Axis' last chance.

I know WW2 has been done to death here, but I'm doing it again. What, in your professional opinion, was the Axis' last and/or best chance to win the war? And I mean the point after which the Allies' long road to final victory began.

Cue the "invasion of Poland Sept. 1st 1939" replies.
 
Italy had no chance.

Germany was doomed the momment they Launched Barbarossa.
I know Hitler hated Communist as much as Jews, but he doomed himself trying to fight three wars at once.

Japan was dead the moment they took the Phillipines, and was burried the moment they attacked Pearl Harbor.
 

General Zod

Banned
Italy had no chance.

Germany was doomed the momment they Launched Barbarossa.
I know Hitler hated Communist as much as Jews, but he doomed himself trying to fight three wars at once.

Japan was dead the moment they took the Phillipines, and was burried the moment they attacked Pearl Harbor.

Actually Germany was doomed the moment they DoWed the USA for no real advantage, falling squarely into Roosevelt's trap. Barbarossa was winnable (at least in the sense of pulling an advantageous compromise peace) up to Zitadelle, but Germany had no hope of winning against UK, USSR, and USA together.
 
I know WW2 has been done to death here, but I'm doing it again. What, in your professional opinion, was the Axis' last and/or best chance to win the war? And I mean the point after which the Allies' long road to final victory began.

Cue the "invasion of Poland Sept. 1st 1939" replies.

metalstar316

I think you need to define win. World conquest during Hitler's lifetime would work a legion of ASBs to death. Domination of most/all continental Europe and Russia west of the Urals was possible but he lost his last chance of that when 1st Japan and then Germany declared war on the US. After that it would need 100% hindsight and a damned sight better leadership that anyone showed in the conflict to have a change of getting a draw. [If you can persuade the western allies to make peace before the atomic bomb looks likely, but that could be a long shot].

Steve
 
I would agree the Minute that Hitler declared war on the United States it and Italy were doomed to lose.
 
Actually Germany was doomed the moment they DoWed the USA for no real advantage, falling squarely into Roosevelt's trap.

i forgot about that.

but Germany had no hope of winning against UK, USSR, and USA together.

accutaly by 'three wars' i ment USSR, Western front, and his Jewish Extermination. by doing the last at the same time as the first two, he lost manpower, and machinery that could have been devoted to either front.
 
I think Kursk would be the last chance for the Germans, since the Germans had inflicted a large defeat on the Soviets after Stalingrad.
 

General Zod

Banned
I think Kursk would be the last chance for the Germans, since the Germans had inflicted a large defeat on the Soviets after Stalingrad.

Indeed it was IF the Germans had relinquished the hopeless Zitadelle plan and went along with Manstein's Backhand Blow. They stood a fair chance of trapping the whole southern flank of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov and accomplishing a reverse Bagration.
 
If only Hitler had killed his Jews AFTER he won the war and not during it. Just think of how he could of exploited them in the factories and such! He would have had a much more efficient war.

Anyway, the Axis' last chance, for me anyway, was both right before the Battle of Britain (Third Reich's) and the bombing of Pearl Harbor (Japan and happend 67 years ago yesterday).

--Warning: If the mentioning of Operation: Sealion causes malicious thoughts or mental images, please close the nearest red X--
Britain needed to get toasted. It was just about surrounding, excluding the North Atlantic. Bombing it into submission didn't work OTL. Maybe you need a more central air force or an invasion. Trust me, Sealion was horribly planned and would only land a small amount of soldiers. Maybe if the Germans had planned it better or something else, Churchill would have finally capitulated.

Japan made one of those stupid decisions that only happen once every century. They bombed Pearl Harbor. Many Japanese officers didn't enjoy the idea of war between them and the United States. They also knew that the best way to cause such a war was to destroy the Pacific Fleet in a clean sweep. That didn't work out. December 7, 1941 was the turning point of the war, overall.​
 

Typo

Banned
Winter of 1941 for both Germany and Japan

Japan was doomed on December 7, 1941, when the first bomb fell

Germany was doomed when Moscow didn't fall, and the DoW on the US sealed their fate

Maybe, maybe if Germany takes Moscow and didn't DoW the US, it might have a chance at European hegemony, since then FDR needs to maneuver hard to get a war with Germany
 

General Zod

Banned
Winter of 1941 for both Germany and Japan

Japan was doomed on December 7, 1941, when the first bomb fell

Germany was doomed when Moscow didn't fall, and the DoW on the US sealed their fate

Maybe, maybe if Germany takes Moscow and didn't DoW the US, it might have a chance at European hegemony, since then FDR needs to maneuver hard to get a war with Germany

Indeed Japan was doomed the moment it chose to attack the USA instead of backstabbing the USSR when Barbarossa started.

