Part 2
  • If the international community weren’t already angered by Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, they definitely were now. Propaganda produced by Baghdad aside, it was really, really hard to justify the Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.

    But while Iraq failed to impress members of the international community, there was great admiration for it from numerous people in Muslim (especially Arab) countries. Many saw Saddam as a hero, the man who would restore Arabs to their rightful glory. The same sentiment was not shared in non-Arab Muslim countries, instead they saw Saddam as a Muslim leader who stood against the west (and, in certain circles, they admired him for fighting Shia Iran). When Kuwaiti refugees living around the border fled following the Iraqi invasion to larger cities such as Dammam Iraqi propaganda said that Iraqi troops were told not to target them by direct orders from Saddam (this was false, of course, and not just that, Saddam was planning on attacking refugee camps if the initial invasion went well), but in spite of the fact that this never happened there were people who believed it. Many Kuwaiti refugees died on their way to Dammam, which put Saudi Arabia in a bad light. The lack of sympathy Saudi Arabia received on the outset of war from the Muslim World eventually led to problems for it and its allies both during and after the war.

    Following the first couple of days into the war, the Iraqi invasion was halted at Hafar al-Batin. By then, the initial shock of the invasion experienced in Saudi Arabia had eroded, and now the nation and its military was mostly prepared for war. The Iraqi military, which had been high on its earlier victories at the beginning of the war, was not expecting the Saudi military to reorganize and resist the Iraqi invasion with more force than they had before. Saddam, recognizing the propaganda value of this battle, declared the battle of Hafar al-Batin to be the “mother of all battles”.

    The Iraqi military’s technology was outdated when compared to the Saudi military. This was to be expected. Saudi Arabia had been an American ally even after the Cold War, Iraq only received some aid from the US for fighting Iran. Iraqi tank designs, such as the T-55 were outdated. Only the Republican Guard, which made up a small amount of the total Iraqi military, had access to new equipment. Most of the Iraqi military in Hafar al-Batin had been composed not of the Republican Guard (which was responsible for taking most of the Iraqi occupied land) but rather the Iraqi military, which, when compared to the Republican Guard, wasn’t as well trained, well led, and well equipped.

    Yet the Saudi military was put in an even worse situation. Most of the troops defending Hafar al-Batin had been ones which already were defeated by Iraq at Khafji and at other border areas. Had it not been for the lack of Republican Guard units in Hafar al-Batin, the battle would not have lasted that long. The Saudis were put on the back foot. When Iraqi reinforcements came, it did not take long for the Saudi positions at Hafar al-Batin to be crushed.

    Following the battle of Hafar al-Batin, Saddam saw it fit to declare the establishment of the “Socialist Arab Republic”. At first, Saddam wanted to annex all of Saudi Arabia and didn’t want to declare a puppet government, but his advisers convinced him of the absurdity of this move. The person leading the “Socialist Arab Republic” was Ali Hassan al-Majid, who at one point was briefly the minister of interior of Iraq. His cabinet consisted of other Iraqi officials along with some no-names from Saudi Arabia in order to give the puppet government some legitimacy.

    The capture of Hafar al-Batin and the subsequent establishment of the Socialist Arab Republic had convinced the Saudi government that they could not take on Saddam alone. Already people were predicting that Iraq could reach Riyadh by spring. Not only that, but they were reports that Yemen was beginning to prepare an invasion of Saudi Arabia themselves, in order to aid Iraq. There were some who wanted to wait until America intervened, but as time went on it seemed less and less of a possibility. The concept of the “American betrayal” began to become prevalent among the Saudi government and Kuwaiti resistance. Soon, not only was America not going to intervene, but many Saudis did not want them to, anyhow.

    A coalition would have to be built in the Middle East itself. Jordan and the UAE, two countries which had been mobilizing its troops following the Iraqi invasion were willing to join. Both Jordan and the UAE were friendly towards Saudi Arabia and had economic and military ties, and they saw a fall of Saudi Arabia to ultimately be harmful to themselves. However, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE all knew that even with the latter two joining they could only delay the inevitable. Their militaries were small, and in around the same shape as the Saudi military, which, as shown previously, had not been doing well against Iraq. The same was for Qatar, Egypt, and Oman, three other Arab nations which were willing to help Saudi Arabia but did not have a quality, or large, military. Even if they could stop Iraq, it would take a long time to cause a situation which would force it to the negotiating table.

    So Saudi Arabia appealed to two other countries which had a decent military and could potentially ally with Saudi Arabia against Iraq - Pakistan and Syria.

    Pakistan was traditionally an ally of Saudi Arabia and much of its economy was dependent on it. Yet there was unease among the more Saudi sympathetic members of its civilian government and military to support Pakistan intervening because there was a sizeable group of pro-Saddam members of the Pakistani military and civilian government. Not only that, but Saddam was seen as a hero in certain political corners in Pakistan. He had stood up to Iran, the US and the rest of the west. He was the “true leader of Muslims,'' according to them (this was in spite of the fact that in the 1970s Saddam had funded groups in Iranian Baluchistan which also wanted an independent Pakistani Baluchistan). This led to Pakistan not responding to any Saudi overtures for an alliance.

    Syria’s case was odd. Like Iraq, it was a Baathist government with little positive feelings for the Saudi state. But this was not to say that there was any Baathist camaraderie between Syria and Iraq. Hafez al-Assad hated Saddam for numerous reasons. For one, under Saddam, Iraq funded Muslim Brotherhood militants against Assad in the 1980s. Syria aligned itself with Iraq’s enemy, Iran. There was very little love for Saddam from Assad. As such, Assad was open to the possibility of Syria aligning itself with Saudi Arabia against Saddam. There was a risk, though, as much of Syria’s population was Sunni Muslim and many supported Saddam against the Saudis. Still, the Syrian government had quashed rebellion before, why wouldn’t they do it again, if rebellion were to occur? There was also economic benefits to Syria joining. Saudi Arabia had promised to invest in Syria if they were to join the anti-Iraq coalition. Assad saw this as a way to get back at Saddam for funding the Muslim Brotherhood against him, and saw an alliance with the Gulf states as beneficial for Syria in the long run.

    Signs of an anti-Saddam coalition being in the works became known to Iraq. While Iraq could probably take on Syria and Jordan, along with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar, it could not take all of them at once. Saddam also knew that there was no way to prevent such a coalition from emerging unless he withdraws from Saudi Arabia, which, at this point, was out of the question. The only option left was to weaken Saudi Arabia enough in a short amount to the point where it decides that it isn’t worth fighting Iraq even with a coalition.

    On the night of February 21st, 1991, a series of air strikes took place along the northeast of Saudi Arabia, in which much of its oil is located. Those air strikes were committed by the Iraqi Air Force, and were done with the thinking that by doing so they would weaken Saudi Arabia and force it to the negotiating table. The air strikes were limited, with over 100,000 barrels of oil being spilt. On the same night the Yemeni Air Force also did their own series of airstrikes, which were done on military bases in Najran. Those airstrikes didn’t do much damage, but that wasn’t the point of them. The point was that now Saudi Arabia was facing a war on two fronts, a war which they could not possibly hope to win by themselves.

    The airstrikes which were committed by both Iraq and Yemen was the impetus for the building of the anti-Iraq coalition. On February 23rd, the UAE, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman declares war on Iraq and Yemen. A day later, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan (which had an economy dependent on Saudi Arabia, and as such saw the Iraqi airstrikes as enough of a reason to declare war on them when they wouldn’t previously) also declared war on them.

    In the west, anger with Iraq had reached a breaking point. War with Iraq, once seen as a minority position, had become mainstream. General military action against Iraq received even more support as it punished Iraq without forcing American soldiers to actually invade and fight a long war.

    Whether or not military action against Iraq was popular in the US or not, Iraq’s aggression had come to the point were the Dukakis administration could not shrug it off any longer. If Iraq were to take Saudi Arabia’s oil fields, the economic situation would be akin to that, or perhaps even worse, than in the 1970s. Not only that, but there would be little time for the economic situation to be fixed by the 1992 election, which was already seen as an election in which Dukakis could lose.

    On March 1st, 1991, at around 1 AM, Task Force Normandy entered Iraqi airspace...

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    Situation of the Middle East and North Africa around March 1st, 1991
    Green: Saudi Arabia
    Red: Iraq
    Dark Green: Saudi-led coalition
    Brown: Iraqi occupied territory
    Pink: Yemen and their occupied territory
     
    Part 3
  • d4XE4HeID5h7_jxDFYPqZ0K9a7Tl8g0Bfomqu7hmZTzPU364HwB_GqsTNekJ9r5E0gNDnAo0NXkcuTUsFZ4-uUHaVPvCKn6ctja9Yd-q-pUShbgaqhpaWSw6cIgBHEy0cE6i3Ktp

    F-111 LGB attacks Ali al-Salem Airfield in the Kuwait Governorate, March 2nd, 1991.

    From March 1st to March 4th, 1991, the United States Air Force undertook a series of airstrikes aimed at weakening Iraq and Yemen’s ability to wage war against the Saudi-led coalition. Over 75 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles were launched at various airfields and military bases in both Iraq and Yemen. Over 30 Iraqi soldiers and 14 Yemeni soldiers were killed in the strike.

    The airstrikes were popular in the US, with polls showing that over 65% of the population approved of it. The airstrikes were also a boon to Saudi Arabia and its allies, who now had to face a much weaker Iraq and Yemen. Iraqi troops had to pull back and reorganize. But while this action was seen positively among the American public and the governments of the anti-Iraq coalition, in certain countries, it wasn’t.

    Sympathy for Saddam in certain countries turned into all out support. In Algeria, Sudan, Palestine, and other countries, Islamist parties held rallies in support of Saddam Hussein. Libyan leader Gaddafi made a speech on March 5th in which he said that Saddam had the “full support of the Libyan people” (Gaddafi was aware of how foolish it would be to actually declare war on Saudi Arabia and its allies, but he did give enough diplomatic support in order for Libya not to be seen as truly neutral). This wouldn’t be much of an issue seeing as how none of those countries was going to align itself with Iraq in the war, but sympathy with Saddam was not limited to neutral countries. In Pakistan, numerous protests broke out against the government and in support for Saddam. This support for Saddam wasn’t limited to civilians, as even in the military there was enough anti-American sentiment for many to question the government’s alliance with Saudi Arabia against Iraq. On March 7th, Pakistani general Mirza Aslam Beg resigned from the position of Chief of Army Staff, claiming that he could not in good conscience fight against other Muslims. His vocal support for Iraq led to Pakistanis going to Iraq specifically to fight for Saddam.

    In countries such as Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, there was doubt about fighting Iraq following the airstrikes. It was soon becoming clear that this war would not end quickly, and as such, many felt that it was not worth it to fight another Arab country just to preserve an American-backed kingdom which they did not feel any attachment towards. Much like Pakistan, there were people in those three countries which went to Iraq to fight for Saddam. Unlike Pakistan, those countries had the power to crack down on such activities, scaring any pro-Saddam people living in those countries into submission (of course, some continued such activities - they went to another country, and then went to Iraq, or they somehow found a way to get into Iraq directly from their original country).

    Iraq sensed that, after the airstrikes, they had a lot more sympathy in the Muslim world than they did previously. Many in the Iraqi government began to believe that if they got enough sympathy in the countries they were fighting that eventually they would have to withdraw in order to withstand public pressure. Saddam sought to speed up this process by attacking Israel.

    Whether or not Israel were to join the war Saddam had something to gain by attacking Israel. If Israel were to enter the war, Saddam thought, public sentiments in the countries of the anti-Saddam coalition would become more and more pro-Saddam as they began to realize that they weren’t fighting for their own national interest, but for a foreign country, supported by America and Israel. If Israel did not enter the war, Saddam could still play up the attacks against Israel into generating support for him, even if support would not be at the levels in the hypothetical situation Israel does enter the war. Not only that, but whether or not Israel enters, an attack on Israel would give Saddam allies among Palestinian groups, which would be helpful in the years following the end of the current war.

    On March 15th, 1991, over 100 Scud missiles were launched at Israel from Iraq. Most of the missiles were fired at West Jerusalem, deliberately so, because it would mark a propaganda tool for Iraq that they were liberating Jerusalem from Israel. A total of 102 Israelis died in the attack.


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    Israeli civilians taking shelter from missiles

    While they were some in Israel who caught on to Iraq’s plan, and as such did not want Israel to retaliate, further Scud attacks on March 17th had led to most of Israel clamoring for some sort of retaliation. A day after the second set of missile attacks, Israeli jets entered Iraqi airspace and attacked any camouflaged vehicles thought to be holding Scuds (thus starting the tactic of “Scud hunting”, which would be used throughout the war) along with attacking Iraqi positions around the Syrian border. Israel had retaliated.

    Israel’s retaliation had sent shockwaves throughout members of the Saudi-led coalition. This was made worse when you consider the fact that Israel had used Syrian airspace to attack Iraq, and that Syria hadn’t even noticed. Hafez al-Assad was outraged at this, and made numerous threats saying that he would have Syria leave the coalition if they did not receive any assurance that no aid would be sent to Israel if Israel were to strike at Iraq again. He did not want Israel to be seen as an ally against Iraq, not only because of his own views on Zionism, but because he was aware of what the Syrian people would think of Assad allied with Israel. Sadat had been killed for even making peace with Israel (a peace which led to Egypt retaking the Sinai peninsula), Assad probably wouldn’t fare much better if he were to ally with Israel against an Arab nation. In order to prevent Israel using Syrian airspace, the Syrian military began to placed troops around the Israeli border. Much of the resources used against Israel by Syria could have been used against Iraq. News of Israel using Syrian airspace had been suppressed in Syria, with Syrian news claiming that Israel had instead used Jordanian airspace. This was noticed by Iraq, which sought to weaken Assad’s power in Syria.

    For one, Iraq sought to weaken Syria in Lebanon, which had been under Syrian occupation since the 1980s. Iraq began to fund and arm various Maronite Lebanese groups (Maronite Christians, of course, being the most staunch anti-Syria group in Lebanon). This created a conundrum for Iraq as it simultaneously funded both Palestinian and Maronite groups. The Lebanese Civil War was originally between Palestinians and Maronites, and while the PLO had been expelled from Lebanon the enmity still remained. The smaller Palestinian groups, Iraq could control and tell not to be involved in Lebanon. The larger ones, such as the PLO, Iraq could not. This meant that relations between Iraq and the PLO were just ok, not great. Lebanon would end up playing a role in the Arab War, and in its aftermath.

    For over a month a stalemate occurred in the Arab War. This did not mean that fighting stopped completely, but that neither side was prepared to launch any sort of offensive to either take back land, or to occupy more land. In that sense, most of the fighting occurring in April and early May was going on was in Yemen, which was surrounded on all sides and as such was losing. It took some time for Iraq to recover from the airstrikes in March. When it did, the Iraqi military had set its sights on three cities: Dammam, Buraydah, and Hail. Those three cities were some of the largest cities in Saudi Arabia which were near the Socialist Arab Republic. If Iraq could capture them, it would be a blow to Saudi morale, deny their enemies a base, and open up the road to Riyadh. It would not be easy, the capture of those cities would be essential to the Iraqi war effort, and as such it would have to be done. Operation Decisive Storm began on May 15th, 1991.

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    The Middle East and North Africa on the eve of Operation Decisive Storm
    Green: Saudi Arabia
    Red: Iraq
    Dark Green: Saudi-led coalition
    Brown: Iraqi occupied territory/Socialist Arab Republic
    Pink: Yemen

    Light Green: Coalition occupied territory
    Light Blue: Israel
     
    Part 4
  • From May 15th to May 18th, a series of air strikes were done by the Iraqi Air Force against Saudi positions in Hail, Buraydah, and Dammam. The strength of the Iraqi Air Force was limited to the extent that there wasn’t much damage done to the Saudi military in those areas. But that wasn’t the point, the point of the airstrikes was to mark the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm, and to show Saudi Arabia the three cities they planned on capturing.

    Saudi Arabia could not afford to lose more than one of those three cities. If they lost two, it would cripple the Saudi military effort to the point where it would become entirely dependent on Coalition forces. If they lost all of them, even all of the Coalition’s strength could not stave off Saudi collapse. Troops from Yemen had to leave to join themselves with the Saudi military in Hail, Buraydah, and Dammam. At the height of desperation, Saudi Arabia requested that America attack Iraq, even when they knew that they won’t.

    With the dire situation facing Saudi Arabia, it was clear that they had to put everything they - and their allies - had in order to defeat Iraq. It came to the point where Saudi Arabia armed civilians in those three cities in order to increase the size of forces fighting Iraq. These civilian defense militias were small in size, ill equipped, and led by people who were generally disinterested and just wanted a quick buck. In short, such militias would be destroyed quickly, not even putting a dent in the Iraqi military. This was true for most of those militias, except for the one in Dammam.

    Following the initial invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq, most Kuwaiti refugees which lived around the Saudi-Iraq border fled to Dammam. They knew that Iraq was preparing to attack Dammam, and as such they were preparing themselves for when that would happen. After Saudi Arabia began to show an interest in arming civilians, it didn’t have to look for whatever opportunist who was willing to fight for some money in Dammam. There were people willing to fight and die against Iraq, and so Saudi Arabia decided to align themselves with them.

    Because Saudi Arabia was willing to bunker down and defend those three cities instead of fighting the Iraqi onslaught, the Iraqi military began to cut through Saudi lines. Most resistance to the Iraqi invasion was from foreign soldiers - Pakistani, Egyptian etc. The lack of resistance coming from the Coalition in the initial Iraqi onslaught led to Iraq reaching its targets of Hail, Buraydah, and Dammam, within ten days. Now would come the hard part - taking those cities.


    Most of the resources Iraq used in Operation Decisive Storm was directed to capturing Dammam. If Iraq could capture Dammam, then they would be able to capture much of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves. The strategic importance of Dammam was noticed by Saudi Arabia, its allies, and international observers. Numerous troops from members of the Coalition, be it from Qatar, the UAE, Pakistan, and Egypt, defended Dammam. That, along with armed Kuwaiti refugees, had made it so that Saudi troops were actually the minority in defending Dammam.

    The strength of the Coalition in Dammam was not something Iraq had expected. One could forgive Iraq for believing that Decisive Storm would be an easy victory for them. From the beginning of the war they had been victorious, and the level of resistance that they were facing was not one they had been expecting. This was the same situation in Hail and Buraydah, but Iraq saw Dammam as the most important city to capture.

    In order to prevent any more supplies from reaching the Iraqi military in Dammam, the Saudi government asked the Pakistani military to use its air force to attack Iraqi supply routes. Pakistan’s Air Force was larger than most other Coalition air forces, and was also fairly powerful, at least when up against a country like Iraq. While some Pakistani generals were skeptical, they were brought on board when the Saudi government offered them monetary bribes. On July 1st, the Pakistani Air Force launched a series of airstrikes on Iraqi supply routes which were coming in from Saudi Arabia’s Highway 85. The airstrikes were successful in that it blocked Iraq from sending more supplies to its soldiers in Dammam, but it was only a temporary setback for Iraq. Supplies to Iraqi soldiers resumed after three weeks.

    Around the end of August, the Battle of Dammam began to turn in Iraq’s favor. The resistance to Iraq had slowly been crumbling as Iraq began to put everything it had against them. Supplies and soldiers meant for helping Iraqi positions in Hail and Buraydah had been redirected to Dammam. Saudi Arabia tried to retaliate by using everything it had against Iraq in Dammam. But it could not do that without hurting their defenses in Hail, Buraydah, and around Yemen.

    With victory in Dammam appearing to be near, Iraq tried to do everything it can to speed up victory. Iraq began to blockade Dammam to prevent aid from reaching Coalition fighters there. Not only that, but blockading Dammam could also demoralize the Coalition to the point where they had to surrender. There was one problem with this, and it is that the Iraqi navy, much like its Air Force, was in a poor shape. The poor state of the Iraqi navy was due to the fact that much of it had been destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War, and it was destroyed further during the American airstrikes in March. As such, a blockade could not do much damage to Coalition fighters in Dammam, but at this point any damage that could be done to the Coalition was worth it. The blockade continued because the navies of the Coalition were also in a bad shape.

    But perhaps it would have been better for the Iraqi navy for the Coalition’s navies to be in better shape. A blockade in Dammam was seen as a step too far by the United States. A blockade further damaged the oil supply in Saudi Arabia, and increased oil prices in the West. The Saudi government saw this as a good chance at getting America to intervene in the war. If their ally losing battle after battle to a hostile power wasn’t enough to get them to intervene, then a disruption of the oil supply should be enough. Surprisingly to the Saudis (who believed that the entire American government was either hostile or apathetic towards them) there were many in the American government who saw the same way. These were mainly people who had ties with the oil industry and as such the events of the Middle East had a personal impact on them.They had been criticizing Dukakis for not having the United States help Saudi Arabia more than it has. They were aware of the detrimental effect an Iraqi victory would have on American influence in the Middle East. They played up the blockade of Dammam to make it sound worse than it actually was, that the Dammam blockade would starve thousands and lead to an Iraqi victory, which in turn would lead to a massacre of refugees (this prediction wasn’t too far off, considering that Iraq had planned an attack on refugee camps from the beginning of the war) and a massive increase in oil prices. This eventually convinced Dukakis, who decided that Iraq must be prevented from taking Dammam.

