Axis Vichy?

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich..._II#Sea_Lion_and_the_.22Mediterranean_plan.22
When Raeder first raised the "Mediterranean plan" on 6 September 1940, Hitler mentioned that he was also considering an attack on the Soviet Union, to which Raeder did not object, and only at the second meeting of 26 September 1940 did Raeder first argue for giving primacy to the "Mediterranean plan" over an invasion of Soviet Russia.[66] Raeder's change of mind about what operation to give primacy to was mostly due to signs of increased American support for Britain such as the "destroyers-for-bases" deal of 2 September 1940, the Anglo-Free French attack on Dakar and the defection of several French colonies in Africa from Vichy to the Gaullists.[67] Raeder argued that it was quite possible that the United States might intervene in the near future, which led him to argue that Britain must be defeated in the winter of 1940/41 before America could enter the war, while the signs that Vichy was losing its control over the French colonial empire meant the Allied cause was growing stronger in resource-rich Africa.[66] Raeder argued that it was now time to sign a peace treaty that would make Vichy France into a full ally, claiming that Vichy French forces could take the important British naval base at Freetown and that, by ceasing to treat France as a conquered country, Germany would be allowed to gain all of the resources of the French empire and fleet.[68]

Germany never signed a peace deal with France to end WW2, only an armistice; Raeder proposed allying with France to get access to their fleet to fight Britain in the Mediterranean. Was it at all possible to give Vichy favorable enough terms to get them to enter the war as a German ally to defeat Britain? If so what effect would it have had and would the Vichy military have been willing to fight against Britain?

I'm assuming that Barbarossa is cancelled and the Mediterranean option is the plan for 1941. I'm also assuming that Operation Felix is not pursued though because Hitler didn't want to alienate Spain and Franco wouldn't join except for unacceptable terms.
 
The main wild card is Syria. Make peace wit VIchy and Germany can fly men into Syria and Syria won't fall. If Germany plays their cards right, they might be able to at least get Turkish Bulgarian-style support which allows the Germans to bomb Baku.
 

Deleted member 1487

The main wild card is Syria. Make peace wit VIchy and Germany can fly men into Syria and Syria won't fall. If Germany plays their cards right, they might be able to at least get Turkish Bulgarian-style support which allows the Germans to bomb Baku.
How though? IOTL the very limited Syrian intervention by the Germans required violating Turkish airspace. From Greece the Ju52 didn't have the range and there is no question of moving troops in by sea. Furthermore a Vichy entry has the issue of finding fuel for the fleet, which is what kept the Italians in port for most of the war. Without Barbarossa there is more fuel, but as it was in 1941 before Barbarossa the Germans were bitching about the fuel usage of individual large surface units, so I'm not sure what the Franco-Italian fleet would require.

Likely the Brits invade Syria as per OTL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria–Lebanon_Campaign

Perhaps though if they wait to May they could do more to assist the Iraqis with Vichy military units, rather than letting the Brits deal with them and then invade.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War
 
I don't think that would be doable.
Sure, the sensible thing for Germany would have been to say "Listen, all this war had been a mistake. We should just make peace at fair terms for you, and we could fight together" in order to have an Axis France.

But Hitler and nazis simply couldn't do that, as they couldn't consider non-Russian slavs as equals.
Their goal was, simple as that, to crush France as hard they could, preventing it to ever have a working army and to take from it as much they could because they were driven by others motives : it was way better for them to simply drain the industrial and productive possibilities, without giving any possibility for Vichy to be something other than a puppet-state deprived of large part of its North-West (not only Alsace-Moselle, but as well part of Lorraine and Picardie which were undergoing a "Reichisation" at some point).

Not only the whole Vichyst stance was "We're no longer part of the conflict, whatever Britain and Germany are doing is no longer our business", but the notes that were develloped in order to reach what seems to them a "fair peace" was hilariously out of touch with the actual goals of Germany that couldn't care less about making France war-able, and actually wanted to prevent that precisely.
 
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But Hitler and nazis simply couldn't do that, as they couldn't consider non-Russian slavs as equals.

The French aren't Slavs. The French are descended from the Franks, who were technically German, Hitler adorded the French culture, watch the Rape of Europa.
 
From a practical point of view there would be too much risk that the lower military officers would take the new weapons need to do that to lead a revolt against a clearly puppet government. You get France too close to equal to Germany then you will probably wind up with a revolt on your hands. The Nazis were under no illusions that the French people thought the Vichy government was legitimate.
 
The French aren't Slavs. The French are descended from the Franks, who were technically German, Hitler adorded the French culture, watch the Rape of Europa.

That's bullshit.

First : we're talking about Nazis, whom lecture of history had nothing to do with reality. For Nazis, whatever germanic presence may have existed, it either departed or intermixed with inferior peoples.

(If we go down to real history, the actual germanic influence when it come to ascendency or descendency of Western Europe past Rhine is really limited. Makes as much sense arguing Castillans are Visigoths)

Now, let's go for quotes.

Only in France is there today more than even an inner unanimity between the plans of the Jew-controlled stock exchange and the desires of a chauvinistically oriented national statecraft. In this very identity lies an immense danger for Germany.

Exactly for this reason France is, and remains by far, the most terrible enemy. This people, which is constantly becoming more negrofied constitutes, by its tie with the aims of Jewish world dominion, a grim danger for the existence of the European white race. For infection in the heart of Europe through negro blood on the Rhine cor responds equally to the sadistic perverse vengefulness of this chauvinistic, hereditary enemy of our people, and to the ice-cold plan of the Jews thus to begin bastardizing the European continent at its core ana, through infection by inferior humanity, to deprive the white race of the foundations for a sovereign existence.

What France, spurred by its own vengefulness, methodically led by the Jew, is doing in Europe today, is a sin against the existence of white humanity, and some day will inspire against that nation all the avenging spirits of a knowledge which will have recognized race pollution as the original sin against mankind.

For Germany, however, the French danger means an obligation to subordinate all considerations of sentiment, and to reach out the hand to those who, threatened as much as we are, will not tolerate and bear France's drive toward dominion.

That France was rapidly becoming a negro country seemed evident to many Germans, and quite particularly to Austrian nationalists. Thus Professor Hans Eibl (cf . his Vom Sinn der Gegenwart) declares that the role of Germany in the preservation of world culture has now become immensely more important, since it is the bastion lodged between a bolshevistic
East and the 'onward march of Africa.' French publicists tried in vain to persuade the Professor that his diagnosis of their racial characteristics was somewhat premature.

The coming war against France will be justified because it must be the duty of the Germans, having seen the light, to protect Europe from Rassenschande. It may be added that the Germans also employed negro troops in Africa during the War, though they were unable to transport them to European battlefields.

but also because France is racially becoming more and more negroid, so much so that now one can actually speak of the creation of an African State on European soil.

The French nation, which is slowly dying out, not so much through depopulation as through the progressive disappearance of the best elements of the race, can continue to play an important role in the world only if Germany be destroyed

Of course it is here presumed that Germany sees in the suppression of France nothing more than a means which will make it possible for our people finally to expand in another quarter

Yeah, I can feel the respect and adoration.

Well, maybe that was carried in facts? Oops.

Okay, maybe they had better plans?

Hitler's own objective towards France was to eliminate it permanently as a strategic threat to German security. The 1940 campaign in Western Europe was in fact carried out entirely so that its western flank could be secured before Germany would commit its armies to conquering Lebensraum in the Soviet Union. With this in mind, extensive plans were made so that France could be reduced to a minor state and a permanent German vassal kept firmly in the state of dependence that she had found herself in after the 1940 armistice and which it would thus have no further reason to fear.

At Hitler’s request a plan was produced after the fall of France in 1940 that would provide for the outright annexation into Germany of a large strip of Eastern France by reducing it to its late medieval borders with the Holy Roman Empire. This memo, produced by the Reich Interior Ministry forms the basis for the so-called northeast line which separated the 'forbidden zone' of German occupied France from the rest of the areas under military control. It proposed the deportation of its French inhabitants and the settlement of a million German peasants. He considered these areas, as well as Wallonia to be "in reality German" and should therefore be re-integrated.

In 1942 Hitler did mention that the former area of the Kingdom of Burgundy, which France "had taken from Germany in her weakest moment" would also have to be annexed to Nazi Germany after the incorporation of the forbidden zone, but to which areas he referred by this statement remains unclear.

Or the situation in North-Eastern France

Let's be clear : so far, I only saw negationist or litteral neo-nazis supporting what you claim.
 
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The Nazis were under no illusions that the French people thought the Vichy government was legitimate.

