken off from bombing the RAF airfields, the British fighters will re-commence operations from them, meaning German casualties will begin to rapidly increase.

At the end of the day, however, it'll depend upon how many casualties Hitler is prepared to accept as I'd imagine they'll be heavy for Germany. Also, it'll depend upon how much time Hitler is prepared to give the Luftwaffe as I'd imagine it'll take a few extra months, than the OTL, to ensure German air superiority over much of Britain. In fact it may end up as a pyrrhic victory, insofar as this AH Battle of Britain drags on into December, which will be then too late to launch Operation Sealion. And then, over the winter months, the RAF will build up their fighter numbers, meaning the Battle of Britain will have to be refought from late February 1941 onwards...

 

[Michele]

Well for starters,...

Thank you for the interesting post. I see you've dedicated some thought to the issue.

I'd like to point out, first, that going for London was not the same issue for all German decision-makers involved. For some it might have been a retaliation for raids on Berlin, or a desperate gamble to go strategic. But for others, Kesselring, it was a practical decision. He thought Fighter Command was sparing its diminished remaining strength; he hoped that by attacking a target they would be forced to defend, they would have to field those famous last 50 Spitfires, and thus offer the Germans a chance at their final destruction battle. Had the British really been down to their last gasps, the decision would have been entirely sound.

Having said that, I see you list three target classes, in order of priority:
- airfields,
- radar stations,
- aircraft factories.

Indeed, had the Germans been able to seriously damage the above, the British would have had a much tougher Battle of Britain.
But the Germans, had they chosen to follow this strategy, would not have been able to carry it out to the point of defeating Fighter Command, I believe.

The problem with the airfields is that they don't stay out of action. The Germans repeatedly cancelled from their maps air bases that they had bombed in the initial stages. They had mostly hit the runways. The British brought a roller in, and in a few hours to a day or two the runways were operational again. All in all, only two airfields remained not operational for more than a couple of days; Lympne because the British had judged it to be simply too exposed, and Manston. Manston is a case study: the Germans managed to shut it down after 6 raids over a short period of time, and two of the raids had been precision attacks by ErProGr 210. But on the other hand, the British decided they could not afford to give up, even temporarily, Biggin Hill, which was more important because it was a Sector Station. This, notwithstanding the fact that Biggin Hill was bombed 11 times over an even shorter period of time, and had no hangars standing any more. The British decided to keep repairing it, and it stayed out of action for no more than a couple of days.
Note Sector Stations were important as HQs. When attacking Biggin Hill because it was an airfield, the Germans were increasing their chances to degrade the defense network by hitting the Biggin Hill Sector HQ, too. But it seems they never were aware of this. Additionally, Sector Stations began setting up secondary control rooms outside the air bases, exactly in order to prevent a collapse of the local link in the network because of one unlucky hit.

Radar stations present multiple problems. The antennas weren't very vulnerable. It would take a Stuka to deliver a direct hit within the base. Additionally, the system was resilient and redundant, and there were mobile station replacements available.
On the other hand, the buildings containing the personnel and equipment were more vulnerable; and power grid hits were what did actually bring stations off the air at times.

The aircraft factories were more vulnerable. Even with the "shadow" factories up North, most were within range for the Luftwaffe. Here, too, precision bombing would have been much more useful than level bombing from safe altitude, but these were larger targets and even the latter would be useful.
On the other hand, if the British had a shortage of something, it was pilots, especially experienced pilots; not aircraft. It would take a sustained anti-factory campaign over a longish period of time to affect Fighter Command in this way.

So to go back to the issue of equipment changes and strategic changes, what the Germans would have needed, IMHO, is _both_ a change in strategy and a consequent change in equipment, that would allow them to pursue that strategy. This is bascially what Stephen Bungay also seems to think; his "The Most Dangerous Enemy" has been quoted in another thread.

The Germans should have carried out, more or less, the strategy you suggest. The order both of priority and of sequence would have been, however:
Radar stations,
Airfields, but most of all airfields which also were Sector Stations,
Aircraft factories.
Bringing simultaneously off the air a line of four or five radar stations would have blinded, though only temporarily, the defense network over the area to be attacked. This would have increased the success chances of the next step, the attacks on Sector Stations (of course, for this the Germans need half-decent intelligence, which they entirely lacked).
Attacks on factories follow as a side, diversionary but useful, tactics.

