Axis victory: How would the Japanese empire treat Muslim Indonesians?
- Thread starter Incanian
- Start date
Equal-opportunity forced labor/sexual servitude for the masses, relatively better opportunities for collaborationist administrators and other necessary middlemen. The Japanese didn't care that much about religion (except as ritual). ideologically they were like Mongols, but with a better navy.
In the Japanese Empire all non-Japanese were third class "citizens" (Ainu, Okinawans, etc were second class). Using the example of Korea, the Japanese went so far as to force name changes, and were working hard to eliminate the Korean language and culture between 1905 and 1945. Expect no less anywhere in the Greater Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. For the educated/skilled who work hard for the Japanese, a decent lifestyle but always on the edge. Foe everyone else, it starts at being peons with no rights and gets worse from there. If the Muslim imams start some sort of activity against the Japanese, then Islam will be targeted for extinction.
Agree, but at least early on in the occupation they made Muslims bow towards Tokyo instead of Mecca during prayer time.
WOAH they did that? If they continue to do that in an Axis Victory, there's gonna be some serious religious tension.
i do seem to remember reading something to the effect that Xinjiang's Muslims declared a jihad against Japan during the war
Well, the fate of the Indonesian Muslims may rest on what also might happen to the Middle East, and Arabia in an Axis victory.
I suggest that people read Harry J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-45," Pacific Affairs Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1955), pp. 350-362 at https://www.jstor.org/stable/3035318 It can be read online for free if you register with JSTOR. According to Benda, the Japanese showed considerable sophistication in dealing with Indonesian Islam:
"Japan's interest in matters Islamic originated from her plans of conquest in the South Pacific. In the mid.1930's a Japanese Islamic Association was founded in Tokyo and a handful of Japanese students were dispatched to the Middle East, there to acquaint themselves with the Muslim faith and its practices. In 1938 this Association called an Islamic World Conference at Tokyo, which was also attended by a delegation of Indonesian Muslims. Although these preparatory moves may seem meager enough, the occupation of Indonesia was to prove that Japan had a very profound appreciation of the important role which Islam played in Indonesia. This appreciation was demonstrated within a matter of days after the arrival of the Japanese army in Java. Some of the Japanese "students" from the Middle East had apparently arrived back in time to be dispatched to Java with the very first wave of the invading army. They made their presence felt by repeated appearances in Islamic houses of worship, particularly in Djakarta, as representatives of the military administration's Office of Religious Affairs [Shumubu], which was set up only two weeks after the occupation of the Indonesian capital. It was this office which, from the very outset and almost until the end of the occupation era, was to implement and apply Japan's Islamic policy in Java.
"This Islamic policy was, to a very large extent, a direct reversal of that of Japan's colonial predecessors in Indonesia. Instead of observing mere neutrality toward the Islamic religion, the Japanese from the very outset were fully determined to turn the leaders of that religion on Java into staunch allies of their Military Administration. The reasons for such an abrupt reversal are not far to seek: where the Dutch had been primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace and tranquility and the continuation of the status quo, the Japanese were out to mobilize an entire population in the support of their immediate and pressing war aims. The new rulers of Indonesia urgently required a greatly stepped up production of food supplies in the first place, and recruitment of labor batallions and auxiliary troops in the second. They realized only too well that, in order to elicit such support from the Indonesian peasant, it was essential to win to their side the spokesmen of Indonesian Islam, who for centuries have been the most important counsellors and spiritual leaders of the Indonesian villagers. It was on these thousands of Islamic leaders of the Javanese countryside that the Shumubu therefore concentrated its primary attention.
"In drawing this sharp and extremely significant contrast between Dutch and Japanese Islamic policies, it should not be assumed, however, that Japan was unaware of the potential political threat inherent in grassroots Islamic agitation, which had understandably haunted the Dutch for so long. This supervision of Muslim educational activities on all levels was, if anything, increased by the Japanese. It is also very significant that the two political Islamic parties which had existed under Dutch rule were banned in the first few weeks of the Japanese occupation. More important still, the overall Japanese policy of introducing their own cultural standards and politico-religious concepts, in particular that of emperor-worship, constantly militated against the all-out success of their Islamic policies. However, in spite of these great difficulties and inconsistencies, and in spite of the fact that the task of winning to their side the Indonesian believers of Islam was under-taken by a relatively inexperienced military administration, the Japanese seem to have been fairly successful in winning friends, rather than in making enemies, among the majority of Indonesian Muslims."
