Barbarossa halted after Kiev: Opinions?

[Julian]

I didn't see "Suvorov", only Toropets-Kholm. We're getting kind of far from the topic, but IIRC the push South-Westwards from Orel was over mostly decent offensive terrain? There may have been a short stretch of good defensive ground to cover, but basically once the breakthrough had been achieved the forces on the North shoulder of the Kursk bulge had to leg it at high speed.

The ground that Army Group Center defended was for the most part not steppe. Some open ground, but much of it was forest and wetlands crisscrossed with rivers. Compared to South's positions, which at best had the Balkas to use as the basis for switchlines, it was definately stronger defensive terrain yet the Soviet had no trouble achieving penetrations.

Anyways, we're sort of off topic. My belief is that a German stratgic pause is 1. Improbable and 2. Likely to achive little. The Soviets won't have lost as many men, will have several more armies reformed and organized, and by winter will still be in a strong position; remember that the 1941-1942 winter is one of the coldest ON RECORD. Not only do the German's lack winter clothing, they also lack appropriate lubricants too keep guns and tanks working. Their ammo will free up, becoming useless, and tanks won't start in the freezing cold. The Germans will still have no idea how to handle themselves in the Russian winter, leading to the same tactical collapses IOTL.

I know (at least in general terms) how things went around Leningrad, and also acknowledge that forested terrain *does* enable higher infantry concentrations than open ground. I don't see how AG North was isolated, though. Germany operated a lateral rail link -- the one the Velikiye Luki op was meant to cut.

There were few transfers because nothing decisive happened in the sector until the land corridor to Leningrad was opened up in Jan '44 and the Ger tank and Mot formations there had been "de-motorised", i.e. stripped of operational mobility, to make good the units intended for Fall Blau.

Isolated as in because of the lack of proper rail connections strategic interactions and transfers between North and its counterparts were few and far between; only the preparations for Nordlicht really deserve mention. It operated essentially independent of the other two Army Groups. In contrast aforementioned Groups consistenyl cooperated with one anothe and, constantly transferred supplies and reinforcements. Both work in conjunction rather than as independent groups.

 

[dduff442]

Nope, the Battle of Orel was an attempt to reduce a German salient that proved very successful. Orel was starting while the Germans were still grinding forward in the South. Analyses of the USSR's role in the battle usually neglect this particular point as it means that Marty Tzu-I mean Manstein might have been talking out of his ass when he said he could have won the battle.

I'm familiar with Manstein's preferred orifice for verbal communication. OTOH, it's hard to imagine anything more inept than trying to blitz through the densest defensive belts in the Soviet line. By 1943 "blitzkrieg" was no longer possible for any combatant party faced with a cohesive front.

"Nibbling" in the fashion preferred by Eisenhower and Montgomery was the way to go once AT defenses had been beefed up after 1940. Rapid attacks were only realistic once the line had been weakened.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

remember that the 1941-1942 winter is one of the coldest ON RECORD. Not only do the German's lack winter clothing, they also lack appropriate lubricants too keep guns and tanks working. Their ammo will free up, becoming useless, and tanks won't start in the freezing cold. The Germans will still have no idea how to handle themselves in the Russian winter, leading to the same tactical collapses IOTL.

That's somewhat of a myth. The Germans have winter gear, but their forward posture and stretched logistics prevented winter clothing from being brought up. Also having a line near villages and cities for winter logging would be highly beneficial for vehicles to weather the winter. A huge part of the collapse OTL was that they were stalled far beyond their supply lines when the Soviet counterattacks hit. They had already lost tons of equipment and had no winter gear out in the open, rather than near any prepared winter positions.

 

[dduff442]

The ground that Army Group Center defended was for the most part not steppe. Some open ground, but much of it was forest and wetlands crisscrossed with rivers. Compared to South's positions, which at best had the Balkas to use as the basis for switchlines, it was definately stronger defensive terrain yet the Soviet had no trouble achieving penetrations.

Anyways, we're sort of off topic. My belief is that a German stratgic pause is 1. Improbable and 2. Likely to achive little. The Soviets won't have lost as many men, will have several more armies reformed and organized, and by winter will still be in a strong position; remember that the 1941-1942 winter is one of the coldest ON RECORD. Not only do the German's lack winter clothing, they also lack appropriate lubricants too keep guns and tanks working. Their ammo will free up, becoming useless, and tanks won't start in the freezing cold. The Germans will still have no idea how to handle themselves in the Russian winter, leading to the same tactical collapses IOTL.

The winter battles will work out "the same" against a straight defensive line that's been fortified for 3 months as against a spaghetti-like mess defended by units that had been attacking without any pause for half a year?

 

[Snake Featherston]

I'm familiar with Manstein's preferred orifice for verbal communication. OTOH, it's hard to imagine anything more inept than trying to blitz through the densest defensive belts in the Soviet line. By 1943 "blitzkrieg" was no longer possible for any combatant party faced with a cohesive front.

"Nibbling" in the fashion preferred by Eisenhower and Montgomery was the way to go once AT defenses had been beefed up after 1940. Rapid attacks were only realistic once the line had been weakened.

Actually the lines in the southern part of the Kursk Bulge were the *weakest* part of the Soviet lines, they were stronger in Rokossovsky's sector. Too, Manstein had the good fortune to face Vatutin, who was completely unsuited to defense and had the idea that the only good defense was an attack. Germany also had to do *something* to show it could still take the initiative. If not Kursk, what? If it tries to play defense all along the front, what stops the USSR from finding the weaker spots and hitting the Germans right then and there with the armies that IOTL were crammed into the Kursk Bulge?

 

[Julian]

That's somewhat of a myth. The Germans have winter gear, but their forward posture and stretched logistics prevented winter clothing from being brought up. Also having a line near villages and cities for winter logging would be highly beneficial for vehicles to weather the winter. A huge part of the collapse OTL was that they were stalled far beyond their supply lines when the Soviet counterattacks hit. They had already lost tons of equipment and had no winter gear out in the open, rather than near any prepared winter positions.

Saying that they can prepare strong winter positions is a pretty big assumption. Defenses can be constructed and positions consolidated, but essentially re-equipping the Heer, even with shorter supply lines (Though not by much) is an entirely different story. They certainly can improve but they still will be unprepared for a winter campaign.

The winter battles will work out "the same" against a straight defensive line that's been fortified for 3 months as against a spaghetti-like mess defended by units that had been attacking without any pause for half a year?

So the Germans magically establish a coherent defensive position when, even in August 1941, they were starting to lose ground against Soviet counteroffensives? Again there's this assumtpion that the Soviets will be complacent enoguh to allow this to happen or that the Germans will be able to form a coherent defensive line over some 1,000 miles without suffering the same problems they did IOTL.

 

[Snake Featherston]

The winter battles will work out "the same" against a straight defensive line that's been fortified for 3 months as against a spaghetti-like mess defended by units that had been attacking without any pause for half a year?

No, as in those three months the Soviet armies will be far more lavishly equipped and able to actually planned, as opposed to desperately improvise, the attacks.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Saying that they can prepare strong winter positions is a pretty big assumption. Defenses can be constructed and positions consolidated, but essentially re-equipping the Heer, even with shorter supply lines (Though not by much) is an entirely different story. They certainly can improve but they still will be unprepared for a winter campaign.

Not to mention that the USSR has months to push far more of its total industrial capacity west, Leningrad running at full steam, and thus armies that are in total much more lavishly equipped than the OTL ones *without* Lend-Lease just in time to start those offensives......

 

[Deleted member 1487]

No, as in those three months the Soviet armies will be far more lavishly equipped and able to actually planned, as opposed to desperately improvise, the attacks.

What makes you think the Soviets wouldn't counter attack when the Germans pause their advance?

 

[Snake Featherston]

That's somewhat of a myth. The Germans have winter gear, but their forward posture and stretched logistics prevented winter clothing from being brought up. Also having a line near villages and cities for winter logging would be highly beneficial for vehicles to weather the winter. A huge part of the collapse OTL was that they were stalled far beyond their supply lines when the Soviet counterattacks hit. They had already lost tons of equipment and had no winter gear out in the open, rather than near any prepared winter positions.

An even bigger part of the collapse was the misperception that for the second time in a row the Germans deluded themselves into thinking they'd destroyed the USSR's reserves and thus had no reason to worry about consolidating their lines.......

 

[Snake Featherston]

What makes you think the Soviets wouldn't counter attack when the Germans pause their advance?