The recipe has to be repeated constantly. The Germans can switch to other radar stations and airfields for a day or two, then they have to go back to those they had attacked two or three days before, and so on.

However, in order to do this _effectively_, they need more precision-bombing capability; which means changes in equipment, or, rather, changes in their use of the equipment they more or less had, and different training for some units.

I stop here, since it's been a long post. I guess you can see what changes in equipment use I'm suggesting.

 

[zoomar]

Realistically, it is highly unlikely the Fw190 could have entered service much earlier than it did. The original engine around which the prototype was designed turned out to be a failure, as was the ducted cowl. Overheating plagued most of the test models. By all accounts, it took a while to bring the plane to an acceptable level of performance and reliability for operational service. Plus, its range and endurance was not that much much better than the Bf-109.

No, a better solution for the Germans would have been be continued development of the Fw-187 as a high performance single seat escort fighter along the lines of the P-38 Lightning. Rarely would one expect a twin-engine plane to outclass its single engined opponents (even the P-38 didn't do that), but it would have been an infinitely better escort fighter than the Bf-110.

Regarding the He100, I believe it would also have been a very short ranged fighter. Lots of people like this plane because of its high performance, but I think the Germans were wise not to switch over to it. It would have been a specialized dead end. Unlike the Bf-109, which could handle increasingly powerful engines, cabin pressurization, and heavier armament, the He100 was literally tailored to a particular engine and a unique evaporation cooling system. It would have required fundamental redesign to adopt the fighter to the later DB engines and increased armament. Even Heinkel, when asked to adapt the plane for Jumo in line engines, admitted as much and shelved the design rather than even try.

 

[ranoncles]

Thank you for the interesting post. I see you've dedicated some thought to the issue.

I'd like to point out, first, that going for London was not the same issue for all German decision-makers involved. For some it might have been a retaliation for raids on Berlin, or a desperate gamble to go strategic. But for others, Kesselring, it was a practical decision. He thought Fighter Command was sparing its diminished remaining strength; he hoped that by attacking a target they would be forced to defend, they would have to field those famous last 50 Spitfires, and thus offer the Germans a chance at their final destruction battle. Had the British really been down to their last gasps, the decision would have been entirely sound.

Having said that, I see you list three target classes, in order of priority:
- airfields,
- radar stations,
- aircraft factories.

Indeed, had the Germans been able to seriously damage the above, the British would have had a much tougher Battle of Britain.
But the Germans, had they chosen to follow this strategy, would not have been able to carry it out to the point of defeating Fighter Command, I believe.

The problem with the airfields is that they don't stay out of action. The Germans repeatedly cancelled from their maps air bases that they had bombed in the initial stages. They had mostly hit the runways. The British brought a roller in, and in a few hours to a day or two the runways were operational again. All in all, only two airfields remained not operational for more than a couple of days; Lympne because the British had judged it to be simply too exposed, and Manston. Manston is a case study: the Germans managed to shut it down after 6 raids over a short period of time, and two of the raids had been precision attacks by ErProGr 210. But on the other hand, the British decided they could not afford to give up, even temporarily, Biggin Hill, which was more important because it was a Sector Station. This, notwithstanding the fact that Biggin Hill was bombed 11 times over an even shorter period of time, and had no hangars standing any more. The British decided to keep repairing it, and it stayed out of action for no more than a couple of days.
Note Sector Stations were important as HQs. When attacking Biggin Hill because it was an airfield, the Germans were increasing their chances to degrade the defense network by hitting the Biggin Hill Sector HQ, too. But it seems they never were aware of this. Additionally, Sector Stations began setting up secondary control rooms outside the air bases, exactly in order to prevent a collapse of the local link in the network because of one unlucky hit.

Radar stations present multiple problems. The antennas weren't very vulnerable. It would take a Stuka to deliver a direct hit within the base. Additionally, the system was resilient and redundant, and there were mobile station replacements available.
On the other hand, the buildings containing the personnel and equipment were more vulnerable; and power grid hits were what did actually bring stations off the air at times.

The aircraft factories were more vulnerable. Even with the "shadow" factories up North, most were within range for the Luftwaffe. Here, too, precision bombing would have been much more useful than level bombing from safe altitude, but these were larger targets and even the latter would be useful.
On the other hand, if the British had a shortage of something, it was pilots, especially experienced pilots; not aircraft. It would take a sustained anti-factory campaign over a longish period of time to affect Fighter Command in this way.

So to go back to the issue of equipment changes and strategic changes, what the Germans would have needed, IMHO, is _both_ a change in strategy and a consequent change in equipment, that would allow them to pursue that strategy. This is bascially what Stephen Bungay also seems to think; his "The Most Dangerous Enemy" has been quoted in another thread.

The Germans should have carried out, more or less, the strategy you suggest. The order both of priority and of sequence would have been, however:
Radar stations,
Airfields, but most of all airfields which also were Sector Stations,
Aircraft factories.
Bringing simultaneously off the air a line of four or five radar stations would have blinded, though only temporarily, the defense network over the area to be attacked. This would have increased the success chances of the next step, the attacks on Sector Stations (of course, for this the Germans need half-decent intelligence, which they entirely lacked).
Attacks on factories follow as a side, diversionary but useful, tactics.

The recipe has to be repeated constantly. The Germans can switch to other radar stations and airfields for a day or two, then they have to go back to those they had attacked two or three days before, and so on.

However, in order to do this _effectively_, they need more precision-bombing capability; which means changes in equipment, or, rather, changes in their use of the equipment they more or less had, and different training for some units.

I stop here, since it's been a long post. I guess you can see what changes in equipment use I'm suggesting.

Well, there were (at least) three major issues which doomed the Luftwaffe in the BoB.

Firstly, they failed to notice and/or appreciate that Fighter Command was shuffling squadrons between groups, allowing depleted squadrons a period of rest and a chance to rebuild. Had they realized this, the continuing resistance (instead of expecting the "last 50 Spitfires" every day) would have made sense to them.

Secondly, the Luftwaffe in common with every air force at the time, did not appreciate how much sustained damage was necessary to knock out an airfield, especially if the maintenance and repair assets were not destroyed. Most airfields at the time did not have paved runways anyway so damage was mostly superficial. In earlier campaigns, the loss of efficiency due to damaged airfields was enough in conjunction with the German army rapidly advancing. In the BoB, there were no ground assets to capture the airfields.

Thirdly, initially the Bf109's provided top cover for their bombers and more than held their own against the British fighters which were attacking the German bombers. This allowed the Bf109's to take an important toll of British aircraft (similar to the roving allied escort fighters would do in 1944). But the bomber pilots did not realize this and demanded close protection where they could see the Bf109's defending them. This negated the strengths of the Bf109 (especially its ability to boom and zoom) and tipped the battle in favour of the British fighters.

If the Germans had opted differently, they could have done much better. Better intelligence would have provided them with a accurate British order of battle (perhaps including the presence of mobile radar stations) and the transfer of units between groups. That would have given them a much clearer picture of the losses sustained by Fighter Command.

Perhaps a raid by the RAF against their airbases in France would have shown the Germans just how easy it was to repair the damage. This could have led them to change their tactics and launch repetitive strikes until an airfield and all its assets were indeed destroyed.

Or perhaps a major retaliatory day light strike by the RAF, consisting of Wellingtons and Spitfires/Hurricanes in close escort would show the more intelligent Luftwaffe commanders that close escort was not the proper tactic to defend bombers.

Any of these changes would have changed the BoB far more than an Fw190 would have done IMO.

 

[juanml82]

Any of these changes would have changed the BoB far more than an Fw190 would have done IMO.

The Fw190 wouldn't have changed much the BoB. It would have changed what the British would want for a new aircraft. I mean, the Fw190 was superior to anything the RAF had in 1940, so they'll need to do something about that. Maybe the RAF would have used jet fighters in battle in the last years of WW2? Or something

 

[Michele]

Well, there were (at least) three major issues which doomed the Luftwaffe in the BoB.

Firstly, they failed to notice and/or appreciate that Fighter Command was shuffling squadrons between groups, allowing depleted squadrons a period of rest and a chance to rebuild. Had they realized this, the continuing resistance (instead of expecting the "last 50 Spitfires" every day) would have made sense to them.

Secondly, the Luftwaffe in common with every air force at the time, did not appreciate how much sustained damage was necessary to knock out an airfield, especially if the maintenance and repair assets were not destroyed. Most airfields at the time did not have paved runways anyway so damage was mostly superficial. In earlier campaigns, the loss of efficiency due to damaged airfields was enough in conjunction with the German army rapidly advancing. In the BoB, there were no ground assets to capture the airfields.

Thirdly, initially the Bf109's provided top cover for their bombers and more than held their own against the British fighters which were attacking the German bombers. This allowed the Bf109's to take an important toll of British aircraft (similar to the roving allied escort fighters would do in 1944). But the bomber pilots did not realize this and demanded close protection where they could see the Bf109's defending them. This negated the strengths of the Bf109 (especially its ability to boom and zoom) and tipped the battle in favour of the British fighters.

If the Germans had opted differently, they could have done much better. Better intelligence would have provided them with a accurate British order of battle (perhaps including the presence of mobile radar stations) and the transfer of units between groups. That would have given them a much clearer picture of the losses sustained by Fighter Command.

Perhaps a raid by the RAF against their airbases in France would have shown the Germans just how easy it was to repair the damage. This could have led them to change their tactics and launch repetitive strikes until an airfield and all its assets were indeed destroyed.

Or perhaps a major retaliatory day light strike by the RAF, consisting of Wellingtons and Spitfires/Hurricanes in close escort would show the more intelligent Luftwaffe commanders that close escort was not the proper tactic to defend bombers.

Any of these changes would have changed the BoB far more than an Fw190 would have done IMO.

I'm not so sure the issue of Squadron redeployments is that important. Surely the Germans misjudged Fighter Command's strength; but, in this, the initial wrong estiamtes, and the overestimation of combat losses inflicted had more weight, in my opinion, than knowing or not that units were shuffled around.

I disagree that the Bf 109s were more than holding their own against British fighters while not chained to the bomber formations they had to escort. This is probably the version of some German fighter pilot turned writer.
It is true that the Germans downed more British fighters than viceversa. But this is no surprise, since the only targets the Germans had were fighters, while OTOH the British also had bombers as targets, and actually many interception missions were specifically directed at stopping the bombers, not at engaging the fighters. The Germans achieved about a 1.2:1 advantage when fighter losses are taken into account; 1.6 if the very significant loss rate of Bf 110s is ignored. Those figures may probably be reduced to 1.1 and 1.5 respectively, because a small number of British fighters must have been downed by defensive fire by the bombers.
So if we put aside the Bf 110 losses, with a 1.5 ratio in favor of the Bf 109, one might come to the conclusion that the German fighters were more than holding their own.
But the problem with this is that throughout the battle, while the British fighters were taking that 0.5 losses more, were also wiping the German bombers out of the sky. The Germans lost more than 1,000 bombers. A fighter force that allows that isn't faring really all that well.
Of course one might set aside the bomber losses entirely. To which, the reply is the same the British gave to Freijagd missions with no bombers in the air at all: ignore them. Let the German fighters roam the skies pointlessly (and they can always suffer normal attrition losses while they do that). The bombers are the necessary bait. If they are not sent over Britain, Fighter Command will not scramble, so there won't be a chance for the Bf 109s to down more British fighters than their own losses.

