Arthur'Bomber'Harris.

What military targets were in Dresden that warrented Fire Bombing of the Resedential Ares ?
He was ordered by Eisenhower to bomb Dresden. for the reasons I give above, precision bombing would have been too costly. Again, the Nazis were moving troops to the Eastern Front through Dresden. If your calling Harris a War Criminal, by implication you are also accusing Eisenhower.
the specific order to bomb Dresden came through via the Air Ministry from the headquarters of General Eisenhower, the overall Allied commander, Harris was obliged to carry it out, although the fact he requested the order in writing reveals his true feelings about the operation.
 
Your friend is misinformed. Area bombing wasn't Bomber Harris's idea. Bomber Command was already under orders to concentrate all its efforts on "the morale of enemy civil population" when he took command of it. The reality was that practically all strategic bombing in World War II was area bombing. The technology for consistently effective precision bombing simply didn't exist. So, to abandon area bombing would've been to abandon strategic bombing, and that would've extended the war.
 
Bomber Harris was nothing more than a War Criminal. Knowing that Stategic Bombing was having little effect on the German War industry he kept it up as a way to break the spirits of the German Civilians. He did not give a stuff on whether there was or was not war industies in the Target Area , just as long as he killed as many civilians as they could.
Bomber Harris stands shoulder to shoulder with other winners like Heydrich, Himmler and Dirlewanger.

Strategic bombing had a colossal effect on German industry. Check out these numbers:
% of German planes used exclusively against bombers
June, 1944 39
January, 1945 50

% of German artillery built for use as AA guns by 1944: 33 1/3
% of German artillery ammo used in AA guns by 1944: 20
% of German optics made for use against bombers by 1944: 33 1/3
% of German radar and signals equipment made for use against bombers by 1944: 50 - 66 2/3

% of German fighters in WTO by spring, 1943: 70
% of German aircraft built that were bombers in 1942: >50
% of German aircraft built that were bombers in 1944: 18

German monthly oil production beginning of 1944: 316,000 tons
German oil production June, 1944: 107,000 tons
German oil production September, 1944: 17,000 tons

German aviation fuel production April, 1944: 175,000 tons
German aviation fuel production July, 1944: 30,000 tons
German aviation fuel production September, 1944: 5,000 tons

German monthly synthetic nitrogen production beginning of 1944: 75,000 tons
German monthly synthetic nitrogen production end of 1944: 20,000 tons

% of British war effort devoted to strategic bombing: 7
Furthermore, Bomber Harris cared plenty about whether or not there was industry in the target area. He knew that trying to destroy German morale was a waste of time. He wanted to destroy Germany's physical ability to manufacture weapons.
 
Seen it before. The Industry was on the outskirts of the city... not where they bombed.
I think we could go on for ages discussing wether it was warrented or not but as they say

THE VICTORS WRITE THE HISTORY BOOKS

I'm pretty sure if the Germans won, Good 'ole Harris would have been on trial
:rolleyes: Churchill would have been on trial if the Grmans won, or shot without trial. Take your pick:mad:
 
Seen it before. The Industry was on the outskirts of the city... not where they bombed.
I think we could go on for ages discussing wether it was warrented or not but as they say

THE VICTORS WRITE THE HISTORY BOOKS

I'm pretty sure if the Germans won, Good 'ole Harris would have been on trial

It doesn't seem like you read it very carefully. 23% of Dresden's industrial buildings were seriously damaged. Furthermore, the industry was only one thing that made Dresden a target. It wasn't even the most important thing. You're probably right about Harris, though. Fortunately for humanity, the Germans didn't win.
 
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I have to say that as i believe other've said, Harris was given a job to do, and he did it. Now to me for you, backstab, to say that what he was ordered to do is akin to sending people to deathcamps--well actually i had a big long diatrabe i was going to write but if Wozza doesn't mind I think he put it quite succintly

It is hard to know where to begin with the difference between the bombing of Germany and the Holocaust. I suggest you experiment with thinking things through rather than glib simplification and ill-thought through comparisons

At any rate, I definatly think his efforts had an impact. especially the Transport Plan of 1944 prior to Normandy. Thats all
 
I don't know about his earlier attacksbut in my opinion the Bombing of Dresden was a War crime.

There was no way that Germany could win and it was only a matter of weeks before Germany surrendered.

Over 35000 people were killed and god alone how many injured and all to assist the Russian armies.

I wonder how much the allied high command came to regret that little decision to use nbomber command to help the red army.
Why shouldn't they have? The Russians were our allies.
 
When discussing the morality of Allied actions during World War II, it's important to remember that the Axis powers started it. Why should the Allies have refrained from a war shortening course of action when it was the Axis powers who were the aggressors? Why should more Allied servicemen have died so Axis civilians would live? It makes no sense.
 
Yep - it was a total war, not a nice tidy one between professional armies. Those armies needed to be kept supplied with ammunition, weapons, equipment, clothing etc etc, which made the factories targets. The people (men and women) who worked in the factories or ran the railways or generally kept the country's infrastructure going were legitimate targets, just as much as soldiers were, because they were helping the war effort.

Professor Richard Overy presented a paper on this issue at that Bomber Command Association Symposium reported to the RAF Historical Society, and finished off with the following:

"Bombing: The Balance Sheet

The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.

The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.

Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."


Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum
 
By the time Dresden was bombed, Britain was schizophrenic about the bomber offensive, they were not sure if it was morally justified. There were enough questions in the House of Commons to show this. Ultimately, the moralists won over the revenge-for-Coventry crowd. This was why there was no Bomber Command campaign medal (disgracefully), Harris was sacked and got no statue, and no comprehensive analysis of the campaign ever took place.

As for Dresden itself, it was a railway nexus (it still is) and the RAF with very good reason liked such targets. The attack took place at night because it was at extreme range. At the time this was unusual: With the disappearance of the Luftwaffe, the RAF had resumed daylight bombing. Notwithstanding GEE and OBOE it seems that some Bombmasters were careless about releasing their markers. I think by that time the crews were very tired and, the war being nearly over, not anxious to expose themselves to danger longer than they had to.

You cannot compare Dresden to Nanking or Rotterdam. Most German cities had formidable AA defenses, plus the bombers had to overfly more defenses to get there and back. The City was on the list, and the list was approved by High Command. I can't help feeling the Western Allies had a wish to bomb cities in the path of the Red Army, partly to show the Russians what we could do (Berlin was bombed by the USAAF 3 days before the Russinas got into the city.)

As for Harris himself, he seems to have been a WW1 general, in the sense you must accept casualties to get the job done. This was unusual in Commonwealth forces (the only other one I can think of is Freyburg) but common in Russian and US forces - See Zhukhov at Seelow/Berlin or Patton's frequent injunctions to subordinates to take the objective or come back dead.
 

Redbeard

Banned
The British calculations that Redbeard mentioned neglect a key factor--time. No matter how many resources you have, a battleship takes YEARS to build. Not one single battleship laid down while a nation was at war in World War II was completed by the end of the war, IIRC. So if you build 25 battleships concurrently, you will get them all years after you start them. (And that's not even including the long lead time items that are ordered long before the keel is laid--items such as guns, and especially reduction gears.)
(The lightning fast builds of the Great War were accomplished by skimming components from other ships, which were either delayed or cancelled.)

By comparison, of you commit to building 1000 bombers, some will be ready within a much shorter time, and you will getr a continuing flow of bombers after that.

Nobody would dream of replacing 1000 bombers with 25 battleships, but as a key it show the magnitude of Bombercommand.

But when we are at battleships two of the Lion class were laid down in 1939 and two more were to follow shortly after. They were cancelled due to shortage of resources, not at least skilled labour, and other warships were belated of the same reason (Vanguard BB, Implacable CVs).

I know that the the warships given priority were escorts, but if Coastal Command had been given priority to long range planes the Atlantic battle probably could have been won much earlier, and with a smaller demand for surface escorts.

I agree that the expansion of Bomber Command was too late to give resources for building a fleet to keep the japanese away, but Singapore probably could have been succesfully defended with extra 200 fighters, 100 tanks and a trained Division. That could be spared without touching Bomber Command.

The Bomber Command option is relevant however when/if it comes to reconquering the lost possessions in the Far East. A lot of planning was made from 1942, but all failed due to the British war effort being too strained (and the Americans refusing to support British "regaining the Empire actions"). I'm certain that moderating the resource drain from Bombercommand in its OTL expansion from 1942 would drastically increase the chances of the British "liberating" South East Asia by own force from somewhen in 1944. The big question would be to what extent this leads to disagreement with USA.

A parallel effect of a "no big Bomber Command" TL could/would be that the RAF is much less independent - not seen as an arm operating on its own, but rather as a support of the army and the navy (like in Russia and Germany, at least with ragard to army). Imagine the BEF in 1940 being supported by dedicated CAS aircraft and not single engine level bombers like the Fairy Battle. Or if there operated a 100 Beauforts from Malta and another 100 from Malaya.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The fact is, precision bombing with heavy and medium bombers during WW2 meant the bomb hit within a mile of the target during perfect weather conditions, in daylight. At night it was within 5 miles.

Given the bombsight technology at the time that is the equivilent of today's smart bombs going into a second story window of a building when they were aiming for the third story
 

Redbeard

Banned
Strategic bombing had a colossal effect on German industry. Check out these numbers:
% of German planes used exclusively against bombers
June, 1944 39
January, 1945 50

% of German artillery built for use as AA guns by 1944: 33 1/3
% of German artillery ammo used in AA guns by 1944: 20
% of German optics made for use against bombers by 1944: 33 1/3
% of German radar and signals equipment made for use against bombers by 1944: 50 - 66 2/3

% of German fighters in WTO by spring, 1943: 70
% of German aircraft built that were bombers in 1942: >50
% of German aircraft built that were bombers in 1944: 18

German monthly oil production beginning of 1944: 316,000 tons
German oil production June, 1944: 107,000 tons
German oil production September, 1944: 17,000 tons

German aviation fuel production April, 1944: 175,000 tons
German aviation fuel production July, 1944: 30,000 tons
German aviation fuel production September, 1944: 5,000 tons

German monthly synthetic nitrogen production beginning of 1944: 75,000 tons
German monthly synthetic nitrogen production end of 1944: 20,000 tons

% of British war effort devoted to strategic bombing: 7
Furthermore, Bomber Harris cared plenty about whether or not there was industry in the target area. He knew that trying to destroy German morale was a waste of time. He wanted to destroy Germany's physical ability to manufacture weapons.

I think this is good evidence of the bomber offensive NOT working.

In the years when WWII was decided on the battlefields and the open seas German production rose drastically, and by 44/45, when it finally declined, the war had already been won by ground troops closing in on Germany. The production decline probably resulted at least as much from the allied armies (not at least Soviet) taking resource supplying areas as from bombing.

Thank God it worked anyway, but the safest way to play it would have been investing in 1941-43 in something with a much more direct influence on the decisive battlefields – that is where wars are won. In other words Bombercommand apparently needed as at least as much time to gain momentum as it took to build a battleship.

The belief in air force as a decisive arm of its own for instance meant that the (western) allies did not have a dedicated tactical air support until late in the war.

Sure the bomber offensive tied down a lot of German resources, but my claim is that it cost even more allied, and that those resources could have been used much better – it was screw driving with a sledgehammer.

BTW what is your source for Bombercommand taking 7% of British war effort? If using number of killed and missing, which was a very critical factor for UK, Bombercommand alone took 60,000 killed and missing, which was 20% of all British killed and missing. BTW the mortality rate of Bombercommand crews was 47,5%.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

Redbeard

Banned
The fact is, precision bombing with heavy and medium bombers during WW2 meant the bomb hit within a mile of the target during perfect weather conditions, in daylight. At night it was within 5 miles.

Given the bombsight technology at the time that is the equivilent of today's smart bombs going into a second story window of a building when they were aiming for the third story

RAF did some very spectacular airstrikes with Mosquitos in Europe. Targets were typically Gestapo headquarters or prisons and required extreme precision. IIRC three such attacks were carried out in Denmark (and some in France too) and the only bombs missing in the Danish attacks were a result from a crashed plane having the following planes think this was the target (a school unfortunately - 30 kids killed). But still the raids showed that precision comparable to late 20th century smart bombs was possible and that the fast low flying Mosquitos were close to immune to enemy defences. The crashing plane mentioned above wasn't shot down, but hit a mast. AFAIK the Mosquito squadrons were very highly trained, but judging from their hitrate you would only have needed a fraction of the OTL Bombercommand. In the Copenhagen attack they targeted and hit individual floors in a building in central Copenhagen used by the Gestapo, as the top floor was used as prison.

The Mosquito was available parallel to the four engine bombers, but a few handpicked Mosquito squadrons would not give the RAF a position as an independent and warwinning arm. It wasn't the first or the last time services fought each other vigorously, but considering how men lower down the ranks would have been punished if wasting a few items of His Majesty's property you could IMHO include high treason and sabotage in the charges against Harris.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The belief in air force as a decisive arm of its own for instance meant that the (western) allies did not have a dedicated tactical air support until late in the war.
Not true - RAF tactical support in North Africa was good. And an efficient system was in place for Europe in time for when it was really needed - summer 1944. However, I agree with you that it should have been given even more priority, particularly in terms of developing more suitable aircraft.

Sure the bomber offensive tied down a lot of German resources, but my claim is that it cost even more allied, and that those resources could have been used much better – it was screw driving with a sledgehammer.
The problem was - how to aim those resources against Germany before summer 1944? It was vital to support the Russians as much as possible while they were really suffering in 1941-43. The Italian campaign helped, but was only a side-show. The only way to strike directly at Germany was from the air, which is why so many resources were given to Bomber Command during this period.

It is neither easy nor quick to redirect resources from one area to another. You have factories churning out bombers plus the bombs for them, huge training and support organisations for the aircrew, plus the development of doctrine and tactics through experience. These factors gained a huge momentum for Bomber Command, which couldn't just be switched off in 1944 - there wouldn't have been time for any redirection of resources to have any significant effect before the end of the war.

I do agree, though, that diverting more bombers to maritime patrol would have been a good idea, as would accelerating the development and production of the Mosquito to use for more precise bombing. Indeed, that is exactly what I included in my alt WW2 novel The Foresight War :) . However, even in this story, circumstances forced the British into strategic bombing.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum
 
I think this is good evidence of the bomber offensive NOT working.

In the years when WWII was decided on the battlefields and the open seas German production rose drastically, and by 44/45, when it finally declined, the war had already been won by ground troops closing in on Germany. The production decline probably resulted at least as much from the allied armies (not at least Soviet) taking resource supplying areas as from bombing.

Thank God it worked anyway, but the safest way to play it would have been investing in 1941-43 in something with a much more direct influence on the decisive battlefields – that is where wars are won. In other words Bombercommand apparently needed as at least as much time to gain momentum as it took to build a battleship.

The belief in air force as a decisive arm of its own for instance meant that the (western) allies did not have a dedicated tactical air support until late in the war.

Sure the bomber offensive tied down a lot of German resources, but my claim is that it cost even more allied, and that those resources could have been used much better – it was screw driving with a sledgehammer.

BTW what is your source for Bombercommand taking 7% of British war effort? If using number of killed and missing, which was a very critical factor for UK, Bombercommand alone took 60,000 killed and missing, which was 20% of all British killed and missing. BTW the mortality rate of Bombercommand crews was 47,5%.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

Are you kidding me? 70% of German fighters were used against bombers by the spring of '43. If not for the strategic bombing campaign, most of those fighters would've gone to the eastern front. What do you think would've happened there if the Germans had had three times as many fighters as they did? Strategic bombing created such a shortage of synthetic nitrogen that the Germans started filling their artillery shells with a mixture of explosives and rock salt. They were so short on fuel they had to cut the training time for their pilots. It went from 240 hours in 1939 to 205 in late '42 to 170 hours in the summer of '43 to 110 in 1944. Between direct destruction and diversion of resources, strategic bombing denied the Germans approximately half their battlefield weapons and equipment in 1944. As Tony pointed out, strategic bombing was the Allies' only means of striking directly at Germany before D-Day. So, it wasn't a choice between strategic bombing and a major ground operation. It was a choice between strategic bombing and nothing.
 
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This rhetoric kinda eludes me. Making a British Air Commander out to be a villain, while denying the evils that were happening in Germany at the time. Irregardless of the concentration camps, Germany certainly didn't take the High Road and avoid the Blitz, or the whole VI/VII campaign, so how can you blame one man for killing Germans, when Germans were systematically killing thier enemies,and citizens.

I for one, have no sympathy for this argument, other than the innocent peoples caught up in the overall conflict on both sides. The Farmers, and all the other people who made up the majority of all the populations of all the belligerents, had little or no say in foreign policy, and will always suffer for the ideals of the people they put in power, or apathetically allowed into power. JMO
 

Redbeard

Banned
Are you kidding me? 70% of German fighters were used against bombers by the spring of '43. If not for the strategic bombing campaign, most of those fighters would've gone to the eastern front. What do you think would've happened there if the Germans had had three times as many fighters as they did? Strategic bombing created such a shortage of synthetic nitrogen that the Germans started filling their artillery shells with a mixture of explosives and rock salt. They were so short on fuel they had to cut the training time for their pilots. It went from 240 hours in 1939 to 205 in late '42 to 170 hours in the summer of '43 to 110 in 1944. Between direct destruction and diversion of resources, strategic bombing denied the Germans approximately half their battlefield weapons and equipment in 1944. As Tony pointed out, strategic bombing was the Allies' only means of striking directly at Germany before D-Day. So, it wasn't a choice between strategic bombing and a major ground operation. It was a choice between strategic bombing and nothing.

According to Ellis (WWII Data book), who I rarely catch in errors, the Germans in the spring of 1943 had 2400 operational fighters of which approxiamately half were allocated for home defence. In spring 1942 they had 1500 operational fighters of which appr. 600 were allocated for home defence. So the Germans actually succeeded in increasing the number of fighters allocated for the fronts from appr. 900 to 1200! The increase in total number of operational fighters could at a much lower cost have been countered by investing in single engine (and single crew) fighters instead of four engine and multi-crew bombers. The disruption of German production would have been achieved with far less cost with low altitude fast bombers like the Mosquito - which even consumed very little aluminium and productionwise could utilise the otherwise idle furniture industry.

And concerning the argument about bombing being the only way to engage Germany I don't buy it - the Bombing offensive did not seriously bother Germany was defeated anyway (by armies). Bombercommand dropped 46.000 tons of bombs in 1942, 157.000 tons in 1943 and 525.000 tons in 1944. The equivalent numbers for US 8th Airforce was 1.400, 44.000 and 389.000 tons respectively. 15th US Airforce added 13.000 tons in 1943 and 240.000 tons in 1944 (from Ellis).

In the two years needed to have the bombing offensive gain momentum a huge number of Divisions and tactical squadrons could have been trained and equipped; I would even think that a main invasion could have been succesful by 1943. It must be remembered that building and running the planes themselves was only part of the cost. The huge infrastructure needed and intense logistics was a huge strain on allied wareffort where tonnage to the last was in short supply. Short of the 60.000 KIA/MIA of Bombercommand the British effort on land in 1944 might have been quite different. Like Churchill not demanding cautious advance in Market Garden.

The development in German traning was I believe as much an effect of the Germans preferring to let veterans stay at the front line units istead of being withdrawn to train new pilots. Pilots were expected to gain their advanced training at the front, and those who had it in them would survive, those not wouldn't.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
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