At what point did Roman dominance over much of the Mediterranian basin become inevitable?
- Thread starter SunKing105
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i agree that Rome become de jure ruler of the Mediterranean after winning the second Punic war.
although i think it was de facto already after the first.
The second Punic war was literally Hannibal vs Rome playing on sub woofers a mix between the soviet hymn and Erika since it was quality and quantity vs tactic mind.
although i think it was de facto already after the first.
The second Punic war was literally Hannibal vs Rome playing on sub woofers a mix between the soviet hymn and Erika since it was quality and quantity vs tactic mind.
But why, if all those Roman victories were more the product of chance than military superiority, is it that Rome won almost all major engagements against the Hellenistic phalanx, and not only once, but again and again?
Couldn't it be that the tactics used by the Hellenistic armies just weren't up to the task of decisively bearing the Roman legions?
Then, of course, the question becomes why the Hellenistic kingdoms didn't adapt do their new foe.
I mean in the section you quoted the argument made is that when you don't look at it in a contextless statistical manner you see that the phalanx was in fact not completely antiquated or inherently inferior.
That is a really odd and pervasive notion that people have - that in pre-modern warfare, the leader of an army will have an advantage if he hangs back. It is also an assumption that rests upon our own modern biases, of command staff who are distant from the front and observe and issue commands through state of the art communication technology.
But that is not the case in pre-modern war. We see the opposite across a huge span of time, over a vast range of cultures. Philip and Alexander were not impeded whatsoever from leading their troops and fighting, and Alexander especially was renowned for both his personal courage and incredible talent as a commander. And the Romans were not exempt from that rule - their history and folklore is replete with examples of Roman leaders commanding from the front, participating directly in battle and leading their troops in person. It was less so with consuls, but that was partially because the tribunes were the ones most expected to win glory in person. Yet despite that, we still have many examples of Roman consuls being very willing to fight in person, or perishing in battles that went ill.
That is why I attribute the victories of the Romans to the superior lower level leadership they displayed, as well as their resilience. This is also attributable to the fact that the Roman legions at the time of the wars against the Diadochoi were at a peak of excellence they would not reach again for a very long time, forged in the crucible of the Second Punic War. It was those armies that won Rome mastery over the Mediterranean, led by battle-hardened generals, veteran troops and their sons and grandsons.
Roman luck, superior Roman leadership, bad Hellenic luck and leaders, high Roman resilience and institutional experience accumulated in the Second Punic War.
Wars are not decided by which side has the 'superior' infantry formation, the 'best' weapons and so on.
Very true, almost all of the eastern foes were willing to compromise or had no interest in long term conquest.The Arsacids were the most substantial eastern foe and their entire ideology did not permit these sorts of widespread conquests and geopolitical reality ended ambitions. The precipitous rise of the Yuezhi to their east and the dangers from the steppe, ensured that the dream of Mithridates I (Arsaces V) was nullified and the Arsacid woudl be unable to put an end to Pontus, the Seleucids or challenge the Ptolemaic kingdom in Egypt. Later, the Arsacids would switch their role to simply attempting to gather loot and tribute from Rome and attain gains in Armenia, not contest Rome for the Sea or for Anatolia. This limited any strategic threat they could pose.
The Germanic, Celtic and Lusitanian folk on the otherhand, are near to Rome and have expressed the examples of inflicting defeats upon the Republic and the later Principate. Doctor Michael Speidel makes a case, that I find poignant, that Republican Rome had only with utmost effort and exchange of resources, was able to subdue the Celtic threats to the north and west, which challenged Republican expansion and if Republican expansion was curbed and stopped, the Celts to their north, would push into Rome in migrations with the intent of grasping control over routes of trade and influence, as they did to the Etruscan League. However, more importantly, the Roman Republic and the Principate, may have found its most difficult foe in the north, both from the Germanic folk, the Dacians and the Sarmati-Scythian folk of the Northern sections of Europe beyond the Rhine and Danube. These peoples, matched Rome in the field and dealt the Principate grievous wounds from which the old Roman morality and ethic did not recover and Rome transitioned further away from its Republican routes and would remain a stagnant entity, no longer resembling its Republican conquering predecessors. By the reign of Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus Aurellius, the empire was already contracting its military towards these peoples from the north.
Considering this, buttresses your point, that should Rome be given a crushing defeat in the III BCE, it must come from the north, assuming you want a defeat that asserts the collapse of the eventual Roman order and breaks the willpower of the Republican elite. The Western Hunnic host displays a good way to destroy Rome as do the Iazyges and their Germanic and Dacian allies. If such a surge could be occur earlier, Rome can be crushed, even in its ascending phase.
It wasn't completely antiquated, no, but it certainly showed signs of inferiority against the Roman legions (which itself had evolved out of a phalanx-like style of warfare).
Didn't claim that it was inferior in every respect, nor that it was the only factor, but I think we shouldn't underestimate the advantages of Roman tactics either.
The outcome isn't inevitable, but the Roman legions were decidedly favored in the legion v phalanx matchup.
One thing that stands out to me reading about battles of the Successors is that they almost never employ substantial forces in reserve; they sought to achieve the decision with the first blow, and so made it as strong as possible. By contrast, Roman legions were mostly reserves, having 1600 infantry in the first line and 2600 in the second and third. Deploying in 4-6 ranks with wider file intervals as well as wide intervals between maniples allowed fewer men to cover the front of the army than phalanxes 16 or 32 men deep, freeing up more of the army for the reserves. In combat, the victors of an engagement are usually reduced to as much disorder as the vanquished, and for a time, the least counterattack puts them to flight. In this situation, the Roman practice of keeping most of the army in reserve was a great advantage, as they had fresh, organized bodies available for an advantageous counterattack.
Something intriguing also comes up when looking at the casualties of Roman battles. When the Romans win against phalanxes, their own losses are often trivial. However, when the phalanxes do win, they often suffer non-trivial casualties. The Carthaginians usually took non-trivial losses in their victories over the Romans in the Second Punic War. However, interestingly, the same goes for the Romans; looking at the casualty figures for their victories over Carthage, they often take serious losses, ranging from say 2,000-8,000 KIA, pretty substantial for armies of 20,000-40,000, especially compared to other ancient battles. At least at Zama, the Carthaginians deployed in three lines, allowing them to hit the Romans with a succession of blows, prolonging the battle and raising the cost to the victor.
In naval warfare, the Romans were also favored IMO, as they tended to employ a decisive fleet battle strategy, whereas the Successors often designed their fleets around naval siege warfare, specializing in frontal ramming for cramped harbor fighting and carrying engines for reducing city fortifications. By contrast, the Carthaginians also employed a fleet battle strategy, allowing them to face the Romans on mostly even terms.
More important, though, was the political structure of the Roman state. In the Successor kingdoms, the prestige of the head of state was directly tied to his success in war. A serious defeat could undermine his legitimacy, and it only took a few such losses before his position was so weakened as to practically force a peace. Rome and Carthage were both republics, though, and developed mechanisms for shifting blame for setbacks away from the state. In Rome, it was blamed on improper ritual observance, ill disciplined soldiers, or otherwise diffused so widely as to amount to nothing; in Carthage, the crucified the general, nailing (tee hee) the shame of the defeat to a single aristocrat and carrying on with a new one.
This is why the Punic Wars lasted for decades; neither side allowed defeats to dampen their ardor, and with ample resources, fighting it out to the finish took years. The Carthaginians demonstrated a similar capacity for mobilizing manpower; depending on what numbers you go with, they outnumbered the Romans in the first few years of the war. Their weakness was that their manpower came from the periphery of the empire, so lost ground was harder to gain back, but this didn't need to prove fatal.
TL;DR if anyone was going to stop the Romans, it was going to be Carthage. They could match the Roman strengths in land warfare, naval warfare, and the political aspects of war, crucial areas where the Successor kingdoms struggled to compete.
One thing that stands out to me reading about battles of the Successors is that they almost never employ substantial forces in reserve; they sought to achieve the decision with the first blow, and so made it as strong as possible. By contrast, Roman legions were mostly reserves, having 1600 infantry in the first line and 2600 in the second and third. Deploying in 4-6 ranks with wider file intervals as well as wide intervals between maniples allowed fewer men to cover the front of the army than phalanxes 16 or 32 men deep, freeing up more of the army for the reserves. In combat, the victors of an engagement are usually reduced to as much disorder as the vanquished, and for a time, the least counterattack puts them to flight. In this situation, the Roman practice of keeping most of the army in reserve was a great advantage, as they had fresh, organized bodies available for an advantageous counterattack.
Something intriguing also comes up when looking at the casualties of Roman battles. When the Romans win against phalanxes, their own losses are often trivial. However, when the phalanxes do win, they often suffer non-trivial casualties. The Carthaginians usually took non-trivial losses in their victories over the Romans in the Second Punic War. However, interestingly, the same goes for the Romans; looking at the casualty figures for their victories over Carthage, they often take serious losses, ranging from say 2,000-8,000 KIA, pretty substantial for armies of 20,000-40,000, especially compared to other ancient battles. At least at Zama, the Carthaginians deployed in three lines, allowing them to hit the Romans with a succession of blows, prolonging the battle and raising the cost to the victor.
In naval warfare, the Romans were also favored IMO, as they tended to employ a decisive fleet battle strategy, whereas the Successors often designed their fleets around naval siege warfare, specializing in frontal ramming for cramped harbor fighting and carrying engines for reducing city fortifications. By contrast, the Carthaginians also employed a fleet battle strategy, allowing them to face the Romans on mostly even terms.