As it concerns Germany, well, it was a sliding scale of missed chances that made odds worse and worse. The first really important PoD was in March 1939 when Hitler chose to invade rump Czechoslovakia instead of slowly forcing it into satellite status with political and economic pressure. Without such a blatant betrayal of Munich, and a little cleverer provocation of the Polish bull at Danzig, it is entirely possible that war with Britain and France could have been avoided, which would have allowed Hitler to attack Russia when the Red Army was still in its abysmal post-purges condition.

Then there was the forsaking of Lithuania for a little more useless Polish land, while Lithuania would have been a very good jumping point for Moscow.

Then there was the failure to let the British invade Norway first, which would have placed Norway and Sweden in the Axis camp by their own will, and spoiled the moral case of the Allies considerably.

Then there was the failure to conquer Dunkirk and force the BEF to surrender, which would have quite possibly brought down the Churchill government in shame, and anyway, would have weakened British defense of Egypt considerably.

Then there was the failure to pursue a Mediterranean strategy in mid-late 1940, which could have easily allowed the conquest of Egypt and quite possibly brought the fall of Churchill, and wrecked the British war effort anyway, as well as preventing Mussolini's disastrous invasion of Greece.

Then there was the lack of winter equipment for Barbarossa, the disastrous decision to mad racist enslavement/extermination of Russians and Ukrainians instead of waiting for victory, and the decision to make a detour for Kiev, instead of aiming for Moscow.

Then there was the supreme follow of DoWing the USA for no clear advantage, giving Roosevelt the war he craved and would not have been able to start on his own initiative. This makes not only victory but survival impossible not just because of American industrial potential, but b/c America is presently ruled by the absolutely worst President ever for Germany's interests, an anti-fascist, anti-Prussian, philo-Stalinist fanatic that would eagerly destroy half of Europe and let Stalin reap the other half rather than letting Germany get away with anything. Once he gets nukes, it's game over.

Without a war with the USA, Germany could still win this war up to the surrender of Stalingrad, and make it a draw up to Zitadelle.
 
The last turning point for Germany is, IMHO, in July 1941. I wrote "turning point" on purpose, because a different, more successful series of decisions at that time might have brought about a different, more successful series of events for Germany – not necessarily a final victory.
A case has been made for the drive on Moscow. Personally, I'm not convinced it would have caused the collapse of the USSR; the Ukrainan front, not captured and not destroyed, would have been a terrible threat to the exposed Southern flank of such a move, smashing through it in December 1941 while the German vanguards are bogged down in a Stalingrad-like house-to-house battle in the outer neighborhoods of Moscow. Yet this is the most convincing case that I have seen this far. This is why I say that the summer of 1941 is when the Germans could have taken different decisions having a serious impact on the war in the East.
Any later date is just that, too late to be significant. By the winter of 1941 the Soviets had not lost, which means the Germans have. Different decisions in 1942 might bring about greater setbacks for the Soviets than in OTL, but nothing really significant.

Italy follows Germany. Otherwise, Italy's best chance to win in WWII is to stay neutral until 1944, then become an Ally.

The Japanese's only different option is to ignore the USA. Take the huge risk of leaving the PI astride their supply lanes. I think the probabilities are that this would bring about a declaration of war later on anyway, after one too many accidents at sea. But the small possibility that this does not happen is probably the best for the Japanese.
 
As it concerns Germany, well, it was a sliding scale of missed chances that made odds worse and worse. The first really important PoD was in March 1939 when Hitler chose to invade rump Czechoslovakia instead of slowly forcing it into satellite status with political and economic pressure. Without such a blatant betrayal of Munich, and a little cleverer provocation of the Polish bull at Danzig, it is entirely possible that war with Britain and France could have been avoided, which would have allowed Hitler to attack Russia when the Red Army was still in its abysmal post-purges condition.

Then there was the forsaking of Lithuania for a little more useless Polish land, while Lithuania would have been a very good jumping point for Moscow.

