August 1914 : An offer not - or to be rejected

NoMommsen

Donor
@Glenn239
What was it then, what Grey wanted to achive in your opinion ?
First the offer of the possibility of british as well as french neutrality communicated by Tyrell.
Second with the 'backflip' after the Kaiser agreed on not waging war in the west, if France does the same ?

So, when the French mobilize and the Germans ask for an actual guarantee of neutrality, Grey cuts bait.
What was it in your opinion grey wanted to 'lure the germans too with his 'bait' ?

Here's the elephant in the room - the reason that Grey did this backflip, I'd bet, is that it bothered him France would mobilize first. Mobilization meant war.
Why should have he bothered, who mobilises first (what actually did the french, even though only by less than 2 hours) ?
Do you say Grey wanted to avoid war at all ?



The British were setting up for a naval war at the minimum so it's quite possible they'd have simply taken into custody the German merchant ships trying to return to Germany from overseas. Not like after guaranteeing Belgium the Germans would be in any position to do anything about it, right?
Why and with what reasoning should have Britain do this ? ... if they are NOT at war with Germany ? ... especially after the german guarantee Belgium ?
The violation of was the only arguement he could get the cabinet to agree upon to be concerned for some action (not necessarily military action).
 
NoMommsen
What was it then, what Grey wanted to achive in your opinion ?

Grey wanted Britain in unity with French objectives, whatever these may be. Grey wanted, at any cost, to avoid giving any assurance of neutrality to Germany under any condition.

First the offer of the possibility of british as well as french neutrality communicated by Tyrell.
Second with the 'backflip' after the Kaiser agreed on not waging war in the west, if France does the same ?

Grey's question to Bertie after 5pm on August 1st, as I posted yesterday, shows what Grey's offer was. This is the offer communicated to Lichnowsky and causing the confusion. But Grey left out some of the details conveyed to Lichnowsky earlier in the day, such as that the neutrality he was proposing would not be guaranteed. Lichnowksy only got the proposal in its full form later on, and his reaction was along the lines of, "you gotta be kidding me..."

What was it in your opinion grey wanted to 'lure the germans too with his 'bait' ?

Grey wanted the German themselves to agree to the French and British mobilizations against Germany.

Why should have he bothered, who mobilises first (what actually did the french, even though only by less than 2 hours) ?

Grey did not know the French had mobilized when all this went down. But, later, when Grey said to the king it was all just a misunderstanding, he probably did know they had done so.

Do you say Grey wanted to avoid war at all ?

As first answer above, Grey wanted Britain and France in lockstep. If France wanted to avoid war and negotiate, Grey would oblige. If France wanted war with Germany, Grey would oblige.

Why and with what reasoning should have Britain do this ? ... if they are NOT at war with Germany ?

The British naval pledge to France was agreed on by cabinet before Germany demanded passage from Belgium. Why would the British commit to blasting the German navy out of the water, but wave and let their merchant fleet pass through, back to Germany, laden with American goods?

... especially after the german guarantee Belgium ?

Germany made no guarantee of Belgium. The exact offer, which was rejected by Grey on behalf of cabinet, was to respect Belgium in exchange for the guarantee of British neutrality. But Grey, and cabinet, would not bind their hands. They would not make that guarantee. So the German offer was stillborne.

The violation of was the only arguement he could get the cabinet to agree upon to be concerned for some action (not necessarily military action).

You're getting ahead of the game. Grey's objective on 1 August wasn't that yet. All he wanted to do was to get mobilization underway, and if Germany agreed to let that happen, then so much the better as far as Grey was concerned.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Grey wanted Britain in unity with French objectives, whatever these may be. Grey wanted, at any cost, to avoid giving any assurance of neutrality to Germany under any condition.
...
As first answer above, Grey wanted Britain and France in lockstep. If France wanted to avoid war and negotiate, Grey would oblige. If France wanted war with Germany, Grey would oblige.
Can't really follow you on that, since Grey told Cambon quite different.
From the same source you drew upon :
No. 352
Telegram (No.290) 31.07.1914
to Sir F.Bertie :
" ... Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has gone yet, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was in the Morocco question, which was a dispute directly involving France. In this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.
I have told French Ambassador that we cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.
"
No. 367
to Sir F. Bertie 31.07.1914
about conversation with Cambon
"... I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
... the only answer I could dive was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
"
He still did so after his meeting with Lichnowsky that afternoon after the cabinet meeting
No. 426
Telegram (No.299) 01.08.1914 dispatched 8.20 pm
"... Now, the position was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If france could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.
...
I said that we had come to a decision : that we could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expeditionary military force to the continent. ... It was one that we could not propose and Parliament would not authorise unless our interest and obligations were deeply and desperatly involved.
... and that I would ask the cabinet to consider the point about the French coasts.
"



More on other - IMO errors on your arguements later ...
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Grey's question to Bertie after 5pm on August 1st, as I posted yesterday, shows what Grey's offer was. This is the offer communicated to Lichnowsky and causing the confusion. But Grey left out some of the details conveyed to Lichnowsky earlier in the day, such as that the neutrality he was proposing would not be guaranteed. Lichnowksy only got the proposal in its full form later on, and his reaction was along the lines of, "you gotta be kidding me..."
Document No. 419 you quoted was sent after the talk between Lichnovsky and Grey, which started at 3.30 pm. in which Grey made no offer at all. He only ventilated the "great regret" about Germanys reply regarding the neutrality of Belgium (as communicated by Goschen after his talk with Bethmann-Hollweg).

The communication, that caused the confusion was made in the morning of the 1.August 1914 by Tyrell and by Grey himself by phone.
Karl Kautsky ; "Die Deutschen Dokumente Zum Kriegsausbruch"; volume 3

document 562
Telegram 205, sent from London 11.14 am, arrived at the german foreign office at 4.23 pm.
(sry, haven't found an english translation of these documents on the net yet, but the german originals can be found here : https://archive.org/details/diedeutschendoku03germ_0 )
Its content in short : Grey might be able to make some disclosures as results of the cabinet meeting, usefull to avaoid the catastrophe, which was interpreted by Tyrell as : if Germany doesn't attack France, also England would stay neutral and would guarantee France' passivity. Then Grey phoned himself and asked Lichnowsky if Germany would refrain from attacking france if France would stay neutral in german-russian war, what Lichnovsky answered in affirmative.

document 570
Telegram 209, sent from London 2.10 pm (still before the Grey-Lichnowsky meeting !)
"Sir William Tyrell was just with me, to tell me, Sir E. Grey would want make proposals this afternoon for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we have war with Russia as well as with france. I will see Sir E. Grey at 3.30 and will report immediatly."


Why and with what reasoning should have Britain do this ? ... if they are NOT at war with Germany ?
The British naval pledge to France was agreed on by cabinet before Germany demanded passage from Belgium. Why would the British commit to blasting the German navy out of the water, but wave and let their merchant fleet pass through, back to Germany, laden with American goods?
... especially after the german guarantee Belgium ?
Germany made no guarantee of Belgium.
I'm afraid you mixed OTL and ITTL here.

ITTL Germany guarantees belgian neutrality and integrity and pleases britain to do so as well in putting his military strengh in favor of Belgium, despite whoever might violate Belgium.

The RN could only go after german ship if they are at war. Which they are not at this point in OTL as well as ITTL.

Btw, if you read further the British documents, esp. No 426 of 01.08.1914 and No 487 of 02.08.1914, you will find that the cabinet approved the protection of the french coast against german warships only on the 02.08.1914, what also should be kept secret.


The exact offer, which was rejected by Grey on behalf of cabinet, was to respect Belgium in exchange for the guarantee of British neutrality.
At the afternoon meeting Lichnosvky 'offered' even more : to accept that the german army and the french army stand fully mobilised opposite each other and ... don't do anything.
 

NoMommesen
Can't really follow you on that, since Grey told Cambon quite different.

“I have told French Ambassador that we cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.
"”

And,

France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.

Grey’s principles were twofold. First, to be in unison with the French, second, under no circumstances to bind Britain to neutrality with Germany. The excerpts you’ve quoted are consistent with these principles – all Grey is saying on these dates (31 July and 1 August) was that Britain would not commit itself to war against Germany on those dates. But then, on August 2nd, the British did commit to war with Germany under certain (naval) conditions. So, when Grey said to Cambon on the 31st “we cannot undertake a definite pledge”, we know he was not being truthful, because he did just that on behalf of cabinet just 3 days later.

Document No. 419 you quoted was sent after the talk between Lichnovsky and Grey, which started at 3.30 pm. in which Grey made no offer at all. The communication, that caused the confusion was made in the morning of the 1.August 1914 by Tyrell and by Grey himself by phone.

Negative. Document no. 419 is the transmission to Paris of the offer Grey made to Lichnowsky during the meeting at 330pm. This offer was for a temporary and non-binding form of British neutrality conditional upon it being in lockstep with French intentions, (the two principles that underpinned Grey’s policy). The morning conversation on the phone and by Tyrell was in reference to the offer later made in no.419. But key details were omitted earlier in the day to make it appear better than it actually was. The German version says,

Germany doesn't attack France, also England would stay neutral and would guarantee France' passivity

You see the bait and switch that Grey pulled on Lichnowsky – the two offers are one and the same offer, except for the ‘guaranteed’ neutrality part – in that key detail Grey lied to Lichnowsky over the phone and then told the truth in the face to face meeting. He was probably hoping the Germans would agree to let the British and French mobilize at them. He dropped the whole scheme later when it was clear the French were not interested and had already mobilized. He did not care that the Germans had offered neutrality in the west – he wanted unity of policy with France, not neutrality towards Germany.

ITTL Germany guarantees belgian neutrality and integrity and pleases britain to do so as well in putting his military strengh in favor of Belgium, despite whoever might violate Belgium.

Ok, but in real history the German ambassador floated a deal on Belgium on 1 August but it was stillborne because of the British in principle refused to bind themselves to anything. This is where Verone hits the wall – he can’t argue Grey wanted western neutrality when it was Grey himself that rejected western neutrality outright


The RN could only go after german ship if they are at war. Which they are not at this point in OTL as well as ITTL.

The RN can’t sink HSF warships without it being war. But countries do commandeer merchant vessels even today and its not an act of war, but an act of blockade. So yes, the RN could have sent German merchant ships into British ports. They did it during the war with Denmark, The Netherlands, etc.


At the afternoon meeting Lichnosvky 'offered' even more : to accept that the german army and the french army stand fully mobilised opposite each other and ... don't do anything.

Lichnowsky knew that if he could get a British guarantee of neutrality he could offer quite a bit. But Grey would not guarantee anything, so there was no deal to be had, as per Lichnowksy's own telegram to Berlin later that night.
 

Btw, if you read further the British documents, esp. No 426 of 01.08.1914 and No 487 of 02.08.1914, you will find that the cabinet approved the protection of the french coast against german warships only on the 02.08.1914, what also should be kept secret.

No. 143.
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René‚ Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
London, August 3, 1914.


Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows: --

" In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round l the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French.shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war."

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the notion of` an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.




 
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