Atrocities and peace in a CP-victory WWII

[I Blame Communism]

About militarism being a French disease, here's my source:

http://books.google.com/books?id=k1TWQG9QElEC&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=militarism+%22french+disease%22&source=bl&ots=7CCPFH-XXy&sig=KkBNPyoUc55hKU_PTxGoTykZDSg&hl=en&ei=WkhOS6HHBJGQtge_iZHkDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=militarism%20%22french%20disease%22&f=false

But what facts does he cite in support of his thesis? There was no French Zabern Incident or French Captain of Koepenick. The French generals may have wanted the Rhine frontier, but they never actually sabotaged their own civilian and political authorities llike Ludendorff did. And France managed to go through four years of war and come out constitution intact. The German one was pretty irrelevant after two years.

 

[shillinger]

If it ends in 1917/1918, the German economy won't be able to handle any continued fighting. The British, who happen to control Germany's colonies by this time, will see no intention in restoring German control to those colonies. Japan need not fear Germany either, so Germany's Pacific colonies will be lost completely. The German economy will be wrecked, and they will struggle to maintain Continental Hegemony. Either they concentrate on their navy, and still be inferior to the British, or they concentrate on their army to protect against France and keep the East pacified. (Although without B/L, it will be interesting to see what Russia relinquishes.) If they win after B/L, they certainly will find it hard to keep the East under their thumbs.

You see, what is needed for this to happen is Britain deciding to keep fighting the CP-s.... completly by herself.

 

[Saladan]

I'm a bit curious at this whole thing. At this point you have a Germany which has historically beaten Austria, Russia, France, and Great Britain. Basically all of Europe's great powers excluding itself. At this point you also have a Germany which has gone undefeated in every war it's gotten into and has managed to take on pretty much everyone and won. Exactly what is that going to do to the German military mindset?

And what of France? Here you have a France that has been beaten twice now and over the same nationalist pride. What are the effects of a second defeat going to have on France?

 

[MerryPrankster]

But what facts does he cite in support of his thesis? There was no French Zabern Incident or French Captain of Koepenick. The French generals may have wanted the Rhine frontier, but they never actually sabotaged their own civilian and political authorities llike Ludendorff did. And France managed to go through four years of war and come out constitution intact. The German one was pretty irrelevant after two years.

The lingering memory of Napoleon.

 

[Wolfpaw]

The lingering memory of Napoleon.

Sort of. You'll probably see an odd mixing of "French (Napoleonic) Military Glory" with the "purity" of Royalism. Remember, the Bonapartes' legacy had largely been marred by Napoleon III's buffoonery and the Republic was viewed by the right as irredeemably corrupt.

So basically they take the best of both worlds; Napoleon's glory + the illusionary Golden Age of a Catholic France under a Most Christian Majesty.

 

[Hörnla]

About militarism being a French disease

Some numbers to think about - and always bear in mind that Germany realistically had to prepare for a two-front war:

When war broke out in 1914, the French army had a mobilized strength of 3.5 million, nearly matching Germany's 3.8 million. (This compares to 4.4 million for Russia.)
For France, with its much smaller population, to field such an army required great sacrifice from the French people. The Three Year Service Law turned France into Europe's most militarized society with 80 percent of its draft age men in military service compared to 50 percent for Germany.

Also, France spent more on its military per capita than Germany.

 

[Eurofed]

How, pray tell, will this happen?

When does the war end?

If it ends in 1914/1915, it won't be decisive enough to convince the French to give up their colonies. Nor has Britain occupied the Middle East by this time. Nor will Germany fell the need to force France to forfeit her colonies. Belgium's colonies likely returned to her as well.

If it ends in 1917/1918, the German economy won't be able to handle any continued fighting. The British, who happen to control Germany's colonies by this time, will see no intention in restoring German control to those colonies. Japan need not fear Germany either, so Germany's Pacific colonies will be lost completely. The German economy will be wrecked, and they will struggle to maintain Continental Hegemony. Either they concentrate on their navy, and still be inferior to the British, or they concentrate on their army to protect against France and keep the East pacified. (Although without B/L, it will be interesting to see what Russia relinquishes.) If they win after B/L, they certainly will find it hard to keep the East under their thumbs.

