Atomic Bombs used against purely military targets in 1945?

[Polish Eagle]

In May of 1943, the Manhattan Project apparently decided that the best first use of an atomic bomb would be against the Imperial Japanese Navy, at the Harbor of Truk.

By 1944, though, conventional attacks had rendered that harbor an irrelevant target.

But this raises the question--could an atomic bomb have been deployed against a purely military target in 1945, instead of against a strategic target like Hiroshima or Nagasaki or Kokura? There were Japanese troop concentrations still in the Philippines at Mindanao, and of course the Imperial Japanese Army in China was still a major threat. Mindanao would seem to be too remote to make an effective demonstration, but would there be any possibility of the Americans dropping Little Boy and Fat Man on Japanese army concentrations in China or Korea in 1945? Or Japanese invasion defenses in the Home Islands?

Or was the idea of the atomic bomb as a strategic bombing weapon too well-entrenched by this point for a reversion to the proposals of 1943?

 

[CalBear]

Define military target.

The headquarters and staging area for the defense of Kyushu (2nd General Army HQ, 59th Division, 22nd Division and the 224th Division (one of the very few "Mobile" e.g. motorized formations in the IJA), a major communication hub and THE major munitions depot for the IJA in southern Japan would seem to be a pretty solid military target, even using today's, far more restrictive, definitions.

 

[mcdo]

Define military target.

The headquarters and staging area for the defense of Kyushu (2nd General Army HQ, 59th Division, 22nd Division and the 224th Division (one of the very few "Mobile" e.g. motorized formations in the IJA), a major communication hub and THE major munitions depot for the IJA in southern Japan would seem to be a pretty solid military target, even using today's, far more restrictive, definitions.

Well, from the OP's example of Truk, it seems clear that he means a military target out by itself, with virtually no civilians nearby, not an army base/communications hub/munitions depot that is also in the center of a major population center.

Might be hard to find in 1945, but I am fairly certain that is what he is asking for.

 

[CalBear]

Well, from the OP's example of Truk, it seems clear that he means a military target out by itself, with virtually no civilians nearby, not an army base/communications hub/munitions depot that is also in the center of a major population center.

Might be hard to find in 1945, but I am fairly certain that is what he is asking for.

I'm not sure Truk was reasonable nuclear target in 1943, much less 1945. You want to talk about collateral damage, there were better than 20,000 Chuuk civilian residents on the island.

It is actually fairly difficult to find ANY purely military target (meaning nothing but troops) that existed at the time (or any other time since) where you wouldn't get massive non IJA/IJN casualties, either civilian (of occupied countries) or "Blue on Blue" where a nuclear weapon would be a reasonable munition, at least before the introduction of PGM and sub-kT weapons.

Where ever the weapon was used massive numbers of non combatants were going to be caught in the blast. Is it better that those civilians are Micronesian or Indonesian, or Filipino, or Chinese than if they are Japanese?

 

[Polish Eagle]

Well, from the OP's example of Truk, it seems clear that he means a military target out by itself, with virtually no civilians nearby, not an army base/communications hub/munitions depot that is also in the center of a major population center.

Might be hard to find in 1945, but I am fairly certain that is what he is asking for.

That is indeed the case. I suspect that, by 1945, there weren't any such targets remaining (the aforementioned Truk was already reduced to impotence), but I'm curious as to whether a demonstration on a purely military target would have the same effect on Japanese command as did the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There were a few fortified islands where the civilians had been removed. Iwo Jima is a obvious example. If one of those very near Japan could be identified in August 1945 it could qualify.

 

[Kou Gakei]

There was virtually no "purely military" target left unless one wanted to bomb isolated Pacific Islands, and even then there was a high probability that at least some natives were still there.

 

[Locke01]

Well, from the OP's example of Truk, it seems clear that he means a military target out by itself, with virtually no civilians nearby, not an army base/communications hub/munitions depot that is also in the center of a major population center.

Might be hard to find in 1945, but I am fairly certain that is what he is asking for.

If the bomb had been available a few months earlier, a possible, purely ''military'' target might have been the YAMATO off Okinawa. I will leave the practicality of that for others to speculate on.

 

[Locke01]

There were a few fortified islands where the civilians had been removed. Iwo Jima is a obvious example. If one of those very near Japan could be identified in August 1945 it could qualify.

A nuclear bombing of Iwo Jima might render the island unusable as an airbase.

 

[mcdo]

I'm not sure Truk was reasonable nuclear target in 1943, much less 1945. You want to talk about collateral damage, there were better than 20,000 Chuuk civilian residents on the island.

Where did the islanders live? I admit I have no idea, but my assumption would be that they lived in settlements all over the island. If that is the case, then a nuclear detonation over the anchorage itself would kill far fewer civilians than did the explosion over downtown Hiroshima. There simply would not be anywhere near the density of civilian housing directly underneath the blast. The target would be a naval base, not an army HQ in the middle of a city, and that makes a difference.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

If the bomb had been available a few months earlier, a possible, purely ''military'' target might have been the YAMATO off Okinawa. I will leave the practicality of that for others to speculate on.

Impossible, A-Bomb attacks needed to be planned and readied in advance, assuming of course you could hit a maneuvering ship close enough from a high altitude heavy bomber, by that point the fast carrier task force would have taken care of it

As for using the bomb on Truk, given what nukemap shows there's a good chance some of the ships in the anchorage could survive a nuclear strike, unless the place is really full to bursting with ships I don't think hitting it would be worth it

 

[cubefreak123]

That is indeed the case. I suspect that, by 1945, there weren't any such targets remaining (the aforementioned Truk was already reduced to impotence), but I'm curious as to whether a demonstration on a purely military target would have the same effect on Japanese command as did the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

It wouldn't, the militarists in the government wanted to keep fighting and only viewed the nukes as one giant bomb that was equal to a large conventional bombing raid. Keep in mind that the Tokyo raid in March 1945 caused horrific devastation and death that dwarfed both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

If the bombs were dropped on a target like a Pacific island or a "purely military" target (which would have largely been bombed to hell by mid 1945) then the destructive capabilities of the bomb would seem far less impressive.

What the nukes did was help inspire the ones in the cabinet that wanted to end the war to take action. Keep in mind though, even with the destruction of two cities with nuclear weapons and Russia invading Manchuria, the militarists attempted a coup to capture the emperor the night before the surrender broadcast.

It's lamentable that civilians died in the atomic blasts. It's lamentable that far more died in the firebombing campaign. But it's easy for an person with an interest in history to sit in front of a computer and berate Truman's decision. It was a bad situation and he went with the one he thought was right; i.e. the one that would show off what the US could and was willing to do to end the war without invading and costing hundreds of thousands to millions of lives.

 

[CalBear]

That is indeed the case. I suspect that, by 1945, there weren't any such targets remaining (the aforementioned Truk was already reduced to impotence), but I'm curious as to whether a demonstration on a purely military target would have the same effect on Japanese command as did the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

The U.S. hit TWO Japanese cities with Nuclear weapons AND the Soviet Union declared war on them and launched a massive attack on the strongest military ground formation the IJA possessed, punching through the Kwantung Army like a piece of rice paper, all in a three day period. With all of that, they barely were able to get a surrender completed (even then elements of the IJA almost managed to squelch it).

No. Blowing the pougies out of some distant atoll wouldn't have the desired effect.

 

[mcdo]

The U.S. hit TWO Japanese cities with Nuclear weapons AND the Soviet Union declared war on them and launched a massive attack on the strongest military ground formation the IJA possessed, punching through the Kwantung Army like a piece of rice paper, all in a three day period. With all of that, they barely were able to get a surrender completed (even then elements of the IJA almost managed to squelch it).

No. Blowing the pougies out of some distant atoll wouldn't have the desired effect.

It depends on the target, I think. Personally I think if the US somehow managed to destroy a large Japanese army group from the air (admittedly quite a tall order), that might have MORE of an effect on the Militarist hardliners. They were fanatics, but they were fighting for a specific end goal--they still had hope, even if they could not repel the coming US invasion, they could at least bloody the US enough that the US would accept some terms instead of unconditional surrender. Of course it is easy for us to say that this was never going to happen, but nevertheless, it is what they were fighting for, and the idea that had to be discredited to allow surrender. Destroying a large formation of troops, without those troops even having the chance to shoot at, let alone harm, US forces, would go a long way towards discrediting that last desperate hope and giving the peace faction the leverage they needed. Of course, if it was done on some remote garrison, you have the issue of conveying what happened back to the Militarist leadership, and also of course the difficultly of finding an army group out in the open and somehow managing to destroy them--stationary headquarters are easier to bomb. But if you could manage it, I think it would have a bigger impact--certainly the Militarists didn't really care how many civilians were killed. Showing the new weapon could destroy Japanese forces and tip a battle instantly in favor of the US, now that they would care about.

 

[cubefreak123]

It depends on the target, I think. Personally I think if the US somehow managed to destroy a large Japanese army group from the air (admittedly quite a tall order), that might have MORE of an effect on the Militarist hardliners. They were fanatics, but they were fighting for a specific end goal--they still had hope, even if they could not repel the coming US invasion, they could at least bloody the US enough that the US would accept some terms instead of unconditional surrender. Of course it is easy for us to say that this was never going to happen, but nevertheless, it is what they were fighting for, and the idea that had to be discredited to allow surrender. Destroying a large formation of troops, without those troops even having the chance to shoot at, let alone harm, US forces, would go a long way towards discrediting that last desperate hope and giving the peace faction the leverage they needed. Of course, if it was done on some remote garrison, you have the issue of conveying what happened back to the Militarist leadership, and also of course the difficultly of finding an army group out in the open and somehow managing to destroy them--stationary headquarters are easier to bomb. But if you could manage it, I think it would have a bigger impact--certainly the Militarists didn't really care how many civilians were killed. Showing the new weapon could destroy Japanese forces and tip a battle instantly in favor of the US, now that they would care about.

So where is this giant Japanese army supposed to be? The one in Manchuria is, as CalBear has already pointed out, already mauled by the Soviet onslaught. Japan wouldn't be keeping a large standing army out in the open either since the US would bomb the area extensively. The US can't just assume where an army group is either. They thought that the aerial and naval bombardments on Iwo Jima and Okinawa had effectively destroyed anything that could be destroyed and that it was safe to send out troops.

So again, where is this army?

 

[mcdo]

So where is this giant Japanese army supposed to be? The one in Manchuria is, as CalBear has already pointed out, already mauled by the Soviet onslaught. Japan wouldn't be keeping a large standing army out in the open either since the US would bomb the area extensively. The US can't just assume where an army group is either. They thought that the aerial and naval bombardments on Iwo Jima and Okinawa had effectively destroyed anything that could be destroyed and that it was safe to send out troops.

So again, where is this army?

I thought we were discussing an bomb available earlier... If the bomb is only available in August 1945, then it will be used when and where it was used.

 

[Devolved]

You need an earlier PoD to change Allied bombing strategy.

By 1944 the terror bombing of cities and inflicting maximum civilian casualties was Allied policy.

The fire bombing of Tokyo killed more people than the A Bomb on Hiroshima.

Why suddenly change the rules just because your bomb is bigger?

 

[NoOneFamous]

Truk is also too far away from Tokyo to have an impact

 

[Kou Gakei]

on the strongest military ground formation the IJA possessed

1. You're overestimating the completely novice troops that were rotated to the Kantogun.
2. The Kantogun was hit while in the midst of reorganizing according to new defensive plans which might have held out better against the Soviet onslaught (I'll PM you the defense plans from 1935, 1941, and 1945 later).


Really, the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation is basically Barbarossa in 1945 Manchuria, with the Soviets being the Germans and the Japanese being the Soviets.

 

[Curiousone]

There were commentator on a thread mentioning the use of the bomb against N-Germany on here, talking about how if it was to be used against them it'd be used first on an airfield nearby Berlin. Close enough to be seen & understood, without the emnity about the (white) civilian casualties.

So..

Oshima Island?

There's an island chain, the Izu islands leading out from Tokyo bay. I believe they were evacuated, they had to be fortified (see Operation Downfall, subsection Coronet. Tangential question, 'WI Operation Downfall eschews Kyushu via Olympic/Majestic for a base of operations with an assault on the Izu islands?') discussion & the Government didn't want the populace freaking out about the enemy being so close.

Other idea.

Mt Fuji?

The Mountain itself is symbolic of the country & it's heights likely aren't housed. Nuking a tiny chunk out of it might be a brutal morale crusher.

Problems.

Whether the U.S wanted to nuke cities to demonstrate to the Soviets how far they were prepared to go. (Que debate about decision & reasoning behind dropping the bomb).

That they were pretty interested in what actually happened to cities & people when you nuked them.

Of note.

As CalBear pointed out, it took what happened OTL to get the Japanese to surrender. +
As the threads around 'Decisive Darkness' point out the Soviets were stealing to get into Japan, got as far as loading the troops on the invasion ships, having subs covering the landing site OTL.

Without hitting Hiroshima & Nagasaki you might be condemning other Japanese on Hokkaido to an unenviable fate. Never mind the non-Japanese civilians who were dying in droves as the war went on.