Barbarossa Called Off After Kiev-Germans Go For Moscow in 1942

Following on the discussion in this thread, what if the OKW had ceased operations after the Battle of Kiev for the remainder of 1941 and then launched its next offensive in the summer of 1942 to take Moscow?
 
Mother of all battles, in a word. It won't just be the German army that will be stronger: without Vyazma-Bryansk and the loss of Eastern Ukraine, the Red Army will be a fair bit stronger even if they do go and launch a disastrous winter offensive (the Germans simply can't inflict as much pain on the Soviets on the defense as they can on the offense, although they can preserve their own forces better). The Germans probably still lose because of this, but their chances at success are better then IOTLs 1942. There's a lot of variables here so whether the Soviets extra strength is able to cancel out or even backfire on what the Germans gain from their strategic pause is subject to some debate.

Of course, this still doesn't actually render the aim of Barbarossa possible. Note the aim - the ultimate strategic aim - of the invasion was not just to defeat the Soviet Army or take Moscow. It was to seize the raw resources of the Soviet Union and use them to fuel further wars against the UK and USA. There was a Nazi economic study made before the invasion that concluded due to the transportation limitations, expected war damage, and the necessity of supporting and suppressing the conquered populations, the Soviet Union would actually be a net drain on German resources. This report was not completely ignored, but Hitler waved it off with the callous decision to simply destroy the conquered populations. To a point such ruthlessness mitigated some of the economic issues, but it exacerbated others, like occupation costs and infrastructure replacement. Even with German colonists, the east wasn't going to be contributing much to the German war effort any time soon.

Nevermind not having a decent plan for taking Moscow, the Germans had no realistic plans for their post-war endstate.
 
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Let me suggest a slight variation in the theme then.
The German AGC make no major offensive after Kiev as above, but the AGS advance as fast as they can until the rains set in and then dig in.
I guess they would face diminished opposition (and highly stretched supply lines off course) and get further ahead than OTL, and they would still get some time to consolidate. Come 1942 they have an advanced jump-off position in the South or a much wider front on which to attack Moscow (west-south of Moscow rather than just west).
Probably a mobile front against the major Soviet forces in 1942? Would that spell destruction?
 
It leaves AGS heavily exposed to a Soviet counter stroke while their still west of places like Kharkov and the Donbass (as these were west of where AGS's front was when the mud set in OTL). I mean, yeah AGS can move forward relatively fast at first, since the Soviets had nothing more then alarm troops in front of them, but without a corresponding move by AGC (OTLs Vyazma-Bryansk), they'll have an exposed northern flank and the Soviets will send many of the forces that OTL were deployed to Moscow down after them instead. Not to mention AGS's supply situation was the worst of all the Army Groups since the Soviets blew all the rail bridges over the lower D'niepr and the Germans weren't able to repair them till 42.

Better for them to just sit along their post-Kiev lines.
 
It depends how 1942 shapes up.

The exact right time for the Germans to stop was Oct 16 1941. This includes the Germans surrounding one million men defending in front of Moscow and the fall of Kharkov. If these events occur, Germany probably wins it, though much of that thread revolved around Hitler being dead and the ramifications of no war with the US.

However, this thread does not have these tack on benefits for the Germans. Kharkov does not fall and a million Russians get away. The problem is, WHY do the Germans stop in this POD? There has to be some more compelling reason than they just did.

Let me just speculate that the Germans decide that the campaign took too long as is, and want to make winter positions on the Dniepr and perhaps focus on taking Leningrad for logistical reasons.

Maybe the Germans have the strength to surround Lake Ladoga. Their defenses are relatively formidable. Knowing Stalin, he would throw everything he has in a massive counteroffensive. Stalin may have enough for it to succeed at least in the north against forces trying to starve out Leningrad (unless they surrounded Lake Ladoga soon enough and the city already fell).

I see this going two ways. If the Germans did succeed in taking Leningrad in 1941, all of the Russian counter-offensives horrifically fail, even though they will be much larger. Germans supply lines will be much and their best troops are fighting on prepared ground instead of freezing to death without fuel, foraging for food. The failure of these offensives can prove to be so costly in the winter, that the Germans will fight a huge battle for Kharkov in the early summer. It's on open ground so it bags a ton of Russians. Then, the fight in the center will be colossal, but Germany essentially being undefeated with much better logisitics (fall of Leningrad) takes the cake and wins it.