Actually, for the period up to 42/early 43 it was the case.

While dissatisfaction grew more importantly, you really have to wait the invasion of non-occupied zone, STO, and the obvious puppetisation of Vichy to have a broad and popular refusal.

That German takeover was considered as legitimate is another thing alltogether tough : Vichy main legitimsation was about "we're sacrificing ourselves to preserve most of what we have", not that the takeover was a good thing : most people agreed with Vichy's pseudo-neutral stance, as in being out of the war.

I don't see, even if ASB made Nazis more sensible to this and Armistice Army able to be an autonomous force worth of mention in metropolitain France, a real popular support on continuing the war on Germany's side.

The only moment I could see this happening, would be after the British attack on Mers-el-Kébir : Vichy government members actually proposed to the occupied to join a war effort against Britain (as Pierre Laval, one of the future "ultra"), which wasn't carried far before Pétain and occupier's disaprooval; while it allowed the political desintegration of the IIIrd Republic.
 
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do not think they could or would benefit from having Vichy regime join the Axis, however they could have expanded their collaboration.

since Petain set out no territorial concessions and no conceding the fleet why not operate within that?

there was a fairly serious offer to allow Germans to use bases at Dakar, Bizerte, and Aleppo (for a start.)

my scenario would be offer enough concessions (and threats) to gain access to French bases worldwide (on clandestine basis.)

(they could allow the Vichy to reactivate their own submarine force and possibly some of their fast DDs, requires few enough personnel to insure loyalties)
 
do not think they could or would benefit from having Vichy regime join the Axis, however they could have expanded their collaboration.
It's not really what Nazis had in mind : even if Robert Paxton begins to be criticized a bit on the matter of Vichy/Germany relationship and the autonomy of the former regarding the latter, we still can say (from documents) that Vichy tried to undergo larger collaboration but was made unable to in no small part because Nazi Germany didn't saw much interest allowing it doing so.

since Petain set out no territorial concessions and no conceding the fleet why not operate within that?
Pétain and his governments didn't have much to say, one way or another : as said above, there were proposals on military collaboration that were refused because Germany didn't wanted military collaboration from France, but total subsmission and destruction of military possibilities of France. That was their main political goal that superseded other concerns. Period.

It might not have been the most logical choice, the most sensible for them, but it's not like Nazi policies weren't driven first by ideological and political convictions, and not pure strategic concerns.

It's as discussing Nazi magically not being anti-semitics, not being anti-bolsheviks, not being anti-slavic...Their francophobia was part of their political DNA since the very start : you just have to read Mein Kampf to be aware of that.

(they could allow the Vichy to reactivate their own submarine force and possibly some of their fast DDs, requires few enough personnel to insure loyalties)
Which, again, would go against the whole policy Hitler and Nazis had planned and envisioned for France since the 1930's : since the beggining, it was quite clear that France was to be written off as a military force, even a secondary one.

It's one of the reasons why Churchill decided to undergo the attack on Mers-el-Kebir : there was no way Hitler was going to allow a strong naval force in France, and eventually it would have beneficied German war effort directly and regardless if Vichy aprooved or not.
 
they were half smart, could see the benefits in collaboration with remnants of France and USSR but too stupid to realize them.

my suggested scenario was smallest of small bore deals possible with Vichy regime, a reduction in occupation costs in return for use of bases.

no 2m man French army, no French fleet sailing, etc.
 
The French aren't Slavs. The French are descended from the Franks, who were technically German, Hitler adorded the French culture, watch the Rape of Europa.

He refused to give the Norwegians a treaty. And for the French and British plenty of people in private said the lower classes were Celtic, which was apparently believed even before the war by some old noblemen. Anyways, I doubt the French would be happy about how the Germans were trying to bar them from returning form any land ever part of the Holy Roman Empire. Meaning the people deemed German would already be in Germany. I suppose if only the German parts of Alsace-Lorraine was taken and the French got the Channel Islands, Walloons, Romandy (French Switzerland), and maybe Nigeria, Belgian Congo, or Siam they would go along with it.
 
they were half smart, could see the benefits in collaboration with remnants of France and USSR but too stupid to realize them.
It's not about stupidity, it's about a racialist ideology at the very base of their conception of the world.

They were deeply convinced that Slavs were sub-humans peoples led by parasitic Jews to enslave pure Germans, and they were deeply convinced that French were negroid people whom main goal was to destroy Germany.

