I agree entirely. The naval campaign of the Balkan War demonstrates just how much capable officers and crew can make up for technical inferiority. I think the biggest impact the Ottoman dreadnoughts would have would be on the mindset of the Ottoman fleet. With a powerful, modern ship the Ottomans might feel confident enough to be more active than they were. I agree that the dreadnought could fall to a concerted attack by torpedo craft, and honestly in my opinion that's the most likely result if the Ottomans try to sortie, but the Greeks won't be able to rely on the Ottomans handling their fleet poorly, and so will have to act more cautiously, at least initially. For example, Kountouriotis' actions with the Averoff at Eli would be vastly riskier with a dreadnought in the Ottoman fleet. By no means impossible but still more dangerous. In a conflict as short as this one would have to be, taking the initiative right off the bat could be decisive.That was not a "plan" in the sense that it was approved as such; that was a proposal by Admiral Kountouriotis, which was shot down by Venizelos as soon as he heard of it. It would not be impossible for either of them to decide to carry it out on the spur of the moment, though. Also, as far as the dreadnoughts are concerned, one factor that is constantly underappreciated is the capability of both sides: even in the Balkan Wars, on paper the Ottoman fleet had the upper hand in tonnage and artillery, but they failed to make much of it due to abysmal training and leadership. There were a few capable officers like Rauf Bey (of Hamidiye fame), but the crews were by and large untrained, the ships ill maintained, exercises rare, and artillery shot far and wide. The Greeks were definitely not up to British or German standards, but they were considerably better, and had much more elan and an aggressive mentality. In a closed sea like the Aegean, even a dreadnought might fall to a concerted torpedo boat attack.
If I remember Leontaritis correctly, the early summer exchange between Greece and Serbia explicitly stated that each would honor the alliance in the event of war with Bulgaria, but not with Austria or Turkey. And I agree that the war ends quickly either with the Great Powers stepping in to enforce negotiations or escalating into a world war.More than that, Greece and Serbia had a defensive alliance directed against Bulgaria. If Bulgaria intervened, then Serbia would too. At that point either the Great Powers would step in, or alt-WWI would develop with the Austrians intervening to stop Serbia from becoming too powerful.
I too was unaware of such a telegram, but let's not forget that by this time, the Kaiser's personal pronouncements were not really decisive in setting the course for German policy. The German investment in the Ottoman Empire had long roots and would not change on the Kaiser's whim, and Germany's backing of Greece in the diplomatic tussles after the Balkan Wars had very specific reasons other than personal ties between Wilhelm and Constantine, being an attempt to score points in Greek public opinion (and with the new Greek king) against Russia, and perhaps throw a spanner in Venizelos' evident pro-French and pro-British course.[/QUOTE]
That does makes sense. It's easy to forget that individual actors within governments had their own agendas and they didn't all act with the same purpose or mindset. Out of curiosity, do you know any good authors or sources for the period? I've had a hell of a time finding much quality material besides the books I mentioned up thread.