Arras Gap -a British thrust south?

On the 19th May 1940 General Ironside requested that Lord Gort attack south with the BEF. Would the British be capable of putting the bulk if not all their forces into the thrust whilst De Gaulle attempt the same from Ameins? The Belgian right flank would obviously collapse a few days sooner, but the British could briefly isolate Guderian before being push south by the rest of the Heer resulting in no Operation Dynamo, but greater Operation Cycle and Operation Ariel. Thoughts?
 
I don't really think it's possibly, at least not without some major previous changes to British tank designs and armoured doctrine. The attack at Arras against Rommel's 7th Panzer Division whilst enough to give him a serious scare wasn't enough to completely break through, on his left/to the south travelling roughly parallel you had a second panzer division - without looking it up I want to say 8th Panzer Division, and further to the south of them you had another two or three panzer divisions acting as the outer edge of the sickle advancing along the Somme river to the coast and then up it. There was meant to be a French attack northwards in concert but from what I remember reading it wouldn't have been ready until the following day and the British commanders felt that the situation wouldn't allow them to wait so attacked by themselves, with a French armoured unit covering their left flank. Any prospective attack would have to see the British beat two panzer divisions around Arras and the French another two on their drive north, and even then I'm not sure how long they could hold their ground as you still had the bulk of the German forces advancing from the north-east I believe.

The action at Arras was a damn close-run thing so if the British had been a bit more lucky and an artillery shell or two had landed by Rommel as he was frantically trying to arrange the gun line of 88mm anti-aircraft guns then you could well have seen 7th Panzer Division take a severe mauling and retreat. Trying for 8th Panzer Division would probably be pushing their luck too far. Considering that Hitler got nervous and issued halt orders at several points during Fall Gelb you could perhaps see him call for one after this until the infantry units had started catching up and the situation became more clear - Rommel apparently reported the two infantry divisions and single tank brigade, of whose 74 tanks only 16 had main guns with the remainder being armed with machine guns, who attacked as being five divisions. The British are then able to take the opportunity to retreat roughly north-west to the coast allowing them to potentially use Calais to evacuate some of their equipment and men as well as Dunkirk.
 
Rommel apparently reported the two infantry divisions and single tank brigade, of whose 74 tanks only 16 had main guns with the remainder being armed with machine guns, who attacked as being five divisions.

Apparently this is all based on a german field map showing a four mile wide enemy formation with "5 Divisionen" written in German, translating to "5 Divisions".

One explanation is that the germans somehow were so flustered they mistook two infantry battalions and two under strength tank regiments for a corps-sized formation marching shoulder to shoulder. Allied historians in general and British historians in particular love this explanation.

The other explanation is that the germans correctly identified the attack as being led by the 5th Division but made a small typo when writing down "5 Division". No-one likes this explanation because it's way too dull and prosaic.
 
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The other explanation is that the germans correctly identified the attack as being led by the 5th Division but made a small typo when writing down "5 Division". No-one likes this explanation because it's way too dull and prosaic.

I saw identical mistakes made in routine low pressure training.

.... There was meant to be a French attack northwards in concert but from what I remember reading it wouldn't have been ready until the following day and the British commanders felt that the situation wouldn't allow them to wait so attacked by themselves, with a French armoured unit covering their left flank. ....

The French attack on the Brit flank could have been the more dangerous to the Germans. The two DLM still had some striking power, despite having covered more road and more combat than the German Pz div. Unfortunatly the French 1st Army staff & to a lesser extent the Corps staff were too influenced by the methodical battle doctrine & did not deploy their armored corps or the supporting inf corps fast enough. They also overestimated the relative strength of the German armored formations.
 
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The action at Arras was a damn close-run thing so if the British had been a bit more lucky and an artillery shell or two had landed by Rommel as he was frantically trying to arrange the gun line of 88mm anti-aircraft guns....

I always unclear on where all these 88mm AA guns came from. The TO/TE for the Pz Div show a total of eight, & if I'm reading things correctly four of those with the 7th Pz were further back on the road trying to catch up after guarding a refueling site. I strongly suspect the Brit tanks were stopped by the dozen 105mm howitzer in the division artillery battalion also deployed for direct fire.

The Brits got their licks in as well. A company of German tanks had been turned around & was probing for the Brit right/west flank. They ran into a ambush of 2pdr AT guns & ceased their investigation after several leading tanks were knocked out.

Had the Brits been at a 1943 skill level the Brit armored commander would have slowed his advance slightly while directing a series of strikes from the division artillery, & perhaps some air attacks as well. The exposed German 88s or howitzers would have been suppressed & overrun in a hour or less.
 
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