Then there was the failure to let the British invade Norway first, which would have placed Norway and Sweden in the Axis camp by their own will, and spoiled the moral case of the Allies considerably.

...

Plenty of questionable asusmptions here.

1. The satellitization of Czechoslovakia in 1939 through political pressure looks quite unlikely, but anyway it's a moot point. It would take at the very least a year or two to look convincing, and Germany simply did not possess that time. In January 1939, either Germany drastically cut military spending – thus further reducing any chances of victory in a war – or within very few months it would face hyperinflation and an economic crash. The MeFo bills would come due, nobody would want to wait further to redeem them, and that financial scam would come to the light, thus pushing major German financial institutions into bankruptcy. The main owners of MeFo bills were, of course, arms industries. So, no, there's not the time for that.

2. The Germans might have provoked the Poles better, yes. Now, the Polish leadership was naïve enough to believe they had a chance of victory in the OTL situation; but I doubt they would be stupid enough to attack first, thus voiding the defensive measures of their alliances with France and Britain. As to any particular German cleverness at Danzig, you might read article 2 of the British-Polish Treaty.

3. And assuming that that worked, when would you want Germany attack the Soviet Union, in 1940? The Soviets are one year closer to the purges (and reorganizing their armored formations), yes. And the German army of 1940 is a dwarf compared to that of 1941, not to mention that the only Eastern ally the Germans can count on in June 1940 is mighty Slovakia. The Finns are still exhausted, the Romanians are not yet recruited, and the Hungarians are watching the Romanians, not the Soviets.

4. As to Lithuania, sure Hitler could have kept it. Save for the small problem that the exachange was a "proposal" by Stalin – probably made exactly because it extended the buffer belt Stalin wanted. The "proposal" was made at a moment when Hitler could not deny Stalin anything of the sort. Besides, the quid pro quo wasn't just what you seem to think (of course, calling "useless" a solution that would provide Barbarossa with starting points shifted East is arguable). The "proposal" was made exactly at the same time as Stalin informed Hitler that after all he did not want a rump Polish state in the area that would fall under the Soviet area of influence. Such timing is not a coincidence – it means that that was the threat for Hitler if he did not accept the "proposal". A rump, formally independent Polish state in what was Eastern Poland. The equivalent of what the Polish leaders would have called the "Romanian bridgehead", only better, because, being in the Soviet sphere of influence, Germany could not attack it and get rid of it. A sanctuary which the Soviet themselves could use against Germany. But the Western Allies could try and use it too; they might send in arms and supplies through Romania. A situation Hitler would have rightly loathed. You should read more about the German-Soviet diplomatic correspondence of that time frame.

5. As to Norway moving to the Axis camp due to the Allied landing, maybe and maybe not. There are those who believe that the Norwegians would have greatly preferred being "forced" into the Allied camp instead, and would have played the Icelanders' or Persians' part, had the British arrived first, and in strength. There has been some speculation as to why the Norwegian coastal defenses had such cautious orders, and the possible answer is that they expected (rightly) the British, not the Germans, to arrive, and they did not want some artilleryman to fire on them – meaning the British.

I could go on, but I think that's enough. If your timeline is based on one or, worse, more of the above, you might wish to reconsider it.
 

General Zod

Banned
1. The satellitization of Czechoslovakia in 1939 through political pressure looks quite unlikely, but anyway it's a moot point. It would take at the very least a year or two to look convincing, and Germany simply did not possess that time. In January 1939, either Germany drastically cut military spending – thus further reducing any chances of victory in a war – or within very few months it would face hyperinflation and an economic crash. The MeFo bills would come due, nobody would want to wait further to redeem them, and that financial scam would come to the light, thus pushing major German financial institutions into bankruptcy. The main owners of MeFo bills were, of course, arms industries. So, no, there's not the time for that.

Yep, the economic issue is a serious consideration. However, since avoiding the blatant betrayal of Munich, in some combination of (2), below, almost certainly butterflies the British-Polish alliance away and the the war with the Western democracies, one valid counterargument could be made that a temporary reduction of military spending in early 1939 might be worthwhile, since it avoids a war with the British Empire entirely.

The satellitization of Czechoslovakia in 1939-40 is less ardous that you put it. Since after the Anschluss and Munich Greater Germany controls the Czech borders, and Hungary is a German ally, Germany only has to block the residual trade route of Czechoslovakia either by supporting Slovak separatism and breakout, or by conquering Poland's access to the sea, which 1 and 2 allow to do with a limited war. Afterwards, Germany shall contorl any and all trade routes of Czechia, so it can impose pretty much any terms it wants to the Cezch government by economic pressure and threat of blockade. Instant and bloodless satellitization.

2. The Germans might have provoked the Poles better, yes. Now, the Polish leadership was naïve enough to believe they had a chance of victory in the OTL situation; but I doubt they would be stupid enough to attack first, thus voiding the defensive measures of their alliances with France and Britain. As to any particular German cleverness at Danzig, you might read article 2 of the British-Polish Treaty.

Indeed, this ruse works optimally if implemented in combination with 1), above, so the British-Polish Treaty does not exist. Britain shall maintain her Munich policy and a fair amount of good will for Germany's long-standing irredentist claims against Poland (Danzig and the Corridor), and they shall be entirely unwilling to help Poland if it uses force to keep the status quo at Danzig. IMO it is entirely possible that Poland would be so bullheaded by their Danzig fixation as to use force if Germany successfully organizes a grassroots German insurrection in Danzig.

3. And assuming that that worked, when would you want Germany attack the Soviet Union, in 1940? The Soviets are one year closer to the purges (and reorganizing their armored formations), yes. And the German army of 1940 is a dwarf compared to that of 1941, not to mention that the only Eastern ally the Germans can count on in June 1940 is mighty Slovakia. The Finns are still exhausted, the Romanians are not yet recruited, and the Hungarians are watching the Romanians, not the Soviets.

All very true, but the Italians would be ready to jump in Barbarossa bandwagon with a considerable portion fo their Army if Britain is neutral. If Germany hands a decent deal to defeated Poland (i.e. they still enforce the ethnic cleansing of Wartheland and West Prussia, but allow a puppet Polish government for the General Government and a decent livelihood to the native thereof) and USSR still attacks Finland, Britain would even be at least a pro-Axis friendly neutral, if not more.

4. As to Lithuania, sure Hitler could have kept it. Save for the small problem that the exachange was a "proposal" by Stalin – probably made exactly because it extended the buffer belt Stalin wanted. The "proposal" was made at a moment when Hitler could not deny Stalin anything of the sort. Besides, the quid pro quo wasn't just what you seem to think (of course, calling "useless" a solution that would provide Barbarossa with starting points shifted East is arguable). The "proposal" was made exactly at the same time as Stalin informed Hitler that after all he did not want a rump Polish state in the area that would fall under the Soviet area of influence. Such timing is not a coincidence – it means that that was the threat for Hitler if he did not accept the "proposal". A rump, formally independent Polish state in what was Eastern Poland. The equivalent of what the Polish leaders would have called the "Romanian bridgehead", only better, because, being in the Soviet sphere of influence, Germany could not attack it and get rid of it. A sanctuary which the Soviet themselves could use against Germany. But the Western Allies could try and use it too; they might send in arms and supplies through Romania. A situation Hitler would have rightly loathed. You should read more about the German-Soviet diplomatic correspondence of that time frame.

Yes, this is all very true. And indeed IMO this PoD was not so feasible as 1 and 2. But it makes all the more important to avoid a war with Britain, since in the case the USSR would have still intervened in a limited German-Polish war to occupy Eastern Poland, Germany could have withstood SOviet requests much better, without a Western front. Heck, if they had played their diplomatic cards well, they could have painted Stalin as the true menace to Europe.

5. As to Norway moving to the Axis camp due to the Allied landing, maybe and maybe not. There are those who believe that the Norwegians would have greatly preferred being "forced" into the Allied camp instead, and would have played the Icelanders' or Persians' part, had the British arrived first, and in strength. There has been some speculation as to why the Norwegian coastal defenses had such cautious orders, and the possible answer is that they expected (rightly) the British, not the Germans, to arrive, and they did not want some artilleryman to fire on them – meaning the British.

Indeed, as you point out, maybe they would have resisted, maybe not. IMO they would have, and the King and Governemnt would have been forced to defend the country. Norwegian resistance to german invasion was essentially fueled by patriotic pride, not by overriding sympathy for the British cause.

I could go on, but I think that's enough. If your timeline is based on one or, worse, more of the above, you might wish to reconsider it.

Indeed my TL is based on a more fundamental PoD which however involves 1 and 2. Hitler is assassinated a month after Munich, and Goering takes over. He implements a more moderate, neo-Wilhelmine fascist-authoritarian nationalistic-imperialistic policy. The racist extremists are purged, the Jewish policy is revised as to implement forced emigration to British Africa, a consistently pro-British foreign policy is implemented. Poland is provoked into attacking when a German insurrection seizes Danzig, and is crushed into a quick limited war. Germany annxes and Germanizes her pre-1914 possessions, and sets up Congress Poland as a puppet. Bohemia-Moravia is cleverly tricked in giving Germany a barely plausible casus belli during the war. As a result of the British-German detente (enhanced by the fact that hardcore Nazi radicals attempt and fail a coup, which gives reason for further housecleaning of racists and a a further swing to moderate far right in Germany), Stalin goes in full paranoid preventive aggression mode, invade Finland and Romania, and unleashing a wave of Communist subversion in Europe and Asia. As a result, Britain and the Rome-Berlin Axis get more close, and finally declare war on the USSR when they bully Bulgaria into surrender as well.
 
I know WW2 has been done to death here, but I'm doing it again. What, in your professional opinion, was the Axis' last and/or best chance to win the war? And I mean the point after which the Allies' long road to final victory began.

Cue the "invasion of Poland Sept. 1st 1939" replies.

I believe the question was when the German's best chance to win was.

So, I think when they lost the Normandy battle, they should have conducted a full scale retreat to the Rhine river and save the majority of their forces.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Germany's last chance for victory was in the summer and fall of 1941, when they should have made an earlier all-out effort to capture Moscow. Had they succeeded, I think that the invasion of the Soviet Union could have been brought to a successful conclusion.

Of course, it would have been better for Hitler not to have attacked the Russians until Britain had been defeated. Invasion of Britain was not on the table, but continuous bombings combined with a tightening U-boat blockade, while pursuing a Mediterranean strategy, could have lead to German victory.

As far as Japan is concerned, victory would have required a collapse of political will in the United States, which seems unlikely under nearly any possible scenario. I suppose that a steady continuation of Japanese victories into 1944 (very unlikely) could have lead to a successful Republican presidential campaign based around the incompetence of FDR's war effort, but I see no reason for the Republicans to be any less determined to crush Japan than the Democrats.
 
I believe the question was when the German's best chance to win was.

So, I think when they lost the Normandy battle, they should have conducted a full scale retreat to the Rhine river and save the majority of their forces.

I agree with you there, but even if they had done that it wouldn't have prevented ultimate defeat.
 

General Zod

Banned
Germany's last chance for victory was in the summer and fall of 1941, when they should have made an earlier all-out effort to capture Moscow. Had they succeeded, I think that the invasion of the Soviet Union could have been brought to a successful conclusion.

True, but the USSR, per se, was wholly defeatable until late 1942, when they made the mistake to attack Stalingrad AND the Caucasus, and a advantageous compromise peace was possible until Zitadelle. Just as Britain was defeatable in 1942 if they had made an all-out effort to secure Malta and storm El Alamein. The problem past 1941 is the belligerance of the USA.

Of course, it would have been better for Hitler not to have attacked the Russians until Britain had been defeated. Invasion of Britain was not on the table, but continuous bombings combined with a tightening U-boat blockade, while pursuing a Mediterranean strategy, could have lead to German victory.

True to a degree. It is wholly true that they should have made an all-out effort at a Mediterranean strategy in mid-late 1940 instead of the futile Battle of Britain. Fall of Egypt might easily could have brought the Churchill government down, when Britain stand alone. But Germany should have not delayed Barbarossa past late Spring 1941. The more they waited, the more the USSR reinforced, and their relative advantage got lesser.
 
Germany's last chance for victory was in the summer and fall of 1941, when they should have made an earlier all-out effort to capture Moscow. Had they succeeded, I think that the invasion of the Soviet Union could have been brought to a successful conclusion.

At least there's a chance.


Of course, it would have been better for Hitler not to have attacked the Russians until Britain had been defeated. Invasion of Britain was not on the table, but continuous bombings combined with a tightening U-boat blockade, while pursuing a Mediterranean strategy, could have lead to German victory.

Really? Could you go ahead with that? I have never seen a convincing development in that direction. The most the Axis can reasonably achieve is the conquest of Egypt, which doesn't give them all that much if you consider it carefully.
 
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