More important, though, was the political structure of the Roman state. In the Successor kingdoms, the prestige of the head of state was directly tied to his success in war. A serious defeat could undermine his legitimacy, and it only took a few such losses before his position was so weakened as to practically force a peace. Rome and Carthage were both republics, though, and developed mechanisms for shifting blame for setbacks away from the state. In Rome, it was blamed on improper ritual observance, ill disciplined soldiers, or otherwise diffused so widely as to amount to nothing; in Carthage, the crucified the general, nailing (tee hee) the shame of the defeat to a single aristocrat and carrying on with a new one.
This is why the Punic Wars lasted for decades; neither side allowed defeats to dampen their ardor, and with ample resources, fighting it out to the finish took years. The Carthaginians demonstrated a similar capacity for mobilizing manpower; depending on what numbers you go with, they outnumbered the Romans in the first few years of the war. Their weakness was that their manpower came from the periphery of the empire, so lost ground was harder to gain back, but this didn't need to prove fatal.
TL;DR if anyone was going to stop the Romans, it was going to be Carthage. They could match the Roman strengths in land warfare, naval warfare, and the political aspects of war, crucial areas where the Successor kingdoms struggled to compete.
Problem with the Greek states beating Rome is that unless they conquer Rome, Rome will be back for a round two. And three. And so on. The only way to truly defeat Roman expansion is to destroy Rome.
Outside of potential barbarian invasions from the North, the last person who could destroy Rome was Hannibal, and he was relying not just on Carthaginian power, but Greek, Latin, Gaul, and Spanish allies and he still couldn't get it done.
The Diadochi states had they unified might be enough of a force to stop Rome, but a unified Greek world post Alexander is simply impossible (to much political intrigue).
Only way to defeat Roman dominance is to destroy Rome and outside of some atl massive German/Celtic migration south, I don't think this is possible.
Outside of potential barbarian invasions from the North, the last person who could destroy Rome was Hannibal, and he was relying not just on Carthaginian power, but Greek, Latin, Gaul, and Spanish allies and he still couldn't get it done.
The Diadochi states had they unified might be enough of a force to stop Rome, but a unified Greek world post Alexander is simply impossible (to much political intrigue).
Only way to defeat Roman dominance is to destroy Rome and outside of some atl massive German/Celtic migration south, I don't think this is possible.
People also tend to say this, but it most likely did not. We do not know much about the Roman army of the Regal period, but the key point is that our surviving primary sources claiming that the Romans used to fight in a phalanx are heavily influenced by Greek culture and education, and writing several centuries after the Regal period. Livy in particular claims that the Romans used to fight in a manner like the Macedonian phalanx, before they ditched that formation in the wars against the Samnites, which is utterly absurd for a large number of reasons (That said, it may perhaps be a garbled recollection of the Roman principes being equipped with long cavalry lances during the war against Pyrrhus).
The surviving archaeological evidence points to equipment that was in some regards similar to the hoplite panoply, but academia is very leery of the idea that the Romans used a phalanx in their early years. Instead, the dominant view taken is that the Roman army morphed out of a sort of gentillicial kind of warfare, centered around noble clans and war parties raiding rival neighboring states. This would explain the Roman tendency towards lower level initiative, their prizing of bravery in single combat as well as their use of the pilum as the primary weapon of war.
That view of a Roman phalanx is also contested from an angle that the phalanxes of the Greek city states themselves evolved throughout their history as recent academic research tends to emphasize (look at the work of Van Wees for one prominent example) as well as the context from which they emerged, which was different from the conditions of Rome. In the archaic era, the 'phalanx' does have missile elements, which are ditched later on, to instead focus on the 'pure' phalanx of the Classical era, geared around fighting against similar formations in a mass struggle. But its development did not stop there, as the phalanx continued changing through the Peloponnesian War and subsequent conflicts. However, that kind of warfare is not something you can adopt and the ditch in an afternoon. I find it difficult to believe that the Romans developed a similar culture and system to that used by the Greek city states in almost a vacuum, then dropped it practically overnight because the Samnites were giving them a hard time.
So, to sum it up - the circumstances that led to the Roman way of war are different from the ones that gave rise to the phalanx of the Greek city states (much less the Macedonian phalanx of Philip and Alexander), archaeological evidence and scholarly consensus points to a different kind of warfare, and we also have good reason to believe that the primary sources claiming the Romans of the Regal era fought in a phalanx.
Roman tactics in what regard? What particularly sets Roman tactics apart, making them uniquely suited here, aside from what I have outlined (That is, resilience due to the depth of the triplex acies, as well as room for initiative on the level of lower officers)? Can you explain to me?
Well that falls more on the OP, clearly the question should've been highly probable and most of the people here assumed that it was. I'd personally argue for Post 2nd Punic War adding that not only was the leadership more in the "all in" mentality but that with the deaths of so many old Patrician families and scions the aristocracy became more and more meritocratic bringing talented people like Marius, Mark Anthony, Julius Ceasar, Sulla from the ranks of the impoverished/insignifcant any single one of which out-matched any general their adversaries would put in command. The perfect contrast would be when Antiochus 3 fought Rome and due to some court jealousies put the exiled general Hannibal in charge of a few boats instead of the main army, then lost badly.