Now, if we went strictly by the OP (no Leningrad), then Germany loses the war sooner, especially if Stalin views it as hopeless to counterattack in the winter as he still has plenty of ground and he views it as suicidal to cross river lines that the Germans have prepared defenses behind. Kharkov is still in Russian hands, producing a lot of much-needed Russian equipment. Germany can try for Tyfun 42, but now they are facing an adversary with more equipment and more men than OTL. So, Germany probably can take Kharkov in 42, but they won't be able to take Leningrad nor do better in the center. By 43, the Russians start pushing the Germans back early.
 

Too late then. They've already pushed too far, strung themselves out, and broken their supply chain. That means the winter counter-offensive would be roughly just as successful as OTL in terms of losses inflicted upon the Germans and territory regained. Given the already amazing scale and scope of German battlefield success during Barbarossa, alternate scenarios where Germany does even more damage to the Red Army aren't particularly realistic and generally enter the realm of fantasy. More realistic is for the Germans to preserve their own forces for the 1942 campaign by going over to the defensive once they start to reach their culmination point. That point isn't October 16th, rather it was September 30th.

I see this going two ways. If the Germans did succeed in taking Leningrad in 1941, all of the Russian counter-offensives horrifically fail, even though they will be much larger. Germans supply lines will be much and their best troops are fighting on prepared ground instead of freezing to death without fuel, foraging for food. The failure of these offensives can prove to be so costly in the winter, that the Germans will fight a huge battle for Kharkov in the early summer.
Leaving aside that taking Leningrad is only possible via direct assault (which is so costly as to not be worth it), the Germans never managed to inflict as bad casualties upon the Soviets when defending as they did on the attack. At worst, the Soviet ITTL winter offensive will cost them as badly as it did OTL, which still leaves them with a net gain without Vyazma-Bryansk or the fall of Eastern Ukraine. More probably is that after the first month of relatively useless hammering at the German line, Stalin calls it off (he only kept pushing offensives which achieved a big initial success), meaning the Soviets get the entire rest of the winter and spring to recuperate instead of just the OTL spring.

Maybe the Germans have the strength to surround Lake Ladoga.
They do not. AGN was hovering at the bare end of it's logistical tether as it was and the terrain they'd have to cross is pete swamp filled with Soviet troops. It isn't happening.
 
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Too late then. They've already pushed too far, strung themselves out, and broken their supply chain. That means the winter counter-offensive would be roughly just as successful as OTL in terms of losses inflicted upon the Germans and territory regained.

Wrong on several counts.

1. The Germans on October 16 1941 reached the point in which they were essentially pushed back to by Jan 1942. So, the Germans were just barely able to logistically keep up at that distance without collapsing.
2. The Germans would ITTL be defending without even more wear-and-tear, being half frozen, and completely unprepared.
3. The Russian counter-offensive IOTL met the forward elements of overstretched, worn out Germans, and then overwhelmed those lagging behind struggling to keep up. ITTL, all the Germans are rested, will roughly be at the same point, and the Russian counter-offensive will fail to have the tyranny of numbers at the front lines that allowed it to have success IOTL.
4. The Russian counter-offensive contained 1.1 million men. The Germans had roughly 1.9 million men in AGC at this point. With the Germans not being overstretched and with 6-7 weeks to get significant amounts of men and material to the Oct 16, 1941 front lines, the Russians are actually going to be outnumbered.

But sure, if you hand wave away these obvious things, I'd agree with you :cool:

That means the winter counter-offensive would be roughly just as successful as OTL in terms of losses inflicted upon the Germans and territory regained.

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Leaving aside that taking Leningrad is only possible via direct assault...

Surrounding Lake Ladoga would have led to their capitulation, but I honestly cannot comment on whether that would be possible, though if German forces were all transferred north instead of center, given the Russian rate of collapse after Sept 30th to December, with more armor and men they might be able to get it done.

...the Germans never managed to inflict as bad casualties upon the Soviets when defending as they did on the attack.

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Wiki puts the ratio of Germans to Russians to 1:6. The Rhzev Slaughterhouse estimates 2 million Russian casualties. The highest estimates I have seen for German losses are 200,000.

