Bataan WIs

What is a thin screen going to accomplish on the beaches? And if they don’t try to stop the Japanese on the beaches where in Luzon do they try to stop them? If they don’t stop them in Luzon then the Japanese take over the US air and naval bases outside of Bataan/Corregidor and the US is no longer a threat to Japanese sea lanes.


This was the whole concept of Warplan Orange. The mission of the US forces in the Philippines was to slow down the Japanese advance, prevent access to Manila Bay, and await the relief fleet that would be sent by the US Navy. The whole plan was to withdraw to Bataan, stockpiling supplies and munitions, and hunker down. MacArthur in 1940 unilaterally decided on a whole new defense plan, which was to contest the beaches. However, the Philippine Army was nowhere ready for these type of operations by the onset of the war. Then right after the first Japanese forces land, MacArthur changes his mind and orders an evacuation to Bataan, wasting 2-3 weeks of time to move supplies, prepare positions and the like. Total lunacy.

US forces actually managed to hold out for 4 months until the fall of Bataan with inadequate rations, low ammunition stockpiles and poorly prepared positions. Under Warplan Orange and with a properly prepared position at Bataan, the US Army envisioned that its forces could hold out for at least 6 months. If MacArthur had followed Warplan Orange, it is very likely that the US forces could have held out until June/July timeframe.

The IJN ships and IJNAF were on an extremely tight time-table to accomplish all of the initial war objectives. As it was, the Japanese withdrew ground forces and much of its airpower from the Philippines and advanced their timetable to invade the DEI. Would the Allies been able to put up a better defense if given an additional 4-6 weeks to prepare? Would Admiral Doorman been able to integrate the ABDA fleet into a functional unit in that time?
 
One really bad thing could, too: the 200+ Mk14 torpedoes lost might be saved.:eek:

Actually, that's not so bad, I think.

More torpedoes means boats don't go out with partial loadouts, and can use torpedoes a little more liberally - and remember, *sometimes* the damned things worked.

Also, greater expenditure might mean the flaws get noticed a little quicker.

And any not used can be modified as IOTL to be effective at that time.
 
LastTimelord said:
Actually, that's not so bad, I think.

More torpedoes means boats don't go out with partial loadouts, and can use torpedoes a little more liberally - and remember, *sometimes* the damned things worked.

Also, greater expenditure might mean the flaws get noticed a little quicker.

And any not used can be modified as IOTL to be effective at that time.

I maintain the survival of any Mk14s is bad for several reasons.

One: it delays the onset of the "wall" at NTS, where BuOrd have to consider going to an outside contractor.

Two: it discourages English & Nimitz from using minelaying, which is safer & more productive.

Three: it maintains the myth the Mk14 works a little longer, tho I do agree, more warshots means more chance of failure.

Four: it increases the prospects for circulars sinking friendly boats.:eek::eek: (The odds are low, but it only takes one... What happens when that's Fluckey, or Dealey,:eek: or Morton?:eek::eek:)

In favor? Sinking 125000-150000 tons more shipping (about 25 ships, at the average 1942 rate).
 

Hoist40

Banned
This was the whole concept of Warplan Orange. The mission of the US forces in the Philippines was to slow down the Japanese advance, prevent access to Manila Bay, and await the relief fleet that would be sent by the US Navy. The whole plan was to withdraw to Bataan, stockpiling supplies and munitions, and hunker down. MacArthur in 1940 unilaterally decided on a whole new defense plan, which was to contest the beaches. However, the Philippine Army was nowhere ready for these type of operations by the onset of the war. Then right after the first Japanese forces land, MacArthur changes his mind and orders an evacuation to Bataan, wasting 2-3 weeks of time to move supplies, prepare positions and the like. Total lunacy.

US forces actually managed to hold out for 4 months until the fall of Bataan with inadequate rations, low ammunition stockpiles and poorly prepared positions. Under Warplan Orange and with a properly prepared position at Bataan, the US Army envisioned that its forces could hold out for at least 6 months. If MacArthur had followed Warplan Orange, it is very likely that the US forces could have held out until June/July timeframe.


It was Roosevelt who changed policy and threw out War Plan Orange. Roosevelt’s new plan involved sending hundreds of aircraft to the Philippines and along with submarines threaten Japan’s trade route. Without the Army in the field the bases they would be quickly overrun

It was only after he cut off oil to Japan in late July 1941 that he decided to defend the Philippines and sent the B-17's and increased the number of submarines. However in order to operate them the air and naval bases had to be held which would not happen if the Army just withdrew to Bataan which had no air or naval base. But Roosevelt waited too long to change policy since the distance involved and the lack of shipping meant that many of the new US forces were still in transit or the USA when the war started.
 
Hoist40 said:
It was Roosevelt who changed policy and threw out War Plan Orange.
The Navy had realized the P.I. were indefensible by 1935 (IIRC; could be 1937), & decided to abandon them. FDR's change in policy, with the aim of aiding Britain, was designed to deter Japan & prevent a war in Asia & the Pacific. If it provoked Japan to do something that would allow the U.S. to impose a blockade, & thus aid China, so much the better.
 

Hoist40

Banned
The Navy had realized the P.I. were indefensible by 1935 (IIRC; could be 1937), & decided to abandon them. FDR's change in policy, with the aim of aiding Britain, was designed to deter Japan & prevent a war in Asia & the Pacific. If it provoked Japan to do something that would allow the U.S. to impose a blockade, & thus aid China, so much the better.

The book "War Plan Orange" by Edward S. Miller says that during the 1920's and 1930's there was a constant back and forth on whether to rush aid to the Philippines or to allow it to fall. As soon as the idea to let it fall grew, someone in the Army, Navy, Congress or Press would raise a stink and demand that "That our boys in the Philippines not be abandoned". However logistics always triumphed and it was shown that there was no way without large increases in military budget to hold the Philippines long enough to allow a fleet and army to arrive to save it.

From what I have read even the fall back to Bataan option was never really worked out, nor trained for because of the stink it would raise in the US and Philippines. Virtually nothing was done on Bataan to prepare the place for the US Army prior to the war starting
 
Hoist40 said:
The book "War Plan Orange" by Edward S. Miller says that during the 1920's and 1930's there was a constant back and forth on whether to rush aid to the Philippines or to allow it to fall. As soon as the idea to let it fall grew, someone in the Army, Navy, Congress or Press would raise a stink and demand that "That our boys in the Philippines not be abandoned". However logistics always triumphed and it was shown that there was no way without large increases in military budget to hold the Philippines long enough to allow a fleet and army to arrive to save it.

From what I have read even the fall back to Bataan option was never really worked out, nor trained for because of the stink it would raise in the US and Philippines. Virtually nothing was done on Bataan to prepare the place for the US Army prior to the war starting
I've read Miller. He says it was MacArthur's aggressive posture & refusal to accept the P.I. should be abandoned that caused the problem. The "Bataan Option" was the standard outcome for Orange, & it was only realistic if the Navy was coming. The Navy had already said rescue was impractical, & they weren't going to be coming....:rolleyes: And MacArthur knew it when he proposed his "forward defense"...yet he managed to sell it to Congress anyhow.:rolleyes::confused:

Something else: without the Clark Field debacle, it's possible the already-available resources of food & medicine could be distributed, rather than destroyed. It's also just possible more ammo & medicine could be delivered before the P.I. become untenable.
 

Hoist40

Banned
But if he immediately falls back to Bataan and abandons PI then the Japanese take the air and naval bases more quickly and people would blame MacArthur for that. Does it matter if the bases are destroyed from the air or from the ground?
 
Sorry guys but I find it hard to envision any real strategic difference. Undoubtedly the Philippine and American forces could have held out longer but ultimately the Philippines were a side show. The Japanese war aim was the oil, rubber and tin of Southeast Asia. An Allied force holding out somewhere in the Philippines would not impede the capture of Southeast Asia or the flow of these materials. The United States war plan of marching through the Central Pacific islands to rescue the Philippines was never realistic. Remember it took 18 months to build the fleet and another 12 months to conduct the campaign. I do not see how any force could have held out for 30 months nor do I see any realistic means of resupply.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Hyperion: No destruction of the FEAF on 8 December 1941 might have allowed the US to contest air superiority with the Japanese for a week or two but that's about it.

If you read William Bartsch's trilogy relating to Allied airpower at the beginning of the war along with John Burton's Fortnight of Infamy, you come to the quick realization that the Allies were in deep shit from day one. Most of their aircraft were inferior to their Japanese counterparts, their tactics were immature and their command and control was inadequate. The FEAF was short of replacement engines for P-40's, extremely short of the Prestone anti-freeze for the P-40's inline Allison, short of .50 cal ammo, and other spare parts. Once an aircraft was severely damaged, FEAF mechanics weren't going to be able to make it combat-worthy. Simple battlefield attrition would have rendered the FEAF combat ineffective after a couple of weeks at most.

Throughout the rest of the theater, the other allies forced many of the same problems: inferior aircraft, inadequate supplies, poor training, inferior numbers. A recipe for disaster and defeat.

The interesting scenario would be if the Japanese waited until February/March 1942 to begin the war. The buildup of forces in the Philippines would have been essentially completed by that time and would have presented a much more even fight.

So lets assume even with OTL issues, the P-40 squadrons aren't gutted on the ground and do manage to fight for a week, no more than two before the majority of them are shot down or damaged beyond repair.

Even then, you'd be looking at potentially dozens of Japanese aircraft shot down.
 
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