I think that their having just lost their entire strategic reserve right at that moment is the biggest factor stopping them. Kiev cut off the Red Army's reserve in 1941, and recuperating all that *will* take time even with Barbarossa suddenly halting.

 

[Snake Featherston]

10:1 casualties is really a highly favorable loss ratio that Germany could afford. I should make it clear though that the defensive would be only for the remaining months of 1941 and the winter of 1942. After the Spring thaw the Germans could then launch their operation blue and take the strategic offensive after that when feasible.
For the October 1941-May 1942 period Germany would only benefit from holding the line and launching operational offensives in November and December, with the aim of holding out until the weather improved to launch their next round of offensives. Sitting on the defensive forever can only result in Germany losing. I should have made that more clear.

The thing is that staying on the offensive after Kiev was a net loss to Germany, that is until fighting season in 1942. After that they should go on the offensive again against the southern front, going after Soviet oil. Of course it would be impossible to seize and use, so when Baku comes into range the Germans should focus on bombing it. Cutting off this oil would deprive the Soviet agriculture sector of its mechanization, which freed up millions of men for the army IOTL.

Thing is that if the Germans wait a long time they won't be facing under-equipped shellshocked armies of riflemen with panzers, they'll be facing Soviet armies equipped far more thoroughly with both guns and ammunition. That changes quite a bit more of the fighting all along the front.

I know (at least in general terms) how things went around Leningrad, and also acknowledge that forested terrain *does* enable higher infantry concentrations than open ground. I don't see how AG North was isolated, though. Germany operated a lateral rail link -- the one the Velikiye Luki op was meant to cut.

There were few transfers because nothing decisive happened in the sector until the land corridor to Leningrad was opened up in Jan '44 and the Ger tank and Mot formations there had been "de-motorised", i.e. stripped of operational mobility, to make good the units intended for Fall Blau.

The problem at Leningrad was more that the Soviets there were mulishly and stupidly blind in refusing to adapt their tactics to the terrain despite repeatedly being told how stupid this was by the Stavka VGK, amplified by Leningrad Front being defined to fight north of Leningrad, not south of it. This meant that in a part of the war where tactics, the German strength, predominated the Germans had their overall best performance of the war.....precisely because the terrain kept Soviet operational superiority from mattering for some time.

 

[dduff442]

Thing is that if the Germans wait a long time they won't be facing under-equipped shellshocked armies of riflemen with panzers, they'll be facing Soviet armies equipped far more thoroughly with both guns and ammunition. That changes quite a bit more of the fighting all along the front.



The problem at Leningrad was more that the Soviets there were mulishly and stupidly blind in refusing to adapt their tactics to the terrain despite repeatedly being told how stupid this was by the Stavka VGK, amplified by Leningrad Front being defined to fight north of Leningrad, not south of it. This meant that in a part of the war where tactics, the German strength, predominated the Germans had their overall best performance of the war.....precisely because the terrain kept Soviet operational superiority from mattering for some time.

Whoah! My turn for expert advice. Closed terrain engagements are dominated by small-unit manoeuvre -- commanders above the rank of Captain are seriously hampered in their ability to manoeuvre either offensively or defensively. Open country OTOH favours the manoeuvre of divisions, corps or even armies.

But German platoons, companies and battalions had radios whereas the Soviets seldom had radios below regimental hq level before '44 and often not even then. This, just as much as attritional factors, was why Stalingrad was a boon to the Soviets: the qualitative edge of an experience German platoon over an experience Soviet one was negligible. The German advantage lay principally in superior exchange and processing of tactical information.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Whoah! My turn for expert advice. Closed terrain engagements are dominated by small-unit manoeuvre -- commanders above the rank of Captain are seriously hampered in their ability to manoeuvre either offensively or defensively. Open country OTOH favours the manoeuvre of divisions, corps or even armies.

But German platoons, companies and battalions had radios whereas the Soviets seldom had radios below regimental hq level before '44 and often not even then. This, just as much as attritional factors, was why Stalingrad was a boon to the Soviets: the qualitative edge of an experience German platoon over an experience Soviet one was negligible. The German advantage lay principally in superior exchange and processing of tactical information.

As I said, the Germans had better skill at the tactical level, where in the open field in a clash of armies, it was much easier for the Soviets to counterbalance this with operational superiority. Leningrad, however, was an area where German superiority counted because Soviet leaders were incapable of following the advice of their own leaders telling them repeatedly "Stop the damn frontal attacks you idiots, it's not working."

 

[dduff442]

Actually the lines in the southern part of the Kursk Bulge were the *weakest* part of the Soviet lines, they were stronger in Rokossovsky's sector. Too, Manstein had the good fortune to face Vatutin, who was completely unsuited to defense and had the idea that the only good defense was an attack. Germany also had to do *something* to show it could still take the initiative. If not Kursk, what? If it tries to play defense all along the front, what stops the USSR from finding the weaker spots and hitting the Germans right then and there with the armies that IOTL were crammed into the Kursk Bulge?

The OP has Germany resuming the strategic offensive in late-spring/early summer '42 with the objective of cutting the Persian corridor and destroying or isolating the Caucasian oilfields. Not enough to win the war but hypothetically enough for Germany to force stalemate... at least until sometime in 1946 when the US unleashes the stockpile of A-Bombs it's built up.

 

[Snake Featherston]

The OP has Germany resuming the strategic offensive in late-spring/early summer '42 with the objective of cutting the Persian corridor and destroying or isolating the Caucasian oilfields. Not enough to win the war but hypothetically enough for Germany to force stalemate... at least until sometime in 1946 when the US unleashes the stockpile of A-Bombs it's built up.

And what does the USSR do in all that time?

 

[dduff442]

As I said, the Germans had better skill at the tactical level, where in the open field in a clash of armies, it was much easier for the Soviets to counterbalance this with operational superiority. Leningrad, however, was an area where German superiority counted because Soviet leaders were incapable of following the advice of their own leaders telling them repeatedly "Stop the damn frontal attacks you idiots, it's not working."

Yeah, but political, cultural and social factors impacted on Soviet behaviour as well. Just as the German leadership was incapable of sound judgement regarding the USSR on ideological grounds, there were also practical reasons Soviet commanders couldn't put their sophisticated doctrines into effect.

The average Soviet commander's fear in 1941-42 wasn't that a given attack would fail, it was that an attack wouldn't happen at all. Infiltration requires decentralised initiative and mutual trust, but centralised control and paranoia were the safe options for a Soviet commander -- the opposite of decentralisation and trust. A frontal attack, with everybody under the direct supervision of the CO, allowed the commander to be certain he wouldn't face a firing squad.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah, but political, cultural and social factors impacted on Soviet behaviour as well. Just as the German leadership was incapable of sound judgement regarding the USSR on ideological grounds, there were also practical reasons Soviet commanders couldn't put their sophisticated doctrines into effect.

The average Soviet commander's fear in 1941-42 wasn't that a given attack would fail, it was that an attack wouldn't happen at all. Infiltration requires decentralised initiative and mutual trust, but centralised control and paranoia were the safe options for a Soviet commander -- the opposite of decentralisation and trust. A frontal attack, with everybody under the direct supervision of the CO, allowed the commander to be certain he wouldn't face a firing squad.

Except that in the Leningrad sector the tactical *requirement* was fairly simple and after 3 years of the Stava VGK repeatedly requiring the exact same patterns of behavior be done by all the commanders of the Front, it leaves the question of why, precisely, in three years they failed and why after three straight years they *weren't* all shot. Those men were the best Soviet generals of the war for Germany.

 

[dduff442]

And what does the USSR do in all that time?

I'd guess they launch continuous under-resourced offensives as in OTL, but if the Germans are allowed what-ifs then the Soviets must be as well. Whatever way the Soviets went, Germany desperately needed to rationalise its forces. The winter battles placed the maximum number of skilled specialists (artillerists, engineers etc) and rear-echelon equipment (transport etc.) in harm's way for the minimum of combat value.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I'd guess they launch continuous under-resourced offensives as in OTL, but if the Germans are allowed what-ifs then the Soviets must be as well. Whatever way the Soviets went, Germany desperately needed to rationalise its forces. The winter battles placed the maximum number of skilled specialists (artillerists, engineers etc) and rear-echelon equipment (transport etc.) in harm's way for the minimum of combat value.

If Germany stops rather further west than it did IOTL, why is it still under-resourced, given the USSR has more resources and more ability to plan moving those resources to safety, starting with a Leningrad front that gets a better tactical position by bashing Finland out of the war in the winter of 1941-2? Why, if Germany stops months before OTL, does the contingent circumstances of the OTL Winter Battles repeat without good reason?