    The United States had previously attacked the Iranian Navy during the Iran-Iraq War in order to prevent any attacks on shipping. The lesson taken from this was that if America could attack the Iranian Navy with impunity then they can do the same against Iraq.

    On September 14th, American warships in the Gulf of Arabia attacked the Iraqi navy around the coast of Dammam, and in general around the Saudi Coast. Many of the warships America used were already used against Iran during the late 1980s and as such were more effective than the ships America had used which weren’t in the Gulf of Arabia before. Operation Wasp Sting, as it was called, lasted until September 27th. In that time, the Iraqi Navy was assaulted and anything left of it was destroyed. The blockade over Dammam ended because of this.

    Iraqi intelligence did not predict that America would strike at them and as such its entire military was in disarray as it was expected that America would then strike at the Iraqi army following the Iraqi navy. This period of confusion and demoralization was seen especially in Dammam, where Iraqi troops were told to prepare for an American strike against them. This led to the forces of the Coalition reorganizing and striking at Iraqi positions on October 2nd. After a week, Iraq was pushed out of Dammam altogether. On October 11th, Coalition forces reached Safwa, a town Iraq had captured months prior. On the same day, both the Syrian and Pakistani air forces both launched a series of airstrikes targeted at Iraqi positions in Hail and Buraydah. The airstrikes lasted until the beginning of November, but were enough to force the Iraqi army out of those two cities. In an attempt to stifle Saudi advance, Yemen launched an offensive against Saudi positions in the south, but the offensive was poorly planned and as such failed.

    Decisive Storm proved to be a failure for Iraq. It had been the first time Iraq had lost militarily in the Arab War. It was a morale boost for the Coalition, and marked the beginning of US intervention into the Arab War. America would begin to send arms to Saudi Arabia and their allies, along with military advisors and help with intelligence. Israel and the United Kingdom would begin to do the same. The Kuwaiti refugees which defended Dammam would soon form their own militia, known as the “Kuwaiti Liberation Army”. The KLA pledged allegiance to Prince Naser al-Sabah’s government-in-exile in Riyadh, and would aid the Coalition in future battles with Iraq and Yemen.

    For Iraq, it proved one thing, and that was that the early military successes did not mean that Saudi Arabia was doomed to failure. Iraq also needed more allies in the conflict. Yemen could hold out against Saudi Arabia, but there was some discontent within Yemeni ranks about what they were fighting for, and if they were just being used by Iraq as a way to distract Saudi Arabia and prevent it from using all of its forces against them. Saddam’s rhetoric of a “pan-Arab war against Israeli and American puppets” rang hollow because of Iraq’s ties with Maronite anti-Syria militias in Lebanon, whose entire raison d’etre was opposition to pan-Arabism. There were a sizable amount of people in the Yemeni military and government who wanted to withdraw from the conflict and declare neutrality.

    In order to bolster Saddam’s claims of a pan-Arab conflict against “Western puppets”, Iraq tried to improve relations with countries sympathetic to them. There were only two countries which were sympathetic towards them, and that was Sudan and Libya. Libya, while sympathetic, was unwilling to help Iraq because Gaddafi did not know what Libya had to gain from it. Sudan, however, was more open to helping Iraq because of two reasons - one, the Arab League had been consistently in favor of Egypt in the Hala’ib Triangle dispute, and Sudan wanted an ally, and two, Iraq had offered to help Sudan in its conflict in the south. While Sudan did not go to war with the Coalition, it allowed Iraq to use Sudan for intelligence against Egypt.

    Just because Iraq had failed to capture Damman, Hail, and Buraydah the first time did not mean that they would give up on capturing it forever. Those three cities were too important to just be let go of. Everyone, be it in Iraq, Yemen, the Coalition, or a neutral observer, knew this, and the Coalition made plans to prepare for this. Question is, with Iraq now being more prepared for whatever may happen, could Iraq win this time?


    n3m.png

    The Middle East and North Africa on November 1st, 1991
    Green: Saudi Arabia
    Red: Iraq
    Dark Green: Saudi-led coalition
    Brown: Iraqi occupied territory/Socialist Arab Republic
    Pink: Yemen

    Light Green: Coalition occupied territory
    Light Blue: Israel
     
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