See also 9:18 in Soviet Storm's description of the events at Rhzev: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Su67gOzFPQM

In translation, Russian soldiers woefully underperformed for whatever reasons through 1942, and the Germans exacted similar kill ratios on the defense in the center as they did on the offense in Case Blue until they started fighting in the city itself.

Other than 2nd Kharkov, which was an absolute gift to the Germans, Rhzev was their most successful fighting in all of 1942. Woefully surrounded on three sizes, with their main rail head right one the front lines, and they still repulsed the Russians all three times.

So, the "no cat" has got a point, you should listen to him.

...Stalin calls it off (he only kept pushing offensives which achieved a big initial success)...

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Like Rhzev, like Kharkov...

They do not. AGN was hovering at the bare end of it's logistical tether as it was and the terrain they'd have to cross is pete swamp filled with Soviet troops. It isn't happening.

Didn't the Germans move forward in hundreds of kilometers in the heavily forested region approaching Moscow?:confused:
 
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1. The Germans on October 16 1941 reached the point in which they were essentially pushed back to by Jan 1942. So, the Germans were just barely able to logistically keep up at that distance without collapsing.

Incorrect. Their supply lines were actually collapsing before the mud even set in. What allowed the Germans to hold their line was not that they fell back into supply range (there was practically no improvement to the German logistical situation until very late in the winter) but that the Soviet assault had run out of steam. Even then, it had enough left to make things very uncertain for the Germans for practically the rest of the winter. It's a lot more conceivable that the Soviets manage to pocket and destroy the Rzhev salient then a lot of what people on here posit the Germans are capable of doing.

2. The Germans would ITTL be defending without even more wear-and-tear, being half frozen, and completely unprepared.
Nope. Much of the wear-and-tear had happened before this point. There is no reason to suspect they would be any less frozen or unprepared for the Russian winter then IOTL given the Germans total incapcity of getting winter equipment to the front and the inappropriate weather conditions for fortification.

The Russian counter-offensive IOTL met the forward elements of overstretched, worn out Germans, and then overwhelmed those lagging behind struggling to keep up.
And that will still be the case. The Germans don't have the time or supplies to recuperate and their front is already too long for them to avoid being overstretched. It wasn't the next month-and-a-half that overextended the Germans, it was the previous few weeks. That next month-and-a-half was just them putting their arm deeper into the bears mouth.

Surrounding Lake Ladoga would have led to their capitulation, but I honestly cannot comment on whether that would be possible, though if German forces were all transferred north instead of center, given the Russian rate of collapse after Sept 30th to December, with more armor and men they might be able to get it done.
The terrain, weather, logistics, and Soviet forces are all against it. The terrain is practically impassible for armor and the concentration of the requisite infantry and artillery forces would break AGNs supply net. So to take a page from your book:

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Wiki puts the ratio of Germans to Russians to 1:6. The Rhzev Slaughterhouse estimates 2 million Russian casualties. The highest estimates I have seen for German losses are 200,000.
Adding up the total casualties of all offensives across the entirety of 1942 is a non-starter. Looking at the Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive, the Soviets suffered a total of 776,889 losses (272,320 irrecoverable and 504,569 sanitary, from When Titans Clashed). Pinning down German losses for this period is proven to be elusive, but even with your number that is a casualty ratio of 4:1, not 6:1.

Like Rhzev, like Kharkov...
Yes, actually. After taking a quick moment to check the dates, I can actually state that if one actually examines the Rzhev offensives (note the plural), the only one that Stalin didn't call off after about 2 month was the one following the Moscow counter-offensive (the Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive). Both the Kharkov offensives and the pre-Moscow attempts at counter-offensives were even shorter then that.

Didn't the Germans move forward in hundreds of kilometers in the heavily forested region approaching Moscow?:confused:
Terrain which is vastly more favorable to large-scale movement of troops, vehicles, and supplies (not least because it featured actual roads, including even one paved one!) then the pete swamps beyond the Volkhov river.
 