Nor is it true that the German fighters' performance decreased over time. Some of the best days for the Germans, in terms of loss ratios, are at the end of the campaign, and even after they had resorted to bombing London: 11, 14 and 28 September, when they achieved ratios of 1.3:1, 1.4:1 and 4:1. Unfortunately, these were days of very limited air action. In other words, the German fighters scored well when there was not a lot going on in the air. In fact, in absolute numbers, those three days, plus July 19 (2.5:1 in favor of the Germans) add up to 68 to 40 aircraft downed. RAF vs. Luftwaffe, respectively, with the German losses including bombers of course. 1.7:1 overall in these four most favorable days for the Germans.
But let's look at the first four favorable days for the British. Note that, I'm not talking about the most favorable days all over the battle; the first four, I said, since you believe that initially the German fighter fared well. Those are August 11, 12, 13 and 15 (yes, Adlertag is included!). The ratios are 1.2:1, 1.4:1, 3.6:1 and 2.3:1 in favor of the RAF. And in absolute numbers, note how these were the real "Battle of Britain" days: 169 German losses vs. 82 British losses (and 2:1 for the Brits). This is not the best score of the RAF throughout the campaign; it's just the best score in the early part of it.

I agree on your point about damage to airfields; I think it has already been pointed out.
However, I disagree that repeating attacks on airfields can ever "indeed destroy" it and its assets. Most assets, especially the most important of them all, can be redeployed elsewhere; and, as you yourself point out, the airfield can be easily repaired. I agree that keeping up sustained bombing of airfields would have been one of the ways to go, but the very most the attacker can hope for by that, is keeping the airfield temporarily not operational, for as long as the attacks are sustained. Anything beyond that is a vain hope.

 

[zoomar]

The Fw190 wouldn't have changed much the BoB. It would have changed what the British would want for a new aircraft. I mean, the Fw190 was superior to anything the RAF had in 1940, so they'll need to do something about that. Maybe the RAF would have used jet fighters in battle in the last years of WW2? Or something

Unless memory fails, the Hawker Tornado/Typhoon/Tempest series were already in the works during the BoB, and the Spitfire was an amazingly adaptable plane which was fairly quickly brought up to the standards of the Fw190A in the IX and later model, so I don't see why having the Fw190 introduced in German service a year earlier would have changed all that much in what the British did - although they might do it with more losses. There's also the matter of the Mustang, which the Brits were having designed and produced for them in the USA. It's hard to imagine why there would be a greater focus on jets, or that the technological difficulties inherent in developing operational jet fighters would have allowed the Meteor to enter service much earlier than it did. IN addition, by the end of the war the Allies were winning and could afford to gradually and cautiously introduce their jets to front line units, which is the smart thing with such a new technology. The Germans, on the other hand were forced to use the Me262 for about as many desparate needs as Hitler could dream up, and send them piecemeal into action without established doctrines, with the result that more Me262's were lost in combat and accidents than allied planes they shot down. Also by the last two years of the war, the US and Britain were waging an offensive war in NW Europe, where long range intruder and/or ground attack capabilities were more important than pure speed. Other than interception of V1s, a few Me410 intruders here and there and the occasional Ar234 recon plane, or point defense against rare tactical Luftwaffe raids (like Bodenplatte)I'm not sure what the Meteor gives you that the Tempest, Mustang, Mosquito or Spitfire doesn't.

 

[juanml82]

Yes, but neither the engines for the IX (or the Hawkers tempest, typhoon and Tornado) were availiable by 1940. The same applies for the guns, witch were having trouble by that time. I mean, the war began a year ago and the British are already finding that the Germans have much better fighters that what they have, and the outcome of the war is so far uncertain. They don't know for sure if the US wil enter the war or when, or neither if Hitler will attack the SU. Would they just continue their regular aircraft research programs when their aircraft are totally outperformed just one year after the war began? Or would they think in speeding up something else, at least to try to keep the pace of what seems to be German technology?

 

[Tony Williams]

Yes, but neither the engines for the IX (or the Hawkers tempest, typhoon and Tornado) were availiable by 1940. The same applies for the guns, witch were having trouble by that time.

Which also applies to the wing-root mounted MG 151/20 cannon which gave the Fw 190 its formidable firepower. Historically they were not in service until 1941. The first Fw 190s were armed with only four 7.9mm MGs, which was rather pathetic compared with the Spitfire. No doubt they would have added the outer-wing mounted 20mm MG-FF, as carried by the Bf 109, but that would still be nowhere near the firepower of the historical Fw 190.