Baltic Invasion??

You have to remember that Hitlers response to an Allied invasion of Denmark would probaply been rapid as opposed to the landings in Normandy. Remembering his fascination with Norway and Swedish iron ore...furthermore logistics for Germans would have been MUCH easier than in France.
 
You have to remember that Hitlers response to an Allied invasion of Denmark would probaply been rapid as opposed to the landings in Normandy. Remembering his fascination with Norway and Swedish iron ore...furthermore logistics for Germans would have been MUCH easier than in France.

Considering the man wasn't convinced that Normandy landings were the real thing until some time had passed, an invasion of Denmark would have been much more surprising... Then issue on how Germans could react should be considered. If invasion targets are Sjaelland, Jutland north of Limfjord and some adjacent islands the question is how could Germans make an impact on invasion zones? Opposed crossing over Limfjord or Great Belt would need time to prepare, during which additional Allied forces in addition to initial forces could be poured in and various light and heavy naval forces could be transferred to the theater. In France, although forces were under heavy air attack, they could move during long nights without problems of trans-shipment.

Additionally, no amount of ground forces based in Norway would have an impact on Denmark. The air forces in Norway were fairly weak, and reinforcing them would be tricky as reinforcements could be flown in first to Finland, then to Northern Norway and only then to Southern Norway.
 
Considering the man wasn't convinced that Normandy landings were the real thing until some time had passed, an invasion of Denmark would have been much more surprising... Then issue on how Germans could react should be considered. If invasion targets are Sjaelland, Jutland north of Limfjord and some adjacent islands the question is how could Germans make an impact on invasion zones? Opposed crossing over Limfjord or Great Belt would need time to prepare, during which additional Allied forces in addition to initial forces could be poured in and various light and heavy naval forces could be transferred to the theater. In France, although forces were under heavy air attack, they could move during long nights without problems of trans-shipment.

They don't directly need to attack the invasion beaches, just isolate the area. Invading Sjaelland would probaply only be a waste of resrouces for Allies, as the Axis simply need to take(or keep) Jutland and the allied forces in Sjaelland will eventually starve to death.

As long as the Germans keep the Allies from breaking out of Denmark they hold the cards, as they can reinforce faster than Allies.

Additionally, no amount of ground forces based in Norway would have an impact on Denmark. The air forces in Norway were fairly weak, and reinforcing them would be tricky as reinforcements could be flown in first to Finland, then to Northern Norway and only then to Southern Norway.


Norway is of no importance, Germany is. Even Hitler would not allow a landing so close to Germany, and would probaply order any and all available forces(including the airforce which is well within range) to drive back the attacker.
 
The main advantage being, of course, that it's a scenario which has not been discussed very often.

The advantage over Overlord would be more efficient use of ample naval power available to allies, avoiding the logistical problems of supplying advancing armies from France to Germany, bonus use of tactical airpower, greater effect on morale, and finally, a lodgement more to east than OTL, causing Stalin to get less of Eastern Europe.

I'm not terribly convinced by some of these arguments, sorry.

I'd remove morale first. Sure, attacking directly Germany might boost the Allied camp's morale – if it worked. If it did not, it would be a catastrophic blow to said morale. So one would need to see what chances of working the plan has, and therefore what concrete, practical advantages it would have over Overlord.

As to making more use of the superior naval power, that's a consideration regarding the means, not really an advantage over Overlord. It is worth using it only if there are objectives I cannot achieve without it; otherwise, it's not really an advantage for me.

Tactical air power? Well, and isn't it better when the distance between their airstrips and the battlefield is shorter?

As to avoiding the logistical work of going through France, for a long time after the landing, certainly that could be avoided. OTOH, I'd have a much harder logistical work up front, during and immediately after the landing, given the much higher logistical strain when compared to Normandy.

The fact that German territory itself is attacked, the relative closeness to the German industrial heartland, the fact that German fighter units intended for defense against strategic bombing can intervene in the beachhead battle... all these factors don't bode well, and coupled with the consideration about hard initial logistical conditions seem to hint at a high-risk gamble in the very first days of such an operation. In Normandy, there never was a real chance for the Allies to be thrown back into the sea. But here, the outcome will remain undecided for days. OTOH, yes, it would pay off better and quicker, if successful; but I don't know whether I'd like those odds.

No argument about the Soviets advancing less into Europe. One wonders whether that wouldn't be a reason _against_ the scheme, in the Allied decision-makers' minds.
 
They don't directly need to attack the invasion beaches, just isolate the area. Invading Sjaelland would probaply only be a waste of resrouces for Allies, as the Axis simply need to take(or keep) Jutland and the allied forces in Sjaelland will eventually starve to death.

As long as the Germans keep the Allies from breaking out of Denmark they hold the cards, as they can reinforce faster than Allies.

Well, in my concept Allies would not invade entire Jutland, just the north portion of it. As for the rest, how can a German occupation of Jutland threaten Sjaelland and Lolland? Only way to interdict Allied supplies would be via air power or sea power, in both of which Germany was deficient. Coastal artillery lacks range. In top of it, checking from the map, Sjaelland looks like it's filled with protected natural harbours, something which Normandy lacked. Plus no tides and not as much storms. Thus the ability to scrap such concepts as Mulberry.

Of course going down from Jutland may or may not work well. Supplying large scale operations from it's harbors might prove to be difficult. It would also present Germans a single front to defend. One factor in support for it would be ability to use very powerful naval gunfire support. Follow-up landing from Sjaelland-Lolland might work better, as it would multiply the amount of terrain Germany would have to defend against.

Norway is of no importance, Germany is. Even Hitler would not allow a landing so close to Germany, and would probaply order any and all available forces(including the airforce which is well within range) to drive back the attacker.

Yes, but Luftwaffe would have been no match to airpower Allies would have been able to project to Denmark.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The main advantage being, of course, that it's a scenario which has not been discussed very often.

The advantage over Overlord would be more efficient use of ample naval power available to allies, avoiding the logistical problems of supplying advancing armies from France to Germany, bonus use of tactical airpower, greater effect on morale, and finally, a lodgement more to east than OTL, causing Stalin to get less of Eastern Europe.

Stalin was going to get Eastern Europe. This had been decided at Tehran.

This entire scenario, as has been noted before would be an utterly unjustifiable risk with extremely high likelyhood of losses far in excess of OTL and a reasonable probability of total failure.

Losses to Allied Naval forces would have been assuredly far higher than were suffered IOTL. Losses to carrier airwings would have been significant, certainly far higher than those suffered in the Pacific Theater, if for no other reason that the concentration of enemy fighters, flown by veteran pilots, that will be encountered.

The danger of the landing force being cut off and destroyed in detail is extreme. In the case of D-Day the Allies were able to push 130,000 troops onto the Beach in the first 24 hours. Given the distances involved there is no way to put that many troops over the beach. The Heer will be operating along interior lines, allowing them to rapidly move forces to the invasion points, including moving troops from the Strategic reserve via the still undamaged rail system (unlike the system in France that had been extensively prepped by TACair, the German system was outside the range of fighter-bombers).

You have greatly underestimated the danger from enemy submarines. The Baltic is almost an ideal hunting ground for subs due to the very poor sonar conditions, short range from base for the U-boats and restricted waters involved as well as the still potent surface threat posed by the small surface combatants that the Kreigsmarine operated in the Baltic (LSTs, in particular, were remarkably vulnerable to torpedo attack, as were other Amphibious vessels). While the German forces would unquestionably have suffered appalling losses attacking the amphibious/troop convoy the losses to allied troops, especially the assault troops would have been equally devestating.

All this risk is in order to end the war, at best, five months earlier. This is even less useful than it appears since it will add several months to the Pacific War (or at the minimum, result in the deaths of thousands more Allied POWs in Japanese hands).

This sort of risk actually makes the German idiocy in North Africa or the near criminal Allied diversion of resources to the fighting in Italy after the fall of Rome seem like sound strategic planning.
 
As to making more use of the superior naval power, that's a consideration regarding the means, not really an advantage over Overlord. It is worth using it only if there are objectives I cannot achieve without it; otherwise, it's not really an advantage for me.

To enact manouver for strategic and tactical surprise, as well as providing much firepower to have an effect on German industry, as well as distrupting German supply traffic in Baltic, and elimination of German u-boat threat at the source.

Tactical air power? Well, and isn't it better when the distance between their airstrips and the battlefield is shorter?

Bonus targets. A bridge dropped over Seine will not directly impact German war production, but a bridge dropped over Oder will, for example.

As to avoiding the logistical work of going through France, for a long time after the landing, certainly that could be avoided. OTOH, I'd have a much harder logistical work up front, during and immediately after the landing, given the much higher logistical strain when compared to Normandy.

Would there be more logistical strain, actually? In comparison to Normandy most troops would not have to be assault transported, there's more natural harbors for LST's and very high possibility of capturing intact supply harbors. In addition, weather conditions are better in Baltic than in English Channel. For follow-up operations to Germany the distance would be smaller than in English channel, with Sjaelland available as good advance base.

No argument about the Soviets advancing less into Europe. One wonders whether that wouldn't be a reason _against_ the scheme, in the Allied decision-makers' minds.

Sure, like in almost all AH scenarios we look at them more from our time perspective than actual historical ones. From the time the strategy of cross-channel invasion was decided an operation to Baltic would seem far too far fetched, by the time it could be pondered realistically perhaps during Autumn of 1943 the preparations of Overlord would be well underway with very much political capital tied into project. Furthermore, Mediterranean entanglements have expended the resources available for possible flanking campaigns.
 
Well, in my concept Allies would not invade entire Jutland, just the north portion of it. As for the rest, how can a German occupation of Jutland threaten Sjaelland and Lolland? Only way to interdict Allied supplies would be via air power or sea power, in both of which Germany was deficient. Coastal artillery lacks range. In top of it, checking from the map, Sjaelland looks like it's filled with protected natural harbours, something which Normandy lacked. Plus no tides and not as much storms. Thus the ability to scrap such concepts as Mulberry.

Of course going down from Jutland may or may not work well. Supplying large scale operations from it's harbors might prove to be difficult. It would also present Germans a single front to defend. One factor in support for it would be ability to use very powerful naval gunfire support. Follow-up landing from Sjaelland-Lolland might work better, as it would multiply the amount of terrain Germany would have to defend against.



Yes, but Luftwaffe would have been no match to airpower Allies would have been able to project to Denmark.


So do tell me, what would be the point of only taking northern parts of Jutland? What kind of war winning move is that supposed to be?

Regarding ports, you need big ports not some natural harbours or small town docks.
 
Another concenr would be replacements. If I recall correctly, during the Normandy campaign before operation Cobra the Axis forces got hardly any replacements. Something like 100 000 men lost, with 10 000 sent as replacements. Not mention tanks, which they only got a few dozen, most being sent to eastern front. The figure sent to eastern front at the same time was something like a thousand tanks.

Now if Allies would land in Denmark moving that thousand tanks plus replacements there would be much easier and
would probaply have been done.
 
The danger of the landing force being cut off and destroyed in detail is extreme. In the case of D-Day the Allies were able to push 130,000 troops onto the Beach in the first 24 hours. Given the distances involved there is no way to put that many troops over the beach. The Heer will be operating along interior lines, allowing them to rapidly move forces to the invasion points, including moving troops from the Strategic reserve via the still undamaged rail system (unlike the system in France that had been extensively prepped by TACair, the German system was outside the range of fighter-bombers).

In case of Jutland, there's just one adequate rail link going northwards. In case of Sjaelland, the bridge spanning over Great Belt was built in 1990's. So I wonder what good the rapid rail transportation would do for Germany?
After taking air bases in Sjaelland and clearing the Oresund there's excellent conditions to devastate German rail transport in Northern Germany prior to follow-up operations.

You're also thinking too much in Normandy terms. In Denmark, there's no extensive beach defenses like in Normandy, thus except small special circumstances, there's no need to bring the troops to the beach, but into harbours and airfields. In case of both Northern Jutland and Sjaelland, after initial airborne operations there's excellent opportunity to fly in additional troops (1st British Airborne, Polish Airborne Brigade, 52nd British division etc.) with gliders and direct to the airfields.

Danish harbours were also not fortified in same sense as French harbours were, in addition to numerous natural harbours available, thus making initial logistics far easier.

You have greatly underestimated the danger from enemy submarines. The Baltic is almost an ideal hunting ground for subs due to the very poor sonar conditions, short range from base for the U-boats and restricted waters involved as well as the still potent surface threat posed by the small surface combatants that the Kreigsmarine operated in the Baltic (LSTs, in particular, were remarkably vulnerable to torpedo attack, as were other Amphibious vessels). While the German forces would unquestionably have suffered appalling losses attacking the amphibious/troop convoy the losses to allied troops, especially the assault troops would have been equally devestating.

The fact that waterways were constricted goes both ways. If one wants to interdict landings on northern Sjaelland, one has to come through Oresund (about 2nm's wide), Great Belt (approx 8nm wide) or Little Belt. (some 0,5nm's wide) All these routes are easily cut off by coastal artillery, naval mines and constant aerial surveillance. Any follow-up operation in the Baltic could well include mining of Kiel Canal and hermetically sealing Sweden-German Coast gap, with anti-sub net if necessary.

