In a scenario where the Belle Epoque lasts 25 more years with the Great War starting on September 1, 1939, how do armies develop? What would the armies look like with a further 25 years to hone their technology and tactics without the Great War? Would army technology be ahead or behind OTL?
That’s basically impossible to predict. The experience of WW1 represented such a fundamental alteration in tactical methodology that it’s absence would have an immense distorting effect. The modern employment of infantry and artillery that was worked out in the trenches and fields remain fundamentally the same too this day. It’s been remarked that if you brought a Entente or CP officer from 1918 to today, he’d be able to recognize the tactics and adjust quite rapidly. On the other hand, if you brought a Entente or CP officer from 1914 to 1918, he’d recognize nothing. That’s how big a leap WW1 was and we can see how peacetime speculation and exercises can skew things, so suffice to say it is extremely implausible that the various armies work it all out on their own in the intervening 25 years, although they are liable to get some bits and bops.
With no majors wars to point out the problems with the tactics in general use in 1914 it's hard to see them evolving a great deal. The generals of 1914 knew about machine guns and they knew about barbed wire and they knew about quick-fire artillery, but they believed that boldly led troops could overcome all that and still successfully attack. Even after being shown that no, they couldn't, it still took years to develop the new tactics and equipment needed to break the stalemate. With no strong incentive to change between 1914 and 1939 I don't see them doing so.
Deleted member 1487
The difference is that most of the 19th century generals would have aged out by the 1930s, so the new generation who was more up on modern technologies and tactics as well as lessons from other conflicts that had or will happen ITTL would adapt.
So they are gonna be more motorised - even just from a pure transport point of view
Hussars probably have armoured cars
Aeroplanes play a recognised integrated scouting role
DOCTRINE may still be mass cavalry breakout, and horses probably outnumber motor vehicles at a front, but getting that into a reality will be difficult
Hussars probably have armoured cars
Aeroplanes play a recognised integrated scouting role
DOCTRINE may still be mass cavalry breakout, and horses probably outnumber motor vehicles at a front, but getting that into a reality will be difficult
Maybe, maybe not. The biggest single influence on tactical development prior to WWI had been the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. It showed that the mass formations of the Napoleonic Wars could no longer survive in the face of breechloading rifles. The rest of the 19th Century was spent in trying to figure out the best way to control and employ troops in open order. The generals of 1914 were not Franco-Prussian War veterans, but they were still following the lessons learned from forty years earlier.
Deleted member 1487
The Russo-Japanese war had quite the impact as well, but it was largely ignored by the people at the time, not because innovators were not paying attention. It's hardly surprising that the largely 19th century born and matured general officer class of 1914 to the end of the war focused on the last major war in western europe as their model for modern wars, but those guys would have aged out by the 1930s.
If you read some of the work being done in the early 20th century major reforms were coming just as soon as the older generation aged out. See 'the Kaiser's Army' for a discussion of how pre-war innovations were being done, but stifled by the crusty older generals in the German army.
Reform is never easy. I read a lot of translated articles from the various European military journals of the time period for a lengthy research project on this topic I did for my Ph.D program and the problem wasn't so much the generals not seeing the potential problems as it was coming up with an answer for them. One of the most fundamental changes to infantry tactics that came out of World War I was the idea that tactical decisions could actually be made by junior officers or *Gasp!* non-commissioned officers. Trench warfare forced this on the armies, but prior to that it was a universal belief that the smallest tactical unit you could have on the battlefield simply had to be commanded by an officer. This severely restricted the tactical flexibility in the face of modern weapons.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
In 1914 the smallest tactical unit was the Company - platoons and Sections/squads were organisational only
By the time you get to 1916 the Platoon is the tactical unit and arguably the Section/Squad led by a JNCO by wars end.
When you consider the change in such a short period of time - today we have in all the years since dropped to a 4 man fire team (2 fighting pairs) as the smallest tactical unit that would operate alone and that included WW2.
So without a major war as you point out, forcing such change we might still see the Company still remaining as the smallest maneuver element.