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As interesting as ideas of limited post-Kiev German offensives are, I think they should probably have a separate thread. Returning to the idea mentioned in the OP and the thread it links to, to me there are essentially two big questions. First, just how badly does the TTL Soviet winter counteroffensive go? Second, how successful is the Abwehr at deceiving the STAVKA into believing that the 1942 German offensive will come in the south, rather than at Moscow? As I understand it, after Kiev, the Soviet high command believed the Germans had shifted their main area of effort to Ukraine, and continued to until Typhoon (which of course hasn't happened ITTL) disabused them of the notion, in addition to being surprised in general by an attack so late in the year.

If TTL's 1942 offensive at Moscow fails, than the war unfolds more or less as OTL although the details will be different. The interesting question is what happens if we say that the Soviet winter 1941-42 counteroffensive goes really badly and the STAVKA is deceived into putting most of its reserves in the south and as a result the German attack destroys the weakened forces defending Moscow and takes it (and perhaps Leningrad as well) before the STAVKA has time to react. What happens then? AGC would then have another long flank to its right, so perhaps another thrust south by Guderian to try to replicate the Kiev encirclement?
 
First, just how badly does the TTL Soviet winter counteroffensive go?

We're looking at a minimum of hundreds of thousands of Soviet losses and probably several tens of thousands of Germans. That's if Stalin calls it off after a month or two. Call it 750 thousand Soviet losses and maybe... I guess a hundred thousand Germans? Maybe 150 thousand? But the Soviets will still be up 750 thousand without the loss at Vyazma-Bryansk, plus the industrial resources of Eastern Ukraine, which kind of cuts it out. In any case, defense is fundamentally about preserving ones own forces for when the time is favorable to go over to the offensive, not about inflicting damage upon the enemy. That is the job of the offense. As Clausewitz observed: "Defense is passive, its purpose is preservation. The purpose of assault is conquest."

As I understand it, after Kiev, the Soviet high command believed the Germans had shifted their main area of effort to Ukraine, and continued to until Typhoon (which of course hasn't happened ITTL) disabused them of the notion, in addition to being surprised in general by an attack so late in the year.
I generally read it as the Soviets expecting a quiet autumn on the whole, since they didn't expect the Germans to be so bloody stupid as to overextend themselves so close to the winter. Not the first time Stalin ascribed a degree of rationality to his opposition that didn't exist. The question of whether the Germans would be able to mount a successful deception op in the south without a previous thrust at Moscow to draw Soviet attention... is an interesting one. I can certainly see it.

The interesting question is what happens if we say that the Soviet winter 1941-42 counteroffensive goes really badly and the STAVKA is deceived into putting most of its reserves in the south and as a result the German attack destroys the weakened forces defending Moscow and takes it (and perhaps Leningrad as well) before the STAVKA has time to react.
After all the losses they'll take chewing through Soviet defenses in 1942 and having to go through the bloody grindfest of capturing Moscow, I'm dubious they'll have the forces to do it. Even with your proposed deception, Soviet defenses along the Moscow and Leningrad axis will be pretty tough. The loss of Moscow in '42 is a severe blow, but one the Soviets can possibly recover from, depending on where the bulk of the Politburo is when the city goes.
 
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We're looking at a minimum of hundreds of thousands of Soviet losses and probably several tens of thousands of Germans. That's if Stalin calls it off after a month or two. Call it 750 thousand Soviet losses and maybe... I guess a hundred thousand Germans? Maybe 150 thousand? But the Soviets will still be up 750 thousand without the loss at Vyazma-Bryansk, plus the industrial resources of Eastern Ukraine, which kind of cuts it out. In any case, defense is fundamentally about preserving ones own forces for when the time is favorable to go over to the offensive, not about inflicting damage upon the enemy. That is the job of the offense. As Clausewitz observed: "Defense is passive, its purpose is preservation. The purpose of assault is conquest."

I generally read it as the Soviets expecting a quiet autumn on the whole, since they didn't expect the Germans to be so bloody stupid as to overextend themselves so close to the winter. Not the first time Stalin ascribed a degree of rationality to his opposition that didn't exist. The question of whether the Germans would be able to mount a successful deception op in the south without a previous thrust at Moscow to draw Soviet attention... is an interesting one. I can certainly see it.