As Benda notes, the Masjumi Party which becama a major political party in Indonesia (until Sukarno banned it in 1960) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masyumi_Party was descended from the Masjumi that was founded by the Japanese. The Japanese showed a preference for the Masjumi over the western-educated nationalists:
"The position of the Indonesian Islamic leadership, on the other hand, stood in striking contrast to that assigned to the Western-educated political intelligentsia after January 1944. While the M.I.A.I. was disbanded at about the same time as Putera, the Japanese replaced it by a new and far more powerful Islamic organization, to which they gave a name which has continued to play a significant role in Indonesia , to the present moment—that of Masjumi. While the M.I.A.I. had, in effect, been practically restricted to a head office at Djakarta, the Masjumi became a true mass movement in which Muhammadiyah and Nandatul 'Ulama played the leading role. It should be added that neither of these Islamic organizations—the leading reformist and orthodox groupings—had ever been banned by the military government—another contrast with the fate of Indonesian political parties under Japanese rule. To the Masjumi was now entrusted the organization of the training courses [latihan] of village teachers, hitherto organized by the Japanese chiefs of the Religious Affairs Office. More important still, in the course of 1944 leading members of the Masjumi were appointed to executive positions in that Office, the only Department of the military administration headed by Indonesian incumbents since late in 1943.. Not only had Indonesian Islam thus gained a direct and important place at the center of the Japanese military administration itself, but the Masjumi's influence at the administrative level was substantially enhanced when regional Religious Affairs Branches [Shumuka] were established throughout the island in August
"Perhaps less spectacular, but by no means less important, was the fact that many Muslims came to play an important role in the Indonesian Volunteers' Corps [Peta], which the Japanese had set up in late 1943. Although no accurate breakdown of the membership of this Is Indonesian army is available, it is almost certain that its officers' corps was—-at least at the outset—very largely, if not predominantly, drawn from students of Muslim schools and from leaders of the Islamic movement on Java.
"...In part, no doubt, the main justification for this preferential treatment may have stemmed from the realization that it was Islam, rather than nationalism, which could claim the unswerving allegiance of millions of Indonesians, in particular of Indonesian peasants, on Java. Nor is it entirely unlikely that the Japanese may have felt a greater affinity with the apparently far more genuinely anti-Western orientation of the Islamic leadership as a whole, as compared to that of the "secular" but Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the great trust shown in Muslim leaders was not diminished-—indeed, it appears almost to have increased—-as a consequence of one serious anti-Japanese rebellion, led by a local Muslim teacher in West Java in mid-February 1944...
"Doubtless these Japanese policies had paid excellent dividends when the Masjumi declared Japan's cause a Holy War for Indonesian Islam. But it is perhaps equally true to say that the Islamic leadership had very adroitly used its strategic position for the organizational strengthening of Indonesian Islam on Java. The very fact that the Japanese felt they needed Muslim support so urgently had given to the Islamic leaders a bargaining power which the relatively small and more urban-centered, "secular" nationalist elite apparently did not possess. Equally important, Muslim leaders had in their religious conviction a moral line of defense beyond which Japanese demands could not, and would not, be met, and which the Japanese were consequently forced to respect. As far as can be judged, no similar line of ultimate defense was at the disposal of the nationalist leadership or of other Indonesian leading groups. In other words, a price had to be paid for Islamic support. In the measure that it was reluctantly paid, Indonesian Islam on Java increasingly gained in stature and power..."
Admittedly, all this was the product of a time when winning Muslim "hearts and minds" was a military necessity, so it offers no sure guide to what would happen after a Japanese victory.
"Japan's interest in matters Islamic originated from her plans of conquest in the South Pacific. In the mid.1930's a Japanese Islamic Association was founded in Tokyo and a handful of Japanese students were dispatched to the Middle East, there to acquaint themselves with the Muslim faith and its practices. In 1938 this Association called an Islamic World Conference at Tokyo, which was also attended by a delegation of Indonesian Muslims. Although these preparatory moves may seem meager enough, the occupation of Indonesia was to prove that Japan had a very profound appreciation of the important role which Islam played in Indonesia. This appreciation was demonstrated within a matter of days after the arrival of the Japanese army in Java. Some of the Japanese "students" from the Middle East had apparently arrived back in time to be dispatched to Java with the very first wave of the invading army. They made their presence felt by repeated appearances in Islamic houses of worship, particularly in Djakarta, as representatives of the military administration's Office of Religious Affairs [Shumubu], which was set up only two weeks after the occupation of the Indonesian capital. It was this office which, from the very outset and almost until the end of the occupation era, was to implement and apply Japan's Islamic policy in Java.
"This Islamic policy was, to a very large extent, a direct reversal of that of Japan's colonial predecessors in Indonesia. Instead of observing mere neutrality toward the Islamic religion, the Japanese from the very outset were fully determined to turn the leaders of that religion on Java into staunch allies of their Military Administration. The reasons for such an abrupt reversal are not far to seek: where the Dutch had been primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace and tranquility and the continuation of the status quo, the Japanese were out to mobilize an entire population in the support of their immediate and pressing war aims. The new rulers of Indonesia urgently required a greatly stepped up production of food supplies in the first place, and recruitment of labor batallions and auxiliary troops in the second. They realized only too well that, in order to elicit such support from the Indonesian peasant, it was essential to win to their side the spokesmen of Indonesian Islam, who for centuries have been the most important counsellors and spiritual leaders of the Indonesian villagers. It was on these thousands of Islamic leaders of the Javanese countryside that the Shumubu therefore concentrated its primary attention.
"In drawing this sharp and extremely significant contrast between Dutch and Japanese Islamic policies, it should not be assumed, however, that Japan was unaware of the potential political threat inherent in grassroots Islamic agitation, which had understandably haunted the Dutch for so long. This supervision of Muslim educational activities on all levels was, if anything, increased by the Japanese. It is also very significant that the two political Islamic parties which had existed under Dutch rule were banned in the first few weeks of the Japanese occupation. More important still, the overall Japanese policy of introducing their own cultural standards and politico-religious concepts, in particular that of emperor-worship, constantly militated against the all-out success of their Islamic policies. However, in spite of these great difficulties and inconsistencies, and in spite of the fact that the task of winning to their side the Indonesian believers of Islam was under-taken by a relatively inexperienced military administration, the Japanese seem to have been fairly successful in winning friends, rather than in making enemies, among the majority of Indonesian Muslims."
As Benda notes, the Masjumi Party which becama a major political party in Indonesia (until Sukarno banned it in 1960) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masyumi_Party was descended from the Masjumi that was founded by the Japanese. The Japanese showed a preference for the Masjumi over the western-educated nationalists:
"The position of the Indonesian Islamic leadership, on the other hand, stood in striking contrast to that assigned to the Western-educated political intelligentsia after January 1944. While the M.I.A.I. was disbanded at about the same time as Putera, the Japanese replaced it by a new and far more powerful Islamic organization, to which they gave a name which has continued to play a significant role in Indonesia , to the present moment—that of Masjumi. While the M.I.A.I. had, in effect, been practically restricted to a head office at Djakarta, the Masjumi became a true mass movement in which Muhammadiyah and Nandatul 'Ulama played the leading role. It should be added that neither of these Islamic organizations—the leading reformist and orthodox groupings—had ever been banned by the military government—another contrast with the fate of Indonesian political parties under Japanese rule. To the Masjumi was now entrusted the organization of the training courses [latihan] of village teachers, hitherto organized by the Japanese chiefs of the Religious Affairs Office. More important still, in the course of 1944 leading members of the Masjumi were appointed to executive positions in that Office, the only Department of the military administration headed by Indonesian incumbents since late in 1943.. Not only had Indonesian Islam thus gained a direct and important place at the center of the Japanese military administration itself, but the Masjumi's influence at the administrative level was substantially enhanced when regional Religious Affairs Branches [Shumuka] were established throughout the island in August
"Perhaps less spectacular, but by no means less important, was the fact that many Muslims came to play an important role in the Indonesian Volunteers' Corps [Peta], which the Japanese had set up in late 1943. Although no accurate breakdown of the membership of this Is Indonesian army is available, it is almost certain that its officers' corps was—-at least at the outset—very largely, if not predominantly, drawn from students of Muslim schools and from leaders of the Islamic movement on Java.
"...In part, no doubt, the main justification for this preferential treatment may have stemmed from the realization that it was Islam, rather than nationalism, which could claim the unswerving allegiance of millions of Indonesians, in particular of Indonesian peasants, on Java. Nor is it entirely unlikely that the Japanese may have felt a greater affinity with the apparently far more genuinely anti-Western orientation of the Islamic leadership as a whole, as compared to that of the "secular" but Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the great trust shown in Muslim leaders was not diminished-—indeed, it appears almost to have increased—-as a consequence of one serious anti-Japanese rebellion, led by a local Muslim teacher in West Java in mid-February 1944...
"Doubtless these Japanese policies had paid excellent dividends when the Masjumi declared Japan's cause a Holy War for Indonesian Islam. But it is perhaps equally true to say that the Islamic leadership had very adroitly used its strategic position for the organizational strengthening of Indonesian Islam on Java. The very fact that the Japanese felt they needed Muslim support so urgently had given to the Islamic leaders a bargaining power which the relatively small and more urban-centered, "secular" nationalist elite apparently did not possess. Equally important, Muslim leaders had in their religious conviction a moral line of defense beyond which Japanese demands could not, and would not, be met, and which the Japanese were consequently forced to respect. As far as can be judged, no similar line of ultimate defense was at the disposal of the nationalist leadership or of other Indonesian leading groups. In other words, a price had to be paid for Islamic support. In the measure that it was reluctantly paid, Indonesian Islam on Java increasingly gained in stature and power..."
Admittedly, all this was the product of a time when winning Muslim "hearts and minds" was a military necessity, so it offers no sure guide to what would happen after a Japanese victory.
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