Driftless
Donor
The OP has the Belle Epoque last longer. In that time, there were numerous colonial wars of varying scale (NW Frontier scraps, Span-Am, Boer, etc) and a non-continental larger war (Russo-Japan); or are they out as well?
If they're still happening somewhat as they did historically, then military brass may draw some inferences from the data at hand. Or, do they ignore that information as irrelevant - doesn't apply here?
If they're still happening somewhat as they did historically, then military brass may draw some inferences from the data at hand. Or, do they ignore that information as irrelevant - doesn't apply here?
Deleted member 1487
That certainly was an issue, but I think part of it too was the limited firepower available for an infantry squad, as this was before the advent of the LMG. So to achieve a significant effect they'd need a volley fired by an entire platoon (or at least that was the tactical view of the period...which did seem to work during the Battle of the Frontiers). Some units did break down to fire and maneuver with squads, as noted in Rommel's 'Infantry Attacks', but that seems rather haphazard and dependent on the commander. Had LMGs been in service and light enough to keep up with the squad then I think that change might have started pre-WW1, but alas they only started appearing after 1914.
Part of the idea of the 'empty battlefield' come from the increase in infantry firepower that came with the LMG reaching the squad level, well that and the problem of trying to avoid fire by concentrated HMGs in trench assaults. That is what forced the tactical unit down to even the fire team level by the end of WW1.
Using an estimate of roughly 4-5 years of advancement in peacetime made in every year of World War I, I suspect we have roughly 1918-1919 technology in place for some fields. Semiautomatic rifles a la Fusil Automatique Modele 1917 or even 1918 are likely at least in the testing stages, aircraft would advance though how far is uncertain. Duralumin was already around in 1909 while airships might take greater roles in cargo and passenger liner capacities. Germany and the UK likely follow through with their clandestine agreement to split Portuguese colonies up which might incentivize investment in passenger airships, especially as the colonial powers will not have their authority challenged by the World War as it was on OTL. Radio still develops though its use in battle as well as the use of armored carriages/tanks/Landkruzers/etc. will be significantly delayed. US infrastructure will probably be dominated by rail for longer though the rapid introduction of cars will push for them to develop some sort of federal highway system and a nascent program for limited access highways will probably continue as it had in OTL (mostly in the Northeast and Great Lakes areas initially). Tactics will not have adapted much since the Crimean War and infantry will still be a large area of focus, organization being as noted above with emphasis on larger formations with snipers and special operations groups still being looked down upon and very much in organizational/doctrinal infancy. Submarines will still develop, perhaps leading to the U-Cruisers proposed by Germany even into Projekt 47, Projekt 47a, or Projekt 50, and with Germany not suffering the 15-year pause in development we might see the equivalent of Type IX submarines prowling these ATL oceans in 1939. Medicine will have different development with likely crude antibiotics like Prontosil still being investigated, plastic surgery will be well behind its equivalent in OTL as well. Aircraft will be feared greatly and urban development may incorporate more underground systems/housing/connections as a result. Russia likely sees more internal discontent but not necessarily enough to break it apart, there is a small chance Alexei survives long enough to become Tsar and have children of his own that could inherit the throne. Telephones will promulgate as will mass media per OTL, without the Nazis coming to power Germany may become a true competitor to Hollywood and its language might still be seen as the premier scientific language of Europe. Chemical warfare will not be as developed but its prerequisites will be in place as well while nuclear technology might be a decade behind OTL under the wrong circumstances.
Driftless
Donor
I believe that's essentially correct.
In 1912, the US Army ran a small scale (4-5) truck trek from Washington DC to Atlanta and then up to Indianapolis. It was an arduous trouble be-deviled experience that took several weeks to complete, and some more conservative elements of Army brass used as evidence that motor vehicles weren't useful. However, in 1915, another trek was made by a small group of armored cars from Chicago to San Francisco. That too took some time as well, but the trip was a success.
After the war, in 1919, the Army ran a large-scale trans-continental "Motor Transport Corps Convoy" truck trek from Washington DC to Oakland, California. One of the US Army observers was Lt Col Dwight Eisenhower - the eventual godfather of the US Interstate Highway System.
The Army had seen how critical truck transport was to the European war effort. Without that experience, my bet is that cities and suburbs get paved quickly in the 20's and 30's and the rural areas are mostly stuck with dirt tracks for much longer, with just a very few paved arteries - i.e. Lincoln Highway
The Russo-Japanese war and Balkan Wars provided information to the great powers. The Germans increased size of units and their artillery shell supply in 1913 for a reason. If there is no Great War before 1939 would there be other major wars? Might there be a war with one of the great powers in isolation? One of the big impacts of the Russo - Japanese war was it crippled Russia for a decade; there is a reason the Germans felt comfortable with a all in vs France war plan. Russia was militarily crippled for years.
So yes I am part of the group of hard to predict.
So yes I am part of the group of hard to predict.
BooNZ
Banned
The pre-war strategic thinkers were not ignorant to the challenges of the offensive, but were struggling to find solutions to overcome entrenched defenders and avoid the true enemy of any military - a long drawn-out war. If over-whelming defenders with numbers is the only option available, then you need to convince all concerned it is a viable option. The reality was in 1914 the offensive minded military leaders were not content with the offensive tools they had available.
With the benefit of hindsight, disbursed attackers seem common sense to minimise casualties, but this also dilutes the firepower available to the attackers. In 1914 fast firing artillery and light machine guns were still relatively new and the development of doctrine for those tools cannot be attributed entirely to the great war. The key barrier to developing effective doctrine may be the accountants when they learn the weight of shell required to dislodge a well entrenched defender.
With the benefit of hindsight, the delegation of decision making to those on the spot make sense, but if your tool box consists of only a rifle and a bayonet, do you really want part time soldiers thinking about things too much? My understanding was the Germans had started the delegation of decision making well before the war and there would be greater rationale for such as the attackers slowly accumulate tools and associated tactics.
The modern tank was conceived in 1912, but at the time the limited A-H military budget was choosing between expanding its ranks and modernising its artillery. Are we saying this concept will not be revisited and turn existing military realities upside down?
An interesting consideration is that without trench lines forcing a very early very strong desire to have heavy armoured vehicles be able to cross broken terrain, you're fairly likely to see heavy armoured cars before you see anything resembling a modern tank. Depending on how fast wheeled vehicles improve in off-road performance, you might only see tracked armoured vehicles in specialist roles. For an example of early World War One heavy armoured car thinking prior to trench warfare, look up the Russian Garford-Putilov Armoured Car.
The first pre-war 'fighter' aircraft I'm aware of was the Vickers E.F.B.1 'Destroyer' a pusher, designed that way to get a clear field of fire for the forward gunner. It's possible but by no means assured that without WW1 experience pushers may be much more popular than OTL 1939.
Finally, trench warfare really pushed artillery towards more long range indirect fire and less close range direct fire missions. Without WW1 it's fairly likely that even by 1939 most artillery spends most of it's time training for direct fire missions against personnel in the open, with indirect fire being a specialist task for howitzers and siege units. That likely has knock-on effects on counter-battery techniques: without WW1 it's possible that armies go from flash-spotting to counter-battery radar without much sound-ranging in between. (A lot depends on how radar develops, which is hard to predict in this TL).
The first pre-war 'fighter' aircraft I'm aware of was the Vickers E.F.B.1 'Destroyer' a pusher, designed that way to get a clear field of fire for the forward gunner. It's possible but by no means assured that without WW1 experience pushers may be much more popular than OTL 1939.
Finally, trench warfare really pushed artillery towards more long range indirect fire and less close range direct fire missions. Without WW1 it's fairly likely that even by 1939 most artillery spends most of it's time training for direct fire missions against personnel in the open, with indirect fire being a specialist task for howitzers and siege units. That likely has knock-on effects on counter-battery techniques: without WW1 it's possible that armies go from flash-spotting to counter-battery radar without much sound-ranging in between. (A lot depends on how radar develops, which is hard to predict in this TL).
The french were already in the process of adopting a semi automatic rifle before ww1 but canceled it when ww1 started.
Hell the russians were producing a proto assult rifle in 1913.
Demographics and the reality of firepower will force a defensive strategy on the French so you'll see the development of defensive works along the border with Germany. They will give up on Alsace-Lorraine, it was 40 years in 1914. Demographics will also force a similar situation of the Germans and they will have to fortify their eastern border with Russia. It's the Germans and Russians with the need to develop a heavy engineer vehicle like a tank to tackle heavy defensive fortifications.
Armoured fighting vehicles are not a giant leap, entrepreneurs put them forward in 1914 like these Canadian Armoured Autocars.
The Tank was actually developed by the Navy, the largest heavy engineering outfit in the Empire, probably the world. The RNAS put these together:
It was only taking 10-15 years to mature a technology. Powered flight 1903, Channel flown in 1909 and the Atlantic crossing was reachable by 1914.
The classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. Compare the German U43 class designed pre-WW1 and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's:
Type U43 - 725 tons surfaced 940t submerged
Type VII - 769 tons surfaced 871t submerged
Type U43 - 65m long, 6.2m beam
Type VII - 67m long, 6.2m beam,
Type U43 - 2,400 hp 17.1 knots, 1200 hp - 9.1 knots submerged
Type VII - 2,800 hp 17.7 knots, 750 hp - 7.6 knots submerged
Type U43 - Range 9,400miles at 8knots, 55miles at 5knts submerged
Type VII - Range 8,500 miles at 10knots, 80 miles submerged at 4 knots
Type U43 - 4TT 2bow/2stern, 88mm deck gun
Type VII - 5TT 4bow/1stern, 88mm deck gun
Type U43 - Crew 36
Type VII - Crew 44
Type U43 - 164ft depth
Type VII - 750ft depth
As you can see, 20 years of development went into structural improvements following war experience to increase diving depth from 164ft to 750ft. Why? Because concealment as a defense wasn't enough, great depth was required too. The second war showed that great speed at depth was also required and thus the Elektro Boot was required. However, the high speed submarine had been developed in WW1 by the RN - the R class submarine from completely different requirements ie. to ambush submarines.
Type U43:
Armoured fighting vehicles are not a giant leap, entrepreneurs put them forward in 1914 like these Canadian Armoured Autocars.
The Tank was actually developed by the Navy, the largest heavy engineering outfit in the Empire, probably the world. The RNAS put these together:
It was only taking 10-15 years to mature a technology. Powered flight 1903, Channel flown in 1909 and the Atlantic crossing was reachable by 1914.
The classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. Compare the German U43 class designed pre-WW1 and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's:
Type U43 - 725 tons surfaced 940t submerged
Type VII - 769 tons surfaced 871t submerged
Type U43 - 65m long, 6.2m beam
Type VII - 67m long, 6.2m beam,
Type U43 - 2,400 hp 17.1 knots, 1200 hp - 9.1 knots submerged
Type VII - 2,800 hp 17.7 knots, 750 hp - 7.6 knots submerged
Type U43 - Range 9,400miles at 8knots, 55miles at 5knts submerged
Type VII - Range 8,500 miles at 10knots, 80 miles submerged at 4 knots
Type U43 - 4TT 2bow/2stern, 88mm deck gun
Type VII - 5TT 4bow/1stern, 88mm deck gun
Type U43 - Crew 36
Type VII - Crew 44
Type U43 - 164ft depth
Type VII - 750ft depth
As you can see, 20 years of development went into structural improvements following war experience to increase diving depth from 164ft to 750ft. Why? Because concealment as a defense wasn't enough, great depth was required too. The second war showed that great speed at depth was also required and thus the Elektro Boot was required. However, the high speed submarine had been developed in WW1 by the RN - the R class submarine from completely different requirements ie. to ambush submarines.
Type U43: