1. The satellitization of Czechoslovakia in 1939 through political pressure looks quite unlikely, but anyway it's a moot point. It would take at the very least a year or two to look convincing, and Germany simply did not possess that time. In January 1939, either Germany drastically cut military spending – thus further reducing any chances of victory in a war – or within very few months it would face hyperinflation and an economic crash. The MeFo bills would come due, nobody would want to wait further to redeem them, and that financial scam would come to the light, thus pushing major German financial institutions into bankruptcy. The main owners of MeFo bills were, of course, arms industries. So, no, there's not the time for that.
Yep, the economic issue is a serious consideration. However, since avoiding the blatant betrayal of Munich, in some combination of (2), below, almost certainly butterflies the British-Polish alliance away and the the war with the Western democracies, one valid counterargument could be made that a temporary reduction of military spending in early 1939 might be worthwhile, since it avoids a war with the British Empire entirely.
The satellitization of Czechoslovakia in 1939-40 is less ardous that you put it. Since after the Anschluss and Munich Greater Germany controls the Czech borders, and Hungary is a German ally, Germany only has to block the residual trade route of Czechoslovakia either by supporting Slovak separatism and breakout, or by conquering Poland's access to the sea, which 1 and 2 allow to do with a limited war. Afterwards, Germany shall contorl any and all trade routes of Czechia, so it can impose pretty much any terms it wants to the Cezch government by economic pressure and threat of blockade. Instant and bloodless satellitization.
2. The Germans might have provoked the Poles better, yes. Now, the Polish leadership was naïve enough to believe they had a chance of victory in the OTL situation; but I doubt they would be stupid enough to attack first, thus voiding the defensive measures of their alliances with France and Britain. As to any particular German cleverness at Danzig, you might read article 2 of the British-Polish Treaty.
Indeed, this ruse works optimally if implemented in combination with 1), above, so the British-Polish Treaty does not exist. Britain shall maintain her Munich policy and a fair amount of good will for Germany's long-standing irredentist claims against Poland (Danzig and the Corridor), and they shall be entirely unwilling to help Poland if it uses force to keep the status quo at Danzig. IMO it is entirely possible that Poland would be so bullheaded by their Danzig fixation as to use force if Germany successfully organizes a grassroots German insurrection in Danzig.
3. And assuming that that worked, when would you want Germany attack the Soviet Union, in 1940? The Soviets are one year closer to the purges (and reorganizing their armored formations), yes. And the German army of 1940 is a dwarf compared to that of 1941, not to mention that the only Eastern ally the Germans can count on in June 1940 is mighty Slovakia. The Finns are still exhausted, the Romanians are not yet recruited, and the Hungarians are watching the Romanians, not the Soviets.
All very true, but the Italians would be ready to jump in Barbarossa bandwagon with a considerable portion fo their Army if Britain is neutral. If Germany hands a decent deal to defeated Poland (i.e. they still enforce the ethnic cleansing of Wartheland and West Prussia, but allow a puppet Polish government for the General Government and a decent livelihood to the native thereof) and USSR still attacks Finland, Britain would even be at least a pro-Axis friendly neutral, if not more.
4. As to Lithuania, sure Hitler could have kept it. Save for the small problem that the exachange was a "proposal" by Stalin – probably made exactly because it extended the buffer belt Stalin wanted. The "proposal" was made at a moment when Hitler could not deny Stalin anything of the sort. Besides, the quid pro quo wasn't just what you seem to think (of course, calling "useless" a solution that would provide Barbarossa with starting points shifted East is arguable). The "proposal" was made exactly at the same time as Stalin informed Hitler that after all he did not want a rump Polish state in the area that would fall under the Soviet area of influence. Such timing is not a coincidence – it means that that was the threat for Hitler if he did not accept the "proposal". A rump, formally independent Polish state in what was Eastern Poland. The equivalent of what the Polish leaders would have called the "Romanian bridgehead", only better, because, being in the Soviet sphere of influence, Germany could not attack it and get rid of it. A sanctuary which the Soviet themselves could use against Germany. But the Western Allies could try and use it too; they might send in arms and supplies through Romania. A situation Hitler would have rightly loathed. You should read more about the German-Soviet diplomatic correspondence of that time frame.
Yes, this is all very true. And indeed IMO this PoD was not so feasible as 1 and 2. But it makes all the more important to avoid a war with Britain, since in the case the USSR would have still intervened in a limited German-Polish war to occupy Eastern Poland, Germany could have withstood SOviet requests much better, without a Western front. Heck, if they had played their diplomatic cards well, they could have painted Stalin as the true menace to Europe.
5. As to Norway moving to the Axis camp due to the Allied landing, maybe and maybe not. There are those who believe that the Norwegians would have greatly preferred being "forced" into the Allied camp instead, and would have played the Icelanders' or Persians' part, had the British arrived first, and in strength. There has been some speculation as to why the Norwegian coastal defenses had such cautious orders, and the possible answer is that they expected (rightly) the British, not the Germans, to arrive, and they did not want some artilleryman to fire on them – meaning the British.
Indeed, as you point out, maybe they would have resisted, maybe not. IMO they would have, and the King and Governemnt would have been forced to defend the country. Norwegian resistance to german invasion was essentially fueled by patriotic pride, not by overriding sympathy for the British cause.
I could go on, but I think that's enough. If your timeline is based on one or, worse, more of the above, you might wish to reconsider it.
Indeed my TL is based on a more fundamental PoD which however involves 1 and 2. Hitler is assassinated a month after Munich, and Goering takes over. He implements a more moderate, neo-Wilhelmine fascist-authoritarian nationalistic-imperialistic policy. The racist extremists are purged, the Jewish policy is revised as to implement forced emigration to British Africa, a consistently pro-British foreign policy is implemented. Poland is provoked into attacking when a German insurrection seizes Danzig, and is crushed into a quick limited war. Germany annxes and Germanizes her pre-1914 possessions, and sets up Congress Poland as a puppet. Bohemia-Moravia is cleverly tricked in giving Germany a barely plausible casus belli during the war. As a result of the British-German detente (enhanced by the fact that hardcore Nazi radicals attempt and fail a coup, which gives reason for further housecleaning of racists and a a further swing to moderate far right in Germany), Stalin goes in full paranoid preventive aggression mode, invade Finland and Romania, and unleashing a wave of Communist subversion in Europe and Asia. As a result, Britain and the Rome-Berlin Axis get more close, and finally declare war on the USSR when they bully Bulgaria into surrender as well.