Armistice in 1940 ?

What would it take for Britain to (most probably temporarily) agree to an armistice with Germany in 1940, while acknowledging German dominance of mainland Europe ?

i'm thinking either

1. the Germans give up way way waaay more (nigh ASB)
2. a different political situation in both leaderships (but what exactly?)
or
3. a series of catastrophic defeats for the British

Regarding 3), think something along the lines of

- far greater Royal Navy losses and lesser German ones, more merchant ships sunk (all as a result perfectly working German torpedoes)
- first BEF captured with minimal losses, second BEF severely mauled
- 2/3 of fighter reserve sent and lost in France
- a better show by the LW in the BoB
- Japanese, Thai, Iraqi, Iranian and Spanish DOW
- a hostile Vichy France and an America that has written them off
- large territorial losses in Africa/the Med/the Far East
- a large-ish naval defeat vs the Japanese
- an apparently imminent SeaLion

, or more (handwaving probability).


Deadline is the October 30th-November 4th period, when the last likely date for SeaLion (owing to the high tide) was determined by the British.


My thinking is that even under such circumstances, Churchill agreeing to an armistice would be unlikely. However, even if he does, it won't really do the nazis much good imho, since now it's highly unlikely that they'll achieve any kind of surprise in op. Barbarossa. Plus, as soon as they start fighting the USSR, the British would go back to a shooting war, no ?

What say you, oh wise members AH.com ?
 
You forget about Dunkirk,
As for surprise in the east well with the British not in the war the German industry will not be under bombardment,no will the Romanian oil fields,Germany will have more planes for Barbarossa.So it will make life a lot harder for the soviets
Yes the British will join in again but it they will take there time,don't think they will join in immediately that the Germans launches Barbarossa
 
You forget about Dunkirk,

I didn't. I said
first BEF captured with minimal losses, second BEF severely mauled
I didn't say Dunkirk, because it doesn't have to be. They could just as easily have been trapped north-west of Liege if general Gort had followed orders and pressed for a counterattack when told to do so...

As for surprise in the east well with the British not in the war the German industry will not be under bombardment,no will the Romanian oil fields,Germany will have more planes for Barbarossa.So it will make life a lot harder for the soviets

From what I understand, British bombing of the German war industry in November 1940-May/June 1941 was insignificant at best, whilst that of Romania was non-existent.

Regarding the number of aircraft, I think a lot depends on how operations go in 1940. Plus, Germany can't send everything east, since they'll have to keep some sort of reserve over Germany, France and even Norway, just in case.

Yes the British will join in again but it they will take there time,don't think they will join in immediately that the Germans launches Barbarossa

Maybe not immediately. They'll probably start enacting a blockade soon after (since the threat of an invasion would be low) and this would inexorably lead to war.
 
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What would it take for Britain to (most probably temporarily) agree to an armistice with Germany in 1940, while acknowledging German dominance of mainland Europe ?

i'm thinking either

1. the Germans give up way way waaay more (nigh ASB)
2. a different political situation in both leaderships (but what exactly?)
or
3. a series of catastrophic defeats for the British

Regarding 3), think something along the lines of

- far greater Royal Navy losses and lesser German ones, more merchant ships sunk (all as a result perfectly working German torpedoes)
- first BEF captured with minimal losses, second BEF severely mauled
- 2/3 of fighter reserve sent and lost in France
- a better show by the LW in the BoB
- Japanese, Thai, Iraqi, Iranian and Spanish DOW
- a hostile Vichy France and an America that has written them off
- large territorial losses in Africa/the Med/the Far East
- a large-ish naval defeat vs the Japanese
- an apparently imminent SeaLion

, or more (handwaving probability).


Deadline is the October 30th-November 4th period, when the last likely date for SeaLion (owing to the high tide) was determined by the British.


My thinking is that even under such circumstances, Churchill agreeing to an armistice would be unlikely. However, even if he does, it won't really do the nazis much good imho, since now it's highly unlikely that they'll achieve any kind of surprise in op. Barbarossa. Plus, as soon as they start fighting the USSR, the British would go back to a shooting war, no ?

What say you, oh wise members AH.com ?
I did a wee timeline a while ago based on an Armistice in 1940. The optimal time for it to happen was between the German breakthrough and the fall of Paris. At this point, with the French pushing for peace, there could have been the possibility of them taking the British with them.

Had this happened, I suspect France loses heavily, the British return to a status quo and an uneasy peace develops. This would give the Germans a free run at the Soviets.

The result?

Despite having the Western Powers back at war with Germany in 1942 in my timeline, I suspect a Soviet Europe with Britain isolated is a more realistic long-term scenario here..
 
a) German fixes torpedo problems earlier, in time for Norway Invasion, considerable more allied naval and shipping losses in Norwegian campaign. while not a serious threat to British mastery of the seas around the British Islands, this makes Britain more nervous about the slopes and curves of the shipping war going against her, and more nervous about launching invasions in the future.

b) Most of the BEF captured in France, while the British Isles are not really any more threatened (the Canadian Corps is sitting in Kent just the same) this makes Britain less confident she can build up an army that will ever be able to invade again.

c) Hitler does not do a OTL Battle of Britain with intent to invade, Hitler focuses on an air war on shipping, going after Belfast and Liverpool and Bristol repetatively in night raids, and completely shutting down the Channel, London and the southern ports by day.

With a+b+c the British are on their heels, the long term outlook apears bleak, sure Britains survival ins't threatened but winning the war anythime in the future appears bleak. Any reasonable British politician however knows that dealing with Hitler is like dealing with Genghis Khan and any deal has to not weaken British security.

Hitler wanting to invade the Soviet Union offers a deal in early October.

1) 1914 boundries in the west.
2) France to pay reparations for 5 years equal to her military budget 1934-1938 (these reparations a combination of $ and actual military equipment and supplies)
3) Germany gets a free hand in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
4) Germany gets no colonies back.
5) Germany allowed to trade freely again.
6) Treaty of London naval agreement back in effect.
7) France not allowed to import armaments from other countries and other military restrictions mainly on air force and armor for 10 years.
8) Britain not to supply armaments to any country in Europe for 5 years.

Its a great deal for Germany, basically she can focus on the Soviet Union while completely at peace in the west. France will be military impotent for a number of years.

Its not bad for Britain, her immediate security is intact and improved in fact, however she is faced with a German superpower for the long term.
 
As has been stated earlier, this will radically alter Soviet foreign policy for the remainder of 1940-41. One of Stalin's major prerequisites before he believed in the possibility of a future German invasion was that Britain would be out of the war. As soon as negotiations begin he will immediately see it, as he did in regards to British warnings in spring 1941, as Capitalists colluding in order to attack the Soviet Union. Thus instead of having planning for war mobilization start in February 1941, STAVKA and the Red Army general staff/organs will begin working on a defense plan in September-October 1940. The OTL Soviet defense plan was rife with flaws, stemming from its incompleteness, being rushed, and being composed without coordination with Military District and rear service officers. The Red Army will still be deficienent in many respects. But its summer performance without the loss of the vast majority of its equipment, artillery, AFVs, trained manpower, and ammunition/food stores will be orders of magnitude greater than IOTL.

Further, Germany will suffer as a result of this. IOTL Stalin did not press the issue of German requirements to transfer machine tools and other equipment to the Soviet Union as payment for the oil and grain. Here, without the need to continue appeasement, Stalin will be much more forceful. If Hitler does concede Germany will suffer economically. If not then Stalin will reduce or cancel all shipments in the winter of 1940-41, crippling the German economy. Even with trade reopened in the west, Germany even pre-war lacked the cash and credit to pay for what it needed.
 
Hitler doesn't halt the Panzers 23rd of may, the BEF is captured.
The loss of the BEf alone might be enough to topple Churchill and then Britain sues for peace, Dunkirk nourished a feeling of defiance without that who knows. Who might replace Churchill.
Loss of the BEF makes it much difficult for Britain to field an army in years to come, everyone whos anyone is in the pocket, so the loss of experienced officers makes training a future army more difficult.
I think loss of the BEF alone might bring Britain to the negotiating table.
 
Thus instead of having planning for war mobilization start in February 1941, STAVKA and the Red Army general staff/organs will begin working on a defense plan in September-October 1940. The OTL Soviet defense plan was rife with flaws, stemming from its incompleteness, being rushed, and being composed without coordination with Military District and rear service officers. The Red Army will still be deficienent in many respects. But its summer performance without the loss of the vast majority of its equipment, artillery, AFVs, trained manpower, and ammunition/food stores will be orders of magnitude greater than IOTL.

I wonder if the Soviets would do a light in the front, heavier in the rear, defence in depth type defence stance? There would be little point here of loading up the border with divisions as a foreign policy / posturing move.

Would the Japanese/Soviet April 41 non agression pact occur as OTL? Here its obvious to everyone what the Germans are going to do.

Japanese foreign policy/agression would be affected, i.e. maybe neutralized. France and Britain and Netherlands would all be stronger in the far east with peace.

Mussolini would be much stronger, He might not gain much, but wouldn't have lost much either, probably commits a force to the Eastern Front as in OTL but perhaps better equipped and motivated. Perhaps he gets to keep British Somalialand and a strip of northern Chad for his trouble, plus a free hand to pillage Dalamtia from the Yougoslavs.

U.S.A. foreign policy is alittle bit muted. Britain is at peace and somewhat secure, who do you give Lend Lease to, just the Soviets?, seems unlikely. Japan would be boxed in more vs. OTL with western Europe at peace.

Agree that the Soviets will be more ready, perhaps even encouraging an "International Brigade" of leftists and exiles from the world. Perhaps an agreement with the Polish government in exile is in order.
 
I wonder if the Soviets would do a light in the front, heavier in the rear, defence in depth type defence stance? There would be little point here of loading up the border with divisions as a foreign policy / posturing move.

U.S.A. foreign policy is alittle bit muted. Britain is at peace and somewhat secure, who do you give Lend Lease to, just the Soviets?, seems unlikely. Japan would be boxed in more vs. OTL with western Europe at peace.

Soviet strategic planning IOTL assumed that, following a period of posturing, German forces would need at least two weeks to shift from the West. Because of this most of the First Echelon forces which were coherent combat forces were deployed very close to the border to act as a covering force against German incursions. ITTL this assumption is unlikely to be made due to the cessation of hostilities in the West.

Soviet rifle forces will probably not be deplyed in linear formations; they'll occupy positions 10+ kilometers from the border, with the expectation being that they will be shifted to confront German penetrations along with AT artillery brigades and mobile forces. The border itself will be defended by several rifle corps and NKVD units.

The net result is that Soviet forces are stil badly mauled. However, they don't suffer total destruction as IOTL. Most of the Red Army's ammunition stores were still in warehouses within the border regions, which were captured before they could be evacuated. Massive amounts of equipment, prime movers, etc were lost. Radio and wire communications were crippled.

Essentially the result will be, on all fronts, like what happened in the Ukraine; German forces fail to achieve total destruction of the Red Army and are soon slowed by heavy Soviet counterattacks. This avoids the slippery slope where because of the losses in the Border Battles the Red Army fielded increasingly poorly equipped formations with inadequate communications and AT artillery, which were easily encircled and destroyed.

As for the US, the defeat of Britain will if anything increase public support for the Soviet Union as the last "free" bastion against Germany.
 
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Soviet strategic planning IOTL assumed that, following a period of posturing, German forces would need at least two weeks to shift from the West. Because of this most of the First Echelon forces which were coherent combat forces were deployed very close to the border to act as a covering force against German incursions. ITTL this assumption is unlikely to be made due to the cessation of hostilities in the West.

Soviet rifle forces will probably not be deplyed in linear formations; they'll occupy positions 10+ kilometers from the border, with the expectation being that they will be shifted to confront German penetrations along with AT artillery brigades and mobile forces. The border itself will be defended by several rifle corps and NKVD units.

The net result is that Soviet forces are stil badly mauled. However, they don't suffer total destruction as IOTL. Most of the Red Army's ammunition stores were still in warehouses within the border regions, which were captured before they could be evacuated. Massive amounts of equipment, prime movers, etc were lost. Radio and wire communications were crippled.

Essentially the result will be, on all fronts, like what happened in the Ukraine; German forces fail to achieve total destruction of the Red Army and are soon slowed by heavy Soviet counterattacks. This avoids the slippery slope where because of the losses in the Border Battles the Red Army fielded increasingly poorly equipped formations with inadequate communications and AT artillery, which were easily encircled and destroyed.

As for the US, the defeat of Britain will if anything increase public support for the Soviet Union as the last "free" bastion against Germany.

yet it was in the same Ukraine that hundreds of thousands of men were trapped around Kiev (admittedly possible only thanks to AGC' victory up north and its shift of focus). What I'm trying to say is that we shouldn't rule out one or two spectacular nazi tactical victories. That said, I think its fair to assume the Germans will do much, much worse.
 
Back to the op, this is simpler than it appears. have Lord Halifax decide to run against Churchill for prime minister and win. He was looking for an armistice anyway.
 
Except Halifax didn't have the will to handle the job or the ability to take on Churchill, i think he believed Churchill would not last too long and he would then supplant him.
 

Cook

Banned
2. a different political situation in both leaderships (but what exactly?)
or
3. a series of catastrophic defeats for the British

The result of (3) would have been (2).

Churchill wasn’t secure in his position until well after the Battle of Britain was over andmany in parliament, in the Conservative party and even in cabinet saw him has a temporary interloper. Even Churchill himself believed he’d have to work miracles or he’d be out as quickly as he’d been brought in. The situation wasn’t improved by Churchill not knowing who his enemies were; while Halifax was a known quantity for Churchill, David Lloyd-George wasn’t – Churchill repeatedly tried to get him to join the cabinet, only for Lloyd-George to refuse because of his personal hatred of Chamberlain, it was only a year later that Churchill found out that Lloyd-George had been conspiring to become Prime Minister. Another close confidante of Churchill who was in favour of putting out peace feelers was Beaverbrook. Had the British been unsuccessful in withdrawing the army from Dunkirk the pressure to accept Hitler’s July peace overtures could well have led to the ousting of Churchill and a deal being made.
 
The result of (3) would have been (2).

Churchill wasn’t secure in his position until well after the Battle of Britain was over andmany in parliament, in the Conservative party and even in cabinet saw him has a temporary interloper. Even Churchill himself believed he’d have to work miracles or he’d be out as quickly as he’d been brought in. The situation wasn’t improved by Churchill not knowing who his enemies were; while Halifax was a known quantity for Churchill, David Lloyd-George wasn’t – Churchill repeatedly tried to get him to join the cabinet, only for Lloyd-George to refuse because of his personal hatred of Chamberlain, it was only a year later that Churchill found out that Lloyd-George had been conspiring to become Prime Minister. Another close confidante of Churchill who was in favour of putting out peace feelers was Beaverbrook. Had the British been unsuccessful in withdrawing the army from Dunkirk the pressure to accept Hitler’s July peace overtures could well have led to the ousting of Churchill and a deal being made.

So, in your view, it would only have taken a loss of the BEF in Belgium for the situation to be ripe for an armistice ? I'm a bit surprised, since I thought Churchill was a bit more secure than that and a lot more would have been needed to cause his fall.

Also, do you agree with the view that an armistice wouldn't have really done the Germans much good, given its potential impact on a subsequent Barbarossa ?
 

Cook

Banned
So, in your view, it would only have taken a loss of the BEF in Belgium for the situation to be ripe for an armistice ? I'm a bit surprised, since I thought Churchill was a bit more secure than that and a lot more would have been needed to cause his fall.
When Churchill’s appointment as Prime Minister was announced in the House of Lords it was greeted with complete stunned silence. Churchill was a man without a party (Chamberlain remained the leader of the Conservatives) and didn’t even have a strong enough grip on power to exclude Halifax from the cabinet, even though Halifax’s opinions and ambitions were known to him, let alone those who he didn’t know about. It was only in 1941 that Churchill, after the strengthening of his position that the Battle of Britain gave him, was able to get rid of Halifax and even then it was only by sending him to the critically important diplomatic post in Washington. Churchill even faced rivalry from his ally Anthony Eden. He was seen by most as reckless in the extreme, it was only later success that won over the country.
Also, do you agree with the view that an armistice wouldn't have really done the Germans much good, given its potential impact on a subsequent Barbarossa ?

I think it would have made an immense difference; for starters, Barbarossa was in response to Britain’s ongoing belligerence, Hitler’s original intention had been for a war with the Soviet Union in the 1943-45 timeframe.

With a ceasefire with Britain, the blockade of the Reich have been ended and Germany would have been free to import commodities from overseas – particularly oil.
 
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Churchill was seen as military incompetent and more idealistic than pragmatic, he stepped into a vacuum created by Halifax's reticence to wield the reign's of power. By June military and political opinion in Britain was pretty united in viewing the war as lost, many saw Churchill as a temporary stop gap. Halifax was among many who felt that resisting invasion would give Britain a better bargaining position in a peace treaty. So even after the BoB was won there was still much belief that the war could not be won and that a treaty with Germany would be the best result. Churchill was lucky that Hitler's incompetence allowed the BEF to be saved, it's unlikely Churchill could have ridden so high in the public mind without Dunkirk, the loss of the BEF would have been such a blow that his "fight on the beaches" rheoric would likely have grated on the public mood rather than lifted it.
 

