August 1914 clash of dreadnoughts

As points of alternate history discussion, re-hashed Jutland variants are pretty common. I think there's some features of Jutland that make it an attractive point for timelines: it was indecisive, the underdogs gave a good showing, and it's pretty much set at the midpoint of WW1. I've also seen a few discussions about the High Seas Fleet launching a deathride in late 1918 when the land war was lost. This also has some features that make it attractive for alternate history scenarios, such as the fact that such a battle would feature dreadnought based fleets at their very peak, but also in certain aspects is less interesting than Jutland because the Allied fleet had such overwhelming superiority.

However, I haven't seen as many timelines of pre-Jutland "decisive actions" as I have of post-Jutland, and I've never seen any about the very beginning of WW1 the same way "deathride" timelines are typically set at the closing days of WW1.

In fact, the absence of such an opening decisive action was befuddling to the OTL Royal Navy, who considered that their distant blockade strategy would force the Germans to come out and fight because of the inevitability of economic collapse when Germay was cut off from world trade. (So accurate, yet so miscalculated) The Hochseeflotte on the other hand had been built without much consideration to strategic vision. I've heard anecdotes that the high command started having discussions about what the fleet should do at the beginning of the war, and the Kaiser thought the fleet ought to be kept intact for use as a barganing chip in the inevitable negotiations. (Again, a prediction that was true in a technical sense) However, this seems to be a ripe POD. What happens if the indecisive German admiralty staff goes to the Wilhelm and he tells to deploy the navy in aggressive forward support of the army from the outset?

So what would actually happen if Admiral von Ingenohl takes the Hochseeflotte into the English Channel to bombard coastal resources of the Entente, attack targets of opportunity, and generally disrupt the supply lines of the British Expeditionary Force? I think such a scenario is especially interesting because of the consequences for long term butterflies, and the relatively unique tactical situation. Predreadnoughts would still be abundant. (they were almost phased out at Jutland) WW1 naval warfare, especially early WW1 naval warfare, was characterized by some embarrassing Royal Navy defeats and uninspired leadership in the face of quality German technology and initiative (escape of the Goeben, Coronel, and the Live Bait squadron come to mind) but with the occasional moment of redemption (like the Falklands) or stumble into success (Heligoland Bight), averaging out into doing its job *just* well enough (like at Dogger Bank).

So what would a battle look like? This early in the war I don't think the Royal Navy had broken their enemy's codes. IIRC the dreadnought count is roughly 20 British vs 15 German, as narrow as it ever was. Would Grand Fleet be able to interdict them when sailing from remote Scapa Flow? What are the status of the minefields which would later be massively built up over the course of the war? Did German torpedo boats even have the range to participate? How disruptive could the Hochseeflotte be if it was loose in the English Channel or if it made a move (even if only in part) into the Atlantic? I think the big point in favor of the Royal Navy throughout this scenario is that it's really the mission they had been anticipating at least a generation being fought on home turf.
 
for some reason I'm thinking that the German high command would be reluctant to do this as it could lead to an escalation with a Britain that might (in their eyes) be entirely onboard with intervention on Belgium's behalf, and which could pull out if their expeditionary force were beaten back harshly enough.


that said they'd probably be better off having this be a part of the Schlieffen Plan, sort of a "pearl Harbor in the North Sea/Channel 1914"-type thing.
 
You might have look at the Raid on Yarmouth or the Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool & Witby at 3rd November, respectivly 16th December 1914 (just to put it in relation : Coronel was 1st November and Falkland 8th December).

Ideas similar to what's described in the OP are clearly to be seen here.
Let Hipper find "the right moment" with his Kaiser to present this idea and the latter might become - different to OTL - suddenly all fire and flame for the idea thereby overriding the hesitation he had planted into the admirality IOTL beforehand.
 

Riain

Banned
What happens if the indecisive German admiralty staff goes to the Wilhelm and he tells to deploy the navy in aggressive forward support of the army from the outset?

The problem is that the Kaiser IS the supreme command, the Admiralty Staff were subordinate to him and he gave the orders and operating parameters to the Fleets.

You might have look at the Raid on Yarmouth or the Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool & Witby at 3rd November, respectivly 16th December 1914 (just to put it in relation : Coronel was 1st November and Falkland 8th December).

On top of that for most of late 1914 the Grand Fleet had left Scapa for Loch-na-Keal, Lough Swilly and LocH Ewe in western Scotland and north Ireland. Not only was the BC margin very slim while the two I's were in the South Atlantic but the rest of the GF was well out of position.

That said in this period the Channel Fleet was still in existence, with a battle squadron of pre-dreads and sqn of older heavy cruisers. The HSF would be able to defeat this force, but it would stop it from running amok at will.
 
Especially the raid on Scarborough offers an excellent opportunity for a POD with the High Seas Fleet meeting a portion of the Grand Fleet.
If the HSF manages to hurt the GF significantly, it may change the stance of the Kaiser on further deployments.
It would be very interesting to see an ATL based on that.
 
Yes, and it just requires such a tiny POD... If the torpedo boat V 155 hadn't lost touch with SMS Hamburg, V 158 and V 160 (northern wing of the German van), the British destroyers would've probably have wandered across in front of the central group of SMS Roon (+5 more torpedo boats) and behind the southern group of SMS Prinz Heinrich (+3 TBs) in the darkness. One of the German ACs would've had an unpleasant meeting with the four British ACs (Devonshire-Class) of the 3rd CS and turned back, screaming for help.

I could imagine the engagement spiraling on from there - the German 1st BS moving in to shield the ACs, Beatty moving in with the BCF to support the 3rd CS and then attempting to pull the enemy units back onto Warrender and the 2nd BS (as per his orders!). Even if Ingenohl back down the line would be screaming in Admiral Lans' ear to turn back for home, just imagine him going for redemption of his ideas about torpedo warfare: ordering the Lans' cripples (torpedo boats designed under his oversight in 1911) in the 5th and 7th torpedo flotillas, previously screening the southern wing to overhaul his line on the unengaged side and then break through the line to deliver a nighttime torpedo attack (ostensibly to cover his turn back home). That should have been the outcome anyway - it was exactly what the German training manuals were aiming at!

Might've lost a TB or two to collisions in the dark, but what would 60+ G7 torpedoes at close range have done to 10 British capital ships (all lacking continuous torpedo bulkheads - just with screens around the magazines)? A single mine with ~80 kg wet guncotton had just sunk HMS Audacious six weeks before - the G7 carried 195 kg of Hexanite...

I'm guessing a massive British loss would've seen heads roll at the Admiralty. If Fisher had to go, I'd expect HMS Eagle to be finished as a battleship - just because it would've been the quickest option. Three more Rs built after all? And some improved QEs as proper fast Battleships? In any later engagements I would expect the GF to be really cautious about avoiding nighttime actions and to keep the range open. Even if Wilhelm II. might've assumed the war to be won at sea, an indecisive 1915 Jutland-analogue would probably have destroyed that illusion. And starting in 1916 British numbers of 15" battleships would've restored British superiority at sea. But what sort of other consequences might emerge?
 
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Mine deployment in the channel was pretty low in early 1914. However there is the risk of British submarines. I believe a decent number were operating in the channel early in the war.

It's worth noting what the Royal Navy had at different points in August 1914.

1. First fleet (Scappa {later called the Grand fleet})
20 DN 9PDN 4BC 8AC

2nd and 3rd fleets (Channel just out of reserve, half from light reserve and half from heavy reserve)
29 PDN 10AC

If the High Seas Fleet goes for the channel the question becomes can the Royal concentrate and confront the Germans. Also how many predreadnoughts do the Germans bring. Can they afford to be slowed down by the slower ships if they want to dive into the channel and get out. It's a lot easier for the Royal Navy to intercept the High Seas fleet at 17 knots compared to 19.

Historically many predreadnoughts were kept in the Baltic as coastal defense ships early in ww1.

The Germans (if they choose too) might be able to abuse the older British preadnoughts in the channel if they get lucky. They could inflict massive amounts of deaths on the Royal Navy however they may be caught with the Grand Fleet coming behind them and the Channel fleets ahead of them. The Germans have to be aware of this in an extended engagement.

Historically many of the predreadnoughts stayed in the channel until the mine barrage at Dover became more built up. Or possibly they stayed in the channel to work up out of reserve until needed elsewhere.
 
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Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
It's not just the predreadnoughts that slow down von Ingenohl - the Nassau class gave the early British dreadnoughts a 2-knot advantage in speed. It could be that a smaller HSF comes across not only the BCF but a battle squadron of super-dreadnoughts. The battle may well go to the HSF - not a given - but in that event I would expect their losses to be not inconsiderable.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Historically many of the predreadnoughts stayed in the channel until the mine barrage at Dover became more built up. Or possibly they stayed in the channel to work up out of reserve until needed elsewhere.
Or - as with Formidable - they become sitting ducks.
 
Especially the raid on Scarborough offers an excellent opportunity for a POD with the High Seas Fleet meeting a portion of the Grand Fleet.
If the HSF manages to hurt the GF significantly, it may change the stance of the Kaiser on further deployments.
It would be very interesting to see an ATL based on that.

Although an interesting and lesser used POD, the battlecruiser raids followed the same antagonizing back and forth pattern that led to the classic duels between battlecruisers at Dogger Bank and Jutland. A North Sea reenactment of the Battle of Port Arthur was what the Royal Navy had braced themselves for but is also the kind of thing that would have put unworthy British predreadnoughts in the most vulnerable kind of position.
 

Riain

Banned
Mine deployment in the channel was pretty low in early 1914. However there is the risk of British submarines. I believe a decent number were operating in the channel early in the war.

It's worth noting what the Royal Navy had at different points in August 1914.

1. First fleet (Scappa {later called the Grand fleet})
20 DN 9PDN 4BC 8AC

2nd and 3rd fleets (Channel just out of reserve, half from light reserve and half from heavy reserve)
29 PDN 10AC

If the High Seas Fleet goes for the channel the question becomes can the Royal concentrate and confront the Germans. Also how many predreadnoughts do the Germans bring. Can they afford to be slowed down by the slower ships if they want to dive into the channel and get out. It's a lot easier for the Royal Navy to intercept the High Seas fleet at 17 knots compared to 19.

Historically many predreadnoughts were kept in the Baltic as coastal defense ships early in ww1.

The Germans (if they choose too) might be able to abuse the older British preadnoughts in the channel if they get lucky. They could inflict massive amounts of deaths on the Royal Navy however they may be caught with the Grand Fleet coming behind them and the Channel fleets ahead of them. The Germans have to be aware of this in an extended engagement.

Historically many of the predreadnoughts stayed in the channel until the mine barrage at Dover became more built up. Or possibly they stayed in the channel to work up out of reserve until needed elsewhere.

On 8th of August the Channel Fleet consisted of the 5th and 8th Battle squadrons made up of 2nd and 3rd Fleet ships, but on the 20th of August the 8th BS was broken up and it's ships (IIUC all 3rd Fleet ships from heavy reserve) were dispersed to strengthen the cruiser forces on overseas stations. So by the end of August the CF only had the 5th BS with nucleus crews and reservists, until it became obvious in November that the Allies had won the Race to the Sea and these ships started to trickle away mostly to the Med.
 
Problem is even if the best possible scenario happens for germans i.e Grand fleet is completely defeated 15+ dreadnoughts sunk vs 5 german dreadnoughts

What then ?
They still cannot invade or blockade british isles
empire is infinitely more wealthy than germany [much more beans bullets and men ]
The british with small forces and submarines still maintain much of the blockade of germany

The HSF will be licking its wounds for such a long time that it is effectively out of action anyway for a year or more

and british industry will make up the losses soon enough

infact the RN has so many moth balled pre-dread in 1914 that they can perform a lot of defensive roles
 

Riain

Banned
Problem is even if the best possible scenario happens for germans i.e Grand fleet is completely defeated 15+ dreadnoughts sunk vs 5 german dreadnoughts

What then ?
They still cannot invade or blockade british isles
empire is infinitely more wealthy than germany [much more beans bullets and men ]
The british with small forces and submarines still maintain much of the blockade of germany

The HSF will be licking its wounds for such a long time that it is effectively out of action anyway for a year or more

and british industry will make up the losses soon enough

infact the RN has so many moth balled pre-dread in 1914 that they can perform a lot of defensive roles

Britain was vastly more vulnerable in 1914 than most people realise because a huge portion of the domestic transport task was undertaken by coastal shipping chugging around Britain from port to port.
"About 120 ships passed Dover daily in 1915 and 1916, and between 80 and 100 per day in 1917. ................. Had the Channel traffic been suspended, or even largely reduced, London would have starved, and at least one-third of its population would have had to be removed immediately to the west coast of England, since the railways would have been quite unable to deal with the food-trains that would have been required to make up for the loss of sea transport."

So the danger of a crushing (if almost magically unlikely) victory by Germany over the Grand Fleet is a German close blockade of eastern Britain stopping open traffic in the coastal domestic shipping sector. Without a superior battlefleet to stop this the German would win any open attempt to stop this blockade merely by escalating the engagement until it overpowered the enemy. Uboats west of Britain are the cream on top of this prize which would cripple Britain's war effort.
 
If memory serves me correct, the Germans had virtual parity with the Grand Fleet (In capital ship numbers) in late 1914 - Shortly after HMS Audacious was sunk.

Cause:
3x BC's away in South Atlantic
1x BB mined
Several more BB / BC in maintenance & working up, so actual numbers of available ships was virtually equal. If Germany had sortied and engaged at that stage, they could have done severe damage to the Grand Fleet, but in the long run, the Grand Fleet can repair and has a wave of new ships becoming operational in early 1915 (QE's), so any German advantage would be very short lived.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
If memory serves me correct, the Germans had virtual parity with the Grand Fleet (In capital ship numbers) in late 1914 - Shortly after HMS Audacious was sunk.

Cause:
3x BC's away in South Atlantic
1x BB mined
Several more BB / BC in maintenance & working up, so actual numbers of available ships was virtually equal. If Germany had sortied and engaged at that stage, they could have done severe damage to the Grand Fleet, but in the long run, the Grand Fleet can repair and has a wave of new ships becoming operational in early 1915 (QE's), so any German advantage would be very short lived.
I believe that if Princess Royal was to be sent to the North American / Caribbean station, Jellicoe calculated there was a RN superiority of 1 dreadnought (BB+BC).

Germans raiding east coast convoys will depend to a large degree upon how quickly the defensive minefields are put in place. Of course, if you have a very early German victory then superiority in the North Sea will prevent the minelaying.
 

Deleted member 94680

You need a different Kaiser Wilhelm for this to happen. Early in the War he was still a fully paid up member of Tirpitz’s riskflotte club. Part of that theory (in the early war at least) was to maintain the HSF as a fleet in being rather than risk its dreadnoughts in engagements where the difference in numbers could be widened. Later on the plan changes to involve actions designed to catch isolated parts of the Grand Fleet and reduce the deficit, but at the outbreak of War ships were carefully husbanded.
 
You need a different Kaiser Wilhelm for this to happen. Early in the War he was still a fully paid up member of Tirpitz’s riskflotte club. Part of that theory (in the early war at least) was to maintain the HSF as a fleet in being rather than risk its dreadnoughts in engagements where the difference in numbers could be widened. Later on the plan changes to involve actions designed to catch isolated parts of the Grand Fleet and reduce the deficit, but at the outbreak of War ships were carefully husbanded.
Can the PD be considered "expendables" though ? granted germany did not have many of these ships
 
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