Hmm, it seems I was not sufficiently explicit about setting up the parameters of this CP victory scenario.

Therefore:

CPs: Germany, A-H, Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria.

Entente: UK, France, Russia, Serbia, Japan.

Neutrals: America.

Romania, Sweden, and Greece may or may not join the CPs, and Romania may even go Entente, as butterflies go.

I'm not going so far as to force a detailed and specific course of the war, but it is generally assumed that the CPs don't waltz in Paris in 1914 with a successful Plan Schliffen, nor they manage to snatch a last-ditch victory with the Spring 1918 offensives, and then drop dead by the effort. It is aestimated that the CPs win by 1916-17. Not a quick and easy victory, not one of total exhaustion. If Russia doesn't lose all the B-L stuff, at the very least they lose Poland, Bessarabia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and if they keep Estonia, they are forced to give compensations in Belarus and Ukraine.

 

[Eurofed]

So, ironically, it would be ideal for Germany to win the war, but in such a dragged-out and exhaustive way that the people get sick with the Emperor and either take away his power or his throne alltogether as IOTL...

How do you see a bout a 1916/1917 victory ? I think it would still pave the way to a democratic evolution, although not a Republic, without exhausting the country too much.

Nikephoros:
Oh, Britain can only be brought one way anyways: The submarine blockade. However, if it is kept up throughout the entire war, then it might actually work in bringing Britain down, at least down to the negotiation table where it can use the occupied German colonies and the smooth transfer of the French colonies as bargaining chip.

Perhaps, although it remains to be seen how this would interfere with the scenario requirement that America keeps neutral. Although, I wonder, what would would be Britain's gain from being a sore loser, and refusing to return German and Italian colonies, and go along with the transfer of the French/Belgian ones ?

With France and Russia down, it has lost, German hegemony on the continent is a reality and Britain cannot ever hope to reverse it with its forces alone. Ongoing hostility to the CP victors means it is shutting itself out of the continental European markets, and if the CPs truly get pissed and pool their resources and those of their vassals and conqured countries on raising a naval challenge to Britain, its naval hegemony or its grip on the Empire is not so unshakable, in the long term. Britain cannot do anything more than be a sore loser nuisance about the colonies, with CP control of Russian resources, the UK blockade shall become less and less effective and America more and more pissed off about a bunch of sore losers cutting them off from continental markets.

Surely there are going to be firebrands like Churchill spouting off "never surrendah" idiocy, but a lot of other British leaders can see the writing on the wall.

 

[Eurofed]

Sort of. You'll probably see an odd mixing of "French (Napoleonic) Military Glory" with the "purity" of Royalism. Remember, the Bonapartes' legacy had largely been marred by Napoleon III's buffoonery and the Republic was viewed by the right as irredeemably corrupt.

So basically they take the best of both worlds; Napoleon's glory + the illusionary Golden Age of a Catholic France under a Most Christian Majesty.

Exactly, this is how a French fascism would spin its ideal, an unholy mix of Bonapartist and Legitimist Golden Ages.

 

[shillinger]

Although, I wonder, what would would be Britain's gain from being a sore loser, and refusing to return German and Italian colonies, and go along with the transfer of the French/Belgian ones?

With France and Russia down, it has lost, German hegemony on the continent is a reality and Britain cannot ever hope to reverse it with its forces alone. Ongoing hostility to the CP victors...

Surely there are going to be firebrands like Churchill spouting off "never surrendah" idiocy, but a lot of other British leaders can see the writing on the wall.

Britain continuing to fight after ALL her major allies and all its continental forces are beaten is ASB-level Britwank.

Even if the British government would want to fight on, the British people wouldnt. After 2-3 years of gruelling trench warfare, and the loss of thousands of their soldiers, they wont fight a lost cause alone against the CP-s.

 

[kellineil]

Britain continuing to fight after ALL her major allies and all its continental forces are beaten is ASB-level Britwank.

Even if the British government would want to fight on, the British people wouldnt. After 2-3 years of gruelling trench warfare, and the loss of thousands of their soldiers, they wont fight a lost cause alone against the CP-s.

Assuming all her major allies surrender, Britain will fight on as long as it takes to get a lenient peace and not a moment longer. On top of that, assuming that France and Russia have been knocked out what reason does Germany have to continue fighting the British? The issue of colonies is one that can be dealt with at the negotiating table.

The issues are:

Effectively all of Germany's colonies have been taken by British, Commonwealth or Japanese forces. Germany is going to want them back, or at least compensation

Britain and the Commonwealth have gained a lot of territory. They are going to want to keep it, especially those parts of Africa that allow a Cape to Cairo railway

The Ottomans are going to want their Middle East territory back

The Italians are going to want some colonial gains

Japan has seized a lot of German colonies in the pacific and far east. they aren't going to be given back and Germany doesn't have the capability of taking them back

On the table and available for horse trading are all French, Belgian and lets not forget Portugese colonies

Suggested deal:

Britain keeps German East Africa and German South West Africa

Britain (well Australia) and Japan keep all German territory they seized in the Pacific and Far East

The Ottomans get their 1914 borders in the Middle East and a free hand in western persia. In the Caucusus (sp?) they get their B-L borders

Italy gets Tunis, French Somaliland and a free hand to give Ethiopia another go

Germany gets the Belgian Congo, French Congo (what's now Congo-brazzaville), Morocco, and all French North Africa except Algeria which France retains

Angola goes to Germany, Mozambique to Britain. Goa is ceded to Britain

Oh, and to compensate Germany for the loss of their pacific possessions they get French Indochina and the French spheres of influence in China are ceded to Germany

thoughts?

 

[Earling]

Some numbers to think about - and always bear in mind that Germany realistically had to prepare for a two-front war:

When war broke out in 1914, the French army had a mobilized strength of 3.5 million, nearly matching Germany's 3.8 million. (This compares to 4.4 million for Russia.)
For France, with its much smaller population, to field such an army required great sacrifice from the French people. The Three Year Service Law turned France into Europe's most militarized society with 80 percent of its draft age men in military service compared to 50 percent for Germany.

Also, France spent more on its military per capita than Germany.

Yes, but this was based on the belief that Russia would take a lengthy time to mobilize and, since the war would be decided in weeks rather than years, France had to be able to meet Germany on a roughly 1 to 1 basis for this period if she wanted to prevail.

Alot of people critique this idea, but it seems perfectly justified by the history. Had the battle of the Marne gone the other way Paris may have fallen and France would for all intents and purposes have been defeated in under 40~ days.

French militarism certainly did exist, it seems an inevitable product of nationalism, but it has to be understood to be a rather pessimistic militarism. French chauvinists are mainly interested in trying to ensure French survival. Austrian chauvinists are rather similar. Germany chauvinists by contrast can be found discussing how Germany will at the very least rule the continent if not the world. The British equivelents, to take the other example, felt they already ruled the world and just had to be careful about others taking it away. The simple weakness of France compared to Germany in this period is why French revanchists were reduced to thinking of it always but speaking of it never. There is a reason that Gustave Le Bon, the "intellectual servitor of the French military class", fled to a house in the south upon news of the war breaking out convinced disaster was sure to follow. True he came back after the Marne but he was hardly alone in being pessimistic about France's chances while at the same time raving about how Germany was terrible, France was great, everyone had to support the military and so on and so forth.

I think Susano is right that a victorious Germany is going to provide support for all conservative elements. I would go further and say that if swathes of Europe are rising in socialist/communist/radical revolution then non-socialists of all stripes, even relatively moderate ones, are going to look at democratic socialists with considerable fear and resolve to dig their heels in. They shall ask how will the gains of the war be kept if the socialists are going to cut military spending to fund all their additional welfare policies?

Will Britain fight on if all her allies are defeated? I doubt it, but they will not rush to capitulate either. I also think the British people are far less likely to know a lost cause when they see one than the British government. The question is whether all conflict is over. There is a temptation to make a scenario like OTL where WW2 follows a neat two decades after the first. If violence breaks out a mere handful of years later, revolutionaries and nationalist rebels versus an ever more over stretched German Empire, then any treaty may well be as effective as the Treaty of Amiens 1802.

All in all there will be a mess. Russia will in all likelyhood experience civil war. France is likely to experience the same and at the very least be a deeply divided country. In Italy almost anything could happen. Most of the problems in the Balkans remain unresolved and are probably unresolvable, adding further problems for A-H. The Ottomans, strangely enough, probably come out pretty well. Its hard to say what will happen to the British. There will certainly be factions who say the war was the greatest mistake in recent British history, and advocate a deal with Germany and a return to relative isolation, but then there shall be others who likely place the reason for the defeat on that very isolation and not paying sufficient attention to affairs in Europe. Who will prevail will depend on events in Europe, the global economy and so on and so forth.

 

[Hörnla]

Suggested deal:

Britain keeps German East Africa and German South West Africa

Problem: German South West is the only colony with German settlement to mention.

Italy gets Morroco, French Somaliland and a free hand to give Ethiopia another go

I rather see an Italian Tunis instead of Morocco. It is a strategical dream for them!

 

[kellineil]

I rather see an Italian Tunis instead of Morocco. It is a strategical dream for them!

Damn! I meant Tunis, got them mixed up in my head

 

[Hörnla]

@shillinger

"Exactly what is that going to do to the German military mindset?"

On the one hand, the strong role of the military and its image in Germany will be confirmed. Germans might come close to seeing themselves as invincible. On the other hand - German leadership might become less paranoid. (Nightmare of coalitions - huh! Encirclement - aargh!)

"And what of France? Here you have a France that has been beaten twice now and over the same nationalist pride. What are the effects of a second defeat going to have on France?"

France would have been beaten 3 times by then, if you count 1813/15.

In the longer run, it might not be much different to OTL. Once victory got stale, the huge impression of the ordeal of 14-18 had a huge effect on French attitudes. If the Germans are smart enough NOT TO annex further French border regions (Nancy, Belfort, Briey), Alsace-Lorraine might get written off. This is IMHO not less plausible than a Fascist France.

@I Blame Communism e.a.

I do understand your points but would at least try to counter.

"The German one [Constitution] was pretty irrelevant after two years."

Not more "irrelevant" than before 1914, or in 1914/15. The mindset to leave the management of war to those who could apparently handle it best is understandable in this apocalyptic struggle. See it as a kind of non-codified "Patriot Act".

The 3rd OHL could not dictate - outside of the military. Hindenburg and Ludendorff convinced not just the Reichstag and the Kanzler, but also the Kaiser to (generally) follow their suggestions - until they failed in battle.

Some political changes of the time go into a different direction:

- in April 1917, Wilhelm II promised to introduce the (equal, secret, male) suffrage of the Reichstagswahlen in the state of Prussia as well (whose 3-class-census rigged the elections to a degree that e.g. the SPD was almost chance-less, voter turnout which was around 85% in
Reichs-Elections around 30% in Prussian elections due to this). Considering that Prussia was Germany's largest state (about 60% of the population), this would have meant a major
political change.

- Reichskanzler Hertling (1917/18), himself a member of the Reichstag (Zentrum), was the first Reichskanzler to rise to this position after Parliamentary consultations which included the Liberal Parties and the SPD.
He appointed two further members of the Reichstags to Staatssekretären"(the German equivalent to ministers), settig another precedent.

All this occurred BEFORE defeat became apparent/inevitable.

The actual "Verfassung" remained unchanged until September 1918 and didn't even get suspended (unlike 1933).

The only Constitutional Changes were prepared by the OHL (confronted with defeat) and got accepted by the Reichstag on October 28th, 1918. It changed the following:

- the Reichskanzler needs the trust of (a majority in) the Reichstag and he is responsible
to the Reichstag and the Reichsrat (the federal chamber)
- Declarations of War and Peace need the confirmation of the Reichstag
- Members of the Reichstag can become ministers without losing their seats
- Promotions of Generals/Officers by the Kaiser have to be confirmed by the Reichskanzler
- the Minister of War is responsible to the Reichstag

This is a rough outline into which direction things COULD have gone. Of course, it could have gone worse,too - but I don't buy the assumption that "victory will turn the German electorate to the right".

Military victory is of very short-term political value.

Ask George Bush I, Winston Churchill or Charles de Gaulle.

BUT...

A victory as outlined today by Eurofed would leave the German constitution unchanged. With Italy on the CP side, I see the war going a lot easier for the CP and I assume things would go downhill for the Entente from summer 1916 on.

No 3rd OHL as Falkenhayn might "win" Verdun. Also no direct constitutional reforms, maybe in the longer run.

 

[Hörnla]

Damn! I meant Tunis, got them mixed up in my head

I already has this suspicion.

Otherwise I find your suggestions quite convincing.

 

[Eurofed]

Suggested deal:

Britain keeps German East Africa and German South West Africa

Britain (well Australia) and Japan keep all German territory they seized in the Pacific and Far East

The Ottomans get their 1914 borders in the Middle East and a free hand in western persia. In the Caucusus (sp?) they get their B-L borders

Italy gets Morroco, French Somaliland and a free hand to give Ethiopia another go

Germany gets the Belgian Congo, French Congo (what's now Congo-brazzaville), Morocco, and all French North Africa except Algeria which France retains

Angola goes to Germany, Mozambique to Britain. Goa is ceded to Britain

Oh, and to compensate Germany for the loss of their pacific possessions they get French Indochina and the French spheres of influence in China are ceded to Germany

Mostly good with some necessary corrections. Germany would not want to get the useless Sahel and you are giving Morocco to two different powers. Moreover, Britain is getting too much stuff and Italy too little.

My revision:

Britain: Namibia, Tanganyka, Madagascar, Goa, Macao.

Japan/Australia: German Pacific possessions, New Caledonia.

Germany: recovers Camerun plus Morocco, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Belgian Congo, Middle Congo, Gabon, Angola, Indochina.

Italy: recovers Libya plus Tunisia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Mozambico, Ethiopia, Siam. Perhaps it gets Chad (if it wants it).

Turkey: recovers 1914 borders plus Transcaucasia, Khuzestan, Persian Azerbajian.

America gets French Caribbean and French Guyana because the USA don't want them to be swapped to other European powers (Monroe Doctrine).

France: keeps Algeria, Sahel.

French possessions in China are split between Germany and Italy.

Britain makes a pledge not to interfere with the territorial or political settlement of continental Europe, the CPs guarantee the integrity of the British Empire.

 

[kellineil]

Mostly good with some necessary corrections. Germany would not want to get the useless Sahel and you are giving Morocco to two different powers. Moreover, Britain is getting too much stuff and Italy too little.

My revision:

Britain: Namibia, Tanganyka, Madagascar, Goa, Macao.

Japan/Australia: German Pacific possessions, New Caledonia.

Germany: recovers Camerun plus Morocco, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Belgian Congo, Middle Congo, Gabon, Angola, Indochina.

Italy: recovers Libya plus Tunisia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Mozambico, Ethiopia, Siam. Perhaps it gets Chad (if it wants it).

Turkey: recovers 1914 borders plus Transcaucasia, Khuzestan, Persian Azerbajian.

America gets French Caribbean and French Guyana because the USA don't want them to be swapped to other European powers (Monroe Doctrine).

France: keeps Algeria, Sahel.

French possessions in China are split between Germany and Italy.

Britain makes a pledge not to interfere with the territorial or political settlement of continental Europe, the CPs guarantee the integrity of the British Empire.

Looks good, when I said Italy gets Morocco I meant Tunis, am going back to edit

This settlement in fact gives something to everyone who matters in the immediate future. Granted France and Portugal aren't going to be happy about Britain benefiting from their defeat but what can they do? Of course this builds up grudges for the future and effectively aligns Britain with the new CP hegemony. Same goes for the USA

The CP giving a blanket guarantee in to the integrity of the British Empire could precipetate a future war - for instance if Japan tries to take over some of Britains far eastern possessions

 

[kellineil]

Italy: recovers Libya plus Tunisia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Mozambico, Ethiopia, Siam. Perhaps it gets Chad (if it wants it).

One query though: I find it unlikely that Italy would get British Somaliland in the peace settlement unless they had managed to seize it during the war, and if they did they would likely have to give something up in return

 

[Eurofed]

"Exactly what is that going to do to the German military mindset?"

On the one hand, the strong role of the military and its image in Germany will be confirmed. Germans might come close to seeing themselves as invincible. On the other hand - German leadership might become less paranoid. (Nightmare of coalitions - huh! Encirclement - aargh!)

True. Image of invincibility might bit them in the butt when France and Russia begin to rearm. OTOH, victory (and their Austro-Italian-Turkish colation holding together) shall make them less paranoid. Russia has been pushed back at 1922 borders atr the very least, France bitchslapped, Britain told to mind its business outside the continent, they are free to build their proto-EU. The future looks bright, if hard-won.

France would have been beaten 3 times by then, if you count 1813/15.

In the longer run, it might not be much different to OTL. Once victory got stale, the huge impression of the ordeal of 14-18 had a huge effect on French attitudes. If the Germans are smart enough NOT TO annex further French border regions (Nancy, Belfort, Briey), Alsace-Lorraine might get written off. This is IMHO not less plausible than a Fascist France.

Don't hold your breath about Germany not getting Lorraine. For one thing, the war proved again how much precious econmically and logistically it was. Second, France stands to lose other mainland stuff anyway, because Italy stands in the line just after Germany with their shopping list for Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Riviera, the Alps watershed. It would have been guaranteed by Germany to bring Italy onboard, so it shall be non-negotiable. The French shall have more reasons to get revanchist anger, and I cannot see proud Germany getting less French mainland stuff than noveau riche Italy.

Mainland France is going to be shrunk again. Nonetheless, since as you point out, it would have been the third time in a century that France gets punished for its nationalist pride, it is perfectly plausible that in some variants of this TL, the lesson sticks as it did for OTL Germany and Italy after 1945. This scenario just assumes that this time, it doesn't.

Not more "irrelevant" than before 1914, or in 1914/15. The mindset to leave the management of war to those who could apparently handle it best is understandable in this apocalyptic struggle. See it as a kind of non-codified "Patriot Act".

The 3rd OHL could not dictate - outside of the military. Hindenburg and Ludendorff convinced not just the Reichstag and the Kanzler, but also the Kaiser to (generally) follow their suggestions - until they failed in battle.

Some political changes of the time go into a different direction:

- in April 1917, Wilhelm II promised to introduce the (equal, secret, male) suffrage of the Reichstagswahlen in the state of Prussia as well (whose 3-class-census rigged the elections to a degree that e.g. the SPD was almost chance-less, voter turnout which was around 85% in
Reichs-Elections around 30% in Prussian elections due to this). Considering that Prussia was Germany's largest state (about 60% of the population), this would have meant a major
political change.

- Reichskanzler Hertling (1917/18), himself a member of the Reichstag (Zentrum), was the first Reichskanzler to rise to this position after Parliamentary consultations which included the Liberal Parties and the SPD.
He appointed two further members of the Reichstags to Staatssekretären"(the German equivalent to ministers), settig another precedent.

All this occurred BEFORE defeat became apparent/inevitable.

The actual "Verfassung" remained unchanged until September 1918 and didn't even get suspended (unlike 1933).

The only Constitutional Changes were prepared by the OHL (confronted with defeat) and got accepted by the Reichstag on October 28th, 1918. It changed the following:

- the Reichskanzler needs the trust of (a majority in) the Reichstag and he is responsible
to the Reichstag and the Reichsrat (the federal chamber)
- Declarations of War and Peace need the confirmation of the Reichstag
- Members of the Reichstag can become ministers without losing their seats
- Promotions of Generals/Officers by the Kaiser have to be confirmed by the Reichskanzler
- the Minister of War is responsible to the Reichstag

This is a rough outline into which direction things COULD have gone. Of course, it could have gone worse,too - but I don't buy the assumption that "victory will turn the German electorate to the right".

Military victory is of very short-term political value.

Ask George Bush I, Winston Churchill or Charles de Gaulle.

BUT...

A victory as outlined today by Eurofed would leave the German constitution unchanged. With Italy on the CP side, I see the war going a lot easier for the CP and I assume things would go downhill for the Entente from summer 1916 on.

No 3rd OHL as Falkenhayn might "win" Verdun. Also no direct constitutional reforms, maybe in the longer run.

All very true. However, given that the scenario that I outlined may well stretch the demsie of the Entente up to 1917, we may easily see the OTL 1917 reforms adoped, while the 1918 ones occurs as effect of the post-war sociopolitical readjustment.