Cook

Banned
What say you, oh wise members AH.com ?
There is another thing to consider; for the first two and a half years of the war, the British cabinet was sustained by the belief that Nazi Germany was on the brink of economic collapse and internal uprising. During the darkest days of 1940 -41 is was one of the few things that kept them going, the belief that they were in a life and death struggle but that the pain they were feeling wasn’t anywhere near as bad as the Germans were suffering. They knew the treasury would be bankrupt sometime in the second half of 1941, but they hoped Germany would collapse before then. Had they had a better idea of conditions within the Reich, such a belief would not have existed and things would have looked extremely dark.
 
Back to the op, this is simpler than it appears. have Lord Halifax decide to run against Churchill for prime minister and win. He was looking for an armistice anyway.

I'm currently reading a book that covers this area (and Hess's arrival) 'Ten Days that Saved the West' by John Costello.

In his opinion, Halifax was less enthusiastic about being Prime Minister - because he was afraid that he would be a figurehead to Chamberlain.
Curiously, it seems the King that there could be a temporary suspension of his title to enable him to sit in the Commons, but this wasn't passed on.

But the opposition parties Labour and the Liberals were more in favour of Churchill, rather than others with a history of appeasement.

Seems likely that Hitler's 'halt order' was political rather than military - not wanting to humiliate the British. Hitler, could not have imagined that the BEF could have been evacuated on the scale that happened. Gort, fortunately was a realist and didn't believe a attack/escape to the South was possible - no matter how much Churchill & the French pushed for it (the lack of action on the 'ground' showed that it was a non-starter.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Halifax was aided and abetted by Butler, was in touch with the Italy and Sweden. Major attempts were made to keep Italy out of the War - but Italy got too greedy!
Trouble was Hitler dithered - expecting Churchill to be toppled. He actual peace deal was offered rather than 'do you want to negotiate'?
Even Churchill, might have had a problem saying no.

On the one-hand Britain had the challenge - how do we fight on? Whilst, if we make peace how can we trust Hitler's word!?

With the US Churchill had the problem of an almost pro-German US Ambassador Kennedy.

So, an Armistice in '40 with Churchill is not impossible, but unlikely, but much more likely without him, e.g. gets shot down while on a trip to France.
 

BlondieBC

Banned

Largely agree with this set of items. Hitler has to keep the momentum of defeats up enough to get the UK to agree to "reasonable terms". This list includes the easy items, and Wiking has many little threads on small things that can be improved. I have not looked at the naval records related to ships missed with defective torpedoes in details, but I would guess the number of additional capital ships lost will be greater than 3, the number of medium ships (cruisers) will be over 5, and we get a roughly 50% spike in sinkings by U-boats of other ships. I think the warships will be used much more carefully once the UK starts losing more ships in Norway. While it may not be publicly known or debated, the loss of theses ships will cause a debate of the need to transfer additional ship from other theaters (Med or Pacific), and be a challenging issue for the Admirals.

I would like to add a D that Italy has a solid warplan that it executes. Nothing brilliant or spectular, but simply more than we take a few miles of French soil for a seat at the table. Something like an early attack on Malta that works, or the Italians going into serious war preparations in late 1939 should cause some things to go badly for the UK compared to OTL. Also helps if the UK takes the lost ships out of the Med from above.

I think Hitler could get a bit better deal even with a harsh peace on France. The UK would be very interested in Germany not having forces on the channel coast or Belgium coasts. I think Hitler could get a bit more French land, especially if he allowed a face saving solution. For example, is the UK really going to argue that much if A-L border is a few 10's of miles to the west in locations. Or if Belgium loses a little of its Southern Area.
 
What would it take for Britain to (most probably temporarily) agree to an armistice with Germany in 1940, while acknowledging German dominance of mainland Europe ?

President Burton Wheeler. (He was ready to bid for the nomination if FDR definitely bowed out.)

If there is no chance whatever of any U.S. aid before 1945, and even cash-and-carry is out, then Britain might deal.

Some other factors might be required: destruction of the BEF at Dunkirk, no Churchill as PM, French declaration of war on Britain after Mers-el-Kebir, Japanese attack in the Far East/Pacific.
 
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