Wozza said:
I think the question answer itself - who wants those borders? Long and indefensible for both sides.
But the point is that both have long and indefensible borders (MAD doctrine) and that both believe they are the best in offensive warfare.
At that time Stalin had initiated a huge rearmament programme setting the Red Army for 500 Divisions in 1942 and probably expected Germany to be in for a long war vs, France and UK. If/when it comes to the opportunity for a strike westwards it is paramount to have a starting point as westward as possible if lasting strategic results are to be achieved.
Hitler never lacked selfconfidence, and had made his intentions clear about a "Lebensraum" in the east. In such situations it ought to be a natural job for a staff to study how how to implement the political intentions, and here even a simple study would have shown that it was impossible to keep an army supplied if it started from Poland and had to be in Moscow before winter. The Germans did such calculations in spring of 1941 but had to ignore them as the decision was taken anyway.
In this context the real PoD perhaps is the German General Staff already in 1939 recognising that a plan like the OTL Barbarossa is impossible and Hitler of course being convinced too. But with M-R pact still to come a German possession of at least Lithuania and Latvia will half the distance need before reaching the Soviet heartland around Moscow. The first step of the plan would be to strike from Daugavpils in Latvia along both banks of Dvina to Smolensk. That is appr. 300 km and possible to supply from the railhead at the starting point (rule of thumb on East Front was max. practical operational distance from main railhead/supplypoint = 300 km). (Rail)Roads are relatively good and the Dvina is navigationable. At Smolensk the second supplypoint is established (not at least using the Dvina much of the way from Latvia) and is just inside 300km of Moscow. Judging on the speed of operations in OTL east front it ought to be possible to be in Moscow in a couple of months leaving plenty of time to consolidate and push further into the heartland behing Moscow before the Rasputitsa mud of October.
Further this operation makes it possible to focus the Panzers and mobile forces in one main trust instead of spreading them on three armygroups like in OTL. If/when Moscow is reached it will effectively split the Soviet forces like the "sickle cut" of the 1940 camapiagn did to the French.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard