ATL More Fitting Commands for OTL American Civil War Generals

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

In terms of quality, your typical ACW commander varied greatly, some being magnificent, some being god awful. However there were many whose talents were underutilized and ignored, being put instead in places where they failed.

For example:

1. PTG Beauregard was a god awful field commander. His command during the Battle of Shiloh was extremely poor after Johnston died. And during his command at the First Battle of Bull Run, he almost blew it had it not been for Stonewall Jackson's timely arrival.

At the same time though he had a exceptional engineering background and was amazing when commanding behind fortifications. Corinth, Charleston, and Petersburg are great examples of this.

Knowing this, had Beauregard been put in command of New Orleans early in the war, there's a very good chance that his skills, knowledge, and energy could have been used to stop the Union Campaign against the city in 1862, which would have huge implications.





So what are some ATL commands you would give otl generals of the Civil War to improve their careers and commands?

- Burnside remaining in North Carolina?
- Benjamin Butler in the War Department?
- Hardee as commander of the Army of Tennessee?

 

[Arnold d.c]

1. PTG Beauregard was a god awful field commander. His command during the Battle of Shiloh was extremely poor after Johnston died. And during his command at the First Battle of Bull Run, he almost blew it had it not been for Stonewall Jackson's timely arrival.

Eh, I'll like to say that while I don't disagree with the point that Beauregard was good with fortifications, this is a little harsh. He did pretty well at Bermuda Hundred and First Petersburg though he did seem overwhelmed and was constantly deceived by Sherman during the March through the Carolinas.

Burnside remaining in North Carolina?

Burnside was fairly ok when he wasn't facing the A-team at East Tennessee and North Carolina. He might have a better reputation, but he certainly can't achieve anything major, especially without major reinforcements.

- Harder as commander of the Army of Tennessee?

I assume you mean Hardee here. Hardee... I get conflicted when I think of Hardee as commander of the Army of Tennessee. He did a good job of restoring the army after the defeat at Chattanooga and had moments of genius, but he also demonstrated excessive candor and was sensitive to perceived slights. Moreover, his performance in the Atlanta Campaign was kinda lackluster and his negligence in reporting and reacting to Rosecrans' moves during the Tullahoma Campaign almost destroyed the Army of Tennessee. There's no way to say for certain how Hardee would've performed in army command.

But to offer my own views:
- Gouverneur K. Warren would've been better remembered if he had stayed as Meade's Chief Engineer than as a corps commander. While I do think that Warren's relief at Five Forks was unfair, I think that Warren deserved to be relieved much earlier. While he was intelligent and deserves major props for solidifying the Union approach to the Siege of Petersburg during Globe Tavern, sending treatise on what your superiors ought to do is not a sign of a good soldier. When he couldn't understand the why of an order, he questioned it, dragged his feet and even complained about the order. He also, to his discredit, lied about his corps' casualties at the Wilderness just to cast his corps and himself in a better light.
-Conversely, Andrew A. Humphreys was wasted as Meade's Chief of Staff. While Meade did need to replace Butterfield after the latter's wounding at Gettysburg (and for his ties with Hooker), Humphreys was an excellent combat leader who should've received corps command earlier than 1865.
- Hood and A.P. Hill are textbook examples of Peter's Principle - unable to go beyond division command. While some point at A.P. Hill's performance at Petersburg, I counter by noting that most of the tactical victories were won by his subordinates rather than himself, with the exception of Second Ream Station.
-van Dorn was a disasater of an army commander, but he was a decent cavalry commander... until he gets himself killed bedding with another man's wife.

 

[perfectgeneral]

I'd imagine that identifying diamonds in the rough is as hard now as it was then. Perhaps even harder.

 

[Legofan4]

I'd imagine that identifying diamonds in the rough is as hard now as it was then. Perhaps even harder.

This entirely. Many of the commanders in the war hadn't held command before. Of those who had held a command none were as large as the commands during the war. So no one has any real life experience at that level of command and control. So until you try different commanders out how do you know who is good or not?

 

[TheRockofChickamauga]

A few that come to mind:

• Alexander McCook probably should have been relieved after Stones River, if not earlier. His entire tenure as a corps commander was marked by failure. At Perryville, his command collapsed and nearly cost the Union the battle. Assuming that he don't want to sack your subordinates after their first failure, he definitely should have been relieved after Stones River, where his corps once more was broken by the Confederates and nearly caused disastrous defeat. His command probably would be given to either Lovell H. Rousseau or Gordon Granger, either of whom would have been a marked improvement.
• Burnside probably should not have been returned to command of the IX Corps in the lead up to the Overland Campaign, and should have instead been left in a departmental command. With the capable replacement of John G. Parke on hand and experienced in the post, there was no need to return Burnside to the position. Not only did his service in the posting range from mediocre to outright tragic with the final swan song at the Crater (which you can argue his degree of responsibility for), but it also created unnecessary command tension between himself and Meade over seniority.
• John Bell Hood should have been retired after Chickamauga. While the rumors of him being a drug-addled wreck are like exaggerations or outright myths, there was no reason to give an effectively crippled officer such an important post. With Bragg being transferred out from the Army of Tennessee, the primary reason not to give the job to D.H. Hill or William H.T. Walker is removed. Hill, in fact, was quite loyal and supportive to Johnston, which likely would have been a significant improvement for command cordiality over Hood, who always had at least one eye on the top job. While it is doubtful that any singular command change could have changed the outcome of the campaign, having Hill instead of Hood at the head of the Army of Tennessee's Second Corps would be much better.
• The story of Charles C. Gilbert has always astonished me. Major General "Bull" Nelson gets murdered, so you shift his crucial corps command to a captain? With as capable a subordinate as George H. Thomas languishing in the effectively meaningless "second in command" position, or failing that Lovell H. Rousseau and Thomas J. Wood as proven division commanders, why would you give the command of the III Corps to Gilbert. The decision did not prove to be a total disaster (although an experienced hand likely would have paid dividends at Perryville), but it boggles the mind that Buell was so concerned with having loyal subordinates that he placed a captain in command of a corps.

 

[Valentinian]

Sigel should have been moved as commander of a district in Missouri due to the German element in the state. Giving him the Valley in 64 was a disaster. Hunter was not much of an improvement and got the command due to being a republican. He would have been better tearing up part of the south with no opposition.

Their replacement is, to me, obvious: the criminally underused Alpheus Williams. He was solid in over a dozen engagements, acted as Corps commander multiple times, but couldn't get the permanent command due to not being a West Pointer. He had experience in the Valley and showed he was both a good tactician and a good leader.

 

[Elfwine]

We do see other nonWest Pointers get corps commands, although Williams doesn't seem to have had much in the way of powerful connections so far as why not him too.

Here's one: If the Confederacy had had two sufficiently competent generals to assign one to the Army of Tennessee, Bragg being chief of staff (possibly chief of artillery, although we don't really see anything too impressive in his time as army commander) for one might not have been a bad use of his abilities.

Focus on his strengths, and have someone else to manage people as opposed to mostly things.

 

[SWS]

The West Point bias was unfortunate and strange from an Anglo-American perspective, which should have taught the relative value of the citizen-soldier.

 

[Elfwine]

Not sure it's particularly strange or unfortunate. I would not want someone like Joshua Chamberlain made a brigadier general in 1862 and men like John Gibbon serving as regimental commanders before rising after the untrained citizen-soldiers have reached high command.

Of if you want a Confederate example, having Joseph Kershaw making division command before Dorsey Pender.

I'm trying to look for examples of men who should have been in command at all here, as comparing the best citizen-soldiers to the worst professionals still leaves us with that the first category are still total unknowns as far as how quickly they will learn (without hindsight), and learning on the job can be a rather bloody and inefficient business.

Speaking of people who should have been given other commands: What would you (gentle reader) do with Pemberton?

 

[marktaha]

McClellan being confined to.training the Army.

 

[Arnold d.c]

What would you (gentle reader) do with Pemberton?

I think that Pemberton would be better suited to a command in a quiet sector like North Carolina. While I think that his ineptitude at combat roles is exaggerated, Pemberton had very little combat experience to deserve a field command as important as Vicksburg. He reacted well to Grant's moves during Grant's first and second approach to the city and I'll take the contrary opinion to say that he even reacts to Grant's landing well up until the Battle of Jackson. However, his combat inexperience really shows in the build up and actual battle of Champion Hill. He crumbled to pressure from subordinates to advance to cut Grant's (non-existent) supply line, despite his initial instincts to stay at Edward's Station being the right call. He then botches the march badly due to inexperience in planning a march. He suffered target fixation to the threat of McClernand's Corps to the point that he ignored one of his division commander's cries for help (Carter L. Stevenson) as Grant crushed the left flank until fleeing men showed up at his HQ. Had Grant and McClernand established a better means of communication, it is not unlikely that Pemberton's army would have collapsed and been forced to surrender along Bakers' Creek.

In summary, it'd be best that Pemberton be reassigned to a largely quiet and administrative post, with little chance to see combat. North Carolina was one such post.