Austro-Hungarian borders in negotiated peace 1918

It's a good thing demobalization when the economy has been tooled to a total war footing is going to result in a sudden surplus of metaphorical guns, since you can only convert back to a civilian economy so fast and stockpiles of military supplies have now become superfluios. And that there are dependably pro-German regimes in the Baltic, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland all of whom have the capacity to purchase said arms and form military forces capable of putting the force multipliers of refined German training, heavy equipment, ect. to good use as well as being able to build a combined grand strategy under German oversight (Something that couldent be done IRL) as opposed to effectively conducting half a dozen isolated defensive campaigns. A coordinated offensive on multiple points at once in the West would put far more pressure on the Reds at key moments and force them to dedicate more resources to yet another front.

That's to say nothing of the greater support for the Frecorp and volunteer forces that are going to form irregardless of government policy (indeed, if the demobalization is occurring rapidly and many young low skilled men find themselves suddenly out of a job with few prospects for one back home, working for a warlord with the promise of land and loot is going to be awful tempting as opposed to going back to a sit hungerly in a slowly recovering Germany). Plus you have Scandinavian volunteers and the Japanese interventions of our timeline; that later of which is probably more seriously pursued and lasting without strong Anglo-French pressures to withdraw later on and a generally better White situation in the west.

It actually is better for Germany to hold troops in the East and slow the demobilization. It might feel really bad on the ground and of course the regimes that emerge will be far more pro-German and not so Anglo-French modelled but they will be stronger and likely get on their feet fast enough to stave off any communist revolutions. Inside Russia things can be far worse but a German vassal Finland likely never looks so weak as to invite invasion like a parade. Really interesting is how Germany reacts to the Japanese in Siberia, and how the Russians might flip to asking for German assistance as the pilot fish for their former allies is now attempting to feed on them.
 
You'll have to explain your rational a bit more if you want to discuss. The real wildcard is the UK. If the UK plays hard ball on trade and colonies, the Germany will puppetize Belgium. Calais will be a German military base. Larger defacto or actual annexations in the west are likely.

However, in the more likely scenario (IMO), the UK will place a huge weight on having Antwerp and Calais outside of German hands and will make other concessions in the negotiated peace.

In discussing the scenario of Germany not invading Belgium the bargaining chips of occupied Belgium and occupied northern France are not present. Assuming Britain is in the war still, I would be curious if Britain pushes for an earlier peace or holds out longer without Belgium in German hands?
 
It actually is better for Germany to hold troops in the East and slow the demobilization. It might feel really bad on the ground and of course the regimes that emerge will be far more pro-German and not so Anglo-French modelled but they will be stronger and likely get on their feet fast enough to stave off any communist revolutions. Inside Russia things can be far worse but a German vassal Finland likely never looks so weak as to invite invasion like a parade. Really interesting is how Germany reacts to the Japanese in Siberia, and how the Russians might flip to asking for German assistance as the pilot fish for their former allies is now attempting to feed on them.

Indeed. You can only demobalize and retool the economy so fast if you don't want to produce a simultaneous demand and labor glut, so keeping some forces in the Baltic/Ukraine/Poland to insure the security of the new Empire in the east who are keeping the grain flowing from getting overrun by the Reds would combine solid economic policy and political popularity among a population that still keenly remembers the Turnip Winter and panges of starvation.
 
Indeed. You can only demobalize and retool the economy so fast if you don't want to produce a simultaneous demand and labor glut, so keeping some forces in the Baltic/Ukraine/Poland to insure the security of the new Empire in the east who are keeping the grain flowing from getting overrun by the Reds would combine solid economic policy and political popularity among a population that still keenly remembers the Turnip Winter and panges of starvation.

It is distinctly unpopular with the troops but so long as you prioritize the longest serving and whittle down to the current conscript classes it should forestall discontent in the ranks. Harder still is retaining good officers and better NCOs. The post-war Army will be uneven in quality for a time but it has ample experience and should emerge a rather fearsome machine.
 
It is distinctly unpopular with the troops but so long as you prioritize the longest serving and whittle down to the current conscript classes it should forestall discontent in the ranks. Harder still is retaining good officers and better NCOs. The post-war Army will be uneven in quality for a time but it has ample experience and should emerge a rather fearsome machine.

Well, just make it part of the mandatory service of the new conscript class and depend on a solid core of folks who've made a career out of it for in-unit training alongside the professional core of the Polish, Baltic, and Ukranian standing armies and you should be fine as the experienced manpower slowly trickles back home. Thankfully, the strained state of the German economy would prove a boon for military retention in the critical early years while the human capital and systems in those regions get set up: like late 18th-early 19th century armies guaranteed rations, shelter, and job security can attract men from regions with high unemployment or poor prospects to the colors. As for the NCOs and lower rank officers, the chance to earn a rapid promotion in the newly established eastern armies should provide some incentive.

As for the intervention by Japan, I think Germany would be willing to concede to increased influence in Manchuria and the Russian Far East in exchange for the return of their pacific possessions (Or at least Tsingtou: access to and security for the Chinese market is too big a benefit to just surrender). The Russians can be pressured to accept it, at least temporarily, out of a need to rebuild in the core western regions first provided they retain nominal soverginity (Perhaps a Khedivate-like relationship with a Japanese backed regime in Vladivostok?). The presumption being that at some point they'd be strong enough and united enough to reassert their control, and in the meantime allowing the yellow men to subdue the Reds in the region saves Russian lives and allows a quicker reconquest of Moscow.
 

yourworstnightmare

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You'll have to explain your rational a bit more if you want to discuss. The real wildcard is the UK. If the UK plays hard ball on trade and colonies, the Germany will puppetize Belgium. Calais will be a German military base. Larger defacto or actual annexations in the west are likely.

However, in the more likely scenario (IMO), the UK will place a huge weight on having Antwerp and Calais outside of German hands and will make other concessions in the negotiated peace.
If Germany is strong enough to knock out France they'd not negotiate. They'd move some of their army to the Middle East to bail out the Ottomans, and then talk to Britain from a position of strength, that will be more: we demand this, than any negotiations.

A negotiated peace happens if neither side really see an end to the war on the horizon. Basically you can't have either side feel like they're winning, and they can knock the other side out.
 
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