All this risk is in order to end the war, at best, five months earlier. This is even less useful than it appears since it will add several months to the Pacific War (or at the minimum, result in the deaths of thousands more Allied POWs in Japanese hands).

Actually I don't know which date was predicted for German collapse prior to Overlord, figure of June 1946 is painted into my mind but I'm not sure about it? The shortening of war in Europe and concentrating it on Denmark and Germany also means less problematic post-war period, as Benelux countries and France will need less economic assistance.
 
So do tell me, what would be the point of only taking northern parts of Jutland? What kind of war winning move is that supposed to be?

Regarding ports, you need big ports not some natural harbours or small town docks.

Well, if there's bridgehead in Jutland, it gives one additional airbases, secures the sea line of communications to Sjaelland entirely and finally gives the advantage that Germans cannot be sure whether follow-up operation will go south from Jutland or will be an amphibious operation to cut Jutland or a direct landing to Pomeranian coast.

As for ports, the Allied campaign in NW Europe was conducted just with Mulberries and over the beach supplies initially, then using just Cherbourg and Antwerpen, each hundred of kilometers away from the frontlines. In Danish case, there's a number of unfortified harbors, big harbor of Copenhagen, smaller ones like Fredrikstad etc. Besides, for additional supplying a campaign on German proper would probably not need a big harbor at all, as supplies could be just ferried in from Sjaelland and Lolland with train and car ferries (eg. LCT's, LST's.). Additionally a PLUTO could be constructed from Lolland to German proper easily.

Now if Allies would land in Denmark moving that thousand tanks plus replacements there would be much easier and
would probaply have been done.

Sure, but moving them against landings would require opposed river crossing in the north, with a single rail line, and movement across the sea for Sjaelland, easier said than done, especially against murderous Allied air and naval superiority, which in case of Jutland manifests itself that the rail lines leading to north are well under spectre of Allied naval gunfire.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Jukra - a few comments:

There being too few coastal batteries or other possible weaknesses could be said about the entire Atlantic wall, and was. Rommel himself was very sceptic in general.

Anyway there were 50 German coastal batteries in Jutland, the biggest being the 38 cm battery at Hanstholm (plus 2 batteries on Fyn and 16 or 18 on Sjælland).

50 batteries in an area like Jutland is very powerful and in guntubes double the organic artillery in the five Divisions in Denmark, but in weight of fire much more. On top of that there actually aren't that many good landing places on the west coast and the routes inland are easily blocked (look at the realtively narrow land strips between Limfjorden, Nissum Bredning, Ringkøbing Fjord and Esbjerg).

Jutland has/had two main railway lines. A doubletrack along the east coast and a mainly single track along the west coast (from Tønder over Ringkøbing to Holsterbo) but also connected "criss-cross" by numerous smaller lines. You of course couldn't put the Red Army through those lines, but they would be fully sufficient for any force possible to operate in Jutland. In OTL WWII the Resisstance, although quite effective in railway sabotage, never managed to more than slightly delay German traffic - there allways were lines enough to find an alternative route.

Have you ever been at the Jutland west coast? You can still see the remains of the fortifications - from what I can see they were as in- and extensive as at Normandy, especially if you take into regard the channeling effect of the coastal landscape.

Judging from OTL WWII the Germans would be able to very fast deploy several Divisions by rail - unseen and unhindered - to any destination inside the western European railway network - incl. Jutland.

The idea for the allies about just taking North Jutland (north of Limfjorden) would be that the 38cm battery also controlling Skagerak is ths pacified. But apart from all the problems waiting beyond Skagerak there however is the problem that North Jutland's only major port by 1940s would be Aalborg/Nr.Sundby, and they are deep inside the Limfjord and thus inaccessible. Hanstholm Port is from 1967 and Hirtshals and Frederikshavn were tiny in the 1940s. Next Jutland had very extensive airbase facilities that would threaten any allied operations in Skagerak or Kattegat. Besides securing North Jutland from a counterattack across the Limfjord from the south would probably require as many troops as keeping southern Jutland safe from an attack from the west. Ignoring the long narrow strip of land in the western part would reduce the number of troops required, but would also leave the Germans in control of the 38cm battery at Hanstholm, which it is all about. If a limited operation is opted for, better do a raid in force on Hanstholm, thoroughly demolish the battery and get out ASAP. Just don't hope the Germans roll up some railway guns (of which they had plenty) and pepper the traffic in Skagerak and Kattegat with those.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
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