Trying to come up with an estimate of relative strength for TTL's Moscow offensive, during OTL Typhoon AGC had a little over 1.9 million at the outset. With extra losses saved and replacements brought in over the course of the winter and spring, I'm thinking perhaps a couple of hundred thousand more could be added, counting German allies, bringing the total up to somewhere around 2.2 million. For the Soviet side, at the outset of OTL Blue, in what they considered to be the secondary sector, there were 2.7 million. However, since in this scenario both sides' losses have been lessened during late 1941-early 1942, this number should be increased as well. Assuming the STAVKA is successfully deceived into believing that the German offensive will be in the south rather than at Moscow, most of this increase won't go to the defenses of Moscow, though. My (very rough) guess is somewhere around another three hundred thousand, bringing the total to 2.2 million Axis to 3 million Soviets.

The fighting itself would certainly be interesting, because unlike OTL there's very little room for the Soviet forces to fall back and German supply lines aren't going to be as stretched because there is less distance to advance.

After all the losses they'll take chewing through Soviet defenses in 1942 and having to go through the bloody grindfest of capturing Moscow, I'm dubious they'll have the forces to do it. Even with your proposed deception, Soviet defenses along the Moscow and Leningrad axis will be pretty tough. The loss of Moscow in '42 is a severe blow, but one the Soviets can possibly recover from, depending on where the bulk of the Politburo is when the city goes.

I was thinking the Germans would try to surround the city as they planned to do in OTL Typhoon and then take it once its defenders' supplies have been cut off (like at Kiev).
 
The fighting itself would certainly be interesting, because unlike OTL there's very little room for the Soviet forces to fall back and German supply lines aren't going to be as stretched because there is less distance to advance.

There is some room for the Soviets to withdraw (the Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk line, the Mozhiask defence line, and finally Moscow itself both make excellent reserve lines) and their defensive works on the whole will be much tougher then what the Germans faced in Blau, as would the terrain. It is certainly going to get brutal though...

For the Soviet side, at the outset of OTL Blue, in what they considered to be the secondary sector, there were 2.7 million.
Wikipedia's strength estimate for the Soviets is... optimistic, to say the least. They appear to have included the North Caucasus Front (when Blau's initial blow fell pretty much entirely on the Southern and Southwestern Fronts) and a number of reserve armies that were still in the process of forming up in their estimate of Soviet forces.

I was thinking the Germans would try to surround the city as they planned to do in OTL Typhoon and then take it once its defenders' supplies have been cut off (like at Kiev).
That would be a bitch and a half which would require the Germans to cross some several hundred kilometers of terrible terrain (more so to the north of the city then the south) with no prospect for extending their railheads forward in the North, since the lines there mostly run north-south.
 
There is some room for the Soviets to withdraw (the Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk line, the Mozhiask defence line, and finally Moscow itself both make excellent reserve lines) and their defensive works on the whole will be much tougher then what the Germans faced in Blau, as would the terrain. It is certainly going to get brutal though...

It would seem that much would depend on the exact course of the opening of the offensive. Best case for the Germans, they're able to rapidly break through in the main sectors of attack and drive their armored forces to encircle the defenders, like in OTL Typhoon or (with the roles reversed) Bagration. Best case for the Soviets, they're able to fall back and delay while bringing up reinforcements from elsewhere.

Wikipedia's strength estimate for the Soviets is... optimistic, to say the least. They appear to have included the North Caucasus Front (when Blau's initial blow fell pretty much entirely on the Southern and Southwestern Fronts) and a number of reserve armies that were still in the process of forming up in their estimate of Soviet forces.

A good point. Turning to Typhoon, at its outset the fronts defending Moscow had around 1.3 million. If my guess of an extra three hundred thousand is correct, this would mean the Soviet total at the outset would be around 1.6-1.7 million, bringing the totals to 2.2 million Axis and something like 1.65 million Soviets.

That would be a bitch and a half which would require the Germans to cross some several hundred kilometers of terrible terrain (more so to the north of the city then the south) with no prospect for extending their railheads forward in the North, since the lines there mostly run north-south.

I suppose it would depend how the offensive had gone up to the point the Germans reached Moscow, if they succeeded in surrounding and destroying the overwhelming bulk of the defenders beforehand and what few are left are disorganized, demoralized, etc. than it might be worth directly assaulting the city to try to collapse its defenses quickly. If not, the problems associated with trying to surround it would have to be weighed against those which come with a direct frontal attack into a city several times larger than Stalingrad.
 
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