Aussie General shoots Percival

[Chris]

Something that anouther post suggested to me was that an Austrailan commander, general Bennet (or whoever) instead of leaving Singapore, instead shot Percival and kept fighting the Japanese. What might have happened then? Would the british and Austrailans started shooting each other? Singapore still fall (in which case the Austrailans will get the blame)? What if it holds?

Chris

 

[Prunesquallor]

Unfortunately Gordon Bennett would have been no real improvement on Percival. By that stage the situation was beyond repair.

 

[Valamyr]

Shooting your CiC is rarely a wise move. I think Percieval did what he needed to to avoid senseless loss of life, though obviously the British who surrendered might have been able to fall back and defend Burma somehow.

 

[Redbeard]

The chances of Singapore

I'm not familiar with details on General Bennet, but actually I think it could have had important consequences if Percival had been replaced by a more self-confident general, and that until very late before the OTL fall of Singapore. Percival apparently had lost confidence even before the campaign started, as the British forces present were quite short of fullfilling the strength demand in the plan for defence of Malaya and Singapore (Plan Matador), and it didn't get better from Matador not being initialised at all (ie. occupying the very narrow Isthmus of Kra in S. Thailand, which was the only real acces to Malaya from the East Coast).

I can understand if things looked gloomy seen from Percival after mid December with the Japanese Army having entered the dense roadnet in Western Malaya, that doomed any realistic hopes of stopping the Japanese on the Malayan Peninsula, but I don't understand the passívity in Singapore itself. Singapore wasn't that easy a target to storm, but no field fortifiaction works were undertaken in Singapore. The Engineer officer pleaed for permission to undetake such works, but Percival and the Governor denied such action - the civilians should not be worried (shooting the Governor might be at least at productive)! It is a myth that the guns of the fortress could not cover the land side, most had very good arcs of fire on the land side, but only very few HE shells were supplied. And AP shells, even 15", are not that effective against infantry. Next no serious meassures were undertaken to evacuate Singapore or to build up stores of food and water - i guess it again was the concern about "not worrying the civilans" that counted - but for what purpose if Percival didn't see any hope anyway?

From 10th of December Percival could expect the battle to sooner or later reach Singapore itself, and had he prepared for such a battle/storm I think there is a good chance of the Japanese storm failing. That of course wouldn't necessarily lift the siege, but it would be long time before the Japanese could bring in serious siege equipment and the forces present were already on low supplies (it was quite a job to keep the Japanese forces supplied - the logistic system was already starined to the limit).

Beating back the initial storm would be a tremendous morale booster to the city, it would buy time to bring out civilians and bring in supplies and reinforcements and not at least motivate Churchill to release the neccessary resources for Singapore. He had early in 1941 been recommended by his chiefs of staff to reinforce Malaya and Singapore but refused as he found North Africa and the Med. a more promissing place to find some action. If the need should arise in the Far East "something could always be sent!".

That shows how seriously Churchill underestimated basic logistic laws, but if the siege draws out into March or April there is a real good chance for having something substantial arrive. The forces that the British in OTL had deployed in the IO in late March/early April 42 would alone make a serious difference if Singapore is still on British hands. And if the Japanese have not taken Singapore by April 42 they risk ending like the 6th German Army at Stalingrad. Without Singapore the Japanese presence in South Asia and Pacific is jeopardised.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Prunesquallor]

Percival had the misfortune to be shoved into a job which didn't suit him. IIRC he was a talented staff officer who got promoted because Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, valued such qualities. And of course Malaya was very much an area of secondary importance to Britain (understandably enough under the circumstances) and more obviously capable fighting soldiers were needed nearer home. As for Bennett, the way in which he abandoned his troops and escaped to Australia, claiming that he felt that his knowledge of Japanese tactics had to be preserved, was nothing to be proud of. He was promoted but never given another command. Postwar military and civil inquiries decided that his action was imprudent and unjustified but cleared him of cowardice.

 

[Redbeard]

You are probably right about Percival and why he was selected, but Dill's biggest deficiency was his lacking capability to handle Churchill. Had Dill's replacement from December 1941 (Alanbrooke) been in charge a year before, events probably would have taken a different course. Alanbrooke was superb in not letting Churchill's impulsiveness rule the overal war effort, and I guess Malaya would have been reinforced and the resources taken from some of the pre-1942 Churchill adventures - less fighter sweeps over France and one futile offensive less in NA would be more than enough to make Malaya and Singapore invincible.

But it is interesting how much Alanbrooke, according to his diaries, valued Dill (Dill was the "chief liason officer" to the US government after 1941, and instrumental in keeping the two allies together). I guess Alanbrooke learned the CIGS job from watching where Dill came short and was greatful for Dill providing him with the lesson. It seems like the two generals always were close and trusted each other.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Melvin Loh]

Had Bennett or another Aust gen shot Percival during Jan or Feb 1942, the widespread impression that the AIF were a bunch of cowardly deserters who didn't hesitate to take the places of fleeing civilian women and children on outbound troopships, would've been stepped up a notch...

I agree alot with what you other guys have said- by that late in the campaign it wouldn't have made much difference, given the disarray of the available Allied troops, total Jap air supremacy over Singapore and Malaya, the defenders running low on food and water, and the lack of fixed defensive poisitions facing Johore, which enabled the Japs to quickly seize the island's reservoirs. But earlier on ? If Bennett had replaced Percival in other circumstances- e.g. the latter suffers a nervous breakdown a la Moltke the Younger in Aug 1914 at the high point of the 1st Marne- then he as a more capable commander could've made a difference to the Empire forces fighting on.

 

[Prunesquallor]

But was Bennett a more capable commander? Anyway, next in line to Percival would have been Lt General Heath of 8th Corps.

 

[Mark Ford]

The day before the surrender at Singapore, Percival held a meeting of all his commanders and discussed the situation and possible actions. Lt Gen Heath of the 3rd Indian Corps wanted to surrender without any discussion. Other commanders while not committing themselves an opinion had plenty to say about the condition they were in. The exception was Maj Gen Bennett, who seemed ready to pick a figtht with everyone at the meeting, he disagreed with everything said by everyone. At the end of the round table discussion, Percival announced that he wanted to launch an all out attack with everything he had.

He might have expected support from Bennett as Percival had already expressed an opinion that Bennett was the only General he trusted but true to the form shown that morning Bennett argued with Percival as well. With no-one agreeing with what he wanted to do, Percival decided to surrender.

So considering the mood Bennett was in, it might be possible to believe that Bennett could shoot someone, I think that Bennett was lucky that no-one shot him. Assumeing that Percival is shot, Bennett would have been arrested and it is just possible that the resulting confusion causes a delay in the surrender by a day or two.

Any delay in the surrender becomes crucial because the Japanese supply system had broken down three days before the surrender and the Japanese commander Yamishita recorded in his diary that he would recieve no supplies for another two weeks. I don't know how much food the Japanese had but I do know that on the morning of Perival's confrence, the Japanese had only one days worth of ammunition left. An attack on Singapore city itself would have been a Japanese defeat, a counterattack by Percival's forces would have been a Japanese disaster.

We have to assume that Heath would take over command and then we have to wonder, do they surrender to a japanese army that has no ammunition or will the front line Australian, British and Indian troops report that the Japanese have faltered, causeing a new confidenc? I haven't a clue but I do know that if Percival had stood up to the generals under his command and ordered them to attack Percival would have been remembered as a hero instead of the whimp that he showed himself to be.

And Bennett? His division was the only one to actually inflict defeats on the advanceing japanese in Malaysia. So while Bennett seemed to know how to win, it is doubtful that he would have been able to command in Percival's place. As Bennett is as much remembered for his inability to get on with others as his crucial role in pursuading Percival to surrender his command, which included Bennett's 8th Australian division, and then fleeing the scene.

 

[DMA]

Something that anouther post suggested to me was that an Austrailan commander, general Bennet (or whoever) instead of leaving Singapore, instead shot Percival and kept fighting the Japanese. What might have happened then? Would the british and Austrailans started shooting each other? Singapore still fall (in which case the Austrailans will get the blame)? What if it holds?

Chris

Hi Chris,

I must have missed this posting. Anyway, you already know the answer to this question because CCT is hosting my AH about Singapore

For those of you who don't know about it, here's the URL: http://www.changingthetimes.co.uk/samples/singapore_1942.htm

Of course in this AH Bennett doesn't shoot Percival, but IMHO pity he didn't. But I'd doubt Australians & British would start shooting each other if he did shoot him. They may, however, start shooting each other if the cricket turns into another bodyline series though

 

[Anthony Appleyard]

For Singapore to hold out, Singapore would need plenty of big guns facing inland into Malaya and not all out to sea as was in OTL.

 

[Redbeard]

For Singapore to hold out, Singapore would need plenty of big guns facing inland into Malaya and not all out to sea as was in OTL.

Actually it is only a myth that the guns pointed at sea and couldn't be fired at land targets. But for some reason, that in my mind is criminal neglect, very few HE shells had been supplied to Singapore.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Actually it is only a myth that the guns pointed at sea and couldn't be fired at land targets. But for some reason, that in my mind is criminal neglect, very few HE shells had been supplied to Singapore.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

In case, large naval guns would have been of limited utility in repelling a land assault. Basic fortifications would have sufficed quite nicely.

 

[Redbeard]

In case, large naval guns would have been of limited utility in repelling a land assault. Basic fortifications would have sufficed quite nicely.

Basically agree, the 5 15" in the fortress would not alone make the difference. But a 15" HE do make impression and the Brit's and Americans later with considerable success used heavy naval guns vs. land forces. The fortification did however also have a handy number of 6" guns (and probably some 4,7") as well as a handful of 9,2". But allwere in low supply off ammo, especially HE. Churchill was shocked when he heard that, but basically he performed the same neglect by using all his toy-money on futile Mediterreanean offensives.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard