Barbarossa without the Great Purge

[thaddeus]

I have the unpopular opinion that the purge actually prevented a xoup in the USSR, which may have occurred following an invasion.

IDK, I have the opposite unpopular opinion, that absent (at least some) purge pre-invasion, one could be launched after the invasion? maybe/likely not in 1941, but afterwards, harming the Soviet resurgence.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

IDK, I have the opposite unpopular opinion, that absent (at least some) purge pre-invasion, one could be launched after the invasion? maybe/likely not in 1941, but afterwards, harming the Soviet resurgence.

Why would Stalin start purges when he needs competent generals and officers the most? He didn't do IOTL so I don't see why he would do it here and the army would be more worried about the ongoing invasion to launch a coup; if he's worried about the army taking over he can do the same thing he did IOTL and get rid of important military figures after WW2.

 

[Julian]

Well, that certainly explains such things as STAVKA having to issue orders which said such obvious things as "make sure you weaken the enemy with an artillery bombardment before launching attacks" in 1941.

As others already correctly noted, poor junior leadership is still an enormous issue for the Red Army. Even without the Terror this can’t be fixed given the rapid ‘39-41 expansion.

At the same time, the Red Army made do with inadequate and poorly trained junior leaders until the end of the war. For example, from 2nd Belorussian Front in March ‘45:

TO THE TROOPS OF THE 2ND BELORUSSIAN FRONT
March 12, 1945
On eliminating shortcomings in the organization and control of combat in a battalion, company and platoon.
The practice of recent offensive battles has revealed the following shortcomings in the organization of battle management of rifle units (battalion, company, platoon).
1) Battalion commanders did not always assign specific tasks in offensive battles to company commanders, and the latter to platoon commanders.
2) The battalions did not organize continuous and forward reconnaissance of the opposing enemy, as a result of which the attacking units did not know the location of weapons and the nature of the enemy’s defense.
3) On the battlefield, battalion, company and platoon commanders did not constantly monitor the enemy.
4) Direct fire guns allocated for escort were used ineffectively and acted unpurposefully. The artillery commanders of the rifle regiments did not direct the use of direct fire guns.
5) The commanders of rifle companies and platoons did not organize proper coordination with the attached machine-gun units, as a result of which the powerful fire of heavy machine guns provided little support to the infantry.
6) The starting lines for the attack number of enemy firing points were not suppressed.
There were cases of artillery fire in areas where at that time the combat formations of the advancing units were located, which suffered losses from it (1109th Rifle Regiment of the 330th Rifle Division).
8) Little use was made of night operations by small units, which could yield great results in capturing individual enemy strongholds with methodical machine gun and submachine gun fire.
The night operations that took place were carried out without prior command reconnaissance or advance preparation for them during the day.
9) Individual company and battalion commanders are ignorant about the practice of fighting at night and in forest conditions.
All of the above shortcomings were the result of the fact that the commanders of rifle divisions and regiments did not pay due attention to organizing and managing the battle in such an important link as battalion - company - platoon.
I order:

1) The army commanders take decisive measures to prevent in the future the noted shortcomings in the organization and control of combat in the battalion-company-platoon link.

2) The front artillery commander demands that the army artillery commanders eliminate shortcomings and improve leadership in the use of artillery and the organization of its interaction with rifle units.

3) The order should be conveyed to the commanders and chiefs of staff of formations and units.

4) Report execution by March 17, 1945.

From Сборника боевых документов Великой Отечественной войны Вып. 2

The Red Army could make do with poor junior leadership as long as it had reasonably competent/organized senior leaders.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

As others already correctly noted, poor junior leadership is still an enormous issue for the Red Army. Even without the Terror this can’t be fixed given the rapid ‘39-41 expansion.

At the same time, the Red Army made do with inadequate and poorly trained junior leaders until the end of the war. For example, from 2nd Belorussian Front in March ‘45:


From Сборника боевых документов Великой Отечественной войны Вып. 2

The Red Army could make do with poor junior leadership as long as it had reasonably competent/organized senior leaders.