It's not about logic, it's about Nazis being Nazis.
They were not interested about dealing with inferiors and defeated peoples when they could simply take it directly without counterpart : do you think Vichy gained anything from the fact France was the most plundered country in Western Europe?

And for the French and British plenty of people in private said the lower classes were Celtic, which was apparently believed even before the war by some old noblemen.
It goes further than that : while Hitler believed that Britain could still be a post-war partner, due to Celto-Germanico-bullshit racial vision he had, France was always (you can look at the quotes I gathered above) depicted as a negroised, racially lost people, bent on destroying Germany. (Which goes as far back as WW1 for what matter German racialists).

I suppose if only the German parts of Alsace-Lorraine was taken and the French got the Channel Islands, Walloons, Romandy (French Switzerland), and maybe Nigeria, Belgian Congo, or Siam they would go along with it.
Even admitting people cared about that, which they didn't, Nazis had their own plans for that as point the organisation and divisement of the lands they carried on by 1940. Loss of Northern and Eastern France was constantly used as a threat by occupying powers in France, and they were certainly not about giving territories as a lollypop.

People should stop thinking of Nazis as if they were just a mislead political group, that could have sensible options on gepolitics. The racialist core of their beliefs prevented that, as it prevented most of "What if Nazis stopped to act as Nazis, while still being Nazis".
Hitler didn't wanted "only the German part of Alsace-Moselle" (as if such thing ever made sense, when you had little to none pro-German movement in the region, you could as well tell that Hitler could have asked only "German parts of Poland" as if Nazis had a rightful claim on it*), he wanted as much as possible that would fit in his racial fantasy. Period.

*I don't think people realize how weird and insulting such statement are, really. They should, tough.
 
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Also the issue of how Hitler didn't want there to be French fascists and made sure that Mein Kampf was banned there to not tip anyone off. He had already made sure the Americans and British couldn't read an unedited version in English, but wouldn't want any chances with the French knowing his intentions. Anyways, he was happy having Petain as his cats paw with Laval working to save his country even at the expense of hundreds of thousands sent to slave work in Germany. Coming to think of it, might any collaborators in high position in Europe actually have liked the Reich more than four months into occupation? Because they didn't tend to respect anyone.
 
Coming to think of it, might any collaborators in high position in Europe actually have liked the Reich more than four months into occupation? Because they didn't tend to respect anyone.
Thing is that...yes. They were many of these.
For various reasons, one of the main ones was that Nazi victory allowed them to undergo racists, anticommunist, antimasonic, autoritarians and antisemitic policies they wanted to do but that they couldn't have made in a republican context. (A context they hated and despised much)

French defeat and Nazi takeover allowed them to do that, so they were pretty much okay with.

And you have the whole of "ultra-collaborateurs" that actively liked the Reich, that tought Vichy wasn't doing nearly enough, and that everything should be made even more radically.
 
How though? IOTL the very limited Syrian intervention by the Germans required violating Turkish airspace. From Greece the Ju52 didn't have the range and there is no question of moving troops in by sea. Furthermore a Vichy entry has the issue of finding fuel for the fleet, which is what kept the Italians in port for most of the war. Without Barbarossa there is more fuel, but as it was in 1941 before Barbarossa the Germans were bitching about the fuel usage of individual large surface units, so I'm not sure what the Franco-Italian fleet would require.

Likely the Brits invade Syria as per OTL

Perhaps though if they wait to May they could do more to assist the Iraqis with Vichy military units, rather than letting the Brits deal with them and then invade.

the German pressure to allow Japanese troops into Indochina followed by loss of Syria/Lebanon (which had been left unmolested by Allied side until use as staging area in support of Iraqi rebellion) really soured any chance of expanded collaboration.

and they gained nothing from either Japanese or Golden Square rebels, they could have been cautious about preserving Vichy colonies if for no other reason than to benefit themselves in the future.

as to fuel situation, a deal with Vichy regime for bases stretching from Dakar-Bizerte-Aleppo (ones discussed) implies a "Med first" strategy? so Soviet oil would still be available?

of course they don't want the French flee to have any but minimal fuel anyway. my speculative scenario was for reactivated submarine force both for fuel reasons and requiring smaller number of (handpicked for loyalty) personnel.
 
I could see even a neutral USA occupying the French Caribbean islands, French Guiana and even Dakar if Vichy went over to the Axis. USA certainly wouldn't want those as potential Axis bases.

Plus most of the mid to lower level people were anti-German and wouldn't be fighting the British enthusiastically. As mentioned above I would expect revolts.

Probably better just to negotiate to buy supplies direct from French North Africa, have Vichy build Siebel Ferries and such low tech craft useful for transport of supplies in the med. In exchange the Germans release blocks of French POWs. An October 41 commenced strategy of taking Egypt has an easier change of overcoming supply difficulties.

Clear promises of what a post war France would be with clear boundaries might help prop up the Vichy regime without forcing France to go to overt war with Britain.
 
I could see even a neutral USA occupying the French Caribbean islands, French Guiana and even Dakar if Vichy went over to the Axis. USA certainly wouldn't want those as potential Axis bases.

Probably better just to negotiate to buy supplies direct from French North Africa, have Vichy build Siebel Ferries and such low tech craft useful for transport of supplies in the med.

Clear promises of what a post war France would be with clear boundaries might help prop up the Vichy regime without forcing France to go to overt war with Britain.

they needed only expanded collaboration, not Axis Vichy. could have made clandestine use of French bases and ports, would not think that enough to force U.S. entry into war?

they did not want to draw post-war boundaries in attempt to placate France, Spain, and Italy?

possible in expanded collaboration Germans allow Petain government back in Paris?
 
of course they don't want the French flee to have any but minimal fuel anyway. my speculative scenario was for reactivated submarine force both for fuel reasons and requiring smaller number of (handpicked for loyalty) personnel.
Again, it's not a matter of logic, or scale : it was about a deep refusal of anything looking like a reactivated french army or paramilitary force.
Even collaborationist attempt, such as Milice, were only met with a huge defiance and barely armed (and that's when the situation made it more or less unavoidable).

To think they'll accept more in a less pressured situation, in regions they knew they couldn't control well (Western Africa and Syria were particularly vulnerable to an Anglo-American pressure, and German army had NO way to intervene efficiently there) is wishful thinking and another attempt to make Nazis not being Nazis.

Plus most of the mid to lower level people were anti-German and wouldn't be fighting the British enthusiastically. As mentioned above I would expect revolts.
While I agree that Atlantic French holdingds would likely be taken over, I think you overestimate anglophilia in early 40's France.
Long story short, people wouldn't care for the slightest for UK, critically after Mers el-Kebir attack.

Dieppe Raid's aftermath is an excellent illustration of this : people were clearly NOT supporting of British/Canadian attack, at the contrary.

In exchange the Germans release blocks of French POWs.
Even with such deal, I doubt it would be enforced. French PoWs were the usual pressure on Vichy in order to make anything decision they wanted pass : as such, IOTL, deals like la Relève or Service du Travail Obligatoire, never ever really lead to liberation of PoWs.

Clear promises of what a post war France would be with clear boundaries might help prop up the Vichy regime without forcing France to go to overt war with Britain.
But Germany didn't want France to go at war with Britain : after Mers el Kebir, some Vichy government members attempted that, and they encountered a clear refusal.

I can't make it clearer than that : anything remotely looking like France becoming a military force, would it be second, third or fourth rate, was inconceivable for Nazis. Period.

You have to understand that the current situation, extremely vague and allowing practically anything, beneficed Nazis' views.


they needed only expanded collaboration, not Axis Vichy.
That's wrong : Nazis consistently refused ultra-collaborationist proposals to make a fascist France and always tried to support Pétainist legitimacy.
Every, literally EVERY, ultra-collaborationist attempt to support German war effort further than economical dependence was shunned of or emptied so much it didn't amounted to anything.

Nazis didn't wanted a fascist France, they wanted a crushed France. As CalBear regularly points : contrary to Soviet Union's ambitions, to make socialism the regime of other regions, Nazis were about a racislist-darwinoid show of force and didn't tried to "convert" them to national-socialism (especially not a nation they believed being a main ennemy of Germany, and a negroised race under Jewish dominance with that) but to make them subservient (at best) to Germany.

possible in expanded collaboration Germans allow Petain government back in Paris?
Present situation of division and political shattering beneficed them : as a measure to prevent any French force to appear too strong, as a pressure on Vichy allowing every day stronger and harsher occupation, etc.
 
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