Yes... and no. While junior leadership was always a weakness for the Red Army, it was still something that improved as the war went on and Red Army junior leadership in by '45 was... still relatively poor (and poor enough for the generals to complain about, as your passage reveals), but at least adequate. If it was a unit which received preference for well-trained personnel (usually a Guard, Tank, or Guards Tank formation), it could even be called good. You always need a certain minimum level of competence or you end up with units failing to perform even the most basic tasks the senior leadership expects them too, like failing to even deploy out of march columns into a battle line in response to encountering enemy lines.

But yeah, returning to the topic at hand, continuity of training development is probably the biggest benefit we could say with certainty from a lack of purges.

 

[Julian]

Yes... and no. While junior leadership was always a weakness for the Red Army, it was still something that improved as the war went on and Red Army junior leadership in by '45 was... still relatively poor (and poor enough for the generals to complain about, as your passage reveals), but at least adequate. If it was a unit which received preference for well-trained personnel (usually a Guard, Tank, or Guards Tank formation), it could even be called good. You always need a certain minimum level of competence or you end up with units failing to perform even the most basic tasks the senior leadership expects them too, like failing to even deploy out of march columns into a battle line in response to encountering enemy lines.

But yeah, returning to the topic at hand, continuity of training development is probably the biggest benefit we could say with certainty from a lack of purges.

Funny enough, I ran into a couple examples recently of rifle units botching their deployment from march columns in ‘44! You also had the problem of political officers transferred to regular officer positions starting in Fall’42, which introduced a lot of uneven quality in the ‘43 Red Army. The wartime Vystrel courses were also uneven, as was training in general. Condensed courses focusing on skills that are “what’s needed at the front” could leave out details which officers would sorely miss.

As you say, on average quality improved each year and “tip of the spear” formations were usually quite competent! But even the late war Red Army could be a mess.

Didn’t stop them from winning and kicking Nazi butt, which is the thrust of my earlier point. The ‘41 Red Army could have deep imperfections and still perform much better.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Funny enough, I ran into a couple examples recently of rifle units botching their deployment from march columns in ‘44!

Not surprising. The consistency of fuck-ups probably fell, but fuck-ups nonetheless kept happening. War won by the least incompetent army and all that...

The wartime Vystrel courses were also uneven, as was training in general. Condensed courses focusing on skills that are “what’s needed at the front” could leave out details which officers would sorely miss.

Yeah. That's the impression I got as well. Junior officer training became better and refined based on experience, but it had to be condensed down to just one year courses (later improved to two years) while cramming as much as they could into each day. Inevitably, stuff fell through the cracks.

Didn’t stop them from winning and kicking Nazi butt, which is the thrust of my earlier point. The ‘41 Red Army could have deep imperfections and still perform much better.

Yeah, I can agree with that well enough.

 

[Julian]

Avoiding the Kirov assassination and Terror in the Party also opens the door to a much larger membership base. An understated aspect of the Red Army’s rapid growth was the dilution of Party membership in its ranks, declining from 24% in 1932 to 13% on the eve of war. During the war, it stabilized at 23-25%.

Party membership was a poor vehicle for mass indoctrination, especially with the Terror destroying most of the “usable past” and pantheon of popular Party heroes. But it did put members into a state service elite with shared obligations and privileges. Given the frayed social bonds in the USSR even without the Terror, giving the Red Army more “glue” to bind itself together during expansion would be a good thing.

 

[Julian]

I have the unpopular opinion that the purge actually prevented a xoup in the USSR, which may have occurred following an invasion.

I don't think that was ever on the agenda. The senior leaders of the Red Army were communists, if not necessarily Stalinists, and owed their reputations and careers to the Party and Stalin's patronage. Stalin's over-reliance on repression obscures the fact that, like Hitler, he had a keen understanding of how to buy loyalty through lavish gifts. The distribution of cars, for example, was carefully controlled by Stalin personally. The Party put a lot of effort into buying the loyalty of the "red intelligentsia" as Stalin called them in 1930, both in the Red Army and society in general. Military district commanders and their staffs/subordinates were deeply connected (both formal and informal channels, like corruption) with the regional Party leadership. In many ways the Terror actually undermined the integration of the Red Army into the broader Soviet project. Though it asserted direct political control over the military, it gutted the human connections between Party and military men. If in 1930 the Red Army had 6,760 Primary Party Organizations, by